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DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NOTION OF WISDOM IN
YOGĀCARĀ THOUGHT.

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A STUDY OF THE BUDDHABHŪMYUPADEŚA:
THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT
OF THE NOTION OF WISDOM IN YOGĀCĀRA THOUGHT


A thesis submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Wisconsin-Madison in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy


by

John Peter Keenan


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1980

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INTRODUCTION

Methodological Structure

No one embarks upon the pursuit of wisdom without some prior notion as to the nature of that which is sought. Even at the initial stages of the path, when wisdom and enlightenment are yet far distant, there is present an inkling, a glimpse, a clue that directs subsequent action toward the goal. The samsaric experience of the suffering and meaninglessness of fragmented living elicits the desire for wisdom as the reversal of that suffering and meaninglessness. But such an anticipatory glimpse is not direct vision, and cannot be formulated in concepts and words. It is pre-conceptual and pre-verbal, and is in fact the structure of consciousness as anticipating its full awakening in wisdom. If such an anticipatory awareness were lacking, even the possibility of attaining wisdom would never arise.

In the course of Buddhist doctrinal development, this pre-conceptual awareness of wisdom progressively becomes more comprehensively formulated. The initial purpose of this study is to explain the notion of wisdom as presented in the Buddhabhūmisūtra and in its commentary, the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa. But as this represents a fairly late Indian development, the prior

formulations of Buddhist thinking will first be considered. But thinking does not occur in a one dimensional unilinear progression. Emphases differ, the point of departure shifts, the context within which meaning is understood changes. The first part of this study then will attempt to sketch the development of Buddhist thinking in terms of these shifting contexts of meaning. The early Buddhism of the Nikāyas and the Āgamas² presents a context in which common sense understandings predominate. Questions as to the general nature of wisdom and the consciousness that underlies it are not thematized. Theoretical explanations either do not arise, or are dismissed as being unprofitable and detrimental to the practice that might enable one to realize wisdom.³ But, with the birth of Abhidharmic Buddhism, the nature of mind and wisdom become theoretically explicit, and are thematized. Buddhist thought becomes bifurcated into both common sense and theory. The ultimate concern for the realization of enlightenment remains constant, but no longer is abstract, theoretical understanding rejected as unprofitable. Abhidharmic Buddhism rather attempts to evolve a fully systematic and formulated understanding of the nature of wisdom and the nature of mind. However, this endeavour rested upon an understanding of consciousness that understood knowing to be a bridging process between the mind and externalized units of meaning

(dharmas). Thus the entire Abhidharmic enterprise met its reversal in the Prajñāpāramitā literature, and in their further formulation in the Madhyamikan dialectic of Nāgārjuna. In place of the abstract theory of Abhidharma, there were offered pointers to the naked experience of wisdom in its full immediacy. And so in Prajñāpāramitā and Madhyamika, wisdom is formulated in terms of emptiness (śūnyatā), inasmuch as all concepts and all views are understood to be not only inadequate, but also to be obstacles on the path to the realization of wisdom.⁴ Some, however, conceived this negative thrust of Nāgārjuna's thinking to be less than helpful. The Tathāgatagarbha texts were written to emphasize the positive value of practice over against the perceived dangers of too negative an approach. In place of the mystic context of the Prajñāpāramitā and Madhyamika writings, the Tathāgatagarbha texts reassert a common sense understanding of meaning, in which the objective is not theoretical systematization, but the implementation of practices to attain enlightenment. They simply affirm the presence in everyone of the pure mind of the tathāgatagarbha, the embryo of a Tathāgata, for the focus is not on the abstract possibility of attaining enlightenment, but on the fulfillment of the practices necessary for its existential realization. But, just

as the Nikāyas and Āgamas raised questions that could not be answered within its common sense context, so the Tathāgatagarbha texts uncovered questions that could only be answered within a more inclusive context of meaning. Thus Yogācāra arose as an attempt to resurrect theoretical thinking in terms of interiority. But its theoretical context is no longer based on the confrontational epistemology of the Abhidharma schools, but is rather grounded within a critical understanding of consciousness, for conscious understanding is the common factor in all schools of thought and in every meaning context. Yogācāra is then an attempt to formulate and objectify in words the nature of the mind and of wisdom, which lie implicit in the quest for wisdom in any of its forms.

This description of the development of Buddhist thinking involves four contexts of meaning, four distinct horizons in which insight into meaning occurs.⁵ The common sense context is concerned with the clear practical needs of any task. A theoretical context raises questions for understanding, whether or not these are seen to have any immediate practical relevance. Mystic consciousness functions in a context that regards all intellectualizations as useless and dangerous to the immediacy of its vision. And the context of critical understanding of interior consciousness attempts to ground all thinking, whether common sense, theoretical, or mystic, within a

well articulated understanding of understanding.

This does not imply that any one of these meaning contexts is ipso facto deeper or more conducive to religious insight, but simply that they are different. Theory is obviously more able to academically elucidate doctrinal questions, and thus Abhidharma was more able to treat complex questions than was the earlier Buddhist thinking of the Nikāyas and the Āgamas. The Yogācāra focus upon interiority enabled it to develop a theoretical understanding that was more comprehensive than the immediately preceding Tathāgatagarbha common sense context. Yet it remains quite probable that Śākyamuni lived his entire life without the need for theoretical understanding, which was somehow not quite to the point.

The entire first part of this study will then attempt to sketch the development of Buddhist thinking as it shifts its emphasis from one context of meaning to another in order to lay the groundwork for the second part, the interpretation of the meaning of the Buddhabhūmisūtra and the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa.

However, a study needs not only a general plan of attack, but also a methodology whereby that plan may be carried into action. The methodology employed herein will function in three interlocking operations. It will be textual-philological, interpretative-exegetical, and

critical-historical.

It will be textual-philological, for any attempt to interpret doctrine by intelligible exegesis, and to demonstrate historical developments, of which those interpretations are but elements, must have a solid basis in the texts themselves. However, the literature involved in any such an attempt at an overview of Indian Buddhist thought is simply enormous. The study of the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas could easily lead one into old age. An introduction to the Abhidharma corpus is estimated by a Japanese proverb to necessitate some eight years of study. Nāgārjuna's works and those of his commentators have engaged the efforts of scholars and monks for centuries, and yet all points are not clarified. Tathāgatagarbha thinking is spread among many texts and in different countries. Yogācāra presents a bewildering array of śāstras, from distinct lineages and contexts. Thus the initial question is how to develop an understanding of the movement of Buddhist thought prior to the Buddhabhūmisūtra and the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, when there is no hope of consulting more than a relatively small number of the available sources.

The answer herein proposed is to be highly selective, but not randomly so. The norm for such selectivity will be the basic insight that the development of the notion

of wisdom (buddhabhūmi) arises in synergy with the understanding of consciousness. And so each chapter will focus upon textual material that treats wisdom or consciousness, and ignore other topics, except as these relate to wisdom or consciousness. This norm is further qualified by the basic hypothesis, which runs through the entire study, viz., that the development of Buddhist thinking from the early thought of the Nikāyas and Āgamas to the Abhidharma complex, to its reversal in the Prajñāpāramitā literature, and on to its reworking in Tathāgata-garbha and Yogācāra thought represents an increasingly more comprehensive understanding of the contexts of meaning from common sense to theory, to direct mystic immediacy, and then back to common sense, from which issues the understanding of understanding that might ground all doctrinal thinking within conscious interiority. This basic norm of the synergy of wisdom and consciousness, and this basic hypothesis of the developing awareness of the contexts of meaning will guide the selection of textual material.

The second methodological operation is interpretation, and since it is interpretation of texts, it is exegetical. The first operation consists in gathering the relevant texts, and its performance is readily seen in

the presence of those texts throughout the course of the study. But a text itself neither says nor means anything. The arising of textual understanding necessitates the performance of interpretation. Just as experience without understanding is meaningless, so a presentation of uninterpreted texts is meaningless. Moreover, just as the selection of texts is guided by the basic norm and hypothesis outlined above, so the interpretation will be found to follow that norm and that hypothesis.

Again a problem occurs, for if interpretative exegesis is carried forward in accord with a presupposed hypothesis, then is there not the inescapable danger of reading into the texts preconceived ideas, and thus distorting what they were originally intended to say?

The answer to this problem is that indeed there is a danger of reading into textual sources, but that it is not inescapable. In the first place, the critical theory that would demand the absence of all prior knowledge as a prerequisite for avoiding biased interpretations is to be rejected. A text itself is nothing more than a series of signs on a piece of paper, and without the constructive interpretation of an exegete, it has no meaning.⁶ Nevertheless, preconceived ideas and biases are indeed to be avoided. This will be done precisely in

the degree to which the guiding hypothesis is adequate to an understanding of the movement of Indian Buddhism as represented in the entirety of the textual material. Thus, because of the small portion of texts actually consulted, the first section can be no more than probable. But it is not thereby rendered invalid, for not only was it formed by a constant rechecking with textual material, but it is the opinion of the author that it is based on a representative number of texts, which do present the basic orientations of the trends of thought considered.

Just as the presentation of textual data alone is not sufficient, but calls forth the interpretative function that would understand the meaning of those texts, so interpretative understanding alone is not sufficient, but calls forth the third operation, the critical-historical function. One aims not at glimpses of isolated meaning, but rather at summation judgements that can decide upon a comprehensive overview of the movement of thought. Thus the interpretative understanding of texts issues in the need to determine, to pass judgement on what was going forward in the world of Buddhist doctrinal development, for only by so doing can one understand the questions the texts were intended to answer. It is for this reason that research is not limited to the Buddhabhūmisūtra and the

Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, for in order to understand their doctrine, it is necessary to understand the preceding Yogācāra thought of Dharmapāla and Dignāga, and its relationship to the classical formulation of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. This in turn presupposes a prior insight into the Tathāgatagarbha scriptures, and how they arose in contrast to Nāgārjuna's formulation of the Prajñāpāramitā literature, for that critique is pivotal to an understanding of all later Mahāyāna thinking. As Yamaguchi Susumu points out,⁷ Yogācāra resurrects Abhidharma theory in the context of emptiness. Attention must also then be devoted to the Abhidharma texts, against which the Prajñāpāramitā literature arose. And an attempt must be made to describe the development of Abhidharma from the earlier thought of the Nikāyas and Āgamas. Consequently, the textual material to be considered will span the entire history of Indian Buddhist thought.

Again this critical-historical operation will be selective, for it follows the above hypothesis. All historical writing must be selective, for not all data serve as evidence. And again it will be constructive, for it will attempt to relate the interpretations in preceding chapters to those in later chapters, so as to be able to sum up and pass judgment on the historical movement of Buddhist thought. It will generate historical

judgments, but will attempt to question those judgments. Not all insights into the meaning of a text are direct, as when one catches the point, but inverse insights also occur, as when one finally sees that he has not seen.⁸ Thus a critical attitude to judgments on the historical movement of Buddhist thought will not only generate judgments, but will constantly put them to the test of re-evaluation by comparing them with the textual sources themselves.

The methodology herein employed will attempt to operate on these three interlocking levels. Whether such an attempt is successful or not will depend upon the cogency of the argumentation to follow. For if questions arise that go beyond the framework here developed, then that hypothetical framework must need undergo revision. The validity of any hypothetical framework is seen only in its ability to answer all relevant questions. And, given the abundance of the source data in Buddhist studies, it would appear inevitable that new questions will arise, and necessitate the development of ever more comprehensive hypotheses.

Thus the first part will begin with a rather extended discussion of Indian Buddhist thought. The first chapter will describe the teachings of the early Nikāyas and Āgamas, and conclude that they represent a common sense

understanding of wisdom and consciousness. The second chapter will consider Abhidharma scholasticism, and conclude that it is a development of theoretical understanding, which takes conscious understanding to be extroverted knowing. The third and fourth chapters will examine the Prajñāpāramitā literature and Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika dialectic, and conclude that they represent a context of conscious understanding that is beyond all theory and words, and given only in the immediacy of wisdom itself. The fifth chapter will consider the Tathāgatagarbha texts, and conclude that they represent a re-affirmation of common sense, in contrast to the somewhat difficult negative dialectic of emptiness. The sixth chapter will focus on the rise of Yogācāra, and see it as the re-affirmation of theoretical understanding, which, while continuing the positive orientation of Tathāgatagarbha, understands consciousness in terms of emptiness, and is thus a reworking of Abhidharma tradition in light of Madhyamika, for it shifts the context to conscious interiority, where the question is no longer the nature of the objects to be investigated (dharmas), but the nature of the investigating mind. The seventh chapter will narrow that focus to the initial Yogācāra texts, in order to highlight the principal Yogācāra themes of viññāna-pariṇāma and trisvabhāva. The eighth

chapter will treat the pre-Asaṅga Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, which amalgamates the Vijñaptimātra thesis with Tathāgata-garbha thinking. The ninth chapter will examine the classical formulation of Yogācāra by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. The tenth chapter will consider the alternate formulation of Yogācāra texts, that, because they maintain the doctrine of the pure mind of Tathāgatagarbha, do not fall within the circle of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. The eleventh chapter will consider the place of Dignāga within the Yogācāra tradition, for his thought is crucial for understanding Dharmapāla. The twelfth chapter will turn then to an examination of the principal contributions of Dharmapāla to the Yogācāra tradition. Having then somewhat clarified Dharmapāla's lineage, the two chapters of the second part of this study will attempt to elucidate the teachings of the Buddhabhūmisūtra, which is doctrinally akin to the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, and the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa.

Notes

¹This interpretation of the anticipatory awareness of wisdom owes much to Bernard Lonergan's explanation of the notion of being as the dynamic anticipation of what is to be known. See Insight, pp. 348-374 and 641-651; De constitutione Christi ontologica et psychologica, pp. 10-14; "Metaphysics as Horizon," in Gregorianum 44 (1963), pp. 307-318. Also confer Jean Langlois, "The Notion of Being according to Lonergan," Continuum, 2, 3 (1964), pp. 425-433.

²The Nikāyas are the earliest Buddhist scriptures preserved in Pali. The Āgamas are their parallel Chinese counterpart.

³Thus I disagree with K. N. Jayatilleka, who in his Buddhist Theory of Knowledge approvingly quotes T. W. Rhys Davids and S. Radhakrishnam as comparing early Buddhism with the positivism of A. Comte. This positivism of Comte is a theoretical construct, which endeavoured to subsume all relevant knowledge within an empirically verifiable sociologism, and to construct "a religion resting on demonstration" (Comte, The Catechism of Positivism, tr., R. Congreve, p. 6). No such theoretical program characterizes early Buddhist thought. It rather presents a common sense orientation that is directed to the particular rather than to the universal, and which is concerned with the enlightenment of the individual rather than with the the universal nature of enlightenment. If one can term early Buddhism positivist on this account, then one might also claim that the majority of men and women are cryptic positivists, because they also function for the most part on a common sense level of meaning.

⁴This is evidently the reason for the Buddha's hesitation to enunciate the dharma teaching when importuned to do so by the Brahman Sahamati: adhigato myāyaṃ dhammo gambhīro duddaso duranubodho santo paṇīto atakkavacaro nipuṇo paṇḍita vedaniyo. (SN, I, 136).

⁵This schema of meaning contexts comes from Bernard F. Lonergan, Method in Theology, New York, 1972, pp. 81-99.

⁶Carl Becker, R. G. Collingwood, and Bernard Lonergan discuss this constructive activity of interpretation. See Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 203-204, where he aptly describes the Principle of the Empty Head, i.e., the less one knows, the better is he able to interpret.

⁷Yamaguchi Susumu, Bukkyō ni okeru yū to mu to no tairon, Tokyo, 1941, p.

⁸B. Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, London, 1957, p. 19-35 and *passim*.

PART ONE - CHAPTER ONE

The Common Sense Understanding of the Nikāyas and the Āgamas

The earliest Buddhist literature extant is found in the collection of the Pali Nikāyas and their parallel version of the Chinese Āgamas. It has frequently been held that the early stages of Buddhist doctrinal thought, as seen in these texts, present a pragmatic or positivist understanding of understanding. In 1881 T. W. Rhys Davids compared this early Buddhist thought with the positivist philosophy of A. Comte.¹ C. A. F. Rhys Davids described the pragmatism of the Buddha as utilitarianism.² Louis de La Vallée Poussin discoursed on the rationalism of the Buddha.³ Kurt Schmidt explained the Buddha's rationalistic cognition.⁴ S. Radhahrishnan says that "early Buddhism was positivist in its outlook, and confined its outlook to what we perceive."⁵ In large part Aldous Huxley agreed with this appraisal, when he wrote:

Among the early Buddhists, the metaphysical theory (i.e., of Bhrahman of the Upanishads) was neither affirmed nor denied, but simply ignored as being meaningless and unnecessary. Their concern was with immediate experience, which, because of its consequences for life, came to be known as "liberation" or "enlightenment." The Buddha . . . would not make assertions about the nature of ultimate reality. ⁶

This theme of the positivism of early Buddhism forms the underlying basis of K. N. Jayatilleke's Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, in which he interprets the early Pali Nikāyas to imply a positivist epistemology.

Such an interpretation does find textual support.

The Samyutta-nikāya reads:

Monks, reason not ill, unprofitable reasonings, such as: Eternal is the world, or Not eternal is the world: Finite is the world, or Infinite is the world: Life is the same as body, or Life and body are different: the Tathāgata exists after death, or the Tathāgata exists not after death, or the Tathāgata neither exists nor not-exists after death. Why do I say this? Because, monks, these reasonings are not concerned with profit, they are not the rudiments of the holy life, they conduce not to revulsion, to tranquility, to full understanding, to the perfect wisdom, they conduce not to Nibbāna.⁷

However, a problem arises. These scriptures often relate miraculous events. The account of the Buddha's birth is interlaced with miracles and is difficult to understand from a positivist perspective. The Jātaka accounts are scarcely empirically verifiable. Furthermore, as Huxley noted, the Buddha seems to have accepted the doctrine of transmigration, another unverifiable item.⁸

Such a problematic seems to have formed the context in which Watanabe Baiyū wrote his Thoughts, Literature, and Monasteries in Earlier Buddhism. In this work he argues that, while the "first and fundamental principle

in the teachings of Buddha was pragmatism," yet in the Nikāyas and Āgamas

Buddhism lost its original purity and logical soundness, and became a popular religion appealing to the masses. In other words, it lost its special characteristics which made it at least one of the most thorough and splendid systems in the world, if not the greatest. Besides, it lost its clearness of thought, and became a vague system leaving its adherents almost groping in the dark. The strict pragmatism of Buddha gave way everywhere to what may be termed "explanationism." As a result, Buddhism became full of philosophical complexities, and lost its religious fervour, seriousness and definiteness. 9

Watanabe's argument that the Nikāyas and Āgamas do not represent the earliest teachings of the Buddha himself is generally accepted today.¹⁰ But there is little evidence to support his interpretation of the pragmatic nature of those earliest teachings, for besides the Nikāyas and Āgamas, there are no doctrinal records.

E. J. Thomas attempts to solve this dilemma by the use of a distinction between philosophy and religion:

Philosophy aims to be "the complete interpretation of experience." Religion is not interested in completeness. It is interested in a few facts of experience to which it attributes an absolute truth and value. Its interpretations of these are called dogmas. Whether they can be interpreted in harmony with the rest of experience is secondary. At first it is not even recognized that there may be contradictions. If the disciple is ever brought to see an apparent contradiction, he may say that what he holds is fundamental, whatever else is true. In that case he remains purely at the standpoint of religion. Or he may proceed to show that the contradictions are not real. He then assumes the

standpoint of philosophy . . . Buddhism, in accordance with this distinction, began by being a religion. 11

Thus one can see a progression from Buddhism as a religion, which was not concerned with completeness of explanation, to a later more philosophical Buddhism, which did indeed try to offer coherent explanations of all experience, as in the Abhidharma texts.

However, the above distinction does not appear to be adequate, for historically religious consciousness has functioned at many levels. At one time, it can be blithely unconcerned and even opposed to the coherent formulation of doctrine. At another time, it becomes actively focused upon such doctrinal explanations and apologetic. The theoretical acumen of a Vasubandhu does not preclude him from being religious or mean that he has adopted a diverse standpoint, simply because he engages in philosophical thinking. Such a distinction between philosophy and religion is too broad to be usable in any attempt to historically study the development of Buddhist thought.

It would seem perhaps better to characterize the progression of early Buddhist thinking as a movement from a common sense context of meaning to a theoretical context. The distinction between these is explained by Bernard Lonergan as follows:

Different exigencies give rise to different modes of conscious . . . operations, and different modes of such operations give rise to different realms of meaning.

There is a systematic exigency that separates the realm of common sense from the realm of theory. Both of these realms, by and large, regard the same real objects. But the objects are viewed from such different standpoints that they can be related only by shifting from one standpoint to another. The realm of common sense is the realm of persons and things in their relations to us. It is the visible universe peopled by relatives, friends, acquaintances, fellow citizens, and the rest of humanity. We come to know it, not by applying some scientific method, but by a self-correcting process of learning, in which insights gradually accumulate, coalesce, qualify, and correct one another, until a point is reached where we are able to meet situations as they arise, size them up by adding a few more insights to the acquired store, and so deal with them in an appropriate fashion. Of the objects in this realm we speak in everyday language, in words that have the function, not of naming the intrinsic properties of things, but of completing the focusing of our conscious intentionality on the things, of crystallizing our attitudes, expectations, intentions, of guiding all our actions.

The intrusion of the systematic exigence into the realm of common sense is beautifully illustrated by Plato's early dialogues. Socrates would ask for the definition of this or that virtue. No one could afford to admit that he had no idea of what was meant by courage, or temperance, or justice. No one could deny that such common names must possess some common meaning found in each instance of courage, or temperance, or justice. And no one, not even Socrates, was able to pin down just what that common meaning was. If from Plato's dialogues one shifts to Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, one can find definitions worked out both for virtue and vice in general and for a series of virtues flanked by two opposite vices, one sinning by excess, and the other by defect. But these answers to Socrates' questions have now ceased to be the single objective. The systematic exigency not merely raises questions that common sense cannot answer but also demands a context for its answers, a context that common sense cannot supply or comprehend.

This context is theory, and the objects to which it refers are in the realm of theory. To these objects one can ascend starting from common sense starting points, but they are properly known, not by this ascent, but by their internal relations, their congruences and differences, the functions they fulfill in their interactions . . .

If a biologist takes his young son to the zoo and both pause to look at a giraffe, the boy will wonder whether it bites or kicks, but the father will see another manner in which skeletal, locomotive, digestive, vascular, and nervous systems combine and interlock.

There are then a realm of common sense and a realm of theory. We use different languages to speak of them. The difference in languages involves social differences: specialists can speak to their wives about many things but not about their specialities.¹²

In this common sense context, meaningful answers are referred to the particular people asking about them, and no universal, coherent system is envisaged. Part of the underlying hypothesis of this present study is that the early Buddhism of the Nikāyas and Āgamas represents in the main such a common sense context of understanding in regard to the nature of consciousness and wisdom. This does not mean that Buddhism began as a common sense insight into life, for the Buddha's enlightenment is constantly reported as a truly transcendental realization of wisdom. But it does mean that the understanding of the meaning of that realization in the earliest extant texts, some five hundred years after the time of the historical Buddha, functions in a common sense context.

Katsumata Shunkyo points out that in these

early texts, the nature of consciousness is not theoretically explained, but rather it is assumed that the mind is both impure, because it is involved in karmic impurities, and pure, because is it capable of realizing wisdom.¹³

Some passages do seem to presuppose that the mind is basically pure, and that impurity is some kind of devolution from that basic, original purity. The Anguttara-nikāya states:

Oh monks, the mind is itself pure. But, because of adventitious passions, it becomes defiled. The common people, who have not heard [this dharma teaching], really do not know this. Thus they do not cultivate their minds. But, oh monks, the mind is itself pure, and can be liberated from these adventitious passions. The saintly disciples, who have heard [this dharma teaching] know this, and thus they do cultivate their minds. 14

The parallel Chinese Āgama, 增一阿含經, has some material not found in the Pali Nikāya:

When the fetters of sentient beings are finally broken, their thoughts are not in disarray. And because they are not constrained by defilement, they enter that ancient [Buddha] land. Since the nature of the mind is extremely pure, when they sever the evil, perverse māra thoughts, their merits become as the great sea, and they enter upon that land. 15

The Anguttara-nikāya further explains that just as a metal worker smelts sandy gold, removing first the gross impurities, and then the minute impurities so as to attain the pure gold, so one should nurture the mind.¹⁶ Such an image implies that the mind is itself pure, like

gold, but defiled by extraneous elements, just as gold is mixed with sand.

Continuing this theme, the Samyutta-nikāya further reports that the five impurities of gold are iron, brass, tin, lead, and silver, but, when the gold is purified of these, it becomes pliable and workable. Just so when the mind is purified from desire, anger, drowsiness, indolence, and doubt, it becomes pure.¹⁷

The Majjhima-nikāya gives a listing of ten defilements. Again, when separated from these, the mind becomes pure.¹⁸

These texts seem to imply that the basic nature of the mind is pure, and that all impurities are extraneous or adventitious, but nowhere is the question of the basic nature of the mind specifically thematized.

On the other hand, there are several passages which characterize the mind as both pure and defiled. The Samyutta-nikāya has:

Oh monks, because the mind is defiled, sentient beings are defiled, and because the mind is pure, sentient beings are pure.¹⁹

The Dharmapada reiterates this idea:

All dharmas are ruled by the mind, take the mind as lord, and come to be from the mind. If a man speak or act by means of a defiled mind, then, like a cart wheel following upon the tracks of the animal that pulls it, suffering will follow him. All dharmas are ruled by the mind, take mind as lord, and come to be from the mind. If a man speak or act by means of a pure mind, then, like

a shadow following a person constantly, joy will follow him. ²⁰

These passages describe the mind from the perspective of practice, from a perspective of common sense experience. It is obvious that the mind is involved in impurities, but it is not only impure, because the Buddha has realized enlightenment and purity. But there is no theoretical consideration of the nature of the mind itself. ²¹

Futhermore, in the Nikāyas and Āgamas one finds a lack of that technical language which is necessary for any theoretical thought. The basic terms citta 心, mano 意, and viññāna 識, which in later times take on specific technical meanings, here all indicate simply mental activity in general. ²² The Samyutta-nikāya has:

Oh monks, just as monkeys in the forest jump from one branch to another, so likewise, oh monks, does that which we call mind (citta), thought (mano), or consciousness (viññāna) day and night variously arise and variously pass away. ²³

Many similar passages could be cited to show that these terms do not function as technical terms to describe the nature of mind, but only indicate general mental activity. ²⁴

Thus in the early Buddhism of the Nikāyas and Āgamas consciousness is described in terms of common sense, and no systematic level of understanding is developed. One understands by experiencing, and no theoretical methodology is to be trusted. The Anguttara-nikāya reads:

Be not misled by report or tradition or hearsay.
 Be not misled by proficiency in collections, nor
 by mere logic or inference, nor after considering
 reasons, nor after reflection on and approval
 of some theory, nor because it fits becoming, nor
 out of respect for a recluse [who holds it]. But,
 Kālāmas, when you know for yourself: these things
 are unprofitable, these things are blameworthy,
 these things are censured by the intelligent, these
 things, when performed and undertaken, conduce to
 loss and sorrow, - then indeed do you regret them
 . . . But if, at any time, you know of yourself:
 these things are profitable, they are blameless,
 they are praised by the intelligent, these things,
 when performed and undertaken, conduce to profit
 and happiness, - then Kālāmas, do you, having
 undertaken them, abide within. 25

One can then truly know only by the test of experience.
 Upon his deathbed, the Buddha recommended to his followers
 that they be lamps unto themselves, i.e., that they
 must validate in practice, in the experience of practice,
 whatever truths they assent to.

The Majjhima-nikāya explains the above passage:

These five things, Bhāradvāya, have a twofold
 maturing here-now. What five? Faith, inclina-
 tion, report, consideration of reasons, reflection
 on and approval of an opinion. These, Bhāradvāya,
 are the five things having a twofold maturing
 here-now. 26

These five are the processes whereby people come
 to assent to a truth, and the way in which they will
 arrive at future assent. Thus they have a twofold
 maturing.²⁷ But such processes are not sure means of
 certitude:

Moreover, Bhāradvāya, even although something
 may be thoroughly believed in, it may be empty,

void, false; on the other hand something may not be thoroughly believed in, and yet may be fact, truth, not otherwise. Moreover, Bhāradvāya, even although something may be thoroughly inclined towards . . ., well reported . . ., well considered . . ., well reflected upon . . ., it may be empty, void, false; on the other hand, even although something is not well reflected upon . . ., it may be fact, truth, not otherwise. 28

How then is it possible for the mind to attain certitude, if all these common processes cannot be relied upon? The text continues:

. . . suppose a monk is living, depending upon a village or market town. A householder or a householder's son, having approached him, examines him concerning three states: states of greed, states of aversion, and states of confusion . . . After examining him, and beholding that he is purified of states of confusion, then he reposes faith in him; with faith born, he draws close; drawing close, he sits down nearby; sitting down nearby, he lends ear; lending ear, he hears damma; having heard damma, he remembers it. He tests the meaning of the things he remembers; while testing the meaning, the things are approved of; if there is an approval of the things, desire is born; with desire born he makes an effort; having made an effort, he weighs it up; having weighed it up, he strives; being self-resolute, he realizes with his person the highest truth itself; and penetrating it by means of intuitive wisdom, he sees. 29

The criterion for truth is then the personal embodiment of that truth in practical experience, in an experience of wisdom. But the nature of that mind which knows, and of that wisdom by which it knows, is not explained in theoretical terms. Just as the nature of consciousness is treated in the context of common sense, so wisdom is described as the knowledge implicit in

correct action. The Dharmapada has:

Well-makers lead the water [wherever they like];
fletchers bend the arrow; carpenters bend a
log of wood; wise people fashion themselves. 30

Wisdom is then a practical skill, just as the arts of the well-maker, the fletcher, and the carpenter. Wisdom is indeed a state of consciousness, but in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas it is understood in the practical context of an art. The Samyutta-nikāya devotes an entire chapter to the "Limbs of Wisdom." It enumerates these limbs as mindfulness, investigation of the norm, energy, zest, tranquility, concentration, and equanimity. To these seven it counterposes the five hindrances of sensual lust, malevolence, sloth and torpor, excitements and flurry, and doubt and wavering. The text says that these seven limbs are so called because they conduce to wisdom, but nowhere in this entire chapter of the Samyutta-nikāya is the nature of wisdom specifically treated. The text reads:

As he cultivates these seven limbs of wisdom, he frees his heart from the contamination (āsaava) of sensuality, from the contamination of becoming, from the contamination of ignorance. The knowledge comes to him: Freed am I by being freed. So that he fully knows: Cut off is rebirth, lived is the holy life, done is the task, there is no more of being here for me. 31

Wisdom is thus seen as the practical implementation of these seven items, which, when cultivated, lead to deliverance from contamination. The Samyutta-nikāya

further states:

Kassapa, these seven limbs of wisdom, fully expounded by myself, when cultivated and made much of, conduce to full comprehension, to the wisdom, to Nibbāna. 32

Here the seven limbs of wisdom lead to a wisdom, which is equated with nirvāṇa. Again it reads:

The seven limbs of wisdom . . . conduce to realizing the fruits of liberation by knowledge. 33

Such a polymorphous usage of the term wisdom demonstrates the absence of theoretical thinking, with its exigency for a clearly defined and internally coherent technical language. This does not mean that common sense insight into wisdom or consciousness are shallow or slight, but merely that they are expressed in terms of common sense understanding, and not developed in terms of any systematic, theoretical formulation.

Such a common sense context does indeed have resemblances to pragmatism and positivism, but, as it remains non-theoretical, it cannot be equated with those theoretical frameworks. Furthermore, the Nikāyas and Āgamas include many non-verifiable accounts, such as the many miraculous events concerning the life of the Buddha. Thus the point of the scholars mentioned above is correct, inasmuch as the common sense context is concerned with the questioner rather than his question, with the concrete, cogent reply rather than with the

universally coherent answer. But inasmuch as those scholars erect common sense understanding into a theoretical position, they are anachronistic, for the development of theoretical Buddhist thinking begins with the rise of the Abhidharma schools.

Notes

31. ¹Origin and Growth of Religion, London, 1906, p.
- ²Buddhism, London, 1934, pp. 199-200.
218. ³The Way to Nirvāṇa, Cambridge, 1917, pp. 201-
- ⁴Leben und Lehre des Buddha, Leipzig, 1917, pp. 219-232.
- ⁵Indian Philosophy, New York, 1923-1927, II, 472.
- ⁶Grey Eminence, London, 1941, pp. 47-48.
- ⁷Samyutta-nikāya, V, 418. F. L. Woodward, tr.,
The Book of the Kindred Sayings, London, 19 , V, 354.
- ⁸Grey Eminence, p. 40.
- ⁹Thoughts, Literature, and Monasteries in Earlier Buddhism, Tokyo, 1948, p. 9.
- ¹⁰It is now commonly accepted that the Nikāyas and Āgamas do not represent the content of original Buddhism, but are rather interpretative accounts of the later traditions. See Étienne Lamotte, Historie du bouddhisme indien - des origines à l'ère Śāka, Louvain, 1976, pp. 167-179. In Watanabe Baiyū's day, there yet were those who claimed that these texts did represent original Buddhism, such as Kimura Yasumasa in his Genshi bukkyō shisoron and Anesaki Masaharu in his Konpon bukkyō.
- ¹¹The History of Buddhist Thought, London, 1933, p. 92.
- ¹²Method in Theology, pp. 81-82.
- ¹³Katsumata Shunkyo, Bukkyō ni okeru shinishikisetsu no kenkyū, Tokyo 1974, p. 464.

- ¹⁴ Anguttara-nikāya, I, 6. Quoted in Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, pp. 465-466.
- ¹⁵ T. 2, p. 663c.
- ¹⁶ Anguttara-nikāya, III, 100. Quoted in Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 467.
- ¹⁷ Samyutta-nikāya, 46, 33. Quoted in Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 467.
- ¹⁸ Majjhima-nikāya, Vatthūpama-sutta, in Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 467. See T. 1, p. 575b.
- ¹⁹ Samyutta-nikāya, XXII, 100: Cittasamklesā bhikkhave satta samkilissanti, cittavodanā satta visujjhanti. See T. 1, p. 69c.
- ²⁰ Dharmapada, Yamakavagga, verses 1-2: Manopubbaṅgamā dhamma mano setthā manomayā, manasā ce padutthena bhasati vā karoti vā tato naṃ dukkham anveti cakkam vā vahato padaṃ. Manopubbaṅgamā dhammā mano setthā manomayā manasā ce pasannena bhasati vā karoti vā tato naṃ sukham anveti chāyā vā anapayini.
- ²¹ Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 47.
- ²² Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 322.
- ²³ Samyutta-nikāya, XII, 61. See T. 2, p. 81c.
- ²⁴ Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, pp. 322-324.
- ²⁵ F. L. Woodward, tr. The Book of Gradual Sayings, London, 1917, I, 173.
- ²⁶ I. B. Horner, tr., The Middle Length Sayings, London, 1954-1959, II, 359-360.
- ²⁷ I. B. Horner, tr., The Middle Length Sayings, II, 426.
- ²⁸ Horner, The Middle Length Sayings, II, 361.
- ²⁹ Horner, The Middle Length Sayings, II, 361.
- ³⁰ Dharmapada, Panditavagga, verse 80: Udakaṃ hi nayanti nettikā usukārā namayanti tejanam dārum namayanti tacchakā attānam damayanti pandita.
- ³¹ Samyutta-nikāya, V, 70. F. L. Woodward, tr., Kindred Sayings, V, 59.
- ³² Samyutta-nikāya, V, 78. F. L. Woodward, tr., Kindred Sayings, V, 67.

³³Samyutta-nikāya, V, 96. F. L. Woodward, tr.,
Kindred Sayings, V, 81.

CHAPTER TWO

Abhidharma: The Rise of Theory

As described above, the early Buddhist thought of the Nikāyas and the Āgamas in the main regarded doctrine in the practical, common sense context. But, with the appearance of the various Hīnayāna schools¹ and the composition of the compendious Abhidharma tracts,² doctrinal thinking became theoretical. In contrast to the common sense context, the consciousness of the Abhidharma scholars became bifurcated, and beyond the common sense exigencies of everyday life, they developed logical, systematic formulations of that same doctrinal content. Nyanatiloka, in his Guide to the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, states:

[The Abhidhamma-piṭaka] is . . . in no way to be considered as a corruption or distortion of the Buddha's doctrine, but rather as an attempt to systematize all the doctrines laid down in the Sutta, and to elucidate them from the philosophical . . . standpoint. 3

This theoretical exigency necessitated the development of a new technical language. The Dharmasamgaṇī, the first of the seven Abhidhamma tracts of the Pali canon, begins by presenting a classification of dharmas in one hundred items. This listing is termed mātikā, which Nyanatiloka renders as matrix.⁴ Such a matrix is in fact a technical language. Without such a language

no systematic, theoretical thinking can proceed.

The Kathāvatthu,⁵ which has been traditionally attributed to the Elder Mogalliputtatissa, presents numerous theses, the intent of which is to sum up and classify the various doctrinal positions of the schools in order to refute them from the Theravāda standpoint.⁶ Lamotte notes that such systematization marks an undeniable progress in the theoretical development of doctrine.⁷ What was pointed to in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas becomes objectified in technical terms, from which conclusions can be drawn in particular cases.

This differentiation of consciousness is seen in the following parable:

A soaring royal swan spied a lowland crane puddling in a mud pool. Of compassion he descended and told this inglorious feathered kinsman of the Himalayan heights, of cool mountain streams, and their shining jewels. "But I live on mudfish. Are there any mudfish there?" asked the crane. "No. There are no mudfish there, nor mud," replied the swan. "Then I don't want your mountains and your jewels," said the crane.⁸

To a common sense perspective, the heights of theoretical understanding are lifeless and meaningless. But to the theoretician, they constitute the highest meaning. Ñyanatiloka explains:

Regarding the difference between the Sutta and the Abhidhamma, the 'Higher Doctrine,' it does not really so much concern the subject, but rather its arrangement or treatment. The subject in both is practically the same. Its main difference in treatment, briefly stated, may be said to consist

in the fact that in the Sutta the doctrines are more or less explained in the words of the philosophically incorrect 'conventional' everyday language (vohāra-vacana) understood by anyone, whilst the Abhidhamma, on the other hand, makes use of purely philosophical terms true in the absolute sense (paramattha-vacana). 9

The pre-Mahāyāna Vasubandhu,¹⁰ in his Abhidharmakośa, describes the essence of the Abhidharma as follows:

The Abhidharma is pure wisdom (prajñā) with its accompanying elements. Wisdom is the discernment of dharmas (dharmāṇaṃ pravicaip). 11

Wisdom (prajñā), which is objectified in the Abhidharma, is then an analytical, theoretical understanding of all dharmas. But it does have a specific soteriological purpose:

As, without discernment of dharmas, there is no way to extinguish the kleśas - and it is because of the kleśas that the world wanders through the sea of existence (i.e., transmigration) - the Abhidharma has been expounded by the Teacher in view of [the attaining of] this discernment. 12

Again in his Kośa Vasubandhu explains the content of this wisdom, this discernment of dharmas:

The Bhagavan has taught the four truths. He has also explained the two truths: the relative truth (samvrtisatya) and the absolute truth (paramārthasatya). What are these two truths?

The concept of a pot comes to an end when the pot is broken. The concept of water comes to an end when it is analyzed by the mind. The pot and the water, and all like them, exist relatively (samvrtisat). All else exists absolutely (paramārthasat).

If the concept of a thing disappears when that thing is broken into pieces, then that thing exists relatively. Take, for example, a pot. The idea of a pot disappears when it is reduced to potsherds. If the concept of a thing disappears when it is analyzed by the mind, then that thing should be

regarding as existing relatively. Take for example water. If in water we disregard the dharmas of form, etc., then the concept of water disappears.

Things such as pots, clothing, etc., or water, fire, etc., are given their different names from the relative point of view and conform to conventional usage (samvrtitas). If from this relative point of view (samvrtivaśena) one were to say: There is a pot, or there is water, that would be speaking truly, and not falsely, for this is the relative truth.

Absolute truth differs from this. For if, even when a thing is broken or analyzed by the mind, their concepts continue, then such things exist absolutely (paramārthasat). Although one might reduce form to atoms, or mentally analyze taste or other dharmas, the concept of the specific nature of form (rūpa) persists. The same is true of sensation, etc. As these things exist absolutely they are true absolutely (paramārthasatya).

The ancient masters (Sautrantika) said: Things are absolutely true, inasmuch as they are perceived by super-mundane wisdom, or by mundane wisdom, which is subsequently attained. They are relatively true, inasmuch as they are perceived by any other knowing, whether defiled or not. 13

Here the absolute truth attained by wisdom appears to be precisely the truth of philosophical concepts. The skandhas are absolutely true, because they are fully analyzed, and wisdom is equated with pure theory.

The fifth century Theravāda Master, Buddhaghosa, in his Aṭṭhasālinī, similarly explains that "the Abhidhamma is the instruction in the absolute nature of things (Abhidhammo nāma paramatthdeśana).¹⁴

Thus Abhidharma is the objectification in a systematic fashion of enlightenment itself, of paramattha-vacana. It is the unfolding of the content of that enlightenment

in theoretical terms.

But the exact nature of the differentiation of theoretical understanding from common sense understanding was not clearly seen by all the Abhidharma masters. This can, it would appear, be seen in their various attitudes toward the Abhidharma-piṭaka as canonical, i.e., as issuing from the Buddha himself. Buddhaghosa identifies it as the content of the Buddha's enlightenment:

The Supremely Enlightened One was the first to know the Abhidhamma. While studying under the Bodhi tree, he penetrated the Abhidhamma. He became the Buddha. ¹⁵

Another tradition reports that the Abhidharma was discovered and composed by the Buddha, preached by him to his mother, Māyā, in the Trāyastriṃśa deva heaven, recorded by the disciple Śāriputra, and later transmitted by him to five hundred disciples on this earth.¹⁶

But not all schools admitted the Abhidharma as the word of the Buddha. The Sautrāntika school seems to have recognized the bifurcation between theoretical and common sense consciousness. They denied that the Abhidharma was the word of the Buddha, and recognized the authority only of the sūtras. Thus they are called Sautrāntika. But, in so doing, they did not in any sense reject the theoretical style of the Abhidharma texts. Rather they held that the Buddha had indeed taught the Abhidharma in the sūtras themselves, and that

thus the Abhidharma-piṭaka is simply an unfolding of the teachings of those sūtras.¹⁷ It would thus appear that the Sautrāntika school admitted the Abhidharma as a theoretical construct based upon the earlier sūtras, but not in itself to be granted the canonical validity of those sūtras.

The Abhidharma enterprise can then be considered as the result of the development of theoretical consciousness. But how did those Abhidharma theoreticians themselves understand theoretical consciousness? What was their understanding of understanding?

As seen in the first chapter, in the Nikāyas and Āgamas, the terms citta-mano-vijñāna were used fairly interchangeably to indicate any kind of mental activity. The Abhidharma scholars came to distinguish these terms more clearly. The Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra, the core work of the Vibhāsika school, understood citta as development, mano as deliberation, and viññāna as discrimination. They saw consciousness as a developmental process from its initial arising from sense data to deliberation and discrimination.¹⁸ They further distinguished the mind (citta) from its concomitant mental activities and states (caitta), and began to develop a psychology, which was based on the presupposition that by means of sense perception, the various mental phenomena do correspond to a real external world.¹⁹ Thus it is that

the wisdom, which is the Abhidharma, because it discerns all dharmas, can attain the correct view (samagdr̥ṣṭi), since it is in harmony with the "real existence" of those dharmas.

In the Theravāda context, Buddhaghosa explains that mano-āyatana, the birthplace of mind, arranges sense data to enable them to be understood.²⁰ In his Visuddhimagga, he clarifies:

The mind, which precedes the activity of visual perception and the other sense perceptions, and which discriminates the visual object from other objects, has the function of attention. Its actual phase is the becoming confronted with the visual and the other objects.²¹

The mind adverts to the objects which confront it through sense perception. As the Abhidharma masters admitted the reality of external dharmas, the understanding of consciousness had to explain just how one could come to understand an object already given in the real world. The mind then comes to function precisely in "becoming confronted with the visual and the other objects."

While the mind (mano) pays attention to the objects with which it is confronted, the mind-consciousness (manoviññanadhātu) determines that which is understood:

Its (i.e., manoviññanadhātu) function is to determine at the five doors [of the senses] and to avert at the mind door.²²

Once the mind (mano) attends to the confronting object, consciousness (manoviññana) understands it, and

acts as a connecting link between the external object and what is actually understood by the mind.

Even the understanding of understanding functions in a similar fashion, for just as consciousness determines the meaning of sense data presented to the mind, so it averts at the mind door. That is, it can turn its attention inward and take an inner look at the mind as it is attending to external objects. Such an understanding seems to reduce all knowing to the confrontational mode of knowing characteristic of sense perception.

But, due to the basic thesis that dharmas are real entities, real meaning units, consciousness must be understood as confrontational, and its principal function must be somehow to bridge over the gap between the mind that knows and the real dharmas that are known. Buddhaghosa continues:

The mind-consciousness . . . performs the function of bridging over the gulf between the subjective factor (mano) and the object (dharmas) . . . 23

Thus the Abhidharma understanding of consciousness, as explained here by Buddhaghosa, takes consciousness (manovijñānadhātu) to be the bridging over from the attending subject (mano) to the confronting object (dharma). Consciousness then becomes extroverted, because meaning is assumed to be a property of external dharmas. If one accepts as basic the naive realism of extroverted consciousness, then all knowing will be understood as

confrontational, as bridging the gap between subject and object.

However, the central concern of Buddhist thought is not primarily epistemological, but soteriological. In this context, the question of whether the mind is pure or not had to arise. As described in the first chapter, the Nikāyas and Āgamas tended at times to presuppose the original purity of the mind, but never raised the question to an explicit theoretical status. This theoretical questioning seems to have first been done in the disputes between the various scholastic, Abhidharma schools. Gunamati (ca. 420 - ca. 500), in his Sui-hsiang lun (隨相論) reports:

The Mahāsaṃgika hold that the nature of the mind of sentient beings is originally pure, and becomes defiled by adventitious impurities. ²⁴

The I-pu tsung-lun lun (異部宗輪論) of the Sarvāstivādin Vasumitra also identifies the Mahāsaṃgika school as holding to the view of original purity.²⁵

The Mahīśāsaka, a splinter group of the Mahāsaṃgika, argued that the five sense consciousnesses were both pure and impure, while the Sarvāstivāda held them to be only defiled, and yet another sect, the Vālsīputriya, considered them neutral.²⁶

The Sarvāstivāda held that the mind itself was a mixture of purity and impurity.²⁷ The Śāriputrābhidharma-śāstra, which is of uncertain lineage, ²⁸ quotes the

passage from the Anguttara-nikāya given in Chapter One,²⁹ and affirms the original purity of the mind. It then lists four hundred and sixty kinds of phenomenal minds, which can be either pure or impure. Thus, while the mind itself (citta) is pure, the mentals (caittas) can be either pure or impure.³⁰

The Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra denies original purity, and explains that when kleśa is present, the mind itself is impure.³¹ Sanghabhadra (fourth century) in his Abhidharmanyāyanusāraśāstra refutes the thesis of original purity, and opts for a mind that is a mixture of both purity and impurity, as does the Satyasiddhiśāstra of Harivarman (250-350).³²

All these divergent views on the purity or impurity of the mind pinpoint a basic dilemma, one that will be treated by almost all the later Buddhist thinkers. For how can the mind, since it is clearly afflicted by kleśa, be pure? But if it is not basically pure, then how can it ever become pure? Given the confrontational understanding of consciousness that characterized the Abhidharma, all correct insights must somehow correspond to the dharmas perceived. But the mind presents apparently contradictory characteristics. Thus the above dispute. Although the Abhidharma masters did pinpoint this question, yet they were unable to come to a definite solution.

This understanding of consciousness as extroverted awareness of real dharmas led the Abhidharma masters not only to these various views of the purity of the mind, but also was directly related to their formulation of the notion of wisdom.

The nature of wisdom is described in the discussion of the holy path (āryamārga). As explained by Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakośa, the two basic elements of this path are meditation on the four truths, which issues in the correct view (samagdr̥ṣṭi), and the detachment from passion (kleśa), which is consequent upon that correct view. Because consciousness is understood as the extroversion of meaning, whereby the mind confronts given meanings in real objects, so wisdom (prajñā) becomes the true knowledge of the highest object, the four truths in their sixteen aspects.³³

Four aspects relate to each of the four truths. The four aspects of impermanence (anītya), suffering (duḥke), emptiness (śūnya), and no-self (anātman) relate to the first truth that everything is suffering (duḥke).

The four aspects of cause (hetu), origin (samudaya), successive causation (prabhava), and associated causation (pratyaya) relate to the second truth of the origin of suffering (samudaya).

The four aspects of destruction (nirodha), calm

(śānta), excellence (pranīta), and deliverance (nihsarana) relate to the third truth that suffering can be brought to an end (nirodha).

The four aspects of the path (mārga), reasoning (nyāya), attainment (pratipad), and definite departure (nairyāṇikā) relate to the fourth truth that is the path (mārga), whereby suffering is brought to an end.

Wisdom is the full realization of the truth of these sixteen aspects of the four truths. This same understanding of wisdom as the full realization, the correct view (samagdr̥ṣṭi), is seen in the development of the five stages of the path as given in the Abhidharmakośa.³⁴

In the first stage, wherein the disciple accumulates merit (sambhāramārga), one plants roots of goodness, which will issue in deliverance (mokṣabhāgiya kuśalamūla). The disciple meditates on the horrible (aśubha-bhāvanā), for example, on decaying corpses, in order to engender disgust for all that is transitory, and, as a meditational technique, he develops control of breathing (ānāpānasmṛti). This meditation involves four stages, wherein memory is fixed (smṛtyupasthāna). These stages have as their objects the body (kāya), sensation (vedanā), mind (citta), and dharmas. They constitute a wisdom (prajñā), which comes from hearing (śruta), reflection (cintā), and meditation (bhāvanā),

and which permit insight into the specific and general marks (svasāmānyalakṣaṇa) of all things. All dharmas are seen as impermanent, marked by suffering, empty, and of no-self. But such consciousness is yet impure and imperfect, and the disciple can yet backslide (viparyāsa).

In the second stage of intensified effort (prayoga-mārga), while the disciple remains absorbed in meditation, he attains the four good roots which lead to penetration (nirvedhabhāgīya-kuśalamūla), the experience of warmth (uṣmagata), and the supreme worldly dharma (laukikāgra-dharma). In these states of meditation, he no longer intends the specific or the general marks of dharmas as the object of meditation, but rather takes as the object to be meditated upon the four truths in their sixteen aspects. Even yet, however, his consciousness remains defiled by kleśa and imperfect. In fact, these two initial stages are merely preparatory for insight, which occurs in the next stage.

The third stage of insight-vision (darśanamārga) is characterized by insight into the four truths, and by the elimination (prahāṇa) of one category of kleśa. Such insight is direct comprehension (abhisamaya) and pure wisdom (anāśrava-prajñā), because it is free from all backsliding (viparyāsa), especially from the belief in a real self (satkāyadr̥ṣṭi), and because it implies the elimination of those kleśas which oppose insight into the

four truths, and which consequently can be destroyed by correct views (dr̥gheya).

This direct comprehension and wisdom are gradual (anupūrvābhisamaya), because they develop awarenesses of each of the sixteen aspects of the four truths.

Then a series of four thoughts is applied to the three realms of kāmadhātu, rūpadhātu, and arūpadhātu, i.e., to the entire existent universe.³⁵

The first is the thought of patience concerning wisdom in regard to suffering (duḥkhe dharma jñānakṣānti), which is applied to the realm of desire (kāmadhātu). Such patience is an acquiescence in the truth of suffering, which tends to eliminate doubt. It is at this point that the foolish worldling (prthagjana) becomes a saint (ārya), and is assured of someday attaining the ultimate nirvāṇa.

The second thought is that of wisdom in regard to suffering (duḥkhe dharma jñāna), which is also applied to kāmadhātu. When the first thought has eliminated doubt about the sufferings of kāmadhātu, then this thought of wisdom attains severance from the kleśas of kāmadhātu.

The third thought is that of further patience concerning wisdom in regard to suffering (duḥkhe anvaya-jñānakṣānti), which is applied to rūpadhātu and arūpadhātu. This thought assures the disciple that even in

these higher realm all is suffering.

The fourth is the thought of further wisdom in regard to suffering (duḥkhe anvaya jñāna), and is applied to the same two higher realms. It eliminates the kleśas of these two realms.

This same process of first gaining assurance and then realizing severance from kleśa is then repeated in regard to the other three truths of the origin of suffering (samudaya), the cessation of suffering (nirodha), and the path to attain that cessation (mārga), both in regard to kāmadhātu and to rūpadhātu and arūpadhātu.

The last stage in this entire process, the thought of further wisdom in regard to the path (mārga'nvaya-jñāna) introduces the disciple into the fourth stage of the path. At this point he has eliminated all kleśa that can be removed by insight (dr̥gheya), and attains the status of a stota-āpanna, one who will be reborn in kāmadhātu at most seven more times before attaining nirvāṇa.

The fourth stage, that of meditation (bhāvanāmārga), deals with those kleśas, which are natural or innate (sahaja-kleśa). The kleśas eliminated in darśanamārga, although they may be tenacious (anuśaya), such as the belief in self, nevertheless have no real object. For there is no real self. Thus they can be eliminated by

insight (dr̥gheya). But natural or innate kleśa may have a real object, as hatred is often directed at someone and lust aimed at somebody's body. These kleśas can be eliminated only by meditation (bhāvanāheya). And so bhāvanāmārga is the repeated consideration (punah punar āmukhīkaraṇa), the prolonged effort (abhyāsa) of meditating on the four truths. In eighty-one movements of abandoning and eighty-one movements of deliverance, these kleśas are eliminated. These one hundred and sixty-two movements constitute the stage of bhāvanāmārga.

At the twelfth movement, one becomes a sakṛdāgāmin, one who has but one remaining birth in kāmadhātu. At the one hundred and sixty-first movement, that of neither thought nor no-thought (naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana), i.e., at the summit of existence (bhavāgra), one attains diamond-like contemplation (vajropamasamādhi), which issues in the fifth and last stage.

This last stage, that of nothing more to learn (aśaiksamārga), is that of the arhat, the saint, wherein all kleśa and contamination (āśrava) are eliminated. The arhat has nothing more to learn in regard to the elimination of kleśa. He thus possesses the wisdom of elimination (kṣayajñāna).

This rather involved outline of the Abhidharma path system is here presented in order to highlight three

points.

In the first place, the only obstacle to wisdom throughout all the stages is kleśa. This contrasts sharply with later developments, which will see knowledge itself as a barrier to wisdom, and will thus call into question the Abhidharma emphasis on correct views.

In the second place, this path system is highly scholastic, resembles a curriculum of study at a major university, and as such must have tended to favor an intellectual elite. It seems probable then that the Abhidharma scholasticism in part engendered its own demise by overlooking the less scholastic needs of the lay Buddhists.³⁶

In the third place, throughout these five stages, wisdom is directed toward the four truths in their sixteen aspects. This reflects the underlying understanding of conscious knowing as extroverted meaning, the underlying belief in naive realism. Wisdom is always a knowing of something, an awareness of some specific content, until, having exhausted all kleśa by means of such knowing, the arhat enters nirvāṇa.

Abhidharma then rests upon the conviction that one can comprehend the ultimate truth, i.e., the four truths, that one can attain a correct view (samagdr̥ṣṭi), which

will lead to a deliverance from kleśa. It is based on an understanding of consciousness which projects meaning upon external dharmas. Upon this basis Abhidharma organizes its framework and constructs its theories.

But is this the only option? Is understanding a confrontation of the mind with external objects? And does not the intense practice of meditating upon and striving for correct views itself become a form of intellectual passion (kleśa)? It is from these concerns that the Prajñāpāramitā texts take their origin, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

Notes

¹For a discussion of these schools, see E. Lamotte, Historie du bouddhisme indien, p. 571.

²For a discussion and explanation of the seven canonical Abhidharma tracts of both the Pali canon of the Theravāda and the Chinese canon of the Sarvāstivāda, see Lamotte, Historie, pp. 197-210 and 657-686. For a synopsis of the Pali Abhidharma, see Nyanatiloka Mahathera, Guide through the Abhidhamma-piṭaka. On the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, see J. Takakusu, "On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins," JPTS (1905), pp. 67-146. Louis de La Vallée Poussin expands upon Takakusu's article in L'Abhidharmakośa, Paris, 1923-1935, Intro., pp.xxix-xlii.

³Nyanatiloka Mahathera, Guide through the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, Colombo, 1938, p. 1.

⁴Nyanatiloka, Guide, p. 4. Also confer Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, Introduction, p. vii.

⁵Nyanatiloka, Guide, p. 60.

⁶For the traditional account, see Nyanatiloka, Guide, p. 60. For a more critical discussion of the

role of Mogalliputtatissa in the composition of the Kathāvatthu, see Lamotte, Historie, p. 201 and p. 299.

⁷Lamotte, Historie, p. 657.

⁸Quoted in the forward to Nyanatiloka's Guide, p. xiv.

⁹Nyanatiloka, Guide, p. 9.

¹⁰Erich Frauwallner in his On the Date of the Master of the Law Vasubandhu, Rome, 1951, argues that the works of Vasubandhu are so diverse and their dating so different that there must have been two different Vasubandhus. Noel Péri in "A propos de la date de Vasubandhu," BEFEO, XI (1911), argues for the traditional recognition of but one Vasubandhu, who changed his thinking from the time when he wrote the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya to his later period of Vijñaptimātrata thought. Having often changed my mind, I follow the later interpretation.

¹¹Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, I, 3.

¹²Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, I, 5.

¹³Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, VI, 139.

¹⁴Atthasālinī, III, 488. Quoted in Herbert V. Guenther, Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma, Berkeley and London, 1976, p. 2.

¹⁵Guenther, Philosophy, p. 3.

¹⁶Lamotte, Historie, p. 200.

¹⁷Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, Introduction, p. xi.

¹⁸Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, pp. 325-326.

¹⁹Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 291.

²⁰Visuddhimagga, XIV, 107. Nyaṇamoli, tr., The Path of Purification, Berkeley and London, 1976, p. 513.

²¹Nyaṇamoli, tr., The Path, p. 513.

²²Nyaṇamoli, tr., The Path, p. 513.

²³Visuddhimagga, XIV, 119. Quoted in Guenther, Philosophy, p. 24.

²⁴T. 32, p. 163c.

²⁵T. 49, p. 15c.

²⁶Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 473.

²⁷Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 474.

²⁸For a detailed discussion of the lineage of this work, see Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, Introduction, pp. lx-lxii, and Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 475.

²⁹T. 26, p. 439b. See p. 21 of this study for the quotation from the Anguttara-nikāya.

³⁰Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 474.

³¹T. 27, p. 140b.

³²Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 477 and p. 484.

³³This entire section on the path depends on Lamotte's synopsis of the teaching of the Abhidharmakośa, as given in his Historie, pp. 677-686. See Poussin, L'Abhidharma-kośa, VI, p. 163 et sq.

³⁴These stages were adopted with modifications by the later Yogācārins, and thus they come to have a direct bearing upon the later analysis of wisdom in the Yogācāra context.

³⁵For a discussion of these three realms of Buddhist cosmology, see Lamotte, Historie, pp. 34-35. Kāmadhātu is this world of desire that we inhabit. The realm of form (rūpadhātu) is a higher realm of rarefied material forms, in which desires are much lessened. The realm of no form (arūpadhātu) is the realm of immaterial mental states, which have even less desire involved. All three form the cosmos of transmigration, from which one hopes to be delivered.

³⁶See Lamotte, Historie, pp. 444-445; 667-705; 756-759.

CHAPTER THREE

Prajñāpāramitā

The Rise of Mystic Consciousness

The composition of the Prajñāpāramitā literature (ca. 50 b.c. - a.d. 150) marks a turning point in the understanding of consciousness. The early Buddhism of the Nikāyas and the Āgamas functioned within a common sense context. Abhidharma bifurcated consciousness into both common sense and theory, but, in so doing, presupposed that a subjective consciousness confronted the external units of meaning which are dharmas. The Prajñāpāramitā was developed in order to negate and counteract this Abhidharma assumption. Conscious thinking functions here in a context of mystic, signless immediacy, rather than in either common sense or theory.

The Abhidharma masters were personified by the Prajñāpāramitā texts in the person of Śāriputra. He was painted as the consummate master of analytical knowledge (paṭisambhida),¹ i.e., of theoretical knowledge. Conze reports that in the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra

he is constantly subordinated to Subhūti, whom he constantly asks for information, whose superiority he repeatedly acknowledges, who occasionally shows up his utter obtuseness, and "reproves" him, "although Venerable Śāriputra has taken hold of the matter as far as the words are concerned. 2

The Larger Sutra³ expresses this thought as follows:

if this continent of Jambudvīpa were filled with monks similar in worth to Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana . . . , their wisdom does not approach the wisdom of a bodhisattva, who courses in perfect wisdom, by one hundredth part, nor by one thousandth part, nor by one 100,000th part. 4

The Prajñāpāramitā texts were then a radical break with the theoretical endeavours of the Abhidharma masters. As Conze notes, the Abhidharma masters were constantly engaged in "reviewing" dharmas, and they constructed lengthy scholastic listings of all kinds. By contrast, the Prajñāpāramitā texts frequently recommend that one should not engage in such reviewing.⁵ As seen in the last chapter, the object of such reviewing, of meditative wisdom, were the four truths in their sixteen aspects. In the mystic context of the Prajñāpāramitā, however, all dharmas are empty of any intrinsic meaning. The Heart Sutra says:

Here, Śāriputra, all dharmas are marked with emptiness There is no suffering (duḥkhe), nor origination (samudaya), nor cessation (nirodha), nor path (marga); there is no cognition, no attainment, and no non-attainment. 6

The basic program of Abhidharma is thus denied any validity. However, these four truths form the central theme even in the Nikāyas and the Āgamas. Do the Prajñāpāramitā thinkers then deny validity to the entire tradition? Such is not the case. For the denial of the four truths is not concerned with the doctrine of the four truths itself. Rather it is aimed at the false

consciousness that would hold to those truths as if they circumscribed the ultimate, for the principal characteristic of mystic consciousness is the denial that the ultimate can ever be captured in thought or words. Thus the point at issue is not the doctrine of the four truths, but the falsity of the consciousness that clings to them. In this sense there is no cognition, for no matter how long one spends in the practices of meditation, the ultimate can never be cognized. The basic thrust of the *Prajñāpāramitā* is then a repudiation of the extroverted, confrontational understanding of understanding, which assumed Abhidharma theory issued in an absolute truth (paramārthasatya).

Not being concerned with theoretizing, the question of whether consciousness is pure or not is not thematized in the *Prajñāpāramitā* texts.⁷ The intent of this wisdom tradition was to counterbalance the prior analytical thinking with the skillful presentation of paradoxical pointers to the naked immediacy of the experience and practice of wisdom.⁸ Even had these thinkers desired to develop a systematic presentation of wisdom, the only technical language available to them was that of the Abhidharma naive realism.

In the Abhidharmakośa Vasubandhu argued that the analytical discernment of dharmas was necessary to

free one from kleśa and attain nirvāṇa.⁹ But in the Prajñāpāramitā mystic context, the goal is no longer nirvāṇa, for the very striving toward a goal is seen as an obstacle to wisdom. In place of the wisdom of the exhaustion of kleśa (kṣaya-jñāna), which is attained at the last stage of the path in the Abhidharma system, this new Wisdom literature emphasizes the perfection of wisdom (prajñāpāramitā)¹⁰ of the bodhisattva.

A bodhisattva, a great being, who wants to fully know all dharmas, should make endeavours in the perfection of wisdom. 11

The analytical discernment of dharmas is here replaced with the practice of the perfection of wisdom, and in place of the arhat ideal the career of the bodhisattva is presented. The central point in the practice of bodhisattva wisdom is the realization that all dharmas are empty (śūnya), even the dharma teaching of the Buddha. The Vajracchedika has:

The Bhagavan said: What do you think, Subhūti, does it ever occur to the Tathāgata: "By me is the dharma shown?" Subhūti said: "Not so, Bhagavan, it does not occur to the Tathāgata: 'By me is the dharma shown.'" The Bhagavan said: "Whoever, Subhūti, would say: 'By the Tathāgata is the dharma shown,' he would speak falsely and callumniate me, Subhūti, by grasping what is not. Why? The dharma teaching is termed the dharma teaching, but there is no dharma to be apprehended as the dharma teaching." 12

The very apprehending of the dharma teaching can be false, and, as such, an obstacle to wisdom, because

by grasping at anything, one presupposes that apprehension corresponds to some externalized, objectified content of meaning. In such a case the ultimate would no longer be ultimate, but merely a correct philosophical position. It is precisely such an externalized meaning content (svabhāva) that dharmas are empty of. The Larger Sutra explains that perfect wisdom is opposed to the apprehension of any externalized meaning:

. . . the knowledge of all modes should not be seized through a sign (nimitta); for sign is defilement. What again is sign? Form etc. are signs, and they are also called defilement.¹³

Sign (nimitta) is here understood as any image or concept perceived by the mind through the senses, whether it be common sense or theoretical. Conze explains a sign as "the impression of a stimulus, . . . taken as the indication that there is something there."¹⁴ The apprehension that takes a sign is then precisely the understanding of meaning as being confronted with a pre-existent, given meaning in external things. And any content apprehended by such a sign or concept is mistaken. Thus the philosophical absolutes of Abhidharma, such as the five skandhas of form etc. are denied validity. Conze further explains that "innocuous as it may seem, perception as such is an obstacle to salvation, in that it is both erroneous and misleading."¹⁵ Where the goal

is nirvāṇa, the cessation of suffering, the only obstacle is kleśa, passion, as described in the Abhidharmakośa. But when the goal shifts to wisdom (bodhi), then it is not sufficient merely to eradicate passion. For wisdom implies not only detachment but also phenomenal activity for the sake of others. In such a case, meaning must be interiorized, for if it is always a given correspondence to an assumed external norm, then the skillful works (upāya) of the bodhisattva can never arise. Externalized meaning is an obstacle to bodhi, because by projecting meaning upon external dharmas, it then clings to and is imprisoned within those dharmas, and thus incapable of the polymorphous activities of upāya.

One should thus "take hold of no dharma whatsoever, on account of . . . non-attention to signs."¹⁶ The bodhisattva is encouraged to "develop the emptiness concentration, the signless concentration, the wishless concentration."¹⁷

This hypothesis that the Prajñāpāramitā is at basis a radical rejection of the Abhidharma presuppositions concerning the understanding of consciousness enables one to then interpret the abundant paradoxes found throughout these texts.

For example, the Ratnagūṇasamcayagāthā, a verse

synopsis of Prajñāpāramitā themes, reads:

When he (i.e., the bodhisattva) trains himself, he does not anywhere approach a training, nor does he get at one who trains, or at the dharmas which [constitute] training. He who trains himself, without discriminating between either training or not training, trains himself in this Buddha dharma. 18

Training (śikṣa) as the learning of a set of objectified meanings and their implementation is all to be rejected, because it depends on signs (nimitta), and is thus the projection of meaning upon objects assumed to be real. But he who non-discriminately trains himself, i.e., whose understanding is not extroverted, will learn the Buddha dharma. Meaning is thus not to be found anywhere, but is rather a function of understanding.

Again the Abhidharmakośa described the first stage of the path as the accumulation of merit (sambharamārga). But the Vajracchedika has:

Store of merit is termed store of merit, but it is spoken by the Tathāgata as a no-store. 19

The Vajracchedika then explains that a merit store "should be acquired" (parigrahītavyah) by the bodhisattva, but "should not be grasped" (nograhītavyah).²⁰

It would seem that the Prajñāpāramitā writers considered the naive realism of the Abhidharma thinkers as dangerous, because such a belief that objective meaning can be found in things leads to a grasping at and clinging

to those things, whether they be the objects of lust and anger, or the truths taught by Śākyamuni himself.

Futhermore, the firm belief in the four truths and the strict adherence to the Abhidharma path system could have, as its natural consequence, the divorcing of oneself from everyday concerns, because the gifted practioners would consider themselves aloof from the worldly lives of the laity. The Kathāvatthu reports that some Buddhists even held that the Buddha could feel no compassion (karuṇā), because he was forever liberated from all passionate desire (rāga).²¹

For these reasons this new Wisdom movement of Prajñāpāramitā was probably in large part a lay movement, for its insistence upon the bodhisattva practice of compassion for all suffering beings was directly opposed to the arhat ideal of other-worldliness.²²

The action of the bodhisattva in the world is not then identified with the exact enunciation of doctrine. He is not the mediator of systematic theory. Rather all his actions and words are explained as being a skillful expedient (upāya) for leading sentient beings to an insight into the emptiness of all dharmas. His world involvement is grounded in emptiness:

A bodhisattva, who courses in the perfection of wisdom, should investigate all dharmas as empty in their essential nature. 23

And because he is grounded in emptiness, he realizes that

words are artificial . . . They express [things] conventionally by means of an adventitious designation. 24

Even the philosophically exact words of Abhidharma reasoning, far from presenting absolute truth, are merely conventional designations, for the absolute is not capable of being expressed in words. The words and actions of the bodhisattva are not then intended to convey any specific content, but rather to skillfully engender in sentient beings the aspiration for wisdom. The embodiment of wisdom is not circumscribed in any fixed set of words, but varies according to place, time, and the dispositions of the hearers. Upāya is then the manifestation of karuṇā, rendered possible because of the understanding that verbal expressions do not correspond to any given, set content of meaning.

This understanding is perhaps summed up in a passage from the Saddharmapundarikāsūtra:

And when it comes time for my parinirvāṇa, there will be disciples who will learn (śroṣyanti) the bodhisattva course, but who will not recognize (na cāvabhotsyante) that they are bodhisattvas. 25

The point of the bodhisattva course is not the clear awareness of one's progress along the path system, but rather the practice of wisdom and compassion. Such practice stands in no need of the theoretical developments

of extroverted thinking.

A similar understanding of wisdom as non-discriminative, as being grounded in emptiness, is expressed by the Kaśyapaparivarta as constituting the middle path (madhyamā pratipad):

Again, Kaśyapa, the true insight into reality (bhūtapratyavekṣā) does not see form as either constant or inconstant, does not see sensation, conceptualization, judgement, or consciousness as either constant or inconstant. This insight into the reality of dharmas (dharmānām bhūtapratyavekṣā) is the middle path. 26

This true insight into the reality of dharmas is further described as not taking dharmas as fixed in any way, for it realizes that both the belief in self and the belief in no-self are extremes. For any fixed idea is an extreme, and in one sense or another departs from the middle path.²⁷ Even the basic doctrine of no-self (anātman) must be rejected as an extreme, if it be conceived in an extroverted manner.

The same milieu which produced this Prajñāpāramitā literature also gave rise to the Mādhyamika thinking of Nāgārjuna. His biography recounts that he recovered the Prajñāpāramitā texts from the Nagas in the Nether Regions.²⁸ Some have even believed that he wrote the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra.²⁹ In any event, Prajñāpāramitā thought found its doctrinal elaboration in the śāstras of Nāgārjuna and his commentators. Thus

the next chapter will turn to a consideration of the Madhyamika teachings of Nāgārjuna.

Notes

¹Edward Conze, The Prajñāpāramitā Literature, The Hague, 1960, p. 6.

²Conze, The Prajñāpāramitā, p. 6.

³According to Conze the basic text of the Prajñāpāramitā is the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra, which was then expanded into a larger text or texts, as represented by the Daśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra, and the Aṣṭadaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra. These last three principally differ in length, due to the various numbers of repetitions contained in each. The Larger Sutra refers to Conze's combined translation of these three texts.

⁴Conze, tr., The Larger Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, Berkeley, 1975, p. 58.

⁵Conze, Prajñāpāramitā Literature, p. 7.

⁶Conze, ed., Buddhist Texts through the Ages, Oxford, 1954, p. 7.

⁷See Teruyoshi Tanji, "Hachisenju ni okeru shinsō honjō no mondai," IBK, XXVII, 2, pp. 572-575 for a discussion of the few instances where the purity of the mind is mentioned in the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra.

⁸Confer Conze, Prajñāpāramitā Literature, p. 7.

⁹See p. 33 of this study.

¹⁰See Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature, London, 1932, pp. 18-19.

¹¹Conze, tr., The Larger Sutra, p. 45.

¹²Vajracchedika, verse 21a. Conze, Buddhist Wisdom Books, London, 1958, 61.

¹³Conze, tr., The Larger Sutra, p. 101.

- ¹⁴Conze, tr., The Larger Sutra, p. 11.
- ¹⁵Conze, tr., The Larger Sutra, p. 11.
- ¹⁶Conze, tr., The Larger Sutra, p. 102.
- ¹⁷Conze, tr., The Larger Sutra, p. 46.
- ¹⁸Conze, tr., The Accumulation of Precious Qualities, New Delhi, 1962, p. 260.
- ¹⁹Vajracchedikā, verse 9. Conze, tr., Buddhist Wisdom Books, p. 60.
- ²⁰Vajracchedikā, verse 28: Na khalu punah Subhūte bodhisattvena mahasattvena puṇyaskandhaḥ parigrahitavyah. Ayuṣmān Subhūtir āha: Namu Bhagavan bodhisattvena puṇyaskandhaḥ parigrahitavyah? Bhagavan āha: parigrahitavyah Subhūte nograhitavyah. Tenocyate parigrahitavya iti.
- ²¹Kathāvatthu, XVIII, 3, 561: n'atthi Buddhassa Bhagavato karunati. Quoted in Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine, p. 24.
- ²²Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine, pp. 9-18.
- ²³Conze, tr., The Larger Sutra, p. 101.
- ²⁴Conze, tr., The Larger Sutra, p. 57.
- ²⁵U. Wogihara and C. Tsuchida, Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtram, Tokyo, 1958, p. 165: Ye ca mama parinirvṛtasyāna-agate'dhvani śrāvakā bhaviṣyanti bodhisattva-caryam ca śroṣyanti na cavabhotsyante bodhisattva vyaṃṣanti. Confer H. Kern, Saddharmapuṇḍarīka or the Lotus of the True Law, Oxford, 1884, p. 180.
- ²⁶Baron A. von Stael-Holstein, The Kāśyapaparivarta, A Mahāyānasūtra of the Ratnakūṭa Class, Edited in the Original Sanskrit, in Tibetan, and in Chinese, Shanghai, 1926, pp. 83-84, no. 53.
- ²⁷von Stael-Holstein, Kāśyapaparivarta, p. 87.
- ²⁸Kajiyama Yuichi, Kū no ronri, Tokyo, 1969, pp. 11-14.
- ²⁹Conze, Prajñāpāramitā Literature, p. 2.

CHAPTER FOUR

Madhyamika: The Notion of Emptiness

The Madhyamika teaching was developed by Nāgārjuna (ca. 150-ca. 250) upon the basis of the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures. Its position in Buddhist doctrinal development is central, for it introduced the context of mystic consciousness into the very mainstream of Buddhist doctrinal thinking. No subsequent doctrinal thought could proceed without taking such mystic consciousness into account. In order to elucidate this Madhyamika teaching, the basic insights of Nāgārjuna will be first considered, and then the focus will shift slightly to examine Āryadeva, Nāgārjuna's immediate disciple, so as to highlight the dilemma that Madhyamika posed for later doctrinal thinking. Nāgārjuna's thinking is aimed at the refutation of all theoretical constructs, for he functions within the context of mystic understanding. This point is highlighted by considering Nāgārjuna's intent in developing his notion of emptiness.

A) Nāgārjuna's Intent

Vimalākṣa¹ in his introduction to the Chinese text of the Madhyamikakārikās describes Nāgārjuna's intent as follows:

Why was this treatise composed? There are some who say that the myriad things arise from the god Maheśvara (Śiva). Some say that they arise from the god Viṣṇu. Some say that they arise

from combination (samsarga). Some say that they arise from time (kala). Some say that they arise from world-nature (prakṛti). Some say that they arise from modification (vikāra). Some say that they arise from the self-so (svabhāva, svayambhū). Some say that they arise from the atoms (apū). Because they have such errors, they fall into false views such as [that things are] causeless, have false causes, are annihilated, or are eternal. In many forms, they assert "I" and "mine," and do not know the true dharma. Because the Buddha wishes to cut off all such false views and make them know the Buddha-dharma, he first in the śrāvaka-dharma declared the twelve nidānas. Further, for those who had already cultivated the great thought and were worthy to receive the profound dharma, with the Mahāyāna doctrine he declared the marks of the causes and conditions, namely that all the dharmas are unarising, unceasing, not single, and not plural, etc., utterly empty and devoid of any existent. As it is stated in the Prajñāpāramitā, the Buddha told Subhūti, "When the bodhisattva sits on the bodhimanda, he contemplates the twelve nidānas as inexhaustible like space."

After the Buddha's decease, during the later five hundred years in the [period of] Counterfeit Dharma, men's faculties were even duller, and they were deeply attached to all the dharmas. They sought for the real-being of the nidānas, the five skandhas, the twelve āyatanas, and the eighteen dhatus. They did not know the Buddha's intention and merely clung to the letter. When in the Mahāyānadharma they heard emptiness declared, they did not know the reason why [things] are empty, and thus conceived views and doubts. "If everything is utterly empty, why do you particularize that there are sin and merit and recompense? In this case, there would be no worldly truth and no supreme truth." Grasping this mark of emptiness, they conceive addictions and produce many kinds of error about utter emptiness. For such reasons as these the Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna composed this treatise. 2

In this passage Vimalākṣa begins by listing various false views that were current during the time of the Buddha. He equates such false views with the assertion

of "I" and "mine" (說我我所). The Buddha's intention is then described as the desire to cut off all such false views, and to make men know the Buddha dharma, i.e., the teaching of enlightenment. Thus false views are opposed to enlightenment, because they imply the assertion of "I" and "mine."

However, Vimalākṣa continues, even after the proclamation of the teaching of emptiness by the Buddha, men's faculties became dull and they misconstrued the intention underlying his words by seeking the real being (決定相), the substance of the terms he used. Such seeking again constituted views, and again they became addicted. The term views here refers not only to the false views of the heretics (tīrthikas) of the Buddha's own day, but also to the clinging manner in which some Buddhists of Nāgārjuna's time understood the Buddha dharma itself. It would seem then that Nāgārjuna's intent was to refute all views whatsoever. The Madhyamikakārikās closes by saying:

I bow reverently to Gautama, who, taking compassion, taught the true Dharma, in order to cut off all views (一切見). 3

As Jacques May has pointed out, Madhyamika presents itself not as a dogmatic system, and does not function by means of an exposition of speculative principles, but rather as a "discourse on method."⁴ This method

is that of dialectically uncovering the false assertions of "I" and "mine" in any constructed views. The Abhidharma assertions of having reached the absolute truth by an analysis of the twelve links in the chain of samsaric life, i.e., the twelve nidānas, or by a theoretical understanding of the skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus is just as much to be rejected as the less orthodox errors of non-Buddhists.

B) The Meaning of Emptiness

Since the intent of Nāgārjuna was to cut off all views, emptiness must not be understood as yet another view, however correct.

If there were something non-empty, there might be something termed empty. But there is no non-empty something, and so where might there be an empty something? The Victors have declared emptiness as the expeller of all views, but those who hold emptiness as a view, they have pronounced incurable. 5

Not only is emptiness not a view, but it is the expeller of views, the opposite of, the counteragent to all views. If then emptiness be the expeller of views, in order to understand the meaning of emptiness, one must clearly understand just what constitutes a view. From the above explanation of Vimalākṣa, it would appear that a view refers to any set of terms which purport to explain the structure or nature of reality. All such explanatory sets of words are regarded as prapañca,

foolishness, and so negated by insight into emptiness. The Kārikās thematize the arising of suffering as coming from discrimination, which in turn arises from prapañca:

When karma and kleśa are destroyed, one realizes deliverance. However, karma and kleśa arise from discrimination. And that [discrimination] arises from prapañca. But prapañca, being actually empty, is destroyed. 6

Thus discrimination, even of Buddhist doctrine, is based on the foolishness of prapañca.

What then is prapañca? The etymological origin of the term is obscure,⁷ but from Nāgārjuna's usage, it would appear that prapañca refers to the mental process which projects meaning upon external structures. It is thus that prapañca is the basic process that generates views, that attributes a real-being (svabhāva) to external objects.

In his Prasannapadā Chandrakīrti (ca. 560 - 640) comments on the above passage:

Emptiness is taught in order to lay to rest all differentiation without exception. Thus the intent of emptiness is the laying to rest of differentiation in its entirety. But you, in [attributing] to emptiness the sense of non-being, hypothatize it. 8

Thus emptiness is the counteragent to that mode of knowing, which in externalizing meaning, issues in theoretical views.

Chandrakīrti continues to explain:

By not recognizing that all dharmas have no svabhāva, when one clings to dharmas as real

things (vastudravya), he is caught in the net of prapañca. But since dharmas really are without any svabhāva and are empty, like the son of a sterile woman, if those burning with desire did not cling to things as real, then they would not be caught in the net of prapañca, and regard such things as objects to be known. And, not being caught in the net of prapañca, neither would they be caught in the net of projected imaginings, which arise by taking prapañca as object. And, not being caught in the net of projected imaginings, they would not give rise to the passions, which are based upon the belief in self (satkāyadrsti), which in turn gives rise to the clinging to "I" and "mine." Thus they would not experience suffering. Therefore, basing themselves upon emptiness, upon the absence of svabhāva, they sever prapañca, imaginings are exterminated . . . Therefore emptiness, because it means the extermination of all prapañca, is called nirvāṇa. 9

Prapañca then is the mental Process that clings to objects imagined to have a real, external essence (svabhāva). Emptiness is the rejection of all such thinking, and of all the theoretical constructs that issue from it. Again the Madhyamikakārikās state:

Not related to any other, quiescent, not externalized in meaning by extroverted thought (prapañcair aprapañcitam), non-discriminative, and non-differentiated. These are the marks of reality (tattvasya lakṣaṇam). 10

Chandrakīrti explains the phrase prapañcair aprapañcitam as follows:

Prapañca are the words which develop meaning. The phrase prapañcair aprapañcitam means not expressed in words. 11

To the same point, T. Stcherbatsky says that prapañca is "the expression of conceptually differentiated

reality in words."¹² Prapañca is then verbal expression, which is based upon the clinging to an imagined, real svabhāva.

In his Madhyamikāvatāra Chandrakīrti repeats this equation of prapañca with verbal expression, and adds:

. . . prapañca, which is characterized by [the dichotomy] between the speaker and the spoken, the knower and the known, the marker and the marked." 13

It thus seems clear that prapañca is not simply verbal expression, but rather verbal expression as manifesting the splitting of consciousness into subject and object. The imputation by a subject of real being upon external objects is verbal expression as prapañca. Such is the externalization of meaning, which constantly issues in projected imaginings.

Emptiness is further thematized as being the non-existence of svabhāva:

Because all dharmas do change, we know that they all have no own-being (svabhāva). Also dharmas without own-being do not exist. Hence the emptiness of all dharmas. 14

Emptiness was above explained as the expeller of all views, because it is the negation of svabhāva. Svabhāva literally means own-being, self-being, substance (sub-stans, i.e., to stand under), that which supports things in existence. But such an entity is rejected by Nāgārjuna. He rather understands the

the belief in svabhāva to be the genesis of views, the mental process which externalizes meaning, and projects it upon an imagined structure of real being.

Holding views about the Buddha is treated in the Kārikās:

Those who fantasize (prapañca) about the Buddha, who is beyond all fancies (prapañca) and imperishable, are all slain by fancy (prapañca), and do not see the Tathāgata. 15

Emptiness is then emptiness of all prapañca, of all views, of all imputed own-being. Is it then some rarefied, superhuman awareness, attained only by those highly trained in the arts of meditation and contemplation? Such is not the understanding of Nāgārjuna, for emptiness describes the basic nature of all existents, the basic nature of all thinking.

C) The Meaning of Dependent Co-arising

The two terms emptiness (śūnyatā) and dependent co-arising (pratītya-samutpāda) are basic not only to Madhyamika, but also to all later Mahāyāna thinking. But dependent co-arising must not be taken to be the content of emptiness, for emptiness has no content. The Madhyamikakārikās state that dependent co-arising is not a view:

As realness (sattā) does not occur for existents that lack own-being (svabhāva), "this being, that becomes" is not a fact either. 16

Thus dependent co-arising is not an explanatory

view that states the inter-connectedness of all dharmas. The phrase "this being, that becomes" is a traditional statement of the law of causality. But in Madhyamika dependent co-arising does not explain the causal links of all phenonena, as if these existents formed a real continuum, but it is rather the denial that there is any real substance, which might exert or receive causal force from the one to the other.¹⁷ Nagao Gadjin explains that the view of dependent co-arising as samsaric transmigration, i.e., the view which expresses the constant flux of all existents, is indeed found in early Buddhism, but is negated by Nāgārjuna by means of the insight into emptiness. Emptiness and dependent co-arising are then identical. The Kārikās explain:

I offer salutation to the Best of preachers,
the Buddha, who has taught that dependent co-
arising has no ceasing, no arising, no nullifica-
tion, no eternity, no unity, no plurality, no
arriving, and no departing, that it is quiescent
of all fictions (prapañca), that it is blissful.¹⁸

In this passage it seems clear that dependent co-arising is not any kind of explanation of a samsaric change sequence. These eight negations (pratiśedha) mean that dependent co-arising is quiescent of all fictions (prapañcopaśamam śivam). Thus dependent co-arising is awareness of existents that does not arise from the prapañca process of imagining and imputing own-being to existents.

In his Yuktiṣaṣṭikā Nāgārjuna writes:

I give salutation to the Lord Sākyamuni, who,
in negating the arising and ceasing [of all dharmas]
by the principle of the way, deigned to explain
dependent co-arising. 19

Again in what is perhaps the most quoted verse of
the Madhyamikakārikās Nāgārjuna states:

It is dependent co-arising that I term empti-
ness. Taking on [this meaning], it (emptiness)
is established. It alone is the Middle Path. 20

Dependent co-arising is the meaning whereby emptiness
is established and known. It is awareness of all existents
in their immediacy and prior to the genesis of views.

Thus emptiness is engaged in the awareness of phenomenal
existents, and is not some superhuman abstraction from
this phenomenal world, nor any rarefied insight that
completely bypasses this world. The Kārikās again state:

There has never been any existent that has not
dependently co-arisen. Hence among all existents,
there is none that is not empty. 21

A non-empty existent (dharma) is one imagined to
have own-being, and thus one generated by the prapañca
process of mental projection. Such extroverted meaning
constitutes an attachment to a supposed substratum of
real being, and thus would preclude the possibility of
dependent co-arising.

Consequently, both emptiness and dependent co-arising
are doctrines, which are intended to negate extroverted
meaning, extroverted consciousness. By means of the

negative dialectic of first refuting one alternative view and then another, Nāgārjuna points to an awareness that precedes the arising of all views, and exposes the imaginative prapañca process that underlies those views. Emptiness is then the contentless activity of meaning, and dependent co-arising is the contentless awareness of existents. Both relate to thinking rather than to what is thought.

These terms find their parallel explanation in the Madhyamika doctrine of the two truths.

D) The Two Truths

The doctrine of the two truths does appear in early Buddhism, but it was Nāgārjuna who first explicated its full doctrinal meaning.²² These two truths are paramārthasatya, the truth of the highest meaning, and saṃvṛt(t)isatya, conventional truth. Sthiramati in his Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra says that the two truths were established in contrast to the four truths of Hīnayāna. In the Madhyamikakārikās Nāgārjuna argues that in the mystic context of emptiness, these four truths have no own-being:

When suffering, arising, and cessation do not occur, what path is supposed to be attained through the cessation of suffering. 23

Thus the view that one might move from suffering to enlightenment, because it is a view, is prapañca.

Consequently, because the four truths cannot constitute a valid view, they cannot be relied upon as a sure guide. In contrast to these truths, and to the scholastic elaboration of them in terms of the path system, Nāgārjuna develops the teaching of the two truths.

Paramārthasatya literally is the truth (satya) of the highest (parama) meaning (artha). As such it is ineffable (avācyatva) and silent (tūsmīmbhāva). In contrast to the Abhidharma belief in the attainment of absolute truth in concepts, it cannot be circumscribed or indicated in any manner whatsoever.

But, just as the contentless activity of emptiness is identified with the contentless awareness of dharmas that is dependent co-arising, so paramārthasatya, while being completely other and transcendent, is yet not different from saṃvṛt(t)isatya. The Kārikās explain:

The Buddha's dharma explanation relies on two truths: the worldly, conventional truth, and the absolute truth. Those who do not know the distinction between these two truths, do not know the deep reality in the Buddha's teaching. Without reliance on the expressional [truth], the absolute is not taught. And without arriving at the absolute, nirvāṇa is not reached. 24

What then is saṃvṛt(t)isatya? And what is its relationship to paramārthasatya?

Etymologically there is a problem, for the Sanskrit texts give both saṃvṛti and saṃvṛtti as the proper form

for this term. Samvṛti would derive from the root vr, to cover, hide, hinder. But saṃvṛtti would derive from the root vrt, to exist, arise, transform. Neither of these meanings appears in the Chinese interpretive rendering of conventional (世俗) truth.²⁵

In his Madhyamikāvatāra Chandrakīrti develops the meaning of saṃvṛtisatya as covered truth. In commenting upon the above passage from the Madhyamikakārikās, he gives three meanings for saṃvṛti. The first is that of universal hindrance (samantād varāṇam), i.e., saṃvṛtisatya is a covering over of truth or a hindrance to truth. Such an interpretation appears to be derived by taking the root of saṃvṛti as vr, to cover over. The second meaning is that of mutual dependency, mutual support (paraspara-sambhavana, paraspara-samāśraya), i.e., all things exist in mutual dependency, and are dependently co-arisen in the sense of the view of constant flux described above. Because of the arising of such a view, one can distinguish the self from others, the subject from the object. The third meaning is that of symbolic, effable (saṃketa, lokavyavahārah), i.e., inasmuch as existents are distinguishable, they are objectified in symbols and words. Among these three meanings the most basic appears to be the first one of being an obstacle to truth, a covering over of truth by ignorance (avidyā).

It is because truth is so covered over that the view arises that they are related in a constant flux and in inter-dependency, and can thus be enunciated in symbols and words.²⁶

It would seem then that Chandrakīrti's interpretation accords little validity to conventional truth, for all such thinking constitutes views and arises from the prapañca process of imagining own-being, and projecting such upon external "reality." Words, even the Buddha's words, are true then only inasmuch as they are negated, inasmuch as they are empty. Samvrtisatya in this interpretation, is truth as reflected in extroverted consciousness. It is not really truth at all, but rather prapañca. Such an emphasis of Madhyamika is perhaps understandable, if one keeps in mind that its doctrine of emptiness arose in direct contrast to the Abhidharma confidence and presumption of attaining the absolute truth. The initial task for Nāgārjuna was not then to champion the validity of conventional truth, but to negate this Abhidharma presumption.

However, in the above interpretation, what relationship does conventional truth have to paramārthasatya? Are they to be contrasted simply as error is contrasted with truth?

Such would not seem to be the case. For, while

saṃvṛtīsatya is that which covers (anena saṃvṛiyata
iti saṃvṛtiḥ), that which is covered (etat saṃviryate)
is precisely paramārthasatya. In the Madhyamikāvatāra
Chandrakīrti counterposes the terms saṃvṛta, that which
is covered, and saṃvṛti, that which covers. Thus
saṃvṛtīsatya, by being the covering over paramārthasatya,
points toward that paramārthasatya, just as a form fitting
blouse reveals the fulsomeness beneath.

Samvṛtīsatya, being truth as reflected in extroverted
consciousness, is regarded by the saint as a covering.
But conventionally it is taken as truth by men, who
have not gained insight into emptiness. As such it is
worldly and subject to revision (laukika-viparyāśa). But
within worldly, reversible, covered truth is tathatā,
emptiness, non-duality. While as covered, conventional
truth is illusory, yet it points toward that which it
covers, paramārthasatya. As Jacques May says, "surface
reality (saṃvṛtīsatya) as such does not include the
absolute . . . , but absolute reality (paramārthasatya)
coincides with surface reality, inasmuch as it annuls it,
inasmuch as its being consists in that annihilation."²⁷
The truth of the womanly form does not consist in the
blouse, but rather in that moment of ecstasy when it is
finally removed.

Nāgārguna writes:

Samsara has nothing that distinguishes it from

nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa has nothing that distinguishes it from samsāra. The limit of nirvāṇa is the limit of samsāra. There is not even the subtlest something separating the two. 28

Just as nirvāṇa and samsāra are identical, so the highest truth and the conventional truth are identical. And just as samsāra is illusion, so conventional truth is illusion. It is truth only in a very limited sense, for its identity is taken only from that which it covers over and opposes. Or, by the insight into emptiness, saṃvṛtisatya is truth, because it is not actually distinguishable from paramārthasatya, since it has no substance whereby it could be so distinguished.

E) Nāgārjuna's Critique of the Means of Cognition

In his Vigrahavyāvartanī Nāgārjuna relates the teachings of Madhyamika to the ideas of the School of Nyāya, which was a school of logicians, who held that words do have inherent meanings. Thus, while it might be expected that Nāgārjuna would have turned to an examination of the nature of consciousness, in order to be able to more fully explain the arising of the prapañca process of extroverted consciousness and thinking, in fact he was in the main concerned with the refutation of these logicians. They supported their contention that words have intrinsic meaning by means of their teaching on the four pramāṇas, the means of cognition. These four were direct perception, inference, authority, and analogy. Based upon their conviction that

words really do represent reality, they attacked the teaching of emptiness:

If all things are entirely empty without any own-being (svabhāva), then words have no own-being. In that case you cannot negate the own-being [of all dharmas by means of words]. 29

But Nāgārjuna responds:

Every dharma which is dependently co-arisen is empty. Thus in regard to whatever is born by dependent co-arising, one says that it is without own-being (asvabhāvatva). 30

The negating of emptiness is like one magically created man (nirmitapurusa) negating (pratiṣedha-yate) another magically created man. 31

In the prose commentary Nāgārjuna explains this analogy:

The magically created man, who negates the other magically created man, is [himself] empty . . . Just in the same way, my words are empty, like everything else which is created by magic or illusion. Words, therefore, can negate the own-being of all dharmas. 32

Nāgārjuna's argumentation here, as is often the case, is difficult to follow, because he constantly shifts the question to the mystic context of śūnyatā-pratītyasamutpāda, when one was functioning in the context of theory. He cannot do otherwise, for no argumentation from within the context of a theory of naive realism would be to any avail. The entire thrust of Nāgārjuna's thinking is to establish this mystic, negative context of meaning as central to Buddhist doctrinal endeavour. Thus the words that Nāgārjuna employs, being based on such

a consciousness, are nothing more than magical creations, chosen as a skillful means to bring the opponent to an awareness of emptiness. Needless to say, if he were to allow the opponent to choose the language for dispute, and thus the context of meaning, there would be no possibility at all of explaining the meaning of emptiness. One doubts that even the use of skillfully chosen magical created words did the trick. All words then are mental constructs without any inherent meaning. Even emptiness is a term of conventional meaning, and itself arises from the prapañca process, inasmuch as it is intended to contradict the realistic view of knowing. Such words refute the propositions of extroverted consciousness, not by accepting the same ground rules of discourse, but by shifting the total context.

This shift in Nāgārjuna's horizon is apparent in his further argumentation:

If I formulate any proposition (prati jñā),
 then there would be error [in my reasoning].
 But I do not formulate a proposition . . . 33

The Chinese rendering for the first sentence is 我宗無物,³⁴ i.e., my proposition is not reified. It does not move within the horizon of extroverted meaning, is not a normal proposition at all, and thus cannot be judged or criticized within that horizon.

Therefore, when Nāgārjuna comes to consider the question of the true means of cognition (pramāṇa), he has already established himself within the mystic horizon of emptiness.

The Nyāya objector states:

If, having apprehended (upalabhya) things by means of the cognition which is direct perception (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa), one were yet to deny (nivartayitum) [that they have own-being], then that perception itself, by which one perceives things, would not exist. 35

People are generally convinced that when they directly perceive a horse, then most certainly there is a horse out there. But Nāgārjuna responds:

If I were to apprehend [an object] by means of direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), authority (śabda), or analogy (upamāna), by means of any of these four means of cognition (pramāṇa), then my statement could be either validated or negated. But as I do not apprehend any object in any manner, I have nothing to be validated and nothing to be negated . . . 36

The notion of emptiness is not an apprehension of any particular object in the context of extroverted theory. It is rather a shift in the underlying context of meaning. Meaning is not an inherent property of external objects. Does the horse know that it is a horse? The four pramāṇa of the Nyāya thinkers presuppose the context of extroverted consciousness as an obvious given, but they themselves are unable to validate that supposition. They assume that the means of cognition pramāṇa, offer a bridge between the knowing subject and

the object known (svabhāva). Nāgārjuna objects:

If knowable objects (prameya) were validated by the means of cognition (pramāṇa), then explain how these means of cognition in their turn are validated. 37

If you think that the means of cognition are validated by other means of cognition, then you fall into an infinite regress (anavasthā). 38

There is no way of validating the assumption of naive realism, because every attempt will presuppose its validity, and see the problem in terms of bridging from subject and object. According to the Nyāya thinkers, the reality of things, the validity of the underlying horizon of extroverted consciousness is a self-evident given. After all, they argue, is it not obvious that there are objects to be known?

Just as fire can illuminate both the specific nature of other things (parātmātva) and its own specific nature (svātmātva), so the means of cognition validate (sādhayanti) their own specific nature and that of others. 39

Nāgārjuna argues that fire cannot illuminate darkness either in regard to itself or to others, because, in the realist supposition, the svabhāva of fire and the svabhāva of darkness are unrelated, and thus fire can not reach darkness. The argument continues back and forth, but Nāgārjuna's main thrust is that the means of cognition (pramāṇa) are unable to validate extroverted knowing, for whenever knowing is conceived as an act of an inner subject confronting an outer

object, then any means of bridging that gap will have to begin by presupposing its own validity.

However, throughout the argumentation, it appears that Nāgārjuna assumes that the Nyāya position of cognitional theory is the only one possible. Later on, a different explanation of pramāṇa will be developed by Dignāga, and pass into the Dharmapāla lineage of Yogācāra thinking. This version was developed precisely to avoid the Nyāya dilemma of extroverted knowing. But these are later developments, and during the time of Nāgārjuna, the only option was apparently that of Nyāya, i.e., cognitional theory based upon the extroversion of consciousness. As such, he could have done nothing other than refute it.

To know is not just the simple act of taking a look at something. If we are talking about trees or horses, then the injunction can be given: Take a look! Open your eyes! External objects can be seen by taking such a look. By analogy then internal objects, the mind and the means of cognition, could be seen by taking an inner look, i.e., by intro-spection. Such inner (intro) looking (specto) then would objectify the nature of the mind and clarify the means of cognition. Nāgārjuna, however, understood all such knowing as prapañca, as extroverted consciousness, which equated knowing with taking a look. No matter how long one looks at a horse,

no svabhāva can be seen. And if you close your eyes to take a look at yourself looking at that horse, all that will happen is that you remember looking at a horse. As Aristotle exclaimed: Oh Plato, I see the horse well enough, but I do not see the horseness. But for Nāgārjuna it was not a question of pure cognitional theory, for from extroverted consciousness, discriminations arise, and in their train, clinging and suffering.

He counterposes to this naive realism an emptiness that is meaningful only in its immediacy. All constructed meanings are only conventionally valid, and find their true meaning when annihilated by insight into contentless paramārthasatya.

The early Buddhist thought of the Nikāyas and the Āgamas functioned in a common sense context of meaning. To the question of how one could attain certitude in regard to the dharma teaching, Buddha replied that one should try them out and see whether they work or not.⁴⁰ Subsequent Buddhist thinking began to function in the theoretical context of meaning with the rise of the Abhidharma schools, and developed into a vast scholastic endeavour. Dharmas were classified in a technical language and their natures profusely examined. Practices were minutely outlined and degrees of progress described in full. This mind-set led the Prajñāpāramitā texts

to develop the teaching of emptiness, for the Abhidharma confidence in the validity of extroverted consciousness as insuring certitude did not release one from samsaric suffering, but rather bound one even more tenaciously. It is thus that Nāgārjuna rejects all views, all imaginings, all extroverted consciousness in favor of the immediacy of consciousness, the non-verbally mediated, non-conceptually mediated, the non-propositionally mediated realm of emptiness. The Prajñāpāramitā literature and Nāgārjuna expand the prior horizon and open up a different level of conscious awareness, the realm of mystic consciousness.

But must all knowing be extroverted? Is this the only possibility? Is there a way of thinking that avoids the prapañca process? Why does prapañca arise in the first place? Is phenomenal reality totally without any valid grounding? What does the teaching of śūnyatā mean, if it is not an ordinary proposition? What is the nature of the mind, which causes prapañca? What is bodhi? What kind of thinking was Nāgārjuna himself engaged in when he wrote the Madhyamikakārikās?

In a tantalizing passage from the Mahāyānavimsaka Nāgārjuna writes:

Everything in the world is consciousness only. Their marks are established as magical transformations. Thus all good and bad actions, all good and bad destinies occur. 41

But Nāgārjuna did not thematize the nature of consciousness. Such was to be the task of the Yogācārins: how to ground the immediacy of śūnyatā-pratītyasamutpāda within consciousness. But this development is a later occurrence. Immediately after Nāgārjuna, there seem to have been more problems than solutions, for every epochal thinker upsets the previous balance so much that it takes some time to find a proper equilibrium. Āryadeva appears to have grappled with some of these problems.

Āryadeva (3rd century) was an immediate follower of Nāgārjuna, and may have known him personally.⁴² He not only continued Nāgārjuna's thought, but perforce had to respond to objections raised against it. In his Catūṣaṣṭaśāstra he is accused of being a negativist, because he follows the teaching of emptiness:

Because you negate other's teachings, you are [just] negative. You get a kick out of demolishing the teachings of others and try your darndest to point out their errors. You have nothing to maintain and are thus simply negative.⁴³

But Āryadeva, not to be outdone in dispute, replies:

You are the negative ones. Those who teach emptiness do have nothing to maintain, and so they are not negative at all. But you, because you cling to your own teaching and [from that standpoint] demolish what others cling to, you are negative. 44

One can imagine the frustration of arguing with Āryadeva. To his opponents he must have seemed like

Alice in Wonderland, who made words mean anything she wanted them to mean. For again the same shifting of the context of meaning, and therefore language, is apparent. Upon superficial inspection, both Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva devote the bulk of their writings to refuting the views of others, and, when asked for their own explanations, answer that, as all dharmas are empty, they really have no statement to make at all. But such a criticism is indeed superficial, because it fails to understand the total shift in horizon that is occurring. In Āryadeva's understanding, both proposing theories and negating them implies clinging to extroverted meanings, and thus the opponent is termed negative because he operates only within this horizon. Emptiness is the negation not of any particular theory within that horizon, but rather of the entire horizon. But until he has understood why the meanings of words have so changed, the objector finds Āryadeva's answers meaningless:

Your teaching is not true, because it contradicts [the common awareness of men in] the world. Men in this world are absolutely unable to believe or accept it. 45

Within the context of extroverted meaning, emptiness can mean only the negation of being, i.e., non-being, and Madhyamika must appear to be simply a total negation without positive content. Āryadeva's reply is surprising, for he states that people generally do believe and accept

the teaching of emptiness:

This teaching is believed and accepted by [men in] the world, because dependently co-arisen dharmas are indeed unmarked. You say that there is curd and ghee in milk, that there is a foetus in the young girl, that in the food there is already excrement, that there is really a house apart from the beams and the pillars, and that cloth really exists apart from the thread. Some say that the effect exists in the cause, others deny this, while yet others claim that things arise without any cause. All this is really empty [talk] and should not be claimed to be [accepted by men in] the world. Who would believe or accept all these things you insist upon? But our teaching is different, because it is congruent with human life (人) in the world. Everybody does believe and accept it.⁴⁶

Emptiness, although it moves within the mystic context, is clearly not some rarefied otherworldly insight, but rather is itself the true understanding of the way men in the world understand. Everyone knows that things constantly change, and are not eternally given entities of meaning (svabhāva). It is theory that is unbelievable. Theoretical laws of causality form a stumbling block, because they assume an extroverted mode of understanding. If curds can be seen in one's glass of milk, why must one hold that they have been there all along? If excrement comes out one end, does that mean it went in the other? ⁴⁷

Perhaps though it would be better to say that neither the context of theory nor that of mystic awareness is commonly accepted in the world. For the commonly

accepted context in the world is the common sense context, in which one worries neither about theory nor about emptiness. It is hard to believe that Āryadeva's Catuṣataśāstra was a best seller. Thus both Āryadeva and his opponent function in a context different from common sense, and both have their own technical languages.

The opponent presses on and objects that if all dharmas are empty, then there can be no teaching at all. Āryadeva responds:

We do not err, because we follow conventional speech. In enunciating their teaching all the Buddhas always rely on both the conventional truth and the highest truth. Both of these are real and not false speech. 48

In the Madhyamikakārikās Nāgārjuna has said:

The teaching of the dharma by the various Buddhas is based on the two truths; namely, the worldly truth and the highest truth. 49

It would appear then that to Nāgārjuna's statement Āryadeva has added the the idea that both truths are real and not false (是二皆實非妄語也). He continues:

It is just as the Buddha, although he knew that all dharmas are unmarked, yet said to Ananda: "Go to the town of Śrāvastī and ask for alms." Now a town cannot be known apart from its earth, wood, etc. But he did not fall into vain speech, because he was following conventional speech. . .50

It would appear then that Āryadeva, does accord some validity to conventional truth. But his example is not

particularly helpful. A town can be located by looking at signposts, inspecting the road, or simply asking the locals. In such a case, knowing need not arise above the level of taking a look, and the dilemmas engendered by extroverted consciousness do not arise. But when the question becomes the nature of karma or the meaning of prajñā, roadmap analogies serve little to clarify the confusion, for there is nothing to take a look at.

In his Akṣaraśataśāstra Āryadeva returns to this theme, and does grant a functional validity to conventional truth. It is there objected that, since dharmas have no specific nature or marks, they cannot be said to be real at all. Āryadeva replies:

They are real like things in a dream. All the dharmas of conventional truth are like things seen in a dream. Now such things are not really existent. But they are not inexistent. Neither are they without a cause. In like manner the dharmas of conventional truth do not have specific marks, but they are not without specific marks. Neither do they lack a cause. Take for example a building. If it had a specific nature and marks, there would be no time when it was not visible. But if it lacked these, then it would never become visible. It is because of its conventional beams, rafters, foundation, and walls that it does have a functional validity (而有成用). Thus it is not without a cause. Because all dharmas are neither existent nor inexistent. Nor are they causeless. They are like things seen in a dream. 51

But yet what is the relationship between this functional validity of conventional truth and the ultimate

truth? Āryadeva's example of a building being composed of various conventional parts resembles Vasubandhu's discussion of the difference between the conventional and the ultimate as given in the Abhidharmakośa.⁵² But, whereas for Vasubandhu the ultimate was reached when a dharma could no longer be broken down into more parts by analysis, for Āryadeva the ultimate could not be reached by any kind of thinking at all. Thus the building, i.e., the ultimate, for Āryadeva is not the development of philosophically exact concepts of skandhas, āyatanas, or dhātus, but rather the inexpressible ultimate that is empty of all prapañca.

In the Catuśataśāstra the opponent returns to the attack, and argues that, if conventional truth is real, then it becomes the ultimate truth. Āryadeva responds:

Not so, because they are interdependent, as the great and the small. The conventional truth is considered to be real by men of the world, but is considered not to be real by the saints. It is just as an apple is bigger than a date, but is smaller than a cucumber. These two [statements about an apple] are both true. But if one were to say that the date is small and the cucumber big, this would be false speech . . . 53

For Āryadeva then the two truths are in some way continuous. Their difference lies in the differing consciousness of the people who understand them, i.e., in the horizon or context of meaning with which they are approached. The saint in the mystic context regards conventional truth as non-existent, for it pales to

insignificance in the light of his vision. But ordinary men, not having realized such vision, regard the conventional as valid, for they have to carry on everyday affairs.

But just how that validity of conventional truth might itself be validated is left untreated. And it remains unclear just how the two truths are interdependent and continuous. Paramārthasatya is not perceptible at all (nirābhāsa), beyond words, and incomprehensible. But the conventional is expressible in words and comprehensible. How can they form a continuum in any sense at all?

In granting validity to conventional truth Āryadeva seems to have gone a step beyond his teacher, Nāgārjuna. He clearly states that both truths are real. And he describes them as interdependent. This is perhaps due to the fact that he was pressed to counter objections that Nāgārjuna's dialectic of emptiness was a negative teaching, without any positive content. Nāgārjuna himself did not thematize at any length the relationship between the two truths. In Chandrakīrti's interpretation, they are related as that which covers to that which is covered. This consistent emphasis on the transcendent nature of paramārthasatya is understandable in light of Nāgārjuna's intent to refute the presumptions of the Abhidharma scholars. But Āryadeva's task was somewhat

different. In his milieu people are reacting, not to the Abhidharma complex, so much as to the Madhyamika teachings. And thus his attention must be directed to showing that Madhyamika does not embrace a purely negative position.

In so doing he has made explicit a doctrinal problem that is to engage Buddhist thinkers in later years. For if the conventional is continuous and interdependent with the ultimate, then how can the ultimate nature of that ultimate be maintained? And if it is not related to the ultimate in any continuous, interdependent fashion, then how can it be called truth at all? These questions implicitly contain yet another: What is the validity of human understanding? The subsequent disputes of Chandrakīrti's Prāsāṅgika sect and Bhāvaviveka's Svātantrika sect center upon these questions. And the entire Yogācāra endeavour can be seen as an attempt to ground the Madhyamika themes of śūnyatā-pratītyasamutpāda and the two truths within the experience of consciousness, and thus sort out the origins of extroverted consciousness in order to explain its reversal into wisdom.

These later developments do become rather technically dense. Yet since all are not attracted to theory, before attention is directed to Yogācāra, consideration must be given to the tathāgatagarbha teaching.

Notes

¹Some scholars identify the name 青目 as Pingala. I here follow Richard Robinson, who in his Early Mādhyamika in India and China, Madison, 1967, p. 29, amends the character 青 to 清, and thus arrives at Vimalākṣa.

²T. 30, p. 1b-c. Translated by Robinson, Early Mādhyamika, p. 66.

³T. 30, p. 34b. See Kenneth K. Inada, Nāgārjuna, A Translation of his Mulamadhyamikakārikā with An Introductory Essay, Tokyo, 1970, p. 171. In addition to his English translation, Inada also gives the Sanskrit text.

⁴Jacques May, Chandrakīrti: Prasannapadā Madhyamika-vṛtti. Douze chapitres traduits du Sanskrit et du Tibétain, accompagnés d'une introduction de notes et d'une édition critique de la version Tibétaine, Paris, 1959, p. 15.

⁵T. 30, p. 18c. Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 93.

⁶T. 30, p. 23c. Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 114.

⁷See Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, New Haven, 1953, p. 380.

⁸Jacques May, tr., Chandrakīrti, pp. 223-224.

⁹J. W. DeJong, Cinq Chapitres de la Prasannapadā, Paris, 1949, pp. 11-12. Also translated into Japanese by Yamaguchi Susumu, Bukkyō ni okeru yū to mu to no tairon, pp. 16-17.

¹⁰T. 30, p. 24z. Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 115.

¹¹Jacques May, tr., Chandrakīrti, p. 30.

¹²Theodore Stcherbatsky, The Concept of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, Delhi, 1977 revised edition, Index, p. 30.

¹³Yamaguchi, Tairon, p. 20, n. 3.

¹⁴T. 30, p. 18b. Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 92.

¹⁵T. 30, p. 30c. Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 135.

¹⁶T. 30, p. 3b. Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 41.

- ¹⁷Nagao Gadjin, "Chūkan tetsugaku no konponteki tachiba," in Chūkan to Yuishiki, Tokyo, 1978, p. 8.
- ¹⁸T. 30, p. 1b. Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 39.
- ¹⁹Nagao, "Konponteki tachiba," Chūkan, p. 12.
- ²⁰T. 30, p. 33b. Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 148.
- ²¹T. 30, p. 33b. Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 148.
- ²²Nagao, "Konponteki tachiba," Chūkan, p. 23.
- ²³T. 30, p. 33c. Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 149.
- ²⁴T. 30, p. 32c. Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 146.
- ²⁵Nagao, "Konponteki tachiba," Chūkan, p. 25.
- ²⁶Nagao, "Konponteki tachiba," Chūkan, pp. 40-41.
- ²⁷Jacques May, tr., Chandrakīrti, pp. 18-19.
- ²⁸T. 30, p. 36a. Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 158.
- ²⁹"Vigrahavyāvartanī," E. H. Johnston and A. Kunst, ed., MCB, IX, (1948-1951), pp. 99-152. A French translation has been made by Yamaguchi Susumu, "Pour écarter les vaines discussions," JA, juillet-septembre, 1929, pp. 1-86. An English translation has been made by Guiseppe Tucci in his Pre-Dinnaga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, Baroda, 1929, pp. 1-77. For this passage see Yamaguchi, p. 5; Tucci, p. 2.
- ³⁰Yamaguchi, p. 24. Tucci, p. 26. Johnston, p. 121.
- ³¹Yamaguchi, p. 25. Tucci, p. 28. Johnston, p. 123.
- ³²Yamaguchi, p. 26. Tucci, p. 30. Johnston, p. 123.
- ³³Yamaguchi, p. 31. Tucci, p. 36. Johnston, p. 127.
- ³⁴T. 32, p. 19a.
- ³⁵Yamaguchi, p. 10. Tucci, p. 10. Johnston, p. 112.
- ³⁶Yamaguchi, p. 33. Tucci, p. 36. Johnston, p. 128.

³⁷Yamaguchi, p. 33. Tucci, p. 38. Johnston, p. 128.

³⁸Yamaguchi, p. 34. Tucci, p. 38. Johnston, p. 129.

³⁹Yamaguchi, p. 35. Tucci, p. 40. Johnston, p. 130.

⁴⁰See p. 24 of this study.

⁴¹T. 30, p. 256c: 此一切唯心安立幻化
相作善業感善不善生.

⁴²Robinson, Early Mādhyamika, p. 23.

⁴³T. 30, p. 181a. Tucci, Pre-Dinnaga Texts, p. 83.

⁴⁴T. 30, p. 181a. Tucci, p. 84.

⁴⁵T. 30, p. 181b. Tucci, p. 85.

⁴⁶T. 30, p. 181b. Tucci, p. 86.

⁴⁷It is somewhat difficult to see how Āryadeva could offer the presence of a foetus in a girl as being particularly theoretical, but perhaps he had no direct experience in this matter.

⁴⁸T. 30, p. 181c. Tucci, p. 88.

⁴⁹Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 146.

⁵⁰T. 30, p. 181c. Tucci, p. 88.

⁵¹T. 30, p. 252b.

⁵²See pp. 33-34 of this study.

⁵³T. 30, p. 182a. Tucci, p. 88.

CHAPTER FIVE

Tathāgatagarbha

Beyond Abhidharma and Madhyamika

Shortly after the composition of the Madhyamika-kārikās by Nāgārjuna, the earliest scriptures of the Tathāgatagarbha lineage began to appear. The Anūnatvā-pūṇatvanirdeśasūtra opens with a question that sets the theme of Tathāgatagarbha thinking:

Bhagavan, from the beginningless beginning sentient beings (sattva) have been revolving in the six destinies, going back and forth in the three worlds, transmigrating in samsāra, and experiencing suffering without limit. Now, Bhagavan, is this accumulation of sattva, this ocean of sattva, to be increased or to be decreased? This question is deep and I have not yet understood it. If someone were to ask me, what should I say? 1

This question reflects the dilemma of one born shortly after Nāgārjuna's refutation of the Abhidharma scholasticism. Should the Abhidharma notions of truth and practice be adopted, according to which one must add to common sense the theoretical, philosophical thinking that leads to paramārthasatya? That is, should this present world in which we all live be increased? Or, on the other hand, should the Madhyamika insight into emptiness be followed? That is, should this present world be decreased, because all dharmas are empty?

The early fifth century Ratnagotravibhāgaśāstra,

the only śāstra devoted solely to Tathāgatagarbha thinking,² states the purpose of this teaching in more explicit terms.

It has been said here and there [in the scriptures] that all things are to be known everywhere as being "unreal," like clouds, [visions in] a dream, and illusions. Whereas, why has the Buddha declared here that the essence of Buddha (buddha-dhātu, 如來性) "exists" in every living being? 3

The teaching referred to in the first part of this passage is that of Prajñāpāramitā and Madhyamika. The Madhyamikakārikās state:

It is like an illusion, a dream, or an imaginary city in the sky. In such a fashion, [the concepts of] origination, duration, and cessation have been described. 4

The Ratnagotravibhāga then outlines five defects that are caused by regarding everything as empty. The first is depression, for thinking that everything is simply nothing at all can bring about despondency. The second is contempt against those who are deemed to be inferior, for believing that one has insight into emptiness can lead to pride. The third is the fact that, because of such pride, true knowledge will not arise, and one will consequently cling to unrealities. The fourth defect is speaking ill of the truth, for although defects are empty and unreal, virtues are pure and not to be denigrated. The fifth defect is that, due to negating and denigrating virtue, one cannot attain

compassion (maitrī), and is thus guilty of the defect of affection for one's own self.⁵

It is to be noted that all these objections to Madhyamika are not theoretical, but rather objections to its embodiment in practice. The aim of the Tathāgata-garbha literature is then not to offer a rival synthesis to either Madhyamika or Abhidharma, but to develop a practical doctrine that will encourage people to follow the path. It does not develop the highly sophisticated, technical language of the Abhidharma, but expresses its doctrine in poetic metaphors and images. Tathāgata-garbha does not move in the context of theoretical thinking. But, neither does it function in the mystic context of apophatic thinking. After describing the teaching of emptiness, the Ratnagotravibhāga then explains the teaching of Tathāgatagarbha as the "ultimate doctrine (uttara tantra 究竟論)," which goes beyond the emphasis on śūnyatā to focus upon the existence (astitva) of buddhadhātu. It thus sees itself as a synthesis of śūnyatā, for defilements are empty, and aśūnyatā, for buddhadhātu does indeed exist.

But this does not mean that Tathāgatagarbha is directly opposed to Madhyamika. Again there is a shift in the context of meaning. For the majority of people, reading the tracts of Nāgārjuna will probably

always remain meaningless, for they have not experienced the all encompassing vision that leads to mystic consciousness. Emptiness then seems to be simply a denial of phenomenal validity. Thus Tathāgatagarbha functions in the main in the common sense context of meaning.

This perhaps explains why, although the Tathāgatagarbha teachings limited emptiness to defilements and ran directly counter to Nāgārjuna's emptying of even nirvāṇa, yet it did not evoke much criticism from Madhyamikans of later times. In his Madhyamikāvātāra, Chandrakīrti refers to Tathāgatagarbha doctrine as an upāya,⁶ but does not offer a refutation of its "realistic" conception of buddhadhātu, of tathāgatagarbha, the womb or embryo of tathagatahood. William Grosnick thinks that Chandrakīrti was probably not familiar with the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine.⁷ If this be the case, then it seems obvious that these teachings were never presented as an alternative to Madhyamika. On the other hand, even if he was familiar with them, he did not see them as an opposing doctrine to be refuted.

This does not mean that Tathāgatagarbha did not constitute a coherent doctrinal synthesis in India, but simply that it did not function in the context of theoretical meaning, nor in the apophatic context of mystic meaning. Most saints and models in all religious

traditions are neither theoreticians nor mystics, but rather examples of the embodiment of the teachings in phenomenal living. Even during the development of Abhidharma and the rise of the counteracting Madhyamika, most people, even be they monks, remained unconcerned either with Abhidharma's pretensions to a grasp of paramārthasatya, or with the subtlety of Nāgārjuna's dialectic.

This is to say that Tathāgatagarbha represents a reaffirmation of the common sense context of meaning, in which religious insight occurs not in theoretical or mystic terms, but in the common sense, religious terms of the living of everyday life. One would rather experience enlightenment than know how to define it.

Thus there seems little evidence that Tathāgatagarbha formed an academic school in India. With its heavy emphasis upon the practical and its lack of theoretical sophistication, it simply was not academic. Even the one purely Tathāgatagarbha śāstra, the Ratnagotravibhāga, reads more like a work of literature than a scholastic tract. With such an orientation toward practice, it is not surprising that Chandrakīrti would regard Tathāgatagarbha as an upāya, i.e., a skillful means to lead others toward practicing the path. Nor is it surprising that Bhāvivaveka, being of rather scholastic disposition,

does not mention it at all. Christian theologians in the West tend to pass over in silence the less sophisticated teachings of preachers and charismatic leaders. What were these teachings of Tathāgatagarbha?

A) The Non-Origination of Discrimination and the Originally Pure Mind.

Nāgārjuna's main thrust was the negation of prapañca, the extroversion of consciousness. It is a logical step to conclude that, since discriminative thinking (vikalpa) issues in prapañca, then one must simply not give rise to such thinking. It would seem to be with this meaning that the Tathāgatagarbha texts speak of the original purity of the mind (cittaprakṛtviśuddhi).⁸ The Anūnatvāpūṇatvanirdeśa mentions this original purity,⁹ and the Śrīmālādevīsīṃhanādasūtra writes:

Lord, the intrinsic purity of the Tathāgatagarbha stained by adventitious, secondary defilements is the domain of the Tathāgata, who is the inconceivable Master. Why so? The virtuous consciousness, being momentary, is not defiled by defilements, and also, the unvirtuous consciousness, being momentary, is not defiled by defilements. Lord, since neither do defilements touch that consciousness nor does that consciousness touch defilements, in that case, how does consciousness, having a non-contacting nature, get defiled? Lord, there is both the defilement and defiled consciousness. Therefore the meaning of the defilement on the intrinsically pure consciousness is difficult to understand.¹⁰

The Śrīmālā's answer to this dilemma is not to develop a theory of the nature of consciousness, but

rather to affirm that, even although there are these adventitious defilements, consciousness is indeed intrinsically pure. If one cannot understand how this can be, then it should be accepted through faith in the Tathāgata.

Likewise the thrust of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra is to show by a series of nine metaphors that, although sentient beings are involved in various kinds of defilements, yet they are always in possession of the embryo or germ (garbha) of a Tathāgata, which remains always undefiled. Thus we read:

All sentient beings, although they are in defiled bodies in all the destinies, have tathāgatagarbha, which is always undefiled. 11

This constantly pure potential of everyone to realize tathagatahood and to avoid the defilements of the world is the garbha, the seed, which renders consciousness originally pure. It is never identified with those defilements.

The Ratnagotravibhāga then thematizes this pure mind as the mind of non-discrimination:

Defilements are the darkness and the pure mind is the light. Defilements are of weak power, but the correct intuition (vipaśyanā) 12 is powerful. Defilements are merely accidental, but the original mind is of a pure root (mūla-viśuddhā prakṛtiḥ). Defilements are of wrong discrimination, but the original mind is non-discrimination. 13

Thus, as Grosnick points out,¹⁴ the Ratnagotravibhāga

clearly states that "one who applies himself with fundamental mental comprehension (yoniso-maniskāra)"¹⁵ will simply not give rise to discrimination (vikalpa). There is no need then to stop discrimination. Rather, by abiding in the originally pure mind, it simply does not arise, and thus there is no prapañca.

By knowing deeply that this non-fundamental comprehension (ayoniso-maniskāra) is extinct by nature, consequently there is no origination of duality and discrimination.¹⁶

None of the Tathāgatagarbha texts will explain the specific nature of the mind, whereby such a non-origination of duality and discrimination is possible. The original purity of the mind is not then a metaphysical principle, but simply "a restatement of the principle that one should not originate those false notions of self and dharmas that lead to craving, hatred, ignorance, and suffering."¹⁷

B) The Existence of Tathāgatagarbha

In contrast to what could be supposed to be the negative tone of Madhyamika, the Tathāgatagarbha texts all present the buddha realm, i.e., the tathāgatagarbha, in an affirmative and positive fashion.

The Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśasūtra thematizes the non-differentiation of dharmadhātu, the realm of enlightenment, and sattvadhātu, the realm of beings. As Takasaki

Jikidō has explained,¹⁸ the term sattva of sattvadhātu can be interpreted either as sattva, [sentient] beings, or as sat-tva, being, existence. Thus the Anūnatvāpūrṇatva-nirdeśa, in affirming the non-differentiation of dharmadhātu and sattvadhātu, is in effect identifying the existence of the world with dharmadhātu:

Dharmadhātu is not apart from sattvadhātu.
Sattvadhātu is not apart from dharmadhātu.
Sattvadhātu is precisely dharmakāya. Dharmakāya is precisely sattvadhātu. Śariputra, these two dharmas in meaning are one, but in name are different. 19

Thus underlying prapañca, underlying all views and conceptualizations is dharmadhātu, dharmakāya, tathāgatagarbha, and, once dualistic discrimination does not arise, it is seen that the existence of the phenomenal realm of sentient beings, the existence of the world, is none other than the originally pure mind of tathāgatagarbha.

This positive, affirmative meaning of tathāgatagarbha is seen in the attribution to it of the four guṇapāramitās of eternity (nitya 常), constancy (dhurva 恒), purity (śiva 清), and unchangeableness (śaśvata 不變),²⁰ terms which would have been immediately negated by Nāgārjuna.

However, even in this common sense context, it is evident that everyone is not enlightened simply because of the presence of tathāgatagarbha, for it is covered over

by the impurities of kleśa. The Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa outlines this as follows:

Next, Śāriputra, as I have explained above, in sattvadhātu there are three kinds of dharmas. All are reality (眞實) and are not differentiated nor distinct [from one another].

The first is tathāgatagarbha, existing from the beginningless beginning, together with pure dharmas, and which has the nature of being essentially joined together with [those pure dharmas].

The second is tathāgatagarbha, existing from the beginningless beginning together with impure dharmas, i.e., the coverings of kleśa, and which has the nature of not being joined with [those impure dharmas].

The third is tathāgatagarbha, which is the same for future ages, because it is existence as the eternal dharmatā. 21

The text then explains that the first is the dharma essence (法體) associated with purity that has existed (有) without beginning or end, and because of which the Buddha has taught the inconceivable (不可思議), i.e., the non-conceptual dharma nature that is the pure mind (清淨心).

The second is explained as being impure, because it is covered and bound by kleśa, which can only be severed by wisdom. But such defilement is not due to its nature, which is still the mind of purity (自性清淨心), but to adventitious kleśa (客塵煩惱).

The first then describes tathāgatagarbha in itself and identifies it with the pure mind, while the second recognizes that the very same tathāgatagarbha exists

as covered over by defilements. This parallels the Śrīmālādevīsīṃhanāda's description of the mind of original purity (prakṛtipariśuddhicitta) and the mind of secondary defilement (upakliṣṭacitta), and the Ratnagotravibhāga's description of purified (nirmalā) and non-purified (samala) tathatā.²²

The third item treats the same tathāgatagarbha, but now considers it as the root (根本) or support (住持) for all dharmas, i.e., as the dharmatā of all that exists.

Śāriputra, the tathāgatagarbha, which is the same for all future ages, because it is existence as the eternal dharmatā, is precisely the root of all dharmas. Complete in all dharmas, identified with all dharmas, in worldly dharmas it is not apart nor separated from all dharmas, which are thus actually real. It supports all dharmas and upholds all dharmas. Śāriputra, because of this eternal, constant, pure, and changeless refuge, which is neither born nor destroyed, the inconceivably pure dharmadhātu is said to be the sattvadhātu. Why is this so? Because sattvadhātu is precisely that eternal, constant, pure, and changeless refuge, which is neither born nor destroyed. The inconceivably pure dharmadhātu and other such [terms] are different names for it, because of this meaning. Relying on this teaching, I term the dharmadhātu sattvadhātu. Śāriputra, these three dharmas are all true tathatā (眞實如) and are not differentiated nor different. In these non-differentiated and non-distinct dharmas, which are true tathatā, one finally will not give rise to the two kinds of false views, which are extremely evil and in no wise good. Why? Because of insight into tathatā. Śāriputra, the two views of increase and decrease are far removed from all Buddha-tathāgatas, and are rejected by all of them.²³

This third dharma is then tathāgatagarbha as it

is the support for the existence (sat-tva) of sattva-dhātu. As Grosnick explains,²⁴ tathāgatagarbha is then not only the non-evolution of conceptual, discriminative thinking, but also the support and the basis that enables such non-conceptualization to come about.

The first dharma describes tathāgatagarbha as the original purity of the mind. The second explains that, although it is covered by defilement, yet it does not lose that original purity. The third then affirms that it is precisely the existence of this garbha that allows all sentient beings for all future time to realize the non-evolution of discrimination, i.e., to become aware of the originally pure mind.

This theme of the existence of tathāgatagarbha is emphasized by the Śrīmālā:

The tathāgatagarbha is empty (śūnya) of all the defilement coverings, which are all differentiated and separated from that tathāgatagarbha. But tathāgatagarbha is by no means empty (aśūnya) of the Buddha dharmas, which are not differentiated nor separated from it, and are inconceivably more numerous than the sands of the Ganges. 25

Note that in this passage emptiness applies only to the defilement coverings, and not to tathāgatagarbha itself. This is obviously not the Madhyamika understanding of emptiness, which would allow nothing whatsoever to escape the dialectic of emptiness and be termed aśūnya. But yet for the Śrīmālā, emptiness is limited

to defilement, and is too negative a term to be applied to tathāgatagarbha, the ultimate pure mind.

C) The Need for Faith

Consequently for the Tathāgatagarbha scriptures śūnyatā was not an all inclusive notion, for after śūnyatā, there yet was something left over (avaśiṣṭa), i.e., the existent tathāgatagarbha. After the non-arising of conceptualization and discrimination (vikalpa), there yet remained the originally pure mind.²⁶

But all this is not apparent to empirical consciousness. Rather, most people are aware that their minds are far from purity. The Ratnagotravibhāga does say that if one attain fundamental mental comprehension, then he would understand this purity, and the Śrīmālā does allow that Queen Śrīmālā herself and the bodhisattvas possessed of the great doctrine can understand how the mind can be pure, and yet be adventitiously defiled. But for the rest of humanity, faith must suffice.

This necessity of faith is particularly evident in the Ratnagotravibhāga, for as long as discriminative thinking yet arises, one cannot understand the pure mind of tathāgatagarbha.

. . . this [absolute] essence is not accessible to imagination nor to discrimination. It is accessible only by faith . . . The highest

truth of the Buddhas can be understood only by faith. Indeed the blind cannot see the blazing disk of the sun. 27

The last chapter of the Ratnagotravibhāga ends with an exposition of the merits of having faith in the doctrine of the essence of Buddhahood, i.e., tathāgata-garbha:

The essence of Buddhahood, the Buddha's properties, and the Buddha's acts are inconceivable even to those of pure mind, being the exclusive sphere of the Leaders. But the wise one, whose intellect accepts the faith in this exclusive sphere of the Buddha becomes a receptacle of the whole collection of such properties. And, being possessed of the desire [to obtain] the inconceivable properties [of the Buddha], he surpasses the abundance of all living beings. 28

Faith is then an incipient awareness of the reality of tathāgatagarbha, of the fact that within each and every being is the seed or potential to realize the essential purity of the mind and to attain enlightenment. But this faith is possible in the first place only because it is supported by tathāgatagarbha. In this teaching, faith is then circular, inasmuch as it is rendered possible and valid only because of the existence of its object, tathāgatagarbha. This teaching is not then an attempt to theoretically analyze the nature of the mind, nor to apophatically point to the immediacy of mystic consciousness, but rather a common sense encouragement to practice the realities known, at first, only

through faith. It is then no wonder that the Tathāgata-garbha writers never formed an academic school. Their interest lay elsewhere.

But it does seem unlikely that among those who developed Tathāgatagarbha thinking there were none of a more academic turn of mind. And there are evidences of systematizing models in Tathāgatagarbha literature. The Ratnagotravibhāga employs a schema of six categories which appear to have been borrowed from Yogācāra texts.²⁹ Furthermore, in the Tibetan tradition the Ratnagotravibhāga is attributed to Maitreya, and forms one of the five texts that Asaṅga received from him in the Tuṣita heaven. These texts are the cornerstone of the highly academic Yogācāra synthesis. What is the Ratnagotravibhāga doing among them? Also, later Tibetan commentators, such as Sa skya paṇḍi ta (1182-1251) and Bu ston (1290-1364) classified it among the Viññānavāda texts, although they considered its teachings to be neyartha, i.e., a teaching whose meaning (artha) had to be drawn out (neya) and made explicit.³⁰

At first glance all this seems strange, for the intrinsically pure mind of Tathāgatagarbha thinking seems to have little in common with the classical Yogācāra doctrine of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. While it is true that later Yogācāra texts, such as the Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda

and the Fo-hsing lun (佛性論) have clearly amalgamated Tathāgatagarbha and Vijñānavāda thinking,³¹ this does not explain why the Ratnagotravibhāga should have ever been attributed to Maitreya and classified as a Yogācāra text.

But yet there does seem to have existed an intimate relationship between Tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra. William Grosnick argues convincingly that the Ratnagotravibhāga's understanding of buddhahātu as the non-duality of subject and object can be traced to the earlier Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, an early Yogācāra text.³²

Furthermore, the presence in the Ratnagotravibhāga of the famous quotation on the beginningless realm (anādikāloko dhātuḥ) from the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra shows yet more dependency on Yogācāra works.³³

Takasaki Jikidō, however, argues that, because of the clear differences in doctrine, the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine "is a completely different system from the Vijñānavāda by origin."³⁴ He also notes that, because of its failure to make use of ālayavijñāna, its explanation of tathāgatagarbha as the substratum (ādhāra) of the phenomenal world remained weak, and thus in its later development it could not but introduce ālaya, as seen in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra and the Mahāyānaśraddhotpādaśāstra. Takasaki continues:

Furthermore, such an innovation of the Vijñānavāda

resulted in the absorption of the garbha theory into the Vijñānavāda, preventing the former from establishing an independent school of its own. This absorption seems to have taken place not so long after the Ratna in the period when the Vijñānavāda had formed an independent school as the rival of the Madhyamika. At its starting point, the garbha theory was no doubt of an independent character, different from the Vijñānavāda, and the Ratna was the first and at the same time the last independent and pure exposition of the garbha theory. 35

However, there appears to be no convincing reason to assume that Tathāgatagarbha and Vijñānavāda co-existed as different systems in the same context of meaning. It has been argued above that Tathāgatagarbha functions predominantly within the horizon of common sense meaning, and was not intended principally as a theory at all. Indeed in the period immediately after Nāgārjuna, the very possibility of theoretical endeavours must have been problematic. But as time went on, the need for ever clearer expositions of the relationships between original purity and phenomenal consciousness must have become more and more pressing. From this need there arose the Yogācāra synthesis. If this be true, then Yogācāra is a theoretical development from the common sense context of Tathāgatagarbha, which attempts to resurrect theory in the light of Madhyamika emptiness. It would then not seem to be the case that Tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra existed side by side as alternate options, and were later amalgamated in post Asaṅga texts.³⁶

Rather, Yogācāra seems to have been an organic development from Tathāgatagarbha, brought about by those who felt the theoretical exigency, and so constructed as to incorporate the Madhyamika themes of śūnyatā-pratītya-samutpāda and the two truths. If these two trends of thinking were so related, then it is not surprising that the Ratnagotravibhāga would have been attributed to Maitreya, or that Yogācāra elements are to be found in Tathāgatagarbha texts. Furthermore, this would also explain why the Ratnagotravibhāga is the only purely Tathāgatagarbha śāstra, for the theoretical systematization of Tathāgatagarbha is precisely Yogācāra. If this hypothesis be valid, then one would expect to see in the earliest level of Yogācāra texts a reinterpretation of the Tathāgatagarbha themes. Thus, after a brief chapter on the nature of the Yogācāra endeavour, the following two chapters will be devoted to a consideration of the earliest Yogācāra texts, the Samdhinirmocanasūtra, the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra, and the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, all of which preceded the classical formulation of Yogācāra thinking by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.

Notes

¹T. 16, p. 466a.

²Takasaki Jikidō, A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra), Being a Treatise on the Tathāgatagarbha of Mahāyāna Buddhism, Rome, 1966, p. 60.

- ³Takasaki, Study, p. 305.
- ⁴Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 70.
- ⁵Takasaki, Study, pp. 305-306.
- ⁶William Grosnick, The Zen Master Dōgen's Understanding of the Buddha-Nature in Light of the Historical Development of the Buddha-Nature Concept in India, China, and Japan (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison 1979), p. 80, n. 19.
- ⁷Ibid.
- ⁸This phrase does not occur in what is probably the earliest text, the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, but it is found in almost all of the subsequent texts.
- ⁹T. 16, p. 467b.
- ¹⁰Alex and Hideko Wayman, The Lion's Roar of Queen Śrīmālā, New York and London, 1974, p. 106.
- ¹¹T. 16, p. 457c.
- ¹²According to F. Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, p. 491, vipaśyanā is almost always accompanied by the word śamatha (calm) and designates the penetrating insight arrived at after the calm of non-discrimination is attained. For an analysis of these meditational practices see Geshe Sopa, "Śamathavipaśyanāyuganaddha: The Two Leading Principles of Buddhist Meditation," Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice, ed. Minoru Kiyota, Honolulu, 1978, pp. 46-66.
- ¹³Takasaki, Study, p. 239.
- ¹⁴Grosnick, The Zen Master Dōgen, pp. 51-58.
- ¹⁵Takasaki, Study, p. 166, translates the term ayoniśomanaskāra as "irrational thought." I follow Edgerton, Dictionary, p. 448, who renders it as fundamental mental comprehension. It seems that the point here emphasized is that, since tathāgatagarbha is the basis (āśraya), fundamental comprehension is that which becomes aware of this foundation or basis.
- ¹⁶Takasaki, Study, pp. 166-167.
- ¹⁷Grosnick, The Zen Master Dōgen, p. 60.

- ¹⁸Takasaki Jikidō, Nyoraizō shisō no keisei, Tokyo 1974, pp. 76-77.
- ¹⁹T. 16, p. 467b.
- ²⁰Takasaki, Study, p. 167, n. 28.
- ²¹T. 16, p. 467b-c. Discussed and translated into Japanese by Takasaki, Keisei, pp. 69-92.
- ²²Takasaki, Study, p. 37.
- ²³T. 16, p. 467c.
- ²⁴Grosnick, The Zen Master Dōgen, p. 48 sq.
- ²⁵T.12 , p. 221c. Wayman, The Lion's Roar, p. 99.
- ²⁶See Nagao Gadjin, "'What Remains' in Śūnyatā: A Yogācāra Interpretation of Emptiness," Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice, pp. 74-76.
- ²⁷Takasaki, Study, p. 296.
- ²⁸Takasaki, Study. pp. 380-381.
- ²⁹Takasaki Jikidō, "Description of the Ultimate Reality by Means of Six Categories in Mahāyāna Buddhism," IBK, IX (1961), pp. 24-33.
- ³⁰Grosnick, The Zen Master Dōgen, p. 81.
- ³¹See chapter ten. of this study.
- ³²Grosnick, The Zen Master Dōgen, pp. 91-92.
- ³³Takasaki, Study, p. 290. For a further consideration of this quotation, see chapter nine, p. 183, and chapter ten, p. 244.
- ³⁴Takasaki, Study, pp. 58-59.
- ³⁵Takasaki, Study, p. 60.

CHAPTER SIX

Yogācāra - The Context of Interiority

As seen in chapter one, a common sense context of meaning predominated in the early Buddhism of the Nikāyas and the Āgamas. Chapter two attempted to show that Abhidharma represented a bifurcation of theoretical consciousness from that earlier common sense horizon. The third and fourth chapters aimed at the demonstration of the fact that the Prajñāpāramitā literature and the Madhyamika dialectic of Nāgārjuna focused upon the inadequacies of an extroverted understanding of consciousness, which underlay that Abhidharma enterprise. In place of such extroverted consciousness, they offered an apophatic via negativa, whereby one might be able to realize wisdom without enunciating any positive content in regard to that wisdom. Chapter five argued that the Tathāgatagarbha texts, because they perceived the Prajñāpāramitā and Madhyamika teachings to be overly negative, reaffirmed a more positive approach in developing their notion of the garbha and the originally pure mind. But such a positive thrust did not mean that they thereby adopted the theoretical context of Abhidharma. Rather, in the main they moved in the context of common sense understanding, and were concerned more

with the practices leading to wisdom than with the theoretical understanding of just how it is that such practices can lead to wisdom. But questions do continually arise and theoretical exigency demands the development of appropriate languages and systematic structures. It was then the intent of the Yogācāra thinkers to develop a comprehensive understanding, which might ground doctrinal discourse within consciousness. Meaning is not seen only in its practical effects in everyday living as it is in the common sense context. It is not seen in the grasping of entities through the development of theories as it was in Abhidharma, although Yogācāra does proliferate theories. Neither is meaning identified with the mystic context that would see meaning embodied only in the immediacy of vision, such as was the case with Prajñāpāramitā and Madhyamika. Rather, in the Yogācāra context of critical interiority, meaning is understood as a function of conscious activity, and the pervasive focus is on the nature of the consciousness that can generate meaning at all levels and in all contexts. Yogācāra is then a resurrection of theoretical thinking. But it did not simply repeat the Abhidharma model, for such would have been almost impossible after Nāgārjuna. Theory is now understood in the context of emptiness, in the context of an

understanding of consciousness that generates the meaning of emptiness. The Yogācāra theories are not then the enunciations of extroverted consciousness, but are formulated from within this context of conscious interiority. The objective is to develop an understanding of consciousness which will explain both how prapañca thinking arises, and how it can be reversed. In contrast to Tathāgatagarbha, which takes its point of departure from the faith affirmation of the existence of the pure mind of the garbha, Yogācāra takes as its starting point phenomenal consciousness, for it is from such consciousness that questions arise. Thus, although both Tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra attempt to reassert positive doctrinal content, yet they differ in that, while the former moves in the context of common sense meaning, the later expands the horizon to that of conscious interiority. As Takasaki writes:

In its methodology, the Vijñānavāda was really a successor to the Abhidharma Buddhism, but it was the Abhidharma based upon the śūnyatāvāda of the Prajñāpāramitā, and hence deserves to be called "mahāyānābhidharma," as shown in the title of one scripture. 1

Yogācāra attempts to expand the horizon or context in which meaning may be understood. In contrast to the common sense, theoretical, and apophatic horizons of meaning, it focuses upon the nature of that understanding in order to make explicit the implicit operations of

understanding. Together with Nāgārjuna, the Yogācārins refute the extroverted thinking of the Abhidharma masters. But, whereas Nāgārjuna's refutation flowed from apophatic insight into the realization of wisdom, the Yogācārins' refutation is the result of their understanding of conscious understanding. Together with the Tathāgatagarbha scriptures, they affirm that there is a "remainder" (avaśiṣṭa) after emptiness, but they treat this "remainder" from the critical context of conscious interiority, rather than from the common sense context of practical, religious insight.² The constant Yogācāra refrain that the three worlds are consciousness only (三界識唯) is intended both to refute the Abhidharma assumption that entities exist as meaning units (dharma-svabhāva), and to focus critical understanding upon conscious operations.

The comprehensiveness of this intended horizon can perhaps be seen in the usage of the two terms yāvadbhāvikatā and yathāyāvadbhāvikatā. For Nāgārjuna, as interpreted by Chandrakīrti, the two truths are distinguished as that which is covered (saṃvṛtasatya, i.e., paramārthasatya) and that which covers (saṃvṛti-satya). The Tathāgatagarbha teaching, focusing upon the ultimate pure garbha, lays heavy stress upon paramārtha, and describes it as being covered by kleśa, but does

not devote much attention to the nature of saṃvṛtisatya. Yogācāra, however, does accord more positive value to this conventional truth.

The term yāvadbhāvikatā 尽所有 means "as far as the limits of existence," and corresponds to saṃvṛtisatya. It describes the course of the bodhisattva, who in complete wisdom (sarvākārajñāna, i.e., wisdom of all aspects) can relate to the limitless realm of phenomenal existence. Yathāyadbhāvikatā 如所有 means existence just as it is (tathatā) and corresponds to paramārthasatya. It describes the wisdom which directly enters into the true nature of all things (dharmatā). The first is broad and comprehensive (udāra), while the second is penetrating and deep (gam-bhīra). As Nagao explains, although the correspondence of these two terms with the two truths is not explicitly stated in the Chinese translations of Yogācāra texts, it is attested by the Tibetan translations, which equate ji-sñed-pa (yāvadbhāvikatā) and ji-lta-pa (yathāyadbhāvikatā) with saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya.³

These terms first appear in the foundational Yogācāra scripture, the Samdhinirmocanasūtra⁴ in its discussion of the ten marks of a bodhisattva's understanding:

The first mark is the understanding of the limits of existence. The second is the understanding of

existence just as it is . . . The limits of existence (yāvadbhāvikatā) refer to the limits of discernment of all the aspects of existence in regard to pure and impure dharmas, i.e., the five skandhas, the six internal āyatanas, and the six external āyatanas. Existence just as it is (yathāvadbhāvikatā) is tathatā of the existence of all those impure and pure dharmas. 5

This passage parallels the section on the discernment of dharmas (arthapratisaṃvid) in the Abhidharma-kośabhāṣya,⁶ but, whereas the Abhidharma passage saw such an analysis as issuing in a knowledge of the absolute truth, the Samdhinirmonaca understands understanding in the light of the Madhyamika notion of emptiness.

The text continues:

This true nature (tattva) has seven kinds: The first is the true nature of origination (pravṛtītattva), i.e., all actions have neither beginning nor end. The second is the true nature of marks (lakṣaṇatattva), i.e., all dharmas and persons are without svabhāva. The third is the true nature of consciousness (viññaptitattva), i.e., all actions are consciousness only. The fourth is the true nature of the establishing [of doctrine], (saṃniveśatattva), i.e., the truth concerning suffering which I explain. The fifth is the true nature of false conceptions (mithya-pratipattitattva), i.e., the truth concerning the origin [of suffering] which I explain. The sixth is the true nature of purity (viśuddhitattva), i.e., the truth of the elimination [of suffering] which I explain. And the seventh is the true nature of the highest practice (samyakpratipattitattva), i.e., the truth of the holy path which I explain. 7

As Yamaguchi Susumu points out,⁸ the first true nature discussed, that of origination, echoes the first verse of the Pūrvāparakoṭi-parikṣā chapter of the Madhyamikakārikās:

The Great Wise One has said that the state anterior to samsāra cannot be grasped. For samsāra has no beginning or end; that is to say, no definite points of commencement or conclusion.⁹

The Samdhinirmocana then seems not to agree with the Tathāgatagarbha idea of the non-origination of discrimination (vikalpa), for one cannot reach a state prior to the arising of samsaric thinking and living.

In the second true nature the Prajñāpāramitā theme that all dharmas are empty and without svabhāva is reiterated.

The third true nature is the pivotal point, for only by understanding the true nature (tattva) of consciousness can one then proceed from a negation of extroverted consciousness to the establishment of doctrine. Thus, after asserting that all is consciousness only, the following four natures restate the four truths, which had been negated in a full chapter of Nāgārjuna's Madhyamikakārikās.¹⁰

This same progression is also evident in the literary structure of the Samdhinirmocanasūtra. As Lamotte explains,¹¹ this sūtra is a composite of three different parts that have been joined together to form the present text. The first part, chapters one to four, consist in an essay on paramārthasatya in Prajñāpāramitā style, and thus parallel Madhyamika thinking, for therein all marks of the ultimate are negated. The second part,

chapters four to eight, focus on the Yogācāra themes of the nature of consciousness and the three natures (trisvabhāva). This would suggest that the Samdhinirmocana author has added this section specifically to show that the Prajñāpāramitā notion of emptiness must be interpreted in terms of a critical understanding of consciousness, for only thus can one understand the meaning of the scriptures. Only after this second part does the Samdhinirmocana add a third concluding part, which is a resumé of doctrine and practice for novices.

This movement from Abhidharma through Prajñāpāramitā to Yogācāra is clearly expressed in the Samdhinirmocana's teaching on the three turnings of the dharma wheel.

The bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata said to the Buddha: In the country of Benares at Rṣipatana in the Deer Park, the Bhagavan first turned the wheel of the dharma teaching, demonstrating the four holy truths for the followers of the Śrāvaka vehicle. This turning of the wheel was marvelous and wonderful, such as nobody, whether gods or men, had ever turned before in the world. Nevertheless there were superior teachings. This [first turning] gave rise to criticism, had to be interpreted (末了義, draṇ paḥi don, neyārtha), and became an object of controversy. Then the Bhagavan with an implicit intention (以隱密相, saṃdhyākāreṇa), turned the wheel for the second time for the sake of the followers of the great vehicle, explaining that all dharmas are without svabhāva, do not arise (anutpanna), are not destroyed (aniruddha), are quiescent from the beginning (ādiśanta), and are originally nirvāṇa (prakṛtīnirvāṇa). Nevertheless there are teachings superior to it, for it also gave rise to criticism, had to be interpreted (neyārtha), and

became an object of controversy. Then the Bhagavan, with an explicit intention (以顯了相, vibhātākārena) turned the wheel a third time for the sake of the followers of all the vehicles, explaining that all dharmas are without svabhāva, do not arise, are not destroyed, are quiescent from the beginning, and are originally nirvāṇa. This turning of the wheel of the dharma teaching is absolutely marvelous and wonderful. It is unsurpassed, does not give rise to criticism, is explicit (顯了義, ñes pañi don, nitārtha), and does not become an object of controversy.¹²

This passage highlights the Yogācāra understanding of meaning. The first turning of the wheel includes both the teachings of the Nikāyas and Āgamas and the Abhidharma works, all of which take the four truths as their central theme. The Samdhinirmocana characterizes these teachings as imperfect and in need of the Prajñāpāramitā apophatic negation that all dharmas are without svabhāva. They are neyārtha, i.e. their meaning (artha) has to be drawn out (neya) and interpreted, inasmuch as they have not rendered explicit the understanding of conscious understanding that underlies their teachings. Such extroverted consciousness is counteracted by the second turning of the wheel, the doctrines of Prajñāpāramitā. But even this second turning is neyārtha, for nowhere does it make explicit any understanding of consciousness that might ground its negations and render it critically valid. Instead it remains an object of criticism and controversy. It is only the third turning, i.e., Yogācāra, that can be termed nitārtha,

explicit, for its meaning (artha) has been drawn out (nita) and made manifest. This is because only Yogācāra focuses upon interiority and can thus make explicit the implicit ground for meaning. Without an awareness of how meaning is generated by consciousness, no meanings can be explicitly validated, for one might simply have misunderstood, and being unable to recheck the process of understanding, be involved in the prapañca process of mistaken notions. Yogācāra is a critical understanding of understanding, because, being aware of the conscious process of understanding, it is able to criticize and judge all particular acts of understanding in light of that understood process.

Be it noted also that the third turning of the dharma wheel (Yogācāra) is not distinguished from the second turning (Prajñāpāramitā) in terms of doctrinal content, for the content of the teachings are described in identical terms. Yogācāra then does not set out to offer any new teaching, but rather to render explicit (nirmocana) the implicit (saṃdhi) ground of the Madhyamika teachings within consciousness. This passage is then not simply an expression of a Yogācāra sectarian bias, but rather describes the development of an awareness that there are different contexts of meaning, which are embodied in the various historical formulations

of Buddhist thinking.

But even although it aimed at a consistent grounding of thinking in its analysis of conscious interiority, yet Yogācāra does not present a unified visage. Within the Yogācāra tradition various currents of thought contended. The following chapters will take up the examination of these currents. The next chapter will consider the initial phase of Yogācāra thinking as represented in the first sūtras of this school, the Samdhinirmocanasūtra and the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra. Chapter eight will examine the teachings of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, as they play a crucial role in interpreting later developments. Chapter nine will then treat the classical formulation of Yogācāra by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Chapter ten will consider the alternate Yogācāra view of such texts as the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, the Mahāyānaśraddhotpādaśāstra, and the translations of Paramārtha, which diverged from the classical formulation of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Chapter eleven will then devote some consideration to the place of Dignāga in the Yogācāra tradition in order to lay the foundation for chapter twelve, which treats Dharmapāla's lineage of Yogācāra. Thus for the remainder of this first part the context of meaning will be that of conscious interiority.

Notes

¹Takasaki, Study, p. 59.

²See Nagao Gadjin, "'What Remains' in Sūnyatā: A Yogācāra Interpretation of Emptiness," Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice, ed. Minoru Kiyota, pp. 74-76.

³Nagao Gadjin, "Chūkan tetsugaku no konponteki tachiba," Chūkan to yuishiki, pp. 33-36.

⁴Samdhi means the real meaning, the hidden intent. Thus F. Edgerton, Dictionary, p. 558, gives the meaning of Samdhi-nirmocana as the "setting forth or unfolding of the real truth, the fundamental explanation. This parallels the Tibetan dgoñs pa ñes par hḡrel pa, The real explanation of the esoteric meaning. Hsüan-tsang's Chinese reads 解深密, i.e., Explaining the Deep Mystery. Bodhiruci's version gives 深密解脫, with the same meaning. Etienne Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana-sūtra: L'explication des mystères (Louvain and Paris 1935), p. 12, writes that the title literally means "Sūtra detachant les noeuds (The Sūtra that loosens knots)." The question is just what is meant by these mysteries, hidden intentions, knots (samdhi). In chapter five of the text, the Buddha is questioned concerning the "secrets" of cittamanovijñāna (心意識秘密). It would thus seem that samdhi refers to the implicit functions and structures of consciousness, which are made explicit (nirmocana) by this sūtra. It is not just that mysterious or hidden things are explained, but that by making explicit the implicits of consciousness, the Samdhinirmocanasūtra lays the foundation for Yogācāra itself.

⁵T. 16, p. 699c. Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, pp. 218-219.

⁶Louis de La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, traduit et annoté (Paris 1923-1931) VII, pp. 90-91.

⁷T. 16, p. 699c. Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, pp. 218-219. This passage is quoted in the Madhyantavibhāga-tīkā, ed. Yamaguchi Susumu (Nagoya 1934), pp. 133-134.

⁸Yamaguchi Susumu, Anne Ajiyari zō Chuhen funbetsu ron shakusho, Tokyo, 1967, II, 213,n.2.

⁹Inada, Nāgārjuna, p. 85.

¹⁰Chapter XXIV, Āryasatya-parikṣā. Inada, Nāgārjuna, pp. 143-153.

¹¹Lamotte, Samdhinirmocanasūtra, pp. 17-24. Ui Hakuju, Tōyō tetsyagakushi, p. 37, holds a different theory. He argues that the first seven chapters (of Lamotte's chapter division) formed the original sūtra, to which the eighth chapter (分別瑜伽品) was then added, followed by the ninth (地波羅蜜多品) and the tenth (如來成所作事品). Finally the preface was then appended. Even in this understanding the movement from Prajñāpāramitā to Yogācāra is apparent, and the above argument valid.

¹²T. 16, p. 697a-b. Lamotte, Samdhinirmocanasūtra, pp. 206-207. This passage is also quoted in Bu-ston, History of Buddhism, trans., E. Obermiller, Heidelberg, 1931. Reprinted by Suzuki Research Foundation, Tokyo 1965 II, 53-54.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Initial Yogācāra Statement

This chapter will treat the initial stages of Yogācāra thinking as seen in two sūtras. The Samdhinirmocana-sūtra, the earliest Yogācāra statement, was compiled from various independent sources in the course of the second century, and fixed in its present form at the beginning of the third century.¹ The Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra is no longer extant. However, it is known in part from quotations in other works. Six passages are included in Asaṅga's Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra, one in his Abhidharmasamuccayaśāstra, and one in K'uei-chi's Wei-shih erh-shih lun shu-chi.² Yūki Reimon in his History of Vijñaptimātratā dates the Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra between the Samdhinirmocanasūtra and Asaṅga's Yogācārabhūmiśāstra.³ It would appear that it was not in general usage at the time of Asaṅga's composition of the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra, for it is not quoted therein, but it is quoted in his Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra. From the title, Mahāyānābhīdharma, it was probably intended to be a systematic presentation of the themes introduced in the Samdhinirmocanasūtra. Although it is known only from these scattered fragments, yet in these passages it does afford a valuable glimpse into the formative stages of Yogācāra thinking.

A) The Samdhinirmocanasūtra

What then is the Yogācāra understanding of consciousness? How does prapañca arise? And how can it be reversed?

In response to such questions the Samdhinirmocana develops the notion of the seed consciousness (sarva-bījakavijñāna). The earlier Abhidharma works had discoursed on the five sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness (manovijñāna) that is aware of these sense objects. The Samdhinirmocana expands its understanding of consciousness by introducing the seed consciousness as the basic continuity of all samsaric consciousness, as the subjectivity of all samsaric transmigration. The cittamanovijñāna chapter first thematizes this consciousness:

The seed consciousness (sarvabījakavijñāna) [of sentient beings in the six destinies] matures, evolves, becomes unified, grows, and reaches its development, because it makes its own (執受) two things: the physical body with its sense organs and the habitual proclivities (vāsanā) of discriminately and verbally conceptualizing (prapañca) images and names. 4

Thus the initial arising of consciousness results in prapañca, is due to the proclivities of prapañca, and does not manifest any non-extroverted or non-discriminative mode of understanding. This contrasts sharply with the Tathāgatagarbha teaching of the non-

evolution of vikalpa, which in the Samdhinirmocana cannot occur. The text continues:

This consciousness is also called the appropriating consciousness (ādānavijñāna), because it is by means of it that the body is made one's own and appropriated. It is also called the storehouse consciousness (ālayavijñāna), because it takes unto itself and lies hidden in that body in a common security and risk. It is also called mind (citta), because it is piled up (ā-cita) and accumulated (upa-cita) by form, sound, odor, taste, and touch. 5

Here the seed consciousness is described as appropriating, because it is the unifying principle of phenomenal existence, whereby body and mind are made one's own in a common unity. It is ālaya, because in taking unto itself that body, it lies hidden at the foundation (藏隱) of all consciousness. It is called mind (citta), because it accumulates (cita) all sense experience. But it is not only a unifying principle, for, inasmuch as it makes its own the prapañca propensities of thinking, its empirical manifestation is precisely extroverted consciousness. Thus this sarva-bījakavijñāna accounts for the arising of the cycle of saṃsāra, of prapañca consciousness, by grounding it in the structure of consciousness itself. It is because of such prapañca-vāsanā that the mind clings to the objects of sensation as if they were real external meaning units, and thus presumes names and words to have some exact, external referent.

Futhermore, the Samdhinirmocana says that the seed consciousness not only appropriates the propensities of prapañca, but also the physical body with its sense organs. These two appropriations occur together and are interrelated. It is precisely because one distinguishes one's own body from that of others that dharmas are thought to be external, just as other bodies are external. Implicit in the functioning of sense consciousness is the presupposition that the environment of meaning is to be found "out there" and must be taken apart from and external to the "in here" of consciousness itself. The arising of the prapañca process is then further grounded in the biological response of sense consciousness to external stimuli.

This biological extroversion of consciousness is further described in its relation to the evolutions (pariṇāma) of consciousness.

Having the ācānavijñāna as its support, the six groups of consciousness evolve, i.e., visual, aural, olfactory, taste, tactile, and mental consciousness. 6

These evolutions of consciousness function, when, grounded upon the appropriation (ādāna) of the body and its sense organs, the objects of the senses become present. Without the presence of sense objects, there would be no appropriation, no biological extroversion, and no prapañca process.

In the later Vikalpayoga chapter the Samdhinirmocana returns to this theme:

How should [the bodhisattva] become skillful in the arising of consciousness? In knowing the sixteen kinds of the arising of consciousness, he will exactly understand the arising of consciousness. These are: 1) the arising of that consciousness which is a firm basis and receptacle, and which cannot be known, i.e., ādānavijñāna; and 2) the arisings of consciousness in its various modalities (ākāra) and with its various objects (ālambana), i.e., the discriminative manovijñāna, which grasps the objects of all form, etc. 7

The ādānavijñāna, the seed consciousness, as appropriating the body and its organs, is the firm basis for the continuity of samsaric consciousness. It is the receptacle for all sense awareness of the physical world, but its functioning is subtle and is in fact an unconscious process, and thus cannot be known. Issuing from this appropriation of sense objects, the evolutions of consciousness arise, and being discriminative, result in the prapañca extroversion of consciousness.

However all such extroverted consciousness is in truth empty and ceases to function upon the attainment of wisdom:

Those bodhisattvas, who have established as their support the wisdom of abiding in the dharma (法住智) 8, are well skilled in the mysteries of cittamanovijñāna . . . All bodhisattvas, who each for himself inwardly are in accord with truth (如實), do not see any appropriation (ādāna) or appropriating consciousness; do not see any storing up (ālaya) or storing consciousness; do not see any accumulating (cita) or mind

(citta); do not see visual form (rūpa) or visual consciousness; do not see audible sound nor aural consciousness; do not see odors nor olfactory consciousness; do not see taste nor gustatory consciousness; do not see the tangible nor tactile consciousness; do not see mental dharmas nor mental consciousness (manovijñāna) . . . This describes those bodhisattvas, who are well skilled in the highest truth. 9

Wisdom then implies the total non-functioning of samsaric, extroverted consciousness. What kind of consciousness then functions in wisdom? Is it a conscious state at all? Or does it transcend all consciousness? In the above passage, the Samdhinirmocana seems to suggest that in the state of wisdom, consciousness as taking a look, as seeing (見), does not occur. Thus the bodhisattva does not experience any of the objects of sensation or thought (不見) as if understanding were looking, as if all awareness were commensurate with sense experience. These questions are further treated in the Yogācāra teaching of the three marks or the three natures (trilakṣaṇa, trisvabhāva). But the first extant reference to these three natures does not occur in the Samdhinirmocana, but in the Bodhisattvaśikṣāprabheda chapter of both the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra and the Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra.

Edward Conze translates the passage as follows:

Maitreya: When the bodhisattva, who courses in the perfection of wisdom, proceeds in the skill of the subdivision of dharmas, by which modes should he follow up the conceptual subdivisions of form, etc.?

The Lord: By three modes, i.e., this is the imagined (parikalpita) form; this is the discriminated (vikalpita) form; this is the dharma nature (dharmata) of form.

Maitreya: What are they?

The Lord: Imagined form etc. is the false imagination, which has own-beingness (svabhāva) of form etc. for its object, and which is based on the name, notion, social agreement, concept, and the conventional expression "form" etc. with regard to that entity which is the sign of something conditioned. Discriminated (vikalpita) form etc. is the definition of that entity, which is the sign of something conditioned as being in its dharmic nature (dharmatā) mere discrimination, as being a verbal expression which is conditioned by discrimination, and to which refer this name, notion, social agreement, concept, and conventional expression, i.e., "this is form" etc. The dharmic nature of form etc. is that dharmic nature of dharmas, which is established whether Tathāgatas are produced or not, the established order of dharmas, the realm of dharma (dharmadhātu), the absence of own-being (svabhāva), which is characteristic, eternally and throughout all eternity, constantly and throughout all time, of that discriminated form because of that imagined form. [It is] the absence of self in dharmas, suchness (tathatā), the reality limit (bhutaḥoti) . . . Imagined form should be viewed as unsubstantial. Discriminated form should, because of its substantiality, be viewed as substantial, although it never occurs as an independent reality. The dharmic nature of form etc. should be viewed as neither unsubstantial nor substantial, but as derived from ultimate meaning. . . 10

The awareness of the bodhisattva in regard to the different kinds of conscious understanding of dharmas is expressed in these three modes. The first, parikalpita, is the imputation of extroverted meaning upon externals, the prapañca process that "takes a look" at what is to be understood as if understanding were seeing, that identifies the names of objects and thus discovers their

meaning. The second, vikalpita, is the sign of something conditioned. It is conscious awareness focused upon the judgment "this is form" or "this is the Buddha's word" etc. As such a judgment dependent upon conditions, it is substantial and, unlike the first, existent. The third, dharmatā, is the ultimate, the total absence of all prapañca thinking.

In the Saṃdhinirmocana this teaching is elaborated in the explanation of the marks of the dharma (法相):¹¹

Dharmas are of three marks: the mark of that which has been totally imagined (parikalpita), the mark of that which arises in dependency on others (paratantra), and the mark of full perfection (pariniṣpanna).

The mark of that which has been totally imagined means the discrimination whereby all dharmas are conventionally held to have their own svabhāva, and the verbal expressions that arise consequent upon this discrimination.

The mark of that which arises in dependency on others is the nature whereby all dharmas conditionally arise. For if this exists, then that exists. If this arises, then that arises. This includes [the twelve nidānas] from ignorance (avidyā) up to the [dependent co-arising] of this grand mass of suffering.

The mark of full perfection is the true nature of the equality of dharmas (samatātathatā). It is this tathatā which bodhisattvas come to realize because of their zeal (vīrya), their fundamental mental apprehension (yoniso maniskāra), and their unfailing reflection (aviparīta cintana). By gradual practices until they reach this realization, they finally attain to full enlightenment (anuttara-samyaksambodhi).

The mark of that which is totally imagined is like the defective vision of one who has cataracts in his eyes. The mark of arising in dependency on others is like the imagining of those images, such as the appearance of hairs, flies, small particles or patches of different colors before the eyes of one with cataracts. The mark of full

perfection is like the true, unconfused objects which are seen by the sound eye of one, who has no cataracts. 12

In this passage the Samdhinirmocanasūtra has resurrected the Abhidharma endeavour to explain the marks of all things. Its intent is not only to elucidate the nature of bodhi, but also to explain the phenomenal world in which human beings live. But the level of meaning has been shifted from the naive realistic view of the Abhidharma to the Yogācāra understanding of conscious interiority. This reformulation is expressed in the doctrine of the three natures.

Parikalpita is described as the illusory seeing of one who cannot properly see because his eyes are covered over by cataracts. Just as, due to these coverings on the surface of the eye, one might imagine that he sees things which do not actually exist, so discriminative thinking imagines that it "sees" an inner svabhāva in dharmas and confers names upon it that would grasp its meaning in clear and distinct ideas. This is the prapañca process so assiduously refuted by Nāgārjuna. Chandrakīrti in his Prasannapadā Mādhyamika-vṛtti employs the same image of the man with cataracts (taimirika), but there he is simply contrasted with the Buddha, who sees clearly.¹³ The Samdhinirmocana however develops the structure of the three natures in order to

be able to negate prapañca thinking, while at the same time grounding all understanding within a critical understanding of consciousness. The crucial point in this endeavour is the development of the understanding of paratantra-svabhāva, for as Nagao Gadjin explains,¹⁴ it serves as the pivotal axis on which the other two natures revolve.

The above text identifies paratantra as dependent co-arising and employs the traditional formula: If this exists, then that exists. It has already been explained that Nāgārjuna denied validity to this formula,¹⁵ inasmuch as it constituted yet another prapañca view. But the Samdhinirmocana resurrects it in the context of paratantra. The twelve nidānas, the causal chain enunciated by the Buddha in the earliest scriptures, are also included within paratantra, rather than being denied validity, as in Nāgārjuna. This paratantra is then described as the discriminating (差別) or the appearing before (現前) of the images (相) of dharmas to consciousness. Paratantra then describes the operations of consciousness whereby the illusory images of parikalpita arise. The text continues to compare this consciousness to the surface of a transparent crystal, in which all kinds of images arise as various conditions arise, while the surface of that crystal does not change. Just so the

appropriating consciousness (ādānavijñāna) functions like a mirror, and the other evolving consciousnesses appear when their proper objects are present. Paratantra then describes the dependent structure of consciousness.

The Samdhinirmocana continues:

The bodhisattva, who is able to truly understand the marks of parikalpita imaginings in his paratantra [consciousness], can truly understand that all dharmas are markless.¹⁶

By understanding understanding, one can understand the ground of prapañca thinking as the arising of defiled dharmas (雜染相法) from illusory consciousness. In this manner one can come to an understanding of pariniṣpanna, in which all the imaginary marks of parikalpita imaginings are not grasped by paratantra consciousness. Such an insight into pariniṣpanna constitutes wisdom which, as seen above, includes both awareness of ultimate tathatā (yathāvadbhāvikatā) and awareness of the true nature of all phenomena (yāvadbhāvikatā). This realization is further described as dharmakāya, which is attained by the con-version of the basis (āśraya-parivṛtti) of consciousness.¹⁷

However questions yet remain. In the Samdhinirmocana it is further explained that wisdom enables one "to destroy paratantra-lakṣaṇa."¹⁸ Upon the attainment of wisdom the operations of the seed consciousness and the evolving consciousnesses cease. Thus, although paratantra is like

a transparent crystal, yet in this text it serves to explain the dependently co-arisen nature of parikalpita, and is somehow severed upon the realization of wisdom. Is ālayavijñāna then completely lost? Is there a deeper, purer consciousness that occurs when no parikalpita images appear within paratantra? Or is wisdom transcendent to all consciousness? And if it is, then what is it?

The text does not thematize these questions, and thus they remained a quandry for later thinkers. Is ālaya valid only for defiled consciousness? Or does it somehow perdure in a transformed condition upon the realization of wisdom? Is the dharmakāya attained by the conversion of the basis a conscious state? Or is it a super-conscious reality apart from human consciousness? And, if ālaya is severed upon the realization of pari-niṣpanna, then how can wisdom be broad and comprehensive (yāvadbhāvikatā)? Moreover, how can a completely defiled consciousness be capable of such a realization of pari-niṣpanna in the first place? The Samdhinirmocanasūtra does not accept the doctrine of the pure garbha of the Tathāgatagarbha scriptures, but in one passage it reports the Buddha as saying:

In the Mahāyāna I have taught that all dharmas are identical with the one dharmadhātu, are identical with the one principle (同一法界同一理趣).¹⁹

This one dharmadhātu seems to echo the teaching of the Anūnatvāpūrnatvanirdeśa,²⁰ but it is not developed, and one is left wondering just what is meant. In Vijñaptimātratā this one dharmadhātu should be understood as in some sense consciousness, for apart from consciousness there is nothing. How then can the basic ālaya consciousness be severed? What precisely is left over when no parikalpita images appear in paratantra consciousness?

The Samdhinirmocanasūtra then enlarges the horizon within which doctrinal thinking can occur by focusing upon an understanding of understanding, upon the context of interiority. In the main it ignores the teaching of the originally pure mind of Tathāgatagarbha, and emphasizes the basic seed consciousness as the ground for the samsaric, phenomenal mind in its explanations of cittamanoviññāna and trilakṣaṇa. But questions are left untreated and the systematization of Yogācāra doctrine remains incomplete.

B) The Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra

The Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra does address itself to the above question. In what is perhaps one of the most famous passages of Yogācāra, it writes:

The beginningless realm is the common support of all dharmas. Because of this, there exist all the destinies and the access to nirvāṇa.²¹

The main question here is just what is meant by the beginningless realm (anādikāliko dhātuh). The Ratnagotravibhāgaśāstra cites this passage and interprets the beginningless realm to be tathāgatagarbha,²² while Asaṅga's Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra, Asvabhāva's Mahāyānasamgrahopanibandha, and Dharmapāla's Vijñaptimātratā-siddhiśāstra all interpret it to be ālayavijñāna. Paramārtha's translation of Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya, along with the other three translations of this text, gives the interpretation of the beginningless realm as ālayavijñāna, but also adds the tathāgatagarbha interpretation. These various interpretations will be considered in later chapters, but here the focus will be on the understanding of this verse in light of the problematic concerning the teaching of the Samdhinirmocanasūtra, i.e., how to account for both phenomenal existence (gaṭiḥ sarvā) and the access to nirvāṇa (nirvāṇādhigamo). It would seem that the development of the notion of anādikāliko dhātuh is meant to respond to this dilemma, and can then be best interpreted not by means of the later śāstras and commentaries, which represent various forms of later doctrinal development, but in the light of the sources available to the author of the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra. Asaṅga's formulation of Yogācāra had not appeared when the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra was composed, and thus it

would be anachronistic to rigidly follow their interpretation of the original meaning of anādikāliko dhātuḥ.

From the above discussion it would appear that there were current at the time of the composition of the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra two dominant trends of thought for those involved in post-Nāgārjuna doctrinal development, i.e., the tathāgatagarbha doctrine and the themes of the Samdhinirmocanasūtra. The former had no problem at all in explaining how nirvāṇa was possible, for consciousness was explained as originally pure. But it was rather hard pressed to account for phenomenal defilement, which was seen as merely adventitious. The latter focused on phenomenally defiled consciousness and explained the arising of such defilement by its doctrine of ādānavijñāna. But it did not adequately explain just how that defiled consciousness could be capable of realizing undefiled wisdom. Thus the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra's beginningless realm can be interpreted as an attempt to amalgamate both of these trends of doctrinal thinking. Consciousness is then both defiled and pure. As defiled, it accounts for the samsaric phenomena of all the destinies, but as pure, it makes nirvāṇa possible.

This interpretation is rendered more cogent by another passage from the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra:

There are three dharmas: that which consists in the defiled aspect (saṃkleśabhāga), that which

consists in the pure aspect (vyavadānabhāga), and that which consists in both at the same time (tadubhayabhāga). 23

The text goes on to equate these respectively with parikalpita, pariniṣpanna, and paratantra.²⁴ It would appear then that for the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra the nature of paratantra is not only the underlying nature of samsaric, defiled consciousness, but also includes a pure aspect.

Futhermore, if anādikāliko dhātuḥ referred to ālayavi jñāna as described in the Samdhinirmocanasūtra, then it is quite strange that it be said to be beginningless, for, although the seed consciousness is the continuity of samsaric transmigration, it is seldom described as beginningless. Such a description rather calls to mind the nature of tathāgatagarbha as eternal (nitya) and constant (dhurva).

However the text does not say that the beginningless realm is original purity nor that it leads to nirvāṇa. It rather states that because of the beginningless realm, the access to nirvāṇa exists. This is not the teaching of the earlier Tathāgatagarbha scriptures, which equate the garbha with original purity and explain wisdom as the non-origination of discrimination (vikalpa). Under the influence of the Samdhinirmocana, the Mahāyānābhidharma-sūtra could not affirm that one could simply not give

rise to vikalpa. But since phenomenal consciousness is both defiled and pure, it can give rise to the desire for enlightenment and to the practices that lead to its realization. Thus in this basic Yogācāra text there is already present an attempt to synthesize the garbha theory with the teaching of ālayavijñāna.²⁵

Another verse explains in more detail the nature of the evolutions of consciousness (vi jñānaparināma):

All dharmas are stored in consciousness and consciousness in all dharmas. They are always mutually result and cause of one another. 26

The Samdhinirmocana describes the evolving consciousnesses simply as functioning upon the basic support of the seed consciousness in the presence of their proper objects. But here it is explained that not only do the evolving dharmas, i.e., the other consciousnesses, result from the basic seed consciousness, ālayavijñāna, but also that they are causative in regard to this basic consciousness. Thus all consciousnesses function in a synergistic relationship and the structure of consciousness is understood to be an interlocking, interdependent unity of differentiated operations.

Ālayavijñāna stores up all the dharma-bīja presented to it by the sense consciousnesses and mental operations, and is indeed the consciousness of all seeds (sarvabījaka-vijñāna). But in so doing it is itself influenced and

changed by these dharma seeds. This explanation is an understanding of karmic actions in terms of interiority, and constitutes a Yogācāra explanation of karma, a point overlooked in the Madhyamika dialectic.

It would thus appear from these few quotations that the Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra has furthered the attempt at a critical understanding of consciousness in both its defiled and pure aspects by amalgamating the garbha theory with ālaya, and by explaining the synergistic relationship of the basic seed consciousness with the other evolving consciousnesses. But, as always, questions remain. What does it mean to say that anādikāliko dhātuḥ includes both a pure aspect and a defiled aspect? Is this not merely a restatement of the question, rather than an answer to it? How are these aspects related? If there is a totally pure aspect to consciousness, why does it not burst forth and sweep away all defilements? Far from solving this dilemma, the Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra poses it in more obvious terms.

It is to these questions that the next chapter is devoted, for the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra attempted to further the amalgamation of the garbha teaching with that of ālayavijñāna.

Notes

¹ Etienne Lamotte, Samdhinirmocanasūtra, Explication des Mystères, Louvain, 1935, p. 25.

² Yūki Reimon, Shinishikiron yori mitaru yuishiki shi, Tokyo, 1935, pp. 240-250.

³ Yūki, Shinishikiron, pp. 234-235.

⁴ T. 16, p. 692b. Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, p. 184.

⁵ T. 16, p. 692b. Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, p. 184.

⁶ T. 16, p. 692b. Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, p. 185.

⁷ T. 16, p. 702b-c. Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, p. 232.

⁸ For a consideration of the term 法住智 see Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, p. 186, n. 11.

⁹ T. 16, p. 696c. Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, p. 186.

¹⁰ Edward Conze, tr., The Larger Sutra, pp. 648-649. As Hakamaya Noriaki in "A Consideration of Byams sus kyi lehu from the Historical Point of View," IBK, XXIV, 1 (December 1975), holds, this passage may well have been a later insertion into the text of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra, but, if so, it appears to have been inserted before the time of Asaṅga, who both in his Abhidharmasamuccaya and in his Mahāvānasamgraha seems to regard the teaching of the three natures as already being in existence. The question of whether this passage precedes the Samdhinirmocana's treatment of the trilakṣaṇa remains open, since no definitive evidence has been given for either alternative. Lamotte holds that the Prajñāpāramitā passage is earlier (Samdhinirmocana, pp. 14-16), while E. Obermiller ("The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā," AO, XI (1932), 97-98) and Hakamaya Noriaki (op. cit., pp. 491-489) think it is later.

¹¹ It would appear that this term 法相 is the source for the name of the Chinese version of Yogācāra that came to dominate East Asian developments, i.e., Fa-hsiang. It is then to be understood as emphasizing the understanding of all things by means of the three natures.

¹²T. 16, p. 693a-b. Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, pp. 188-189.

¹³See Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "Réflexions sur le Madhyamika, " MCB, II (1932), pp. 30-31.

¹⁴This is a central theme in many of Nagao's essays. See "Kū-i yori sanshōsetsu e," "Sanshōsetsu to sono hiyū," and "Yuishiki-i no konpon toshite sanshōsetsu," all in Chūkan to yuishiki.

¹⁵See p. 70 of this study.

¹⁶T. 16, p. 693c. Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, p. 190.

¹⁷T. 16, p. 708b. Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, p. 257.

¹⁸T. 16, p. 695a. Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, p. 197.

¹⁹T. 16, p. 708a. Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, p. 256.

²⁰See p. 105 of this study.

²¹Quoted in Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra, T. 31, p. 133b; Sasaki Tsukisho, Kanyaku shihon taishō Shōdaijōron, Tokyo, 1931, p. 5; Étienne Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga (Mahāyānasamgraha), Louvain, 1973, II, 12. This passage is also found in Dharmapāla's Vijñapti-mātratāsiddhiśāstra. See Louis de La Vallée Poussin, La Siddhi de Huian-Tsang, Paris, 1929, p. 169. The Sanskrit has been preserved in Sthiramati's commentary on the Triṃśikā: anādikāliko dhātuḥ sarvadharmasamāśrayaḥ tasmin sati gatiḥ sarvā nirvāṇadhigamo'pi ca.

²²Takasski, Study, p. 291.

²³T. 31, p. 140c. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 125.

²⁴E. Lamotte's translation does not include this section in the quotation from the Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra (La Somme, p. 125), but Yūki Reimon argues that this entire passage is to be considered as the quotation from the Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra (Yuishikishisōshi, p. 249).

²⁵Yūki Reimon, both in his Yuishikishisōshi and in Sesshin yuishiki no kenkyū, Tokyo, 1956, argues that it was Vasubandhu who first attempted to synthesize Vijñaptimātratā with Tathāgatagarbha thinking. I rather see such attempts to have characterized the initial stages of Yogācāra, and suggest that the first Yogācārins were probably those Tathāgatagarbha thinkers who shifted from the common sense context of the Tathāgatagarbha teachings to the theoretical context of conscious interiority, which constitutes Yogācāra.

²⁶T. 31, p. 135b. Lamotte, La Somme, pp. 46-47. The Sanskrit is quoted in the Madhyāntavibhāga: sarva-dharmā hi ālīnā vijñāne teṣu tat tathā, anyonyaṃ phala-bhavana hetubhavana sarvadā.

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Place of the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra

The initial statement of Yogācāra of the Samdhinirmo-
canasūtra emphasized ālayavijñāna as the underlying con-
sciousness of samsaric continuity. The Mahāyānābhidharma-
sūtra appears to have attempted to amalgamate this Yogā-
cāra statement with Tathāgatagarbha thinking, but, since
only fragments remain, it is difficult to ascertain the
teaching of this text. The Mahāyāsūtrālamkāra, which is
extant, clearly continues the attempt to synthesize the
above two trends of thought. It also forms an important
link between the initial statement of Yogācāra and the
later formulation of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. It is more
frequently quoted in Asaṅga's Mahāyānasamgraha than any
other text, even though its doctrine differs in basic
points. Its eminent position in the history of Yogācāra
is attested by the fact that it is included among the
texts that are said to have been received by Asaṅga from
Maitreya in the Tuṣita Heaven. Ui Hakuju, following this
tradition, argues that Maitreya was indeed an historical
person, who composed the verses of the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra,
and who should be considered to be the founder of Yogācāra.¹

But it seems more probable that, as Paul Demieville

argues,² Maitreya was not an historical person at all, but rather, as Sthiramati notes, the "tutelary divinity" (iṣṭtādevatā) or "faith divinity" (śraddhādevatā) of Asaṅga.

This does not alter the claim of the Chinese tradition that attributes the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra to Asaṅga himself. The text was translated into Chinese by Prabhākaramitra, who, after studying with Śīlabhadra in Nālandā, came to China in 627. In the preface to this Chinese translation, Li Pai-yao says that Asaṅga compiled (纂) the text.

However, modern scholars have come to doubt the Asaṅgan authorship of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra. Robert Thurman argues that there is no firm evidence to uphold Asaṅga's authorship.³ Alex Wayman rejects it altogether because he has located a citation to this text in Asaṅga's Yogācārabhūmiśāstra, which implies that Asaṅga regarded the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra as an already existent text.⁴ It would thus appear that it is a pre-Asaṅgan text, and as such is here considered as being intermediate between the initial Yogācāra statement of the Samdhinirmocana and the Mahāyānābhidharma and the later classical formulation of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.

The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra combines both strictly Yogācāra terminology together with Tathāgatagarbha

ideas. It does not however develop either a systematic presentation of Tathāgatagarbha doctrine,⁵ or offer any consistent analysis of the nature of ālayavijñāna,⁶ although it does expound the teaching of viñaptimātratā. It does affirm the original purity of the mind (citta-prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā) and the adventitious nature of defilement (āgantukakleśa).

When water is turbid and then clears, its clarity is not produced by that [turbidity], but precisely by the settling of taints. The principle is just the same in the purification of the mind itself. It is accepted that the mind, which is always originally luminous (prakṛtiprabhāsvaram) is flawed by adventitious faults. It is decreed that there is no other mind apart from the mind of reality (dharmatācitta), which is originally luminous (prabhāsvaratvaṃ prakṛtau).⁷

This passage is quoted by Saramati in his Ratna-gotravibhāga and is in full accord with the Tathāgatagarbha teaching.

Another passage describes the ultimate dharmadhātu as being directly present (pratyakṣa) to consciousness:

And once aware that objects are mere verbalizations, he dwells truly in mind only, which appears as those [objects]. Then he realizes that dharmadhātu is directly present, and that it is free from the characteristic of duality.⁸

The Bodhi chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra explicitly employs the Tathāgatagarbha vocabulary:

Although tathatā is in all beings without distinction, when it is pure, it is tathagatahood; thus all beings possess its seed (garbha).⁹

The prose commentary adds:

There is tathatā in all beings without distinction, while the Tathāgata has it as his nature in pure form. Hence it is said that all living beings possess the seed of a Tathagata (tathā-gatagarbha). 10

It would thus seem that the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra weaves the threads of Yogācāra thinking into what is at basis a Tathāgatagarbha pattern. This is further evident in its treatment of the three natures. In contrast to the Samdhinirmocanasūtra, which considers the three natures as the marks of phenomenal existence, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra treats them as the marks of tathatā:

. . . the three marks of tathatā have now been elucidated; in itself, in reference to defilement and purity, and with reference to the lack of discrimination. 11

Thus, although the initial discussion of the three natures had been introduced as a "quest for the reality of dharmas (dharmatatva),¹² yet this reality is not the phenomenal reality envisaged by the Samdhinirmocanasūtra, but the ultimate tathatā. The three natures are described as follows:

Reality (tatva) is that which is always free from duality, is the basis of error, and can never be expressed in words at all. Its essence is not conceptualizable (aprapañca). It is to be known, to be rejected, and to be purified, although it is originally immaculate. When purified from kleśa, it is like space, gold, water. 13

The prose commentary continues to explain:

The reality which is always free from duality

is parikalpitasvabhāva, because it is absolutely non-existent as subject and object. The basis of error is paratantrasvabhāva, because therein one imagines (parikalpanāt). The inexpressible, that which is not conceptualizable, is pariniṣpanna-svabhāva. Of these the first is to be understood, the second is to be rejected entirely, and the third is to be purified of adventitious defilements. It is originally pure, and because it is originally pure, it is like space, gold, and water, pure from defilements. In truth, space, etc., are not originally impure, and one cannot say that there are any adventitious defilements to be purified.¹⁴

This description of parikalpita as always free from duality is quite different from the Samdhinirmocana's statement that parikalpita is "discrimination, whereby all dharmas are held to have their own svabhāvas."¹⁵

The emphasis here on the absolute non-existence of parikalpita seems rather to reflect the notion of the essential nature of tathāgatagarbha as being associated only with pure dharmas, as taught in the Anūnatvāpūrnatva-nirdeśasūtra.¹⁶

Futhermore, the explanation of paratantra simply as the basis of error (bhrānteśca saṃniśrayaḥ) and thus to be rejected again differs from the Samdhinirmocana's description of paratantra as the dependent co-arising of all dharmas. Again it echoes the Anūnatvāpūrnatva-nirdeśasūtra's second category of tathāgatagarbha existing together with impure dharmas.

Moreover, the explanation of pariniṣpanna as originally immaculate (prakṛtyā viśuddha) goes far beyond

the Samdhinirmocana, and seems to parallel the Anūnatvā-pūrnatvanirdeśasūtra's explanation of tathāgatagarbha as dharmatā, which, in contrast to the Samdhinirmocana's description of the practices needed to attain pariniṣpanna, is basically pure all along and without defilements.

It would seem then that the overarching thrust of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra's exposition of the three natures is Tathāgatagarbha thinking, rather than the more phenomenally focused thought of the Samdhinirmocanasūtra.

Indeed, immediately after this explanation of the three natures, the text continues:

In truth there is nothing else than it (i.e., dharmadhātu) in the world, and the whole world is confused regarding it. How then has this singular folly of the world grown, which makes one cling to that which does not exist, completely putting to one side that which is? 17

This again reflects the Tathāgatagarbha theme that only tathāgatagarbha, only pure dharmadhātu, actually exist, while all else is non-existent.

It would seem then that the movement of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra is between the pure mind of tathāgatagarbha and defiled, samsaric consciousness. If then it moves between this double structure, why does it employ the triple structure of the three natures at all? It would appear that this text uses the teaching of tri-svabhāva, not in order to show how wisdom can be realized by the phenomenally defiled mind of living beings through

a con-version of the basis of consciousness from defilement to purity, but rather in order to further explain the nature of defiled consciousness, so that by insight into its absolute non-existence, one might not give rise to discriminative thinking, and thus realize the originally pure mind. Paratantra serves then not as the pivotal basis, which, as in the Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra, is both pure and defiled and can be con-verted from parikalpita to pariniṣpanna, but only as the basis of error. It is described only as the locus of the imaginings that result in clinging to what is imagined, i.e., parikalpita. The tension is then between the adventitious defilement of paratantra-parikalpita and the purity of pariniṣpanna.

The Samdhinirmocana also explained paratantra as the consciousness whereby the illusory images of parikalpita arise, but, since it did not admit an originally pure mind, paratantra remained open to other possible roles, and the Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra then interpreted it as both pure and impure.

But the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra treats paratantra-parikalpita much as the Tathāgatagarbha texts treat saṃalā-tathatā, i.e., adventitiously defiled tathatā. The validity of paratantric consciousness is to be negated, swept away, and rejected, for it results only in the error of dualistic thinking.

Just as magic, so unreal imagining (abhūta-parikalpa, i.e., paratantra) is explained, Just as a magical trick, so the error of duality (i.e., parikalpita) is explained. 18

Just as in this [paratantra], that [parikalpita] does not exist, so it is of paramārtha. Just as there is a perception of [that which does not exist], so it is of saṃvrtisatya. 19

The prose commentary explains:

. . . in paratantra there is paramārtha, which does not exist as characterized by the duality of parikalpita. But there is a perception of that magical trick as if the [magically wrought] elephants etc. did exist, and likewise [there is a perception] of unreal imaginings, which are like saṃvrtisatya. 20

The ultimate truth (paramārtha) of the originally pure mind is present to paratantric, defiled consciousness, for it alone actually exists. But the magically created illusory objects that are understood in duality do not exist, and are thus the covering of truth, i.e. saṃvrtisatya, conventional truth. Paramārthasatya is here identical with tathāgatagarbha, with the originally pure mind, while saṃvrtisatya is reduced to the illusory images generated by paratantra as the basis of imaginings and error. Just as paratantra is to be rejected, so then must one reject saṃvrtisatya, for in all the world there is only the one truth and the one reality of the pure mind of dharmadhātu. There is simply no room for any validity of paratantra or of the saṃvrtisatya that issues from it. It is all to be swept away upon the realization

of enlightenment.

In the absence of that [duality], one perceives the manifestation of its cause. Just so upon the con-version of the basis, one perceives [the manifestation] of unreal construction. 21

The prose commentary explains:

In the absence of the magical trick, the manifestation of its cause, a piece of wood, etc., [which is used by the magician to conjure up the illusory elephant], is perceived as an existent object. Likewise, upon the con-version of the basis, since the error of duality is absent, one perceives unreal imagining (i.e., paratantra) as an existent object. 22

Upon this con-version of consciousness, one then perceives the non-existence of the duality that arises from the unreal imagining that is paratantra, and understands that consciousness imagines things to be real that actually are non-existent. What does it mean then to perceive unreal imagining as a real object (bhūto'rtha)? It would appear that what is perceived is in fact the originally pure mind, for when consciousness no longer gives rise to unreal imaginings, paratantra has in effect been rejected. At the base of all consciousness that pure mind is the only real reality.

Consequently the con-version of the basis²³ is not from defilement to purity within a dependently co-arisen ālayavijñāna, for that consciousness is the basis only of error. The text states:

Going out from their own realm (svadhātu),
 discriminations (vikalpāḥ) appear in duality. 24
 They function together with ignorance and passion.

The prose commentary explains that the realm
 (svadhātu) from which these discriminations issue is
ālayavijñāna, for it is the source of dualistic discrim-
 inations. The text then continues to describe the
 realm that issues in the non-appearance of duality:

The arrival at the superior object is by means of
 diligence in abiding in their own realm (sva-
dhātu). They function without the appearance
 of duality. 25

Here the prose commentary identifies the realm
 (svadhātu) that issues in non-duality, not as ālaya-
vijñāna, but a tathatā. Thus in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra
 the con-version of the basis appears to be a substituting
 of one basis, the ālaya, for another, tathatā. Ālaya-
vijñāna is always defiled consciousness.

Support, enjoyment, and seed are marks of bondage.
 Mind and mental states with their supports and
 seeds are bound here. 26

The prose commentary explains that "seed" here
 refers to ālayavijñāna.

It would thus appear that the understanding of
 phenomenal consciousness in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra
 regards it as having only a provisional validity, for
 such consciousness dis-appears upon āśrayaparāvṛtti:

The reflective person, having found here the two
 kinds of anātman [of self and dharmas], which
 pervade all existence, and having recognized the

equality [of all dharmas], enters into reality through subjectivity (grahanatah). Then by fixing mind (manasa) there, even that no longer appears here, and that non-appearance is liberation, the supreme freedom from perception (parama upalambhasya vigamaḥ). 27

The prose commentary explains that the reflective person (dhīman) enters into reality (tatvaṃ), which is consciousness only (vi jñaptimātra). But once having arrived there at mind only, even that reality of mind-only no longer appears. Thus vi jñaptimātra has only a provisional validity, is only saṃvrtisatya, and pertains only to defiled consciousness. Upon final liberation, all consciousness, not only dualistic consciousness but also the insight into vi jñaptimātra, falls away in what is described as primordial peace and original liberation.²⁸

But even although phenomenal consciousness and its operations have only a provisional validity, the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra does investigate them in some depth, and its explanations will have much influence on later Yogācārins. Verses thirty-six to forty-nine of chapter eleven offer an analysis of both defiled consciousness and its transformation into purity. They begin by once again explaining the three natures. They are now described as that which is identified (lakṣya), that which does the identifying (lakṣaṇa), and the identification (lakṣaṇā).²⁹

Lakṣya are described as the five Abhidharma categories of form, mind, mental states, unassociated states, and the unconditioned, i.e., as the totality of that which can be known.

Lakṣaṇa, that which does the identifying, is consciousness, and includes the three natures. Parikalpita is described as the objective referent of the conceptualized meaning of words (jalpārthasamjñāya nimitta), its permeations in consciousness (tasya vāsanā), and the consequent objective appearance (tasmādapyaatha vikhyānam) of real objects to consciousness. The commentary states:

The conceptualization of objects of verbal expression, which is a mental function, is the conceptualization of objects corresponding to words. 30

Thus the assumption that words really do refer to external units of given meaning so conditions the mind that it becomes convinced that such objects really do exist, and they appear in the mind as if real. This explanation describes the extroversion of consciousness that assumes objects to be "out there" and to be given units of meaning. The text further identifies parikalpita as the appearance of names and objects (nāmārtha), and the prose commentary comments:

If an object is made clear in terms of a word, or a word in terms of an object, that is parikalpita, which is the object of unreal imagining. 31

The assumption that there is an exact correspondence

between names and objects is naive realism, is extroverted consciousness, whereby one imagines that he captures the meaning (artha) of objects (artha) by conceptualizing.

The text next considers such unreal imagining (abhūta parikalpa) as paratantra, which is characterized by the dichotomy between the object known (grāhya) and the knowing subject (grāhaka). The object is explained as the appearance (ābhāsa) in consciousness of words (pada), objects (artha), and the body (deha), for these are what is grasped by paratantric consciousness to be then assumed as real by parikalpitan consciousness. Note that names and words are related to the appearance in consciousness of the body (dehābhāsa). This parallels the Samdhinirmocana's explanation of ādānavijñāna as appropriating and making its own the body and its sense organs. Again this suggests that the splitting of consciousness into subject and object is grounded upon the awareness of one's own body as over against all other bodies. The text further states that "dharmas which have resistance as their essence are marked by error."³² These resistant dharmas are said both to exist and not to exist. They exist as unreal imaginings, for they issue from the biological extroversion of sense consciousness, since they are given over and against the sensing subject. But they do not exist, inasmuch as

sensation is not coterminous with consciousness, and the subject-object dichotomy of sense experience does not characterize the understanding of meaning." The initial misunderstanding of understanding as imagining, as "taking a look" is illusory, because it takes the biological mode of extroverted understanding to be understanding itself. The point is not whether or not one will bump into a chair directly in one's path, but rather how one is to understand the understanding of meaning. On the level of sense knowing, the presence of the chair is given in the presence of its image in the mind. Looking at the chair and having such an image, one can simply detour around it and avoid injury. But the understanding of meaning demands more than simply the presence of an image in the mind. It necessitates the constructive activity of insight into that image, and thus meaning is the issue of conscious operation rather than a property of the things understood.

After identifying the object of paratantra as the appearance of name, object, and body, the Mahāyānasūtra-alaṃkāra explains the subject (grāhaka) as the appearance (ābhāsa) in consciousness of defiled (kliṣṭa) manas, of the appropriating (udgraha) sense consciousnesses, and of the discriminating (vikalpa) mano consciousness. This echoes the idea of the Samdhinirmocana that, because of

the appropriation of objects by the senses, one discriminates one's own body from others in a biological extroversion, and assumes words have extrinsic meaning, thus clinging to things and defiling the mind. But, whereas the Samdhinirmocana has no notion of a manas consciousness distinct from mano, the Mahāyānasūtra-alankāra has developed such an idea, and this teaching of a distinct manas consciousness will be taken up by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu in their many Śāstras.

The identification (lakṣaṇā) is explained next as pariniṣpanna in three items. It is tathatā, i.e., existence, which does exist because of the non-existence of all constructed dharmas. But it is not peaceful (aśānta), because of the presence of adventitious secondary passions (āgantuka-upakleśa). However it yet is peaceful (śānta), because actually it is originally pure (prakṛtipariśuddhatva). Again one hears Tathāgata-garbha themes. This explanation of pariniṣpanna, i.e., identification (lakṣaṇā) does not in fact explain the process whereby the identifying (lakṣaṇa) and the identified (lakṣya) are related, as one would expect from the use of the term lakṣaṇā. Rather it affirms the originally pure mind as the underlying reality of all dualistic thinking, just as parikalpita was above described as being always free from duality.

In the explanation of the five stages of yoga, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra describes the process whereby defiled consciousness becomes transformed. Verses forty-two and forth-three treat this transforming process as the ground (ādhāra), i.e., the study of doctrine, which is an outflow (nispanna, i.e., niṣyanda) from the Buddha's enlightenment; the product (ādhāna), i.e., fundamental mental apprehension of that doctrine; the mirror (ādarśā), i.e., insight into dharmakāya; illumination (āloka), i.e., the bliss (sambhoga) that, having gained insight into dharmakāya, issues in diverse incarnations (nirmāṇa). Rather than describing the phenomenal realization by paratantric consciousness of enlightenment, this passage outlines the process whereby doctrine, which is an outflow from enlightenment, leads to the realization of the three bodies of a Buddha. The direction is from the ultimate to the phenomenal, rather than from phenomenal consciousness to the ultimate.

The discussion to this point has focused on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra's treatment of the themes of phenomenal consciousness (ālaya) and its three modes of operation (trisvabhāva). It has been argued that this text used Yogācāra terms from a basically Tathāgata-garbha perspective. But it also is important as the first full development of the trikāya (three bodies) doctrine,

a doctrine which became the common property of almost all later Yogācāra thinkers.

As Nagao Gadjin has explained,³³ earlier Buddhist thinking distinguished between two bodies of a Buddha by differentiating the form-body (rūpakāya), in which a Buddha actually appears in this world of form, from the dharmakāya, which remains constant and unchangeable. The Samdhinirmocanasūtra basically follows this line of thought, but further differentiates dharmakāya into the true dharmakāya, which is the body revealed to a bodhisattva, from the vimuktikāya (body of deliverance), which is the body revealed to śrāvakas.³⁴ It would seem then that the first development of a trikāya doctrine is to be found in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra. Verses fifty-six to fifty-nine of the Bodhi chapter treat the dharmadhātu under six aspects: essence (svabhāva), cause (hetu), result (phala), action (karman), association (yoga), and arising (vyrtti).³⁵ Under this last aspect of arising, the text introduces the theme of trikāya:

It (i.e., dharmadhātu) arises differently as the essence (svabhāva), enjoyment of dharma (dharmasambhoga), or transformation (nirmāṇa). The pureness of the dharmadhātu is thus expounded by the Buddhas. 36

Trikāya is thus to be interpreted in the context of the arising of dharmadhātu, and as seen above this dharmadhātu is not distinct from the originally pure mind.

The doctrine of the three bodies is not then an extroverted discourse on the nature and essence of Buddhas "out there," but rather a thematizing of the manifestation of buddha, enlightenment, within consciousness. It explains the realization of wisdom from the foundational insight into dharmakāya on to its phenomenal manifestations as sambhogakāya and nirmāṇakāya. Just as the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra uses the trisvabhāva teaching to describe the defilements that becloud the original purity of the mind of pariniṣpanna, so likewise it uses the doctrine of trikāya to describe the manifestations of that purity that flow from insight into the ultimate dharmakāya.

The Bodhi chapter writes:

Essence body, enjoyment body, and the other one: transformation body. These are the divisions of the Buddha's body. The first one is the basis for the other two. 37

The prose commentary adds:

The body of the Buddha is threefold. The essence body, i.e., the dharma body, is characterized by the con-version of the basis. The enjoyment body is the one by which [the Buddha] enjoys the dharma in the circle of the audience. The transformation body is the one by which [the Buddha], through transformation, produces benefits for sentient beings. 38

Dharmakāya is thus the foundational experience, or the experience of the foundation, which is attained by the con-version of the basis of consciousness. It

is absolute and ineffable. It is devoid of any definable content. But just as wisdom flows into compassion, so this foundational experience flows into and is the ground for the other two bodies. The text continues:

In all worlds, the enjoyment [body] is distinguished by the surrounding troop of attendants, the realms, the names, the bodies, by the dharma enjoyment, and by the actions.³⁹

The prose commentary explains:

Here, in all the world realms, the enjoyment [body] is distinguished according to the circle of audience [which is sometimes constituted of Akṣayamati and other bodhisattvas, and sometimes Samantabhadra, Avalokiteśvara and other bodhisattvas]; the Buddha realms [with gold colors etc.]; the names [such as Amitābha, Vairocana, etc.]; the bodies [as small, tall, etc.]; the enjoyment of the dharma [which involves the variety of teachings]; and actions [i.e., in accordance with the different desires (āśaya) of the bodhisattvas, the Buddhas act differently].⁴⁰

Sambhogakāya is then a manifestation of dharmakāya, for it is characterized by names and other various phenomenal characteristics, although such are seen only by bodhisattvas in higher states of vision. The text explains the relationship between these two bodies as follows:

The body of essence is regarded as equal and subtle and [is regarded] to be closely united with that [enjoyment body]. It is the cause for the powerfulness of enjoyment, when [the Buddha] exhibits, as he wishes, the enjoyments.⁴¹

The prose commentary adds:

The body of essence of all Buddhas is equal, because [the dharmadhātu] is without differentiation.

It is subtle, because it is difficult to know [for the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas]. It is combined with that body of enjoyment, and is the cause for the powerfulness of enjoyment; that is to say, [the cause] for the purpose of exhibiting, as desired, the enjoyment [of the land which appears as gold, etc., and the enjoyment of the profound Mahāyāna dharma teaching]. 42

Dharmakāya is then the naked experience of the foundation, which, because it is ultimate (paramārtha), cannot be expressed in any fashion whatsoever. It is the experience of mystic insight in contentless immediacy, and parallels the Madhyamika insight into śūnyatā. Sambhogakāya however does appear with characteristics that are perceptible to the mind of wisdom. It is "seen" in vision by the bodhisattva. It is the same experience rendered perceptible in terms of human understanding. Just as the defiled operations of ālayavijñāna become perceptible only when they are embodied in the actions of the other evolving consciousnesses, so insight into dharmakāya becomes perceptible only when embodied in sambhogakāya. It is the outflow (niṣyanda) from dharmakāya.⁴³ The text next treats nirmānakāya:

The body of transformation is regarded as the Buddha's magical transformation. To be established in the two [bodies of enjoyment and transformation] means the accomplishment of the two kinds of benefits in all forms. 44

The prose commentary adds that sambhogakāya is

characterized by the fulfillment of one's own benefit, while nirmāṇakāya is characterized by the fulfillment of benefit to others. When the bodhisattva realizes enlightenment (buddha), he then turns back from abiding in the final cessation of all consciousness, in order to benefit sentient beings. He continues to abide in consciousness only, for he no longer gives rise to any discrimination of self and others.

This section of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra is immediately followed by a consideration of wisdom (jñāna). The four wisdoms of mirror wisdom (ādarśana jñāna), equality wisdom (samatā jñāna), the wisdom of intellectual mastery (pratyavekṣāna jñāna), and the wisdom of duty fulfillment (krtyānuṣṭhāna jñāna) are described, for they constitute the functioning of the mind that, having insight into the ultimate dharmakāya, comes to manifest that contentless insight in the activities of sambhoga-kāya and nirmāṇakāya. The first wisdom is described as follows:

The mirror wisdom appropriates nothing as "mine," has no limitations, and is present always. It is neither fooled with regard to all objects to be known nor does it face them. 45

In contrast to the defiled consciousness (ādāna-vijñāna), mirror wisdom is said to appropriate nothing whatsoever. It has no limitations in space or in time (ādarśa jñānamamamaparicchinnaṃ deśataḥ). This parallels

the notion of yāvadbhāvikatā described above,⁴⁶ for it reaches to the limits of existence. Furthermore, the prose commentary continues, mirror wisdom is not fooled (asamudha) with regard to all knowable objects. This does not suggest a state transcendent to consciousness, for, like a mirror, this wisdom reflects all objects that are knowable. But, because in such consciousness, the dualistic appearance (ābhāsa) of subject-object does not appear, the text says that it does not face (āmukha) them, i.e., it does not take the form of such objects (anākāratvat), as if it were to grasp their essence, but merely reflects them as they become present.

Equality wisdom is explained as being attained by those who have entered "non-abiding nirvāṇa" (apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa). Thus although the final stage of enlightenment is one in which consciousness does not occur at all, yet, because of compassion, the bodhisattva does not abide there, but maintains himself in the continuity of wisdom consciousness, and by this equality wisdom, understands the complete equality between himself and others, between samsāra and nirvāṇa.

It is affirmed that great benevolence and compassion are always present [in this equality wisdom]. It exhibits the Buddha image in accordance with the earnest inclination of sentient beings. 47

All the wisdoms function only because of compassion, for enlightenment itself would pass beyond all conscious

functioning.

The wisdom of intellectual mastery is also explained as being "always unimpeded in regard to knowable objects" (jñeyesvavyāhataṃ sadā), and the wisdom of duty fulfillment produces benefits for all sentient beings by means of its innumerable transformations (nirmāṇa). Clearly these wisdoms are involved in phenomenal existence.

How then can it be that paratantric ālayavijñāna be only the basis of error? And why must it be totally rejected? Verse eighty-one of the Bodhi chapter perhaps explains:

It is said that non-conceptualizing bodhisattvas, who perceive what has been explained, i.e., that everything is only conceptual construction, attain enlightenment. 48

The prose commentary develops this passage as follows:

Those who perceive that everything is only conceptual construction (kalpanāmātra) understand that there is no conceptual construction concerning this state of only conceptual construction. It is said of such bodhisattvas that, when they have reached the patience [that understands] dharmas not to arise (anutpattikadharmakṣanti), they have nearly (iva) reached enlightenment. 49

Above it was taught that after realizing the reality of vi jñaptimātra, the reflective person would then attain the supreme freedom from perception, in which mental understanding itself no longer appears.⁵⁰ Thus the state of wisdom, which because of insight into the reality that all understanding is merely conceptual construction, i.e., vi jñaptimātra, is able to attain

the patience of being able to abide in the world through the insight that dharmas do not arise, i.e., that all dharmas are empty. But this state of wisdom is not full enlightenment, for conscious activity yet remains. Thus the above text says that those bodhi-sattvas have almost or nearly (iva) reached enlightenment, for they remain involved in defiled, samsaric existence in order to benefit sentient beings. Just as the originally pure mind phenomenally exists as covered over by defilements, so wisdom remains active in the defiled world, although in its essence it would pass beyond into a state where no conscious activity arises at all.

Another passage thematizes this question by distinguishing pure transcendent wisdom (suviśuddhalokattara-jñāna), which is the realization of the pure mind of the garbha whereby no discrimination arises, from the subsequently attained wisdom (tatprsthālabdhājñāna), which extends to the entire range of the knowable (jñeyaviśaya).⁵¹

Thus the above text says that those who realize kalpanāmātra nearly (iva) attain enlightenment, not because they have not gone quite far enough along the path, but because, having already gained insight into the ultimate non-arising of consciousness, they

subsequently choose to remain in samsāra, because of their compassion (karuṇā) for sentient beings.

However, questions yet remain. What exactly is the relationship between transcendent wisdom and phenomenal wisdom? If the final freedom is absence of all conscious perception, then how can there be a phenomenal wisdom at all? Is the subsequently attained phenomenal wisdom a transformation of defiled ālaya consciousness? In such a case need ālaya be rejected? Since the four wisdoms describe the manifestations of the ultimate pure mind in the phenomenal world, then there must be a transformation of defiled consciousness. What is the basis of that consciousness which perdures from the defiled state to the state of pure wisdom? Furthermore, although the nature of defiled, illusory consciousness is explained as the appearance of the dualistic thinking of subject-object, it remains somewhat obscure just how this can occur, if the only reality in the world is the pure mind of the garbha, the all inclusive dharmadhātu. And does this emphasis on the pure mind remain irrelevant to many, whose experience is quite the opposite?

In its attempt to graft Yogācāra thinking onto the trunk of Tathāgatagarbha doctrine, the Mahāyānasūtra-ālamkāra focuses not upon phenomenal interiority, but

upon the ultimate nature of that interiority as the pure garbha. The Samdhinirmocana had not clearly explained just how the ālayavijñāna is capable of the con-version of its basis from parikalpita to pariniṣpanna, and the Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra had not explained just how paratantra could be both pure and defiled at the same time. The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra responded to these dilemmas by holding to the original purity of the mind, and regarding all defilements to be adventitious and capable of not arising. Thus ālayavijñāna and all conscious functioning is understood to be marked by samsaric bondage. However, in the process the triple structure of trisvabhāva becomes a double structure, in which the tension lies between paratantra-parikalpita and pariniṣpanna.

It appears then that at these early stages of Yogācāra thinking, various interpretations were present. The attempt to synthesize Vijñaptimātratā and Tathāgata-garbha was not the work of Vasubandhu,⁵² nor were the contrasting interpretations of Paramārtha and Dharmapāla without historical precedent.⁵³ In fact it is necessary to understand these initial differences in the development of Yogācāra thinking in order to understand the classical formulation of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, which will be the theme of the next chapter.

¹Ui Hakuju, "On the Author of the Mahāyāna-sūtra-
ālaṃkāra," ZII, VI (1928), pp. 215-225.

²Paul Demieville, "La Yogācārabhūmi de Saṅgharakṣa,"
BEFEO, XLIV (1954), p. 381, n. 4. Both Guiseppe Tucci
and Yamaguchi Susumu concur in this opinion.

³Robert Thurman, ed., Maitreya-nātha's Ornament of
the Scriptures of the Universal Vehicle, unpublished
draft copy, p. 56.

⁴Alex Wayman, "Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manu-
script," University of California Publications in
Classical Philology, XVII (1961), 20-21: "I have already
pointed out a reference to that work (i.e., the Mahāyāna-
sūtrālaṃkāra) by Asaṅga which apparently eliminates
the possibility that he is the author. . . . He (i.e.,
Asaṅga) writes (Derge T., Zi 198a-4; T. 30, p. 658b):
'In regard to that, the commentary truly representing
the meaning of the sūtras promulgated by the Tathāgata
is called Sūtrālaṃkāra.'" "

⁵Takasaki, Study, p. 41.

⁶There are only three instances where the term
ālaya appears in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra. Verse
twelve of chapter one speaks of the permeations of
ālayavijñāna (Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra, Exposé de la
Doctrine du Grand Véhicule, ed., Sylvain Lévi, Paris,
1907, I, 7). Verse forty-four of chapter eleven in the
prose commentary speaks of the transformation of ālaya-
viñāna (Lévi, p. 66). And the prose commentary to verse
nineteen of chapter nineteen identifies the seed, which
is the mark of bondage, with ālayavijñāna (Lévi, p. 169).

⁷Lévi, p. 88. Thurman, p. 177. Ui Hakuju,
Daijōshōgonkyōron kenkyū, Tokyo, 1961, p. 284.

⁸Lévi, p. 24. Thurman, p. 54. Ui, p. 109.

⁹Lévi, p. 40. Thurman, p. 88. Ui, p. 153.

¹⁰Lévi, p. 40. Thurman, p. 88. Ui, p. 153.

¹¹Lévi, p. 65. Thurman, p. 135. Ui, pp. 222-223.

¹²Lévi, p. 58. Thurman, p. 121. Ui, p. 202.

- ¹³Lévi, p. 58. Thurman, p. 122. Ui, pp. 202-203.
- ¹⁴Lévi, p. 58. Thurman, p. 122. Ui, p. 203.
- ¹⁵Lévi, p. 58. Thurman, p. 122. Ui, p. 203.
- ¹⁶See p. 137 Of this study.
- ¹⁷See. p. 106 of this study.
- ¹⁸Lévi, p. 58. Thurman, p. 122. Ui, p. 204.
- ¹⁹Lévi, p. 59. Thurman, p. 123. Ui, p. 205.
- ²⁰Lévi, p. 61. Thurman, p. 123. Ui, p. 205.
- ²¹Lévi, p. 59. Thurman, pp. 123-124. Ui, p. 206.
- ²²Lévi, p. 59. Thurman, p. 124. Ui, p. 206.
- ²³Takasaki Jikidō in his Study, pp. 41-45, Keisei, p. 758, and in "Dharmatā, Dharmadhātu, Dharmakāya, and Buddhadhātu - Structure of the Ultimate Value in Mahāyāna Buddhism," IBK, XIV (1966), 2, pp. 904-903, argues that the two terms āśraya-parāvṛtti and āśraya-parivṛtti are to be distinguished not only inasmuch as the interpretation of the meaning of āśraya (basis) differs from the Tathāgatagarbha notion of garbha to the Yogācāra concept of ālayavijñāna, but also inasmuch as the term parāvṛtti connotes "a change from A to B," while the term parivṛtti means the annihilation of the old basis and the manifestation of reality, which then becomes a new basis. This interpretation seems consistent with the meaning of con-version of the basis in the Mahāyāna-sūtrālamkāra, for there ālaya is rejected upon the realization of the garbha.
- ²⁴Lévi, p. 63. Thurman, p. 130. Ui, p. 215.
- ²⁵Lévi, p. 63. Thurman, p. 130. Ui, p. 216.
- ²⁶Lévi, p. 169. Thurman, p. 331. Ui, p. 520.
- ²⁷Lévi, p. 66. Thurman, pp. 137-138. Ui, p. 226.
- ²⁸Lévi, p. 67. Thurman, p. 140. Ui, p. 229.
- ²⁹Thurman explains: "This epistemological orientation is reflected in the author's employment of a three-fold distinction drawn by earlier writers, particularly

the grammarians, between the "identified" (lakṣya), "identity" (lakṣaṇa), and the "process of identification" (lakṣaṇā). The notion behind these distinctions is that words or "meanings" (artha) are "identities" which assist us in the manipulation of realia. i.e., the "identified," through the establishment of a relation between the word-meaning and thing, that is, the process of "identification."

³⁰Lévi, p. 64. Thurman, p. 133. Ui, p. 220.

³¹Lévi, p. 64. Thurman, p. 134. Ui, pp. 220-221.

³²Lévi, p. 61. Thurman, p. 127. Ui, p. 212.

³³Nagao Gadjin, "On the Theory of Buddha-Body," EB, I (May 1973), 1, pp. 25-53. The Japanese text is contained in Chūkan to yuishiki, pp. 266-292.

³⁴T. 16, p. 708b. Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, pp. 257-258.

³⁵For a discussion of these six aspects, see Takasaki Jikidō, Study, Appendix III, pp. 400-408, and "Hosshin no ichigenron - nyoraizō shisō no hō kannen," in Hirakawa Akira hakase kanreki kinen ronshu: bukkō ni okeru hō no kenkyū, Tokyo, 1976, pp. 231-236.

³⁶Lévi, p. 44. Thurman, p. 97. Ui, p. 165. In the following verses on the trikāya I follow an unpublished translation of Professor Nagao, which he was kind enough to share with me.

³⁷Lévi, p. 45. Thurman, p. 97. Ui, p. 165.

³⁸Lévi, p. 45. Thurman, p. 97. Ui, p. 165.

³⁹Lévi, p. 45. Thurman, p. 98. Ui, p. 166.

⁴⁰Lévi, p. 45. Thurman, p. 98. Ui, p. 166.

⁴¹Lévi, p. 45. Thurman, p. 98. Ui, p. 166.

⁴²Lévi, p. 45. Thurman, p. 98. Ui, p. 166.

⁴³The Lankāvatārasūtra offers a different terminology. There dharmakāya is termed dharmatā-buddha, nirṇāṇakāya is termed nirmita-nirṇāṇa-buddha, and sambhogakāya is termed dharmatā-niṣyanda-buddha, i.e.,

buddha, which is an outflow from dharmatā. See The Lankavatara Sutra, tr., Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, London, 1932, p. 51.

⁴⁴Lévi, p. 45. Thurman, p. 98. Ui, p. 167.

⁴⁵Lévi, p. 46. Thurman, p. 100. Ui, p. 170.

⁴⁶See p. 121 of this study.

⁴⁷Lévi, p. 47. Thurman, p. 101. Ui, p.p. 171-172.

⁴⁸Lévi, p. 49. Thurman, p. 103. Ui, p. 174.

⁴⁹Lévi, p. 49. Thurman, p. 105. Ui, p. 177.

⁵⁰See pp. 160-161 of this study.

⁵¹Lévi, p. 36. Thurman, p. 80. Ui, p. 140.

⁵²See p. 150, n. 25 of this study.

⁵³The traditional East Asian scholarship, since it grew out of the Fa-hsiang version of Yogācāra, favored the interpretations of Dharmapāla over those of Paramārtha. In contrast Ui Hakuju in his many works consistently takes Paramārtha's interpretations as normative, and argues on many points that Dharmapāla has introduced new and strange teachings into the original doctrine of Yogācāra. Both these kinds of options presuppose that there was an original, normative teaching called Yogācāra. However, this does not seem to have been the case, for from the earliest formulations, various interpretations of Yogācāra existed side by side. Thus, even if one maintain that Paramārtha did not follow the teachings of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, as the earlier East Asian Fa-hsiang scholars maintained, yet it is still quite possible that he did follow the teachings of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra. The place of Dharmapāla is more complex, for he has indeed introduced new developments into Yogācāra thinking. These will be treated in a later chapter, where it will be argued that these innovations are responses to questions which were raised within the prior Yogācāra tradition.

CHAPTER NINE

The Classical Formulation of Yogācāra by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu

Asaṅga and his younger brother Vasubandhu (ca. 420-500)¹ developed the themes of Vijñaptimātratā into their classical synthesis. Their many śāstras became the standards for later thinkers, not in the sense that these later Yogācārins slavishly parroted their teachings, but inasmuch as they constituted the commonly accepted point of departure for later endeavours.

This synthesis obviously depended upon the initial presentation of Yogācāra. The Samdhinirmocana and the Mahāyānābhidharma were the principal sūtra sources. The Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra is quoted more than any other text in Asaṅga's Mahāyānasamgraha. But Asaṅga does not accept the teaching of the pure mind of tathāgatagarbha. Rather his focus is upon the phenomenal nature of consciousness. He quotes those sections of the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra which delineate the nature of phenomenal, defiled consciousness, and ignores those that deal with original purity.

In this Mahāyānasamgraha² Asaṅga summarizes the teachings of Mahāyāna as the explanation of dependent co-arising (pratītyasamutpādanirdeśa) and the explanation of the marks of those dependently co-arisen dharmas

(pratītyasamutpannadharmalakṣaṇanirdeśa).³ The first is explained as the mutual conditioning (anyonyapratyaya) of ālayavijñāna and the evolving consciousnesses (pravṛttivijñāna). The Yogācāra understanding of the traditional theme of dependent co-arising is then expressed in the doctrine of vijñāna-pariṇāma, i.e. the relationships between ālaya and the other consciousnesses.

The second explanation is that consciousness functions in the three natures (trisvabhāva). This progression of thought reflects the structure of the Samdhinirmocanasūtra, which moved from a consideration of cittamanovijñāna to the three marks (trilakṣaṇa) of consciousness.

It is within this tripartite understanding of the nature and functioning of consciousness that Asaṅga and Vasubandhu carry out their exposition of Yogācāra. Their explanations of the two truths (satyadvaya) and the three bodies of Buddha (trikāya) must be understood in light of these two basic doctrines of vijñānapariṇāma and trisvabhāva.

This chapter will then begin by attempting to elucidate these two themes. In that context, it will then turn to an examination of the two truths, and the nature of wisdom as shown in the doctrine of the three bodies of Buddha.

A) Vi jñānapariṇāma: - The Evolutions of Consciousness
Vi jñānapariṇāma means the transformations, differentiations, or evolutions of consciousness, and this doctrine treats the mutual relationships between the basic ālayavi jñāna and the evolving consciousnesses (pravṛtti-vi jñāna). In order to clarify just what is so transformed, the nature of ālayavi jñāna will first be examined. Then the meaning of pariṇāma will be investigated. Lastly the schema of the seven evolving consciousnesses will be analyzed, and the meaning of vi jñānapariṇāma outlined.

In his Mahāyānasamgraha Asaṅga takes up the famous verse from the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra on the beginningless realm (anādikāliko dhātuḥ):

The Bhagavan in the Abhidharmasūtra has said that "the beginningless realm (element) is the common support of all dharmas. Because of this, there exist all destinies (gati) and the access to nirvāṇa." 4

However, Asaṅga has understood this quotation not to refer to tathāgatagarbha, but to show that the Buddha has indeed taught that ālayavi jñāna is the support of all that is knowable (jñeyāśraya). The Yogācāra interpretation of anādikāliko dhātuḥ is then ālayavi jñāna, and its meaning is not the originally pure mind at all.

In his commentary, the Mahāyānasamgrahopanibandhana, Asvabhāva (ca. 450-550) explains:

The phrase "the beginningless realm" means that, because there is no initial point, it is without beginning. Realm (dhātuḥ) here means cause (hetu) or seed (bīja). It is the cause of all defiled dharmas (samkleśadharma), but not the cause of pure dharmas (vyavadanadharmā). As afterwards [explained], the basis (aśraya), which receives the permeations of hearing (śrutavāsanā) [of the dharma teaching] is not comprised in (samgrhita) the ālayavijñāna. But just as the ālayavijñāna [matures], so these seeds [of śrutavāsanā] mature. They are comprised in correct reflection (yonīśomanasikāreṇa samgrhitāḥ). They arise in regard to the dharma teaching and its meaning. Because [the ālayavijñāna] can support them, it is the support (aśraya) of all dharmas, but it is not their cause. The notion of support (dhṛti) does not imply that of cause (hetu). 5

According to Asvabhāva then, the ālayavijñāna is the support of all dharmas, even pure dharmas, but it is the cause only of impure dharmas. Pure dharmas, i.e., pure states of consciousness, arise from correct reflection upon the dharma teaching, which has been heard. Without the hearing of and reflection upon this teaching, ālayavijñāna of itself is impotent, and cannot come to the realization of enlightenment. Asaṅga in the Mahāyānasamgraha further states:

Until one has attained (adhiḡamā) wisdom (bodhi), this permeation of hearing (śrutavāsanā), as it resides at whatever level of functioning supports it, resides provisionally (寄在) in the maturing consciousness (vipākavijñāna, i.e., ālaya), unites with it, and functions with it, just as water with milk. Nevertheless, it is not identified with ālayavijñāna, because it opposes (prati-pakṣa) it. 6

Since ālayavijñāna, in appropriating the body with

its sense organs, issues in the prapañca process of extroverted understanding, it cannot be the cause of correct understanding which would reverse that process. But it can be the support for the insight into śūnyatā or viññaptimātratā which reverses prapañca, for, upon hearing the doctrine preached, one can correctly reflect upon it. Defiled dharmas are precisely those which, being clung to as extroverted meaning units, preclude the possibility of realizing enlightenment. Thus the consciousness which causes such impure dharmas cannot be the cause of the pure dharmas of non-prapañca understanding, but it can support such understanding in the hearing and reflection on that dharma teaching.

The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra, a voluminous compendium of Asaṅga's early thinking, develops this idea of the defiled nature of ālayaviññāna:

. . . this defiled, fundamental ālayaviññāna (saṃkleśamūlālayaviññāna), because of the cultivation of good dharmas, comes to be converted and destroyed (轉滅). . . At that time those [who practice] will be able to completely know all the defilements which exist within them. . . Because of their constant practice, they will realize the conversion of the basis (轉依), and immediately upon that conversion of the basis, it is said that they cut off (斷) ālayaviññāna. Because of this cutting off, we say that they have cut off all defilements. Know that because this conversion of the basis is a counteragent, they are able to eternally suppress ālayaviññāna. The ālayaviññāna is essentially transitory (anitya) and has the nature of appropriating (ādāna), but the conversion of the

basis is eternal (nitya) and does not have the nature of appropriating (anādāna). They will take as the object of their understanding tathatā, because the holy path (āryamārga) enables them to con-vert their basis. Moreover, ālayavijñāna constantly follows upon all defilements, but the con-version of the basis is ultimately far-removed from all such defilements. The ālayavijñāna is the cause for the turnings of kleśa [within consciousness], but the holy path is not a cause for any such turnings, but rather the cause whereby they cease turning. . . 7

Thus for Asaṅga ālayavijñāna is clearly phenomenal, defiled consciousness, and in this he is in agreement with the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra. But although it is the cause of kleśa and defilement, it is not totally imprisoned in that defilement. For it is capable of hearing the dharma teaching, and the influence of that hearing (śrutavāsanā) can provisionally reside (寄在) in it, until one has attained wisdom. Thus ālayavijñāna is open to the possibility of āśrayaparivṛtti, the con-verting or turning around⁸ of its basis.

Does ālaya completely disappear upon the realization of wisdom and enlightenment? Is there no consciousness after one has realized wisdom? If so, then how can it be called a realization?

The above quotation speaks of the "destroying" and the "cutting off" of ālayavijñāna. The interpretation of these terms has been a central question in Yogācāra thinking,⁹ and has occasioned different answers. A treatment of it must, however, be left to a later section,

for only after the trīsvabhāva doctrine has been explained, can an adequate response be attempted. Before we ask whether the ālayavijñāna is severed upon the realization of wisdom, it must be first explained just why it is defiled in the first place. What then is the phenomenal nature of ālayavijñāna?

This point is highlighted by Asaṅga in his demonstrations of the existence of ālayavijñāna. These proofs first appear in the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī chapter of the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra,¹⁰ and are repeated in the Abhidharmasamuccaya,¹¹ and the Vikhyāpanaśāstra.¹² Following Hakamaya Noriaki's comparative translation, the introduction to these demonstrations reads:

If there were no ālayavijñāna, then appropriation (upātta), beginning (ādi), discernment (spaṣṭatva), seeds (bīja), action (karman), physical sensation (kāyiko'ṇubhavaḥ), the two mindless states (acitte samapatti), and dying (cyuti) would be meaningless.¹³

The first demonstration is that the appropriation, the making one's own of the material substratum, which forms the sense organs, would be impossible without ālayavijñāna. The functional unity of consciousness, which operates through these sense organs, implies the presence of ālaya. Consciousness operates because of the forces of the sense organs (indriya), their objects (viṣaya), and attention (manaskāra) to these objects by the mind. The ālaya is the stable foundation of the

six sense consciousnesses. Thus ālayavijñāna is the unifying support of sense experience.

In the second demonstration, ālaya is held to be necessary for the very possibility of the incipient evolution (ādi-pravṛtti-sambhava) of that sense consciousness. The third proof holds the same in regard to sense discernment (spaṣṭatva). The fourth holds that ālaya is necessary for the activity of seeds (bīja), which operate through the sense structure.

The fifth demonstration argues that there must be ālayavijñāna, because of the presence of actions (karman). The description of the four kinds of action is significant, because it summarizes the process of extroverted consciousness:

Action is of four kinds, viz., the manifestation of what is represented (bhājana-vijñapti), the manifestation of the basis (aśraya-vijñapti), the manifestation that I am (aham iti vijñapti), and the manifestation of the object (viṣaya-vijñapti). All these manifestations are experienced as being active simultaneously from moment to moment. But one [undifferentiated] consciousness cannot at the same time be differentiated in its action, as these four above [actions] are. 14

The Tibetan commentator and historian, Bu-ston (1290-1364) in his Chos mñion pa kun las btus kyi ti ka rnam bsad Ni mahi hod zer shes bya ba, which comments upon Asaṅga's Abhidharmasamuccaya, explains:

That which is manifested as an object (artha-pratibhāsa) is the manifestation of what is

represented (bhājana-vijñapti). The sense organs, which are manifested as sentient beings (sattva-pratibhāśendriya) are the manifestation of the basis (āśraya-vijñapti). The defiled manas (kliṣṭamanas) consciousness is the manifestation that I am (aḥam iti vijñapti), and the evolving consciousnesses (pravṛttivijñāna) are the manifestation of the object (viśaya-vijñapti). But these four are not different [independent] consciousnesses, because they function instantaneously and simultaneously. It is impossible that each exists independently. . . [and thus they must depend upon ālayavijñāna as a unifying principle]. 15

This description of the activities of consciousness outlines the arising of the prapañca process of extroverted consciousness. From the initial biological extroversion that equates understanding with "taking a look," there arises the belief that there are indeed objects of meaning "out there" (artha-pratibhāsa). In contrast, one then becomes aware of the sensing faculties, i.e., one becomes aware of one's own body (sattva-pratibhāśendriya). Then in distinction from those objects, one imagines a self (aḥam iti vijñapti). By taking an inner look, consciousness is then manifested as confronting external objects (viśaya vijñapti).

Such an outline was seen to be adequate in the Abhidharma context of theoretical thinking. But for Asaṅga, it fails to account for any unifying principle that might render clear all the diverse functionings of consciousness. Thus ālaya is differentiated from the mode of extroverted understanding that characterizes

their operations.

Asaṅga develops ālayavijñāna as the cornerstone of his critical understanding of mind, for mental activities are to be differentiated, and yet must find their unity in the nature of phenomenal consciousness itself. The development of the doctrine of ālayavijñāna not only allows him to sketch the arising of the prapañca process of extroverted meaning, but opens up a new horizon of interiority. For if one be critically conscious of consciousness, then all prapañca thinking will be seen as merely extroversion (kalpanāmātra).

The sixth demonstration of ālaya argues sense experience itself (kāyiko'nubhavaḥ) is impossible without the unifying principle of ālayavijñāna. Again the main point is the distinction of ālaya from sense consciousness and the consequent prapañca process.

The seventh demonstration shifts ground to consider the two states in which mental activity is held in abeyance, i.e., asamjñi-samāpatti and nirodha-samāpatti.¹⁶ If no mental activities are present in these states, and there is no ālaya, then there is simply nothing at all.

The eighth demonstration argues that at the time of dying (cyuti) mental activity ceases, and yet one experiences a sense of dropping temperature. Such an experience implies that even at this point a

consciousness must function, which is ālayavi jñāna.

Thus ālayavi jñāna is the underlying consciousness, which unifies into one experiential whole all the diverse operations of conscious activity. This does not mean that ālaya is the unconscious, if such be taken to mean a repository of repressed emotions, which wait upon a psychological liberation. Rather ālaya is simply consciousness itself, inasmuch as it is not yet objectified in words and rendered present over and against itself. It is pre-conscious, inasmuch as it is not yet objectified, but it constantly calls into being the concepts and names of extroverted understanding. Over and above sense consciousness, over and above the development of extroverted thinking that results from that sense consciousness, there is consciousness itself, a consciousness that is pre-objectified, pre-conceptual, and can thus account for the unity of the objectifying and conceptualizing operations of conscious activity.

Thus consciousness is both a unity and a diversity. It is a unitary consciousness of differentiated operations. It functions as an interlocking, interdependent unity of these different operations, which arise from the natural, biological extroversion of sense experience. By understanding this sequence, one can transcend consciousness and understand understanding (vi jñapti

mātrata). This understanding of the interlocking operations of consciousness understands dependent co-arising (pratītyasamutpāda) not as the interrelatedness of external dharmas, as it would be in the context of extroverted understanding. Rather dependent co-arising is understood as the basic structure of consciousness itself, for its unitary functioning is dependent upon many different operations.

In his Madhyamikakārikās Nāgārjuna explained the meaning of emptiness as dependent co-arising. The phrase used by him is upādāya-prajñaptiḥ, which means "a designation having recourse to materials."¹⁷ Emptiness is understood by having recourse to the designation of dependent co-arising. Yamaguchi Susumu argues that the Yogācāra thinkers understood upādāya-prajñaptiḥ to mean upādāya-vijñaptiḥ, i.e., conscious awareness having recourse to materials.¹⁸ Since verbal designations (prajñaptiḥ) are constructed by consciousness, one must understand consciousness in order to ground any meaning. Yogācāra attempts to render explicit the consciousness underlying the thought of Nāgārjuna by explaining that the meaning of emptiness is the meaning of the interlocking, interdependent structure of the mind. Dependent co-arising is not then only a synonym or a name for emptiness, but rather describes the

interdependent functioning of consciousness, which does not issue in prapañca and is thus empty of imagined units of external meaning (svabhāva).

However, although ālayavijñāna is pre-conscious, because of the failure to understand its interdependent structure, the objectifying process of prapañca does issue in defiled states of mind:

The ālayavijñāna and defiled dharmas (saṃkleśa) are simultaneously (saṃkāle) causes one of the other (anyonyahetuka). 19

This [consciousness] is called ālaya (receptacle) because all the defiled dharmas of beings reside (ālīyante) in it, inasmuch as they are results (phalabhāvena), and, because it resides in those dharmas, inasmuch as it is their cause (hetu-bhāvena). 20

How then can consciousness ever become transformed into wisdom? The Mahāyānasamgraha continues:

How can this maturing consciousness (vipāka-vijñāna), endowed with all the seeds (sarvabījaka) that cause defilement (saṃkleśahetu) be able to be the seed of the transcendent mind (lokattara citta)? Such a transcendent mind is foreign to it, because the permeations (vāsanā) [of pure dharmas] are not present in it. Not having such permeations, from what seed is this [transcendent mind] born? We respond that it issues from the seed that is the permeation of hearing (śrutavāsanā) which is an outflow of the pure dharmadhātu (dharmadhātuniṣyanda). 21

Asaṅga continues to explain that this śrutavāsanā, the permeations that come from hearing the true teaching, is not inherent in ālayavijñāna, nor caused by ālayavijñāna. But as such permeations develop, ālayavijñāna

experiences a total con-version of its basis, and finally completely severs (prahīṇa) all the seeds of defilement.

In a later section, the nature of śrutavāsanā as the outflow of the pure dharmadhātu will be treated. The point to note here is that ālayavijñāna functions as the cause only of defiled dharmas. At the same time, however, it remains open to the possibility of receiving the seed of enlightenment in the hearing of the true teaching. It is not then totally depraved. Of itself it can never bring about enlightenment, but it is capable of producing limited, conditioned, good dharmas. such as turning one's attention to the dharma teaching.

Again [ālayavijñāna] has both the mark of being weak (dausthulyalakṣaṇa) and of being stable (praśrabdhilakṣaṇa). It is weak, inasmuch as it is the seed of passion (kleśa). It is stable, inasmuch as it is the seed of impure, but good dharmas (sāsravakuśuladharmā). 22

These impure, but good dharmas are states of mind conducive to hearing the dharma teaching, which precede the realization of emptiness, and are included within the meaning context of extroverted understanding. Thus, even although one can turn attention to the teaching, this alone is not adequate to bring about the con-version of the basis of consciousness that issues in wisdom.

Asaṅga ends his discussion of ālayavijñāna by equating it with a magical trick (māyā), a mirage (marīci), a dream (svapna) or an optical illusion

(timira). It is the source of unreal imaginings (parikalpa), and so becomes the source of extroverted meanings and false understandings (viparyāsanimitta).²³

In summary, Asaṅga in his Mahāyānasamgraha describes ālayavijñāna as the unifying principle of a differentiated consciousness, which gives rise to unreal imaginings, and which thus results in the clinging to extroverted meanings. Its con-version to wisdom cannot be caused by itself, for it can cause only defiled dharmas, and any good dharma it may support remains circumscribed within that impure context of extroverted meaning. Wisdom can result only from the hearing of the dharma teaching, which is itself an outflow from the pure dharmadhātu. And the realization of such wisdom issues in a state of consciousness that is disjunctive with and heterogeneous to the prior condition of consciousness.

In developing this thinking about consciousness Asaṅga does not profess to be presenting any new content. Rather he claims that this notion of ālayavijñāna is implicitly present even in the literature of the śrāvakas, i.e., in Hīnayāna.²⁴ He quotes the Anguttara-nikāya and the works of various other early Buddhist thinkers.²⁵ His task was to make explicit what remained implicit in those earlier works. He is not then so much concerned with the religious content of what is known, as with the

religious implications of knowing. Before doctrinal discourse can be truly understood, understanding must be understood. It is for this reason that he focuses upon consciousness.

As explained, ālayavi jñāna does not function independently, but rather in synergy with the other evolving consciousnesses. What then are these other consciousnesses? As described in the first chapter, the early Buddhism of the Nikāyas and Āgamas used the terms citta-mano-vi jñāna interchangeably for any kind of mental activity. But Asaṅga assigns each a more specific meaning:

Certain people think that the words citta, mano, and vi jñāna mean the same thing (ekārtha), and that only the words (vyāñjana) are different (bhinna). This opinion is incorrect (ayukta). We have shown that manas and vi jñāna are two distinct things, and thus citta must also be a distinct thing. 26

While the mind is understood to be a unity, it is a unity of distinct operations. Ālayavi jñāna functions in tandem with the other seven consciousnesses. It is pre-conscious, pre-objectified in relation to the other evolving consciousnesses, which are then consciousness as objectified. Ālaya is the fundamental consciousness, inasmuch as it is the foundation for the evolutions (pariṇāma) of these evolving consciousnesses. It is the seed consciousness (sarvabījakavi jñāna), inasmuch as it

gives rise to these evolving differentiations of consciousness. Just as a seed is manifested only in the appearance of a plant, so ālaya is manifested only in the varied operations of conscious knowing. What then is the specific meaning of the evolutions of consciousness (vi jñānapariṇāma)?

In the first place it is not the Saṃkya interpretation of evolution (pariṇāma) from some original principle. Ālaya is not an originating principle, and is not the source from which things arise. The priority of ālayavi jñāna in regard to the pravṛttivi jñāna is one of reason, and not of time, for all the consciousnesses in their varied operations function in an interdependent synergy.²⁷ What then does pariṇāma mean?

Nagao Gadjin explains that the Abhidharmakośa defines pariṇāma as "the differentiation of before and after in the [same] continuum."²⁸ But in Yogācāra there is no temporal sequence involved at all. Sthiramati in his Triṃśikāvi jñaptibhāṣya explains pariṇāma as follows:

What is pariṇāma? It is differentiation. In the same instant that the cause is destroyed, the attainment of the result at that very instant is pariṇāma.²⁹

Thus the relationships between the evolving consciousnesses and ālaya do not imply a change in time, for they take place simultaneously. Pariṇāma then

involves two notions: a) differentiation (anyathātvaṃ) of consciousness from cause to result, and b) temporal simultaneity.

Vi jñānapariṇāma is then of two aspects. As cause (hetuvi jñānapariṇāma) ālayavi jñāna is the root (mūla) from which the evolving consciousnesses arise. As result (phalavi jñānapariṇāma) ālayavi jñāna is formed by the amassing of the seeds of these evolving consciousnesses. The causal relation between ālayavi jñāna and pravrttivi jñāna is reciprocal.³⁰ And this explanation of the evolutions of consciousness further explains the Yogācāra understanding of dependent co-arising. Sthiramati in his Trimśikāvi jñaptibhāṣya states:

We know that consciousness is dependently co-arisen because of the explanation of vi jñānapariṇāma.³¹

The understanding of the synergistic relationships of the functioning of consciousness is fundamental to the understanding of consciousness as dependently co-arisen. If one considers only the process from cause to result, from ālaya to the evolving consciousnesses, then ālaya becomes an originating cause, and would not itself arise co-dependently.

The simultaneity of the causal relationships between ālaya and the evolving consciousnesses is to be understood as functioning from moment to moment (kṣaṇikatva), and thus all dharmas arise synergistically

and momentarily, and conscious awareness continues to be established in such an on-going, momentary structure of awareness. It neither functions eternally, nor for just one moment, but in a continuity of moments, in the continuity of a momentary consciousness.³²

But yet ālayavijñāna does enjoy a priority of reason over the pravṛttivijñāna, for it is the pre-conscious foundational consciousness. The Mahāyānasamgraha writes:

The evolving consciousnesses are experiential (aupabhogika) in the course of all existences and destinies. Concerning this there is a verse from the Madhyāntavibhāga: "The first consciousness is the condition consciousness (pratyaya-vijñāna). The second is the experiential. It is herein that mental states experience, discriminate, and stimulate." These two consciousnesses (i.e., ālayavijñāna and pravṛttivijñāna) are reciprocal conditions (anyonyapratyaya).³³

Vasubandhu in the prose commentary explains the verse as follows:

Ālayavijñāna is the condition consciousness because it is the condition for the other consciousnesses. Arising with that [ālaya] as their condition, the evolving consciousnesses are experiential. Experience means sensation (vedanā). Discrimination means conceptualization (saṃjñā). Stimulation means the activities of consciousness, such as mental attention, etc., [which bring conceptualization into action].³⁴

The evolving consciousnesses are experiential, for they are objectified consciousness. They are conscious awareness embodied in words and concepts, in contrast to ālayavijñāna, which by itself would be contentless and pre-conscious. But what specifically

are these evolving consciousnesses? The first six, the five sense consciousnesses and the sixth manovi jñāna, were inherited from the Abhidharma system. The five sense consciousnesses are obviously the five realms of the sense organs. Manovi jñāna is explained as the consciousness which discerns what is presented to it by sensation. But some explanation is necessary in regard to manas-vi jñāna.

The Samdhinirmocanasūtra in its discussion of citta-mano-vi jñāna, does not treat of a manas consciousness at all. Citta is explained as ālaya, and

having this appropriating consciousness as its support, the six kinds of consciousness of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental consciousness arise . . . Together with this consciousness of the eye, there functions a mental imaginative consciousness, which is simultaneous with it and has the same identical object. 35

The Samdhinirmocana thus presents a schema of seven consciousnesses, where mano, mental consciousness, is simply the interior discernment of objects of sensation. At the time of the composition of this sūtra the notion of a distinct manas consciousness had not yet been developed.

However, there is a clear notion of the manas in Asaṅga's Yogācārabhūmiśāstra:

What is the essence of mind? This refers to cittamanovi jñāna. Citta means the basis (āśraya) for all seeds, the basis on which they rely, the fundamental ability to take unto itself (utpāṭta)

[the sense organs and the body], i.e., the alayavijñāna, which consists in maturation (vipaka). Mind means constantly active thought and the uninterruptedly disappearing thought of the physical organs. Vijñāna means the manifestation in front of one of the objects [of the senses]. 36

In contrast to the Samdhinirmocana, this passage explains mental consciousness (mano) as constantly active thought, and thus, in offering a new definition of mano, presages the distinction of mano from manas. The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra continues:

Now all consciousnesses are termed cittamano-vijñāna. The most pre-eminent of these, the alayavijñāna, is termed citta, because this consciousness is able to accumulate (ci) all kinds of dharma seeds at all times, and takes as its objects [the sense organs], which it appropriates, and the entire physical world. Manas is termed mano, because at all times it clings to I and Mine and has the deliberations of pride as its nature. The other consciousnesses are called vijñāna, because they discriminate the marks of sense objects. 37

Here the function of mano as the discernment of sense data is not mentioned. Rather manas is further described, not only as constantly active thought, but also as the clinging to I and Mine. These two ideas will form the central theme of manas consciousness in later Yogācāra texts. Because it is assigned the role of clinging to I and Mine and has the deliberations of pride for its nature, manas consciousness comes to be identified with the prapañca process of assuming that real entities correspond to its thoughts and concepts.

As Katsumata Shunkyo points out,³⁸ this distinct notion of manas consciousness is first developed in the Yogā-cārabhūmiśāstra.

Asaṅga develops this trend of thought in his Abhidharmasamuccaya:

How is the skandha of consciousness established? By means of the differentiation of cittamano-vijñāna. Citta is the sarvabījakālayavijñāna, which is permeated by the skandhas, dhatus, and āyatanas. It is also called the variously maturing consciousness (vipākavijñāna) and the appropriating consciousness (ādanavijñāna), because it is able to accumulate all these permeations. Manas is that which has deliberation as its nature, and at all times takes as its object ālayavijñāna. It is always associated with the four passions (kleśa) of self-view, self-love, self-pride, and ignorance. This deliberating is pervasively active in all good, bad, and amoral states, and is severed only upon the realization of the path of meditation (bhāvanāmārga), when the meditation of cessation (nirodhasamādhi) appears in the state of no-training (aśaikṣa). . . 39

The nature of manas is here described as that kind of thinking, which assumes as its object the existence of a real self by imagining that ālayavijñāna is an ātman, and consequently clings to that self in pride and ignorance. The function of mano as sense discernment is relegated to the category of vijñāna and treated together with the sense consciousnesses.

Again in the Vikhyāpana Asaṅga says:

Citta is referred to by the different terms citta, mano, and vijñāna. Citta refers to these eight kinds: ālaya, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mano, and manas. 40

Asaṅga clearly distinguishes manas from mano, and assigns it the function of being the source of extroverted consciousness. In the Mahāyānasamgraha he further explains:

This [ālaya] consciousness is again called citta. Thus the Bhagavan said: Among cittamanovijñāna the manas is twofold. It functions as an antecedent condition (samanantarapratyaya), and with it as support (āśrayabhūta) the immediately disappearing consciousness (anantarāniruddhaviññāna) is the support for the arising (utpattyaśraya) of mental consciousness. The second is the defiled manas (kliṣṭa-manas), which is always associated with (samprayukta) four passions (kleśa): the false view of self (satkāyadrsti), pride of self (asmimāna), attachment to self (ātmasneha), and ignorance (avidyā). It is the support of the defilement (samkleśa) of consciousness. Consciousness arises because the first manas is its support. The second is defilement. Because it knows objects (viśayaviññaptiḥ), manas is consciousness. And inasmuch as it is both antecedent (samanantara) and deliberation (manana), the manas is twofold. 41

Manas is then differentiated from ālaya because it is deliberative thinking, which is associated with the genesis of views, with prapañca. As one thought gives way to another, consciousness is held in constant, momentary functioning. As it mistakes understanding for extroverted meaning, it is said to "know objects."

While ālaya is pre-conscious and not objectified in words, manas is precisely consciousness objectified in the concepts and words of extroverted meaning. As such an objectification tends to take understanding as an act of taking a look at external meaning units, the manas is

a misunderstanding of understanding, an unconsciousness of consciousness. Thus Vasubandhu in the Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratāsiddhikārikās describes the nature of manas as evaluative thinking.⁴² Manas constantly evaluates and deliberates upon meanings from its mistaken, but firmly held belief and attachment to a self. It constantly misunderstands consciousness and takes ālayavijñāna to be its own self (ātman). It is thus that manas becomes defiled manas (kliṣṭamanas).

The nature of this misunderstanding of understanding can be seen in the following passage from the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, which is a response to the request to give some examples of vijñaptimātra.

Dreams and so forth can serve as examples. For in dreams, where there is no object, but only consciousness, various objects, such as colors, sounds, odors, tastes, tactile things, mansions, forest trees, and mountains do appear, even though there is no [corresponding] real object at all. By means of this comparison, one can understand how even in states other than dreams, there is consciousness only. [In the phrase "dreams and so forth"], the words "and so forth" refer to other examples, such as magic tricks, mirages, and optical illusions. 43

In all the above examples, i.e., dreams, magical illusions, mirages, optical illusions, etc., the predominant characteristic is that an image is present, which leads to the consequent assumption that a corresponding external object is present. No insight into the image occurs, for then it would be understood that one

is only dreaming or being fooled by magical illusions. It is of this image-bound understanding that the texts speak of unreal imaginings (abhūtaparikalpa) or of the nature of that which is totally imagined (parikalpita).

B) Trisvabhāva - The Three Natures

After considering the structure of consciousness in the Jñeyāśraya chapter, the Mahāvānaśaṅgraha turns to an examination of the marks of the knowable in the Jñeyalakṣaṇa chapter. In this chapter it moves from a consideration of paratantra to the other two natures, as if to highlight the pivotal role of paratantra.

It defines paratantra as:

. . . the conscious knowing (viññapti), which has ālayaviññāna as seed (bīja), and which is comprised in unreal imaginings (abhūtaparikalpa). 44

This same theme is treated by Asaṅga in the Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra:

Unreal imagining (abhūtaparikalpa) exists, but in it the two do not exist. However, herein emptiness does exist. But in that [emptiness], these [unreal imaginings] exist. 45

In his Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā Sthiramati explains that:

Unreal imagining is the imagining of the grasped and the grasper (grāhyagrāhakavikalpa). The word two refers to the grasped and the grasper. . . Emptiness, however, is apart from this condition of the grasped and the grasper of unreal imagining. . . Thus unreal imagining exists in emptiness. 46

Consciousness as unreal imagining, as paratantra,

does indeed exist, but the dichotomy of subject-object, whereby one imagines an inner self over against external objects, does not exist, and is merely imagined (parikalpita).

The Mahāyānaśāstra defines parikalpita as:

that which is manifested under the appearance of an object (arthābhāsa), even although there is no such object, for there is nothing but consciousness (viññaptimātra). 47

Vasubandhu in the Mahāyānaśāstrabhāṣya comments:

The phrase "is manifested under the appearance of an object" means that [parikalpita] is manifested under the appearance of a meaning that is grasped (grāhyārtha), or under the appearance of a self that knows. 48

The objectification of meaning that issues from manasviññāna in its appearance (ābhāsa, pratibhāsa) as subject and object constitutes parikalpitasvabhāva, the nature of that which is totally imagined. Such a dichotomy is however an illusion, and does not exist, for understanding functions in emptiness, i.e., it is empty of extroverted meaning units that might be so grasped. But that basically empty consciousness is the interlocking, interdependent process that gives rise to these unreal, illusory imaginings, and does exist in a paratantric context.

Asaṅga and Vasubandhu have developed in this tri-svabhāva teaching a horizon, in which the prapañca process that imagines unreal entities can be negated,

while yet maintaining the existence of consciousness as not empty of all meaning.

The Mahāyānasamgraha defines pariniṣpanna as:

The complete absense of all marks of the object (arthalakṣaṇa) in paratantrasvabhāva. 49

This means that pariniṣpanna is precisely the absence of the extroverted mode of consciousness, which by externalizing objects comes to be attached to them in samsaric desire.

These three natures are not to be understood as three distinct and separate realms. They rather describe the one process of the liberation of sentient beings from the extroverted mode of consciousness that clings to dharmas and experiences samsaric suffering to the realization of wisdom, which lacks any such extroverted clinging.⁵⁰ Asaṅga raises the question of whether these three natures are different or identical, and responds that:

They are neither different nor identical. In one mode of being (paryaya) paratantra is itself dependent on others. In another mode of being, it is parikalpita, and in another mode of being, it is pariniṣpanna. 51

This passage emphasizes the central position of paratantra. Nagao Gadjin convincingly argues that the term paryaya in the above passage means "the way it is, the way it exists."⁵² Thus at various times paratantra exists as parikalpita or as pariniṣpanna.

It is this transformation from the extroverted consciousness of parikalpitasvabhāva to the internally realized awareness of pariniṣpannasvabhāva, the nature of full perfection, that is meant by the doctrine of āśrayaparivṛtti, the con-version of the basis. Āśraya, which has the meanings of basis, basic support, and body, here means both the body and the mind, for the appropriating ālayavijñāna makes its own the body with its sense organs.⁵³ But the main focus is on consciousness. By assuming that the biological extroversion, which results from the appropriations of the body by consciousness, is the only real mode of understanding, consciousness becomes parikalpita. Its transformation consists in the rejection of this assumption that the consciousness of meaning is extroverted looking. Thus the body and physical sensation are transformed from being the norm of all understanding to being simply the source of illusion, for meaning does not come from sensation. In this manner āśrayaparivṛtti is a transformation of both consciousness and the physical body.

Following the Mahāyānābhīdharmaśāstra's teaching of the two aspects of paratantra, the Mahāyānasamgraha describes the con-version of the basis:

What is the mark of dharmaśāstra of the Buddhas?
It has as its mark the con-version of the basis,
because, having destroyed all the obstacles

(āvarana) and the dependent nature in its defiled aspect (saṃkleśabhāgapatitaparatantra-svabhāva), it is liberated from all obstacles, is assured of mastery over all dharmas, and is transformed into the dependent nature in its pure aspect (vyavadānabhāgapatitaparatantra).⁵⁴

Āśrayaparivṛtti has then two aspects; a con-version away from (轉捨, ldog, vivārtana) the defiled aspect of paratantra, and a con-version to (轉得) the pure aspect of paratantra. This is far different from the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra's treatment of paratantra simply as the basis of error. But what is this pure aspect of paratantra? The Mahāyānasamgraha explains:

Paratantrasvabhāva in its completely perfected aspect (pariniṣpannabhāga) is eternal (nitya), originally peaceful (adīśanta), essentially in nirvāṇa (prakṛtiparinirvṛta). In its imaginary aspect (parikalpitabhāga) it is transitory (anitya), [not originally peaceful, and not essentially in nirvāṇa].⁵⁵

Asaṅga has here reworked Tathāgatagarbha themes. For, although consciousness is not originally pure, yet it is open to, directed to the purity of pariniṣpanna. The pure aspect of paratantra is this openness to being so con-verted. It is not a given component of ālayavijñāna, as if consciousness were somehow composed of two constituent parts. Rather it is the possibility of paratantric consciousness to reverse prapañca thinking, and the defilement that follows upon that thinking. In like manner, the defiled aspect of paratantra, the biological tendency toward extroverted consciousness,

is not a given component of the mind, but rather a mode (pariyaya) of paratantric consciousness. Paratantra is then the pivot between parikalpita and pariniṣpanna. Paratantra is the dependently co-arisen structure of consciousness that enables Asaṅga to ground the tension between illusion and enlightenment, between defilement and purity, within a critically understood consciousness. He thus deepens the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra's understanding of trīsvabhāva, by emphasizing this pivotal role of paratantra, which is no longer interpreted as simply the basis of error, but also as the axis upon which āśraya-parivṛtti occurs.

Consequently it would seem that the above question as to what "destroying" or "cutting off" of ālayavijñāna means is to be interpreted in terms of these two aspects of paratantra. Inasmuch as it is defiled (parikalpita-bhāga), ālayavijñāna is destroyed and severed, but its completely perfected aspect (pariniṣpannabhāga), being open to the eternal (nitya) and originally peaceful (ādiśānta), it need not be severed at all.⁵⁹

This pure aspect must not be understood as meaning that ālayavijñāna in part is originally pure, for by its own inner power consciousness cannot elicit bodhi. It is due to śrutavāsanā that it can be converted. Thus the nature of paratantric consciousness implies the

possibility of consciousness being open to śrtuavāsanā, but the causal force that brings about the con-version of the basis does not lie in the inherent nature of consciousness, but comes from that hearing of the true teaching.

In his Abhidharmasamuccaya Asaṅga further explains the con-version of the basis:

What is the final stage of the path (niṣṭhāmārga)? This means that immediately after all the propensities (dausthulya) of kleśa have been completely severed, because of vajropamasamādhi,⁵⁶ the basis is con-verted, and one realizes exhaustive wisdom (ksaya-jñāna), non-arising wisdom (anutpāda-jñāna), i.e., the ten dharmas of no-training (daśaśaikṣadharmā). These are the true insight of no-training (aśaikṣasamyagdrṣṭi) up to the [eighth] true meditation (samyagdhyāna) of no-training, the true liberation (samyagvimukti) of no-training, and the true wisdom (samyag-jñāna) of no-training. 57

The enlightenment that occurs upon the con-version of the basis involves the complete severance of all kleśa. It is not then merely an intellectual insight into the nature of paratantric consciousness. In his Abhidharma-samuccayabhāṣya Sthiramati explains:

The con-version of the basis, which is realized immediately [after severing all kleśa] in the path of no-training is of three kinds. The first is the con-version of the basis of the mind (citta-āśrayaparāvṛtti), which means that, when one has attained the path of no-training, basic purity (自性清淨, rañ-bshin gyis hod gsal, prakṛtivyavadāna), which is the dharmatā mind (法性心, chos-ñid kyi sems, dharmatacitta), which he then realizes, is completely severed from adventitious, accompanying passion (āgantuka-upakleśa), and thus there is a con-version of

the basis in regard to tathatā. The second is the con-version of the basis of the path (mārṇa-āśrayaparāvṛtti), which is a con-version to a world transcendent [path], which occurs after the worldly path (laukikamārṇa) has already been realized, as stated above [in the text of the Abhidharmasamuccaya]. The term training (śikṣa) means that there are still things to be worked on, but when one has completely eradicated all that should be disciplined (pratipakṣā) and severed the desires of the triple world, then the essence of this path is finally fulfilled (paripūrṇa), and thus this is a con-version of the basis. The third is the con-version of the basis of the proclivities (dausthulya-āśrayaparāvṛtti), which means that ālayaviṣṇāna is completely severed from all the proclivities of passion (kleśānuśaya). This is also called a con-version of the basis. 58

The con-version of the basis does not have a single, univocal meaning, but rather includes these three stages, which are, it would seem, sequential one after the other. Nagao Gadjin writes that the con-version of the basis includes not only the highest liberation attained at vajropamasamādhī, but also that attained by people even before their entry into the higher stages of the path. It is the entrance both into enlightenment, and into faith.⁵⁹

Sthiramati's explanation refers to a process of con-version, of turning around. The con-version of the basis of the mind is a turning away from the prapañca process, which imagines externalized meanings "out there" and a counterposed self "in here," to the awareness of tathatā, to an understanding of the mind just as it is, i.e., as dependently co-arisen. Such a con-version

means that parikalpita imaginings are absent from paratantra consciousness, and thus one realizes pari-niṣpanna. Basic purity is realized, for, as will be shortly described, it is the all inclusive horizon in which the mind moves and functions. It is not that the mind itself is basically pure, for it is the cause only of defiled dharmas. But, although defiled, because the mind is empty of any fixed nature and arises in dependency on a host of causes and conditions, it has the potential to be con-verted or turned around.

But such a con-version remains incomplete, for otherwise the initial insight into the emptiness of all the categories of extroverted meaning would constitute full enlightenment. Besides understanding understanding and rejecting prapañca, one has to translate that insight into practice. One must decide to act in accord with that understanding. Thus the con-version of the basis of the path means that the path previously practiced, the worldly path, must be transformed into the transcendent path. No amount of practice that merely seeks to accumulate merit (sambhāravasthamārga) or that intensifies effort in the same context (prayogavasthamārga) can lead to the wisdom and practice of a bodhisattva. As Asaṅga explained, ālaya can cause defiled dharmas that are good (āśravakuśuladharmas), but such a practice of goodness

remains within the context of parikalpita. Thus this second con-version of the path is that whereby practice is transformed from the worldly path to the transcendent path, and prior understanding is embodied in action.

The third con-version of the basis of the propensities of passion is the final severance of all kleśa, and constitutes entry into nirvāṇa. For this reason many texts explain that the bodhisattva, because of his vow to save all sentient beings, refrains from this ultimate severance, in order to remain among suffering beings to carry out the tasks of compassion.

Another section of the Mahāyānasamgraha thematizes the nature of pariniṣpanna in a different context.

The broad expanse of the Mahāyāna (mahāyāna-vaipulya) [sūtras] were spoken by the Buddha Bhagavan, and in this doctrine, the question is raised as to how one is to understand . . . the nature of pariniṣpanna. It should be understood through the teaching of the four kinds of pure dharmas (caturvidho vyavadānadharma). These four are original purity (prakṛti-vyavadāna), i.e., tathatā, emptiness (śūnyatā), the limit of reality (bhūtakoti), the unmarked (animitta), and the ultimate truth (paramārthasatya). The dharmadhātu is also the same. The second is undefiled purity (vaimalya-vyavadāna), i.e., the same original purity inasmuch as it is free from all obstacles. The third is the purity of the path (mārga-vyavadāna), which attains to that undefiled purity, i.e., all the virtues favorable to enlightenment (bodhipakṣikasārvadharmah). The fourth is the purity of the object (ālambana-vyavadāna), which gives rise to that [path], namely the doctrine of the true dharma of the Mahāyāna (mahāyāna-saddharma). Because this doctrine is the cause of purity (vyavadāna-hetutva); it is not merely

imagined (parikalpita). Because it is the outflow of the pure dharmadhātu (viśuddhadharmadhātu-niśyandatva), it is not dependently co-arisen. All pure dharmas are included in this fourfold purity.

Concerning this a verse says: Magical tricks, etc., are enunciated in regard to that which is produced (bhūta-paratantra), and non-existence in regard to that which is imagined (parikalpita), and the four kinds of purity in regard to full perfection (pariniṣpanna). These purities are original purity, undefiled purity, the purity of path, and the purity of object. All pure dharmas are included in these four kinds of purity.⁶⁰

The schema of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, which explains the threefold con-version of the basis as that of the mind, the path, and the propensities of kleśa (citta-mārga-daṣṭhūlya) finds its parallel here in the purity of object (ālambana), of the path (mārga), and undefiled purity (vaimalya).

The purity of the object gives rise to the path, for it is the understanding, which has as its object the true teaching of Mahāyāna. Such an understanding is an embodiment of the mind of dharmadhātu, and thus, it is termed an outflow (niṣyanda) from pure dharmadhātu, although words can never fully express that object. Furthermore, such an understanding presupposes that a con-version of the basis of the mind (citta-āśrayaparāvṛtti) from prapañca thinking to a purified understanding of the meaning of Buddha discourse (buddhavaśana) has indeed occurred. It is thus that the permeations of hearing (śrutavāsanā) can also be said to be an outflow

from the dharmadhātu, for the hearing and understanding of dharma teaching is the mediating process, whereby the mind is con-verted and turned around.⁶¹

The purity of the path (mārga-vyavadāna) is the process of gradual steps to enlightenment described in all the texts, which issues in undefiled purity. As described in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, it is the attainment of the transcendent path, which gains insight into the fact that there is nothing to be grasped or attained, and which thus does not cling to its object in a religious parikalpita.

Undefiled purity (vaimalya-vyavadāna) is total freedom from obstacles, and thus parallels the con-version of the basis of the propensities of kleśa, in that both are final realizations of tathatā.

But the Mahayanasamgraha further describes this undefiled purity as the attainment of original purity (prakṛti-vyavadāna). What is meant by this original or basic purity? It is the structure of the mind, inasmuch as it is open to purity, open to tathatā. Such a structure is not the inner essence of the mind, but is rather the all-inclusive horizon, within which all structures are included. In their commentaries both Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva do describe this original purity as tathāgata-garbha.⁶² As described above, in the Ratnagotravibhāga

the phrase "all sentient beings are tathāgatagarbha" means that the mind of sentient beings is originally pure and any defilement is consequently adventitious (āgantuka). But this is not the understanding of tathāgatagarbha or prakṛtivyavadāna in the Yogācāra of Asaṅga or Vasubandhu. Rather than tathāgatagarbha being included within the mind of sentient beings, everything is included within the dynamic horizon of original purity, of tathāgatagarbha. Such original purity includes and encompasses all things, just as they are (tathatā), whether conscious or unconscious. Asaṅga explains that if paratantra were non-existent, there would be no pariniṣpanna. But Asvabhāva further explains that even if both paratantra and pariniṣpanna as the full realization of undefiled purity were to be non-existent, yet pariniṣpanna as original purity would still exist.⁶³ Thus original purity is the unrestricted horizon, in which all conscious awareness occurs. Because of the paratantric nature of consciousness, through the permeations of hearing and understanding the dharma teaching, which is an outflow from the pure dharmadhātu, sentient beings are open to the realization that becomes aware of this unrestricted horizon of original purity. The possibility of this realization is due to the practice of the path

(mārga-vyavadāna). In turn the path can be entered upon only because one has realized the purity of the object (ālambana-vyavadāna), i.e., because one has heard and understood in a non-prapañca manner the pure dharma teaching (śrutavāsanā). But this pure hearing does not flow from within the mind, rather it flows from the pure dharmadhātu itself. Therefore the first awakening of the aspiration to seek bodhi flows from original purity, and in the final awareness returns to a realization of that same original purity. It can flow out to the imaginative, defiled minds of sentient beings, because they are originally included within the horizon of that dharmadhātu.

Thus original purity must not be understood to be a "possession" of the minds of beings, which, simply by brushing aside the adventitious defilements of kleśa, can be restored to its pristine state. Asaṅga and Vasubandhu have developed this notion of original purity as the all-inclusive horizon in order to allow them to adequately treat the paratantric reality of defiled consciousness, while at the same time explaining how that defiled mind, because included in that horizon, can be open to the possibility of enlightenment. Mind then is understood as an interlocking, interdependent unity of differentiated operations, and as such, is empty of any

intrinsic essence (svabhāva). Original purity cannot then be the essence of consciousness, just as defilement and illusion cannot be the essence. The Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra reads:

Neither defiled nor undefiled, neither pure nor impure: such is the original purity of the mind , . . 64

But how can such a realization be attained by phenomenally operating minds? How can there be such a purity of object, since the dharma teaching is indeed verbalized, and words have no ultimate validity? How can one practice a world transcendent path, while yet living in the world? In a word, what are the relationships between the ultimate truth (paramārthasatya) and the conventional truth (saṃvrtisatya)?

C) Satyadvaya - The Two Truths

In the Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra Asaṅga presents an explanation of the two truths, which has been recast in the context of the three natures teaching.

There are three kinds of saṃvrti: verbal thought (prajñapti-saṃvrti), the understanding of things thus objectified (pratipatti-saṃvrti), and manifesting (udbhavana-saṃvrti). 65

In his Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīka Sthiramati explains the first prajñapti-saṃvrti as thinking in words, and thus establishing things in existence (vyavasthāna). As such, it corresponds to parikalpita, the prapañca

thinking of extroverted consciousness. The second, pratipatti-samvṛti, is the functioning of understanding, and as such is paratantra, for it imagines (abhūtaparikalpa) the entities of parikalpita. The third, udbhāvanā-samvṛti, is the manifestation in words (samvṛti) of non-verbal emptiness, i.e., of pariniṣpanna.

Nagao Gadjin explains that the most basic of these is pratipatti-samvṛti, for it refers to paratantric consciousness, which issues in words. He writes:

The first and third are not themselves samvṛti, but are rather supported by samvṛti (verbal consciousness), just as parikalpita and pariniṣpanna are supported by paratantra. 66

This reflects the Mahāyānasamgraha's teaching that paratantra has two aspects, the defiled (samkleśabhāga) and the pure (vyavadānabhāga). Words then issue not only from the extroverted consciousness of defilement, but, due to the con-version of the basis, can reveal ultimate meaning in conventional terms. When such a con-version has not occurred, words manifest only defiled imaginings and establish things in a supposed existence. Consequently prajñapti-samvṛti corresponds to the idea of the covering over of truth, as explained by Chandrakīrti.⁶⁷ But when such a con-version has occurred, words can manifest the ultimate. Thus udbhāvanā-samvṛti, conventional truth as manifesting, corresponds to the notion of

the "coming to be" (vrt), i.e., saṃvṛtti, of truth within consciousness.

Thus conventional truth as manifesting (udbhāvanā-saṃvṛti) parallels the above treatment of the purity of the object (ālambana-vyavadāna) in the Mahāyānasamgraha. Both thematize the true understanding of ultimate reality. But in the Mahāyānasamgraha the purity of the object was included under pariniṣpanna, i.e., under paramārtha-satya. As Hakamaya Noriaki explains, it would seem that the Mahāyānasamgraha regards the Buddha realm, i.e., enlightenment, as leading to and flowing out into the enunciation of the dharma teaching (dharmadeśana), while the Madhyāntavibhāga regards verbal enunciation as nothing more than a pointer to paramārtha, and as such saṃvṛti.⁶⁸ In any event, whether one places verbal understanding in saṃvṛti as manifesting (udbhāvanā), or in paramārtha as the purity of the object (ālambana-vyavadāna), the direct experience of enlightenment does become verbalized and objectified in the teaching of the dharma. As such it is a direct outflow from the pure dharmadhātu, for it flows from the experience of that enlightenment. This idea is expressed in the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra as follows:

Truly, when doctrine is enunciated (dharmadeśana) by the Tathāgata, those who cultivate that doctrine gain insight into (sākṣātkurvanti) and bear in mind (dhārayanti) that dharmata. And having

insight into and bearing it in mind, whatever they say, or explain, or relate, or speak, or clarify, or understand is all in accord with that dharmatā. Oh Śāriputra, such good sons, when they narrate that dharmatā, in nowise contradict it, because such is the outflow of the certain doctrine of the Tathāgata (tathāgatadharmadeśana). 69

Thus udbhāvanā-saṃvṛti corresponds to the pure aspect (paṇiṣpannabhāga) of paratantra consciousness, while prajñapti-saṃvṛti corresponds to its defiled aspect. By employing this context of the trisvabhāva, doctrinal discourse is grounded within the nature of consciousness itself. When understood in the context of extroverted meaning, such discourse can lead only to the defiled, good dharmas (sāsravakuśuladharmā) that remained imprisoned within the bonds of parikalpita. But when understood from the insight into viññaptimātra, doctrinal discourse opens upon paramārtha, words are understood to have no external reference point, and doctrine becomes upāya, skillfully constructed means to lead to insight.

The Mahāyānasamgraha's treatment of the other three purities are paralleled by the discussion in the Madhyānta-vibhāga on paramārthasatya, ultimate truth. The text reads:

Paramārtha is to be considered as the object (artha), as realization (prāpti), and as practice (pratipatti). 70

Sthiramati explains that in the case of artha-paramārtha, the ultimate (parama) is the object (artha)

of realized wisdom (paramāsyā jñānasyārtha).⁷¹ It is that toward which the mind tends in every act of conscious knowing. It is tathatā. The term prakṛti-vyavadāna in the Mahāyānasamgraha emphasizes that tathatā is prior to and before any realization, because it is the unrestricted horizon in which all consciousness is included. The term arthaparamārtha in the Madhyānta-vibhāga understands tathatā as the objective toward which consciousness tends in an unrestricted manner, because it alone is the object of wisdom and the final liberation from the suffering of samsaric parikalpita. Thus tathatā, which is both original purity and the object of the ultimate truth, is all inclusive, for it is presupposed in every act of conscious understanding. It lies under and goes beyond any state of consciousness, for it is the ultimate ground upon which all consciousness rests. It penetrates all conscious acts, but cannot be defined by any specific content.

Prāpti-paramārtha, the ultimate truth as realization, is the realization and attainment (prāpti) of the ultimate (paramārtha).⁷² It is the realization of that tathatā, which is attained by the conversion of the basis, and therefore corresponds to undefiled purity (vaimalya-vyavadāna).

Pratipatti-paramārtha, the ultimate as practice,

is the acquiring of paramārtha by the practices of the path, and parallels mārga-vyavadāna.⁷³

In its defiled aspect consciousness functions in the context of parikalpita. But in its pure aspect, because of the hearing and understanding of the dharma teaching, it is dynamically turned toward bodhi, which can be realized by the con-version of the basis. Thus Vasubandhu's definition in his Triṃśikā of ālaya as being non-defined and non-defiled⁷⁴ means that, although it constantly causes impure dharmas to arise, yet it is also open to the possibility of pariniṣpanna. And this basic contradiction between illusion and enlightenment lies at the foundation of all consciousness.⁷⁵

Since the nature of consciousness is contradictory, the nature of truth must also reflect this condition. Nagao Gadjin explains that the relationship of the two truths is both centripetal and centrifugal, both continuous and discontinuous. The centripetal meaning is that paramārtha is born from within saṃvṛti as the objective of its urgent demand.⁷⁶ Paramārtha is not only the object of ultimate wisdom, but is also the prior context in which all questioning takes place. Due to hearing and pondering the dharma teaching, an anticipatory understanding occurs, and consciousness awakens to

the possibility of enlightenment. Such is not the full realization of tathatā as original purity, but is rather the understanding that there is something to be understood, the realization that there is something to be realized, that there is an objective (artha) toward which consciousness tends in its basic structure. Without being thus grounded upon conventional consciousness, the ultimate could never become manifested. In his Madhyamikakārikās Nāgārjuna has said:

Without being grounded upon speech (vyavahāra),
the ultimate (paramārtha) cannot be realized. 77

Thus saṃvṛti becomes in the classical formulation of Yogācāra that which discloses (udbhāvanā) paramārtha.⁷⁸

But, as Nagao continues, this centripetal relationship does not prevent the two truths from being absolutely disjunctive and centrifugal. For saṃvṛti is the covering speech which hinders, and never is the ineffable, non-discriminative Buddha wisdom itself. Thus it is treated in negative categories, as in Nāgārjuna's denials (pratishedha). Pointing at the moon (saṃvṛti) is not the moon (paramārtha). Consequently paramārtha always reveals itself as negation.⁷⁹ All doctrinal discourse, even as the outflow from the pure dharmadhātu, involves the rejection and denial of any view whatsoever, of any prapañca thought categories. It is thus that the Madhyāntavibhāga teaches that one enters the unmarked

(animitta) dharma, i.e., the mark of upāya.⁸⁰ The equation of the unmarked dharma with upāya means that words are no longer imagined to represent extroverted meanings, but are rather seen as skillfully devised means to render in speech the understanding of the ineffable. Such an awareness of the unmarked upāya is an awareness of truth as both hidden and manifest.⁸¹

Paramārtha is frequently described as silence (tūṣṇīm-bhāva), but if this be understood to mean that it is completely negative in every respect and absolutely transcendent to all human understanding, then it becomes meaningless. In the Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra silence is said to have the sound of thunder.⁸² Yogācāra emphasizes this positive aspect of paramārtha by means of Asaṅga's teaching on the manifestation of paramārtha within saṃvṛti in both the notion of saṃvṛti as manifesting (udbhāvanā) and the notion of the purity of the object of understanding (ālambana-vyavadāna). The Madhyānta-vibhāga further speaks of the being of non-being, i.e., the existence in the phenomenal realm (saṃvṛtiparatantra) of the ultimate.⁸³ This being of non-being is understood as the mark of emptiness (abhāvasya bhavaḥ śūnyasya lakṣaṇaḥ), the phenomenal manifestation of the ultimate.⁸⁴ Because Yogācāra has turned Buddhist thought toward an understanding of meaning that focuses upon interiority,

it has been able not only to describe the genesis of prapañca, but also to explain how consciousness is open to ultimate truth.

D) Trikāya: The Three Bodies of Buddha

It is in this context of interiority that we must understand Asaṅga's understanding of the trikāya doctrine. The trikāya doctrine, it appears, was first formulated in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra.⁸⁵ There the ultimate dharmakāya is interpreted as the dharmadhātu, i.e., the one truly existent reality of the pure mind of tathāgatagarbha. Supported upon this body, sambhoga-kāya and nirmāṇakāya are manifestations of it to bodhisattvas and ordinary people respectively. Thus in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra the trikāya teaching was used to explain the arising (vytti) of dharmadhātu, and the direction is from the ultimate down to its manifestation to the samsaric mind.

However the thought of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu does not admit of such an understanding of dharmadhātu as the originally pure mind. It is probably for this reason that in their initial compositions neither Asaṅga nor Vasubandhu seem to have regarded the trikāya doctrine as central to their classical formulation of Yogācāra. It is not thematized in Asaṅga's Yogācārabhūmiśāstra, nor in his Abhidharmasamuccayaśāstra, nor in his

Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra. It is not mentioned in Vasubandhu's Viññaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra. But it is thematized at length in the Phalajñāna chapter of the Mahāyānasamgraha and in Vasubandhu's commentary to that work. Here it is employed to explain the superiority of wisdom (jñānaviśeṣa). Thus in his explanation of trikāya Asaṅga is not treating the arising of the ultimate, originally pure dharmadhātu, but rather is describing the nature of the wisdom that is realized after all obstacles have been severed. As throughout his writings, the direction remains ascendant, for it always takes as its point of departure an understanding of consciousness.

We have explained [in the preceding chapter] the superiority of severance, which is the result of [the three trainings]. But how are we to understand the superiority of wisdom, which follows upon that [severance]? Be it understood that the three bodies of Buddha: the essential body (svabhāvikakāya), the enjoyment body (sambhogakāya), and the transformation body (nirmāṇakāya) - constitute the superiority of wisdom, which follows upon that [severance]. 86

Asaṅga has reinterpreted trikāya in such a fashion as to maintain the context of interiority, where all meaning is grounded in consciousness. In the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra the teaching of viññaptimātra tended to have only a provisional validity, inasmuch as ālaya is always bound in samsaric defilement and rejected upon the realization of wisdom. Thus the bodies of Buddha

were understood, not in relation to consciousness, but rather in relation to the pure dharmadhātu, not in the context of the phenomenal mind, but in that of the pure mind of tathāgatagarbha. But in the context of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu's Yogācāra, it is only this context of phenomenal interiority which renders doctrinal discourse meaningful, and consequently the trikāya doctrine was interpreted within this context.

How then is dharmakāya considered to be wisdom?

What is the mark of dharmakāya of Buddha? Know that there are in sum (samāsataḥ) five marks. In the first place, it has for its mark the conversion of the basis, because, having destroyed all obstacles and the dependent nature in its defiled aspect, it is delivered from all obstacles. It is assured of mastery over all dharmas, and is transformed into the dependent nature in its pure aspect. 87

The other four marks state that dharmakāya is constituted by pure dharmas (śukladharmasvabhāvalakṣaṇa), is marked by non-duality (advayalakṣaṇa), is eternal (nityalakṣaṇa), and is inconceivable (acintyalakṣaṇa).⁸⁸

These last four marks could well have been written by the author of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, but the first mark reflects Asaṅga's insistence on the context of interiority, for even the realization of dharmakāya occurs within paratantric consciousness. In line with the above discussion, dharmakāya is paramārtha as the objective (artha) of consciousness, is original purity

(prakṛti-vyavadāna) realized in the attainment of undefiled purity (vaimalya-vyavadāna).

Asaṅga continues his discussion by raising the question of how one can attain this dharmakāya, and explains that by the practices that lead to the conversion of the basis, dharmakāya can be attained. It is not the case here that dharmadhātu arises in consciousness by the non-evolution of discrimination, but rather it is the efforts that come from hearing doctrine that enable one to sever defilement and convert consciousness from its defiled aspect to its pure aspect.

The discussion then describes the masteries (vi-bhūtvā) attained in the realization of dharmakāya by explaining how each of the five skandhas experiences its specific con-version (skandhaparivṛtti). The phenomenal components of samsaric continuity are not destroyed, but rather transformed into wisdom. The conversion of the skandha of consciousness is said to result in the attainment of the four wisdoms of mirror, equality, intellectual mastery, and duty fulfillment, as described in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra. The discussion continues at length to describe the qualities of enlightenment supported by dharmakāya with many quotations from the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra.

Sambhogakāya is explained at the beginning of this chapter as:

Sambhogakāya is supported upon dharmakāya and is characterized by various kinds of Buddha assemblies, because it experiences (anubhavati) the entirely pure Buddha fields and the joy of the Mahāyāna dharma. 89

But Sambhogakāya is not treated again until the end of the chapter. It would seem that Asaṅga devoted the bulk of his discussion to dharmakāya in order to highlight the differences in his interpretation of trikāya from that of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, for that difference focuses mainly upon the nature of the ultimate. In his treatment of sambhogakāya and nirmāṇakāya, he basically follows the teaching of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra. Both of these bodies are supported by dharmakāya.

It (dharmakāya) is the support of the various enjoyment bodies, because it completes the maturation of bodhisattvas. . . It is the support of the various transformation bodies, principally because it completes the maturation of śrāvakas. . . 90

Sambhogakāya, supported by dharmakāya, is the experience (anubhava, i.e., sambhoga), or the realization of the joy of dharmakāya. It is the realization (prāpti) of undefiled purity (vaimalya-vyavadāna), which attains the ultimate objective (paramārtha as artha), the original purity (prakṛti-vyavadāna). It is further described as being differentiated from dharmakāya, because it appears differently to bodhisattvas at

different times, in different assemblies, and in different aspects. But Asaṅga adds another reason for the differentiation of sambhogakāya from dharmakāya.

Because the two con-versions of the basis, that of ālayavijñāna and that of the pravṛttivijñāna, are not the same (viśama), the sambhogakāya is not the svabhāvikakāya. 91

Just as ālayavijñāna is pre-conscious and devoid of phenomenal objectification in words and concepts, so its con-verted pure aspect, dharmakāya, is devoid of any such objectification, and is inconceivable. And just as the evolving consciousnesses do issue in perceptible words and marks, so sambhogakāya is an experience that is expressible in the words of wisdom, and is thus the manifestation of the ultimate dharmakāya. But any manifestation is a manifestation to someone. And the mind of beings can function either in the awareness of consciousness only or in the prapañca mode of parikalpita. Consequently there is also a difference between sambhogakāya, which is manifested to the pure minds of bodhisattvas, and nirmānakāya, which is manifested to the defiled mind of ordinary beings. The bodhisattva, because of the understanding of consciousness only, is able to understand that all phenomenal words, images, and experiences are upāya, and refer to the ineffable dharmakāya, which is their support. But the imaginative thinking of ordinary people is incapable of such an

insight and experience of sambhogakāya. Thus nirmāṇa-kāya is directed to them, and appears in material human form to encourage them to hear the dharma (śruta) and open themselves to its influence (vāsanā).

Just as the central theme of all Buddhist thought is directed to the experience of enlightenment, so in the trikāya doctrine, sambhogakāya fulfills a central role. In the trisvabhāva teaching, it was seen that paratantra, being both defiled and pure, played a pivotal role between parikalpita and pariniṣpanna. Likewise, because sambhogakāya is the experience of dharma-kāya while yet being understandable in terms of phenomenal experience, it plays a pivotal role between the other two bodies. As Nagao Gadjin explains,⁹² because of this double character, sambhogakāya occupies the central position in the trikāya doctrine. This same point is made by M. P. Masson-Oursel:

Sambhogakāya, always cited between the other two bodies, plays the role of an intermediary. The texts seem to present it as less spiritual than dharmakāya and less material than nirmāṇakāya.⁹³

In contrast to nirmāṇakāya, which is perceptible to anyone walking down the street, sambhogakāya is visible only to the bodhisattva, because he has entered into samādhi. It is thus also called samādhikāya. It is the realization which opens upon unlimited tathatā.

This classical formulation of Yogācāra by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu focuses upon the consciousness of conscious interiority, and attempts to make explicit the genesis of both illusory clinging, and of its reversal into wisdom. In contrast to the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra, it maintains this context of meaning throughout, for paratantric consciousness functions both as defiled and as pure. Within this understanding of the three natures of consciousness, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu develop their understanding of the two truths and the three bodies of Buddha.

But this formulation did not satisfy everyone. There were other voices to be heard from within the same Yogācāra tradition. Questions remained. Even if consciousness is paratantric, since ālayavijñāna can cause only defiled dharmas, how can it even come to consider the dharma teaching? How can śrutavāsanā, even if it is an outflow of the pure dharmadhātu, ever become relevant to a consciousness capable only of producing defilement? Furthermore, if original purity is to be understood as the all-inclusive horizon within which all consciousness occurs, but not as consciousness itself, then everything is not only consciousness, and the most basic Yogācāra theme is violated. Such questions as these led to diverse, alternate developments

of Yogācāra. It is these developments that will be considered in the following chapter.

Notes

¹There seems to be general agreement that Vasubandhu, the brother of Asaṅga, lived during the fourth century. The above dates of 420-500 are those given by J. Takakusu, "The Date of Vasubandhu, the great Buddhist Philosopher," Indian Studies in Honor of Charles Rockwell Lanman, (Cambridge, 1929), pp. 79-88. For a listing of articles on the subject, see Walpola Rahula, Le Compendium de la Super-doctrine (Philosophie) (Abhidharmasamuccaya) d'Asaṅga, Paris, 1971, p. XIII, n. 3.

²The Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra is perhaps the most fully developed and articulated text of Asaṅga, which brings together in a comparatively concise form the voluminous teachings of the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra. The original Sanskrit text is lost. But there are four Chinese translations extant and one Tibetan. The Chinese are by Buddhaśānta (531) of the Western Wei (T. 31, n. 1592), by Paramārtha (563-565) of the Ch'en (T. 31, n. 1593), by Dharmagupta (605-616) of the Sui, who incorporated his translation in that of Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya, and by Hsüan-tsang (648-649) of the T'ang (T. 31, n. 1594). The Tibetan translation Bstan hgyur, Mdo hgyel LVI is by Jinamitra, Silendrabodhi, and Lo-tsa-ba Ban-de.

Besides the above mentioned translation by Dharmagupta of Vasubandhu's commentary, the Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya (T. 31, n. 1595), two other Chinese translations are extant: one by Paramārtha (563-565) (T. 31, n. 1595) and one by Hsüan-tsang (648-649) (T. 31, n. 1597).

There remains one Chinese translation of Asvabhāva's commentary, the Mahāyānasamgrahopanibandhana, by Hsüan-tsang (T. 31, 1598).

Of modern works mention should be made of Sasaki Tsukishō, Kanyaku shihon taishō Shodaijōron, Tokyo, 1931, which gives in parallel the four Chinese translations and in a later section the Tibetan. Also to be noted is Étienne Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga, Louvain, 1973, which gives Hsüan-tsang's version and the Tibetan text in volume one, followed by a French translation in volume two.

³T. 31, p. 141b. Lamotte, La Somme, pp. 132-134. Actually Asaṅga treats of three points, but the third is not so much a teaching as a criterion to interpret

teachings. It enjoins that the meaning of what the Buddha has said (uktārthanirdeśa) should be understood by interpreting a prior statement (purvaktapada) by means of later statements (śeṣapada). Śeṣapada refers to statements left out or not stated, i.e., implicit. Thus it would seem that this criterion is an injunction to interpret the former statements of the first two turnings of the wheel (Abhidharma and Prajñāpāramitā), which are neyārtha because their grounding in critical understanding of consciousness remains implicit, by means of the third turning, which is the critically grounded understanding of consciousness of Yogācāra.

⁴T. 31, p. 133b. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 12. For the Sanskrit see p. 149, n. 21 of this study.

⁵T. 31, p. 383a. For a Japanese translation see Hakamaya Noriaki, "Yuishiki ni okeru Butsu no shakai - (Shishu sei jōhō) no kōzō," in Komazawa daigaku bukkyō gakubu kenkyū kiyō, dai 34 gō nūkizuri, p. 33.

In his Shodaijoron kenkyū (pp. 214-215) Ui Hakuju considers this passage of Asvabhāva to be the origin of Dharmapāla's theory that the ālaya is the cause only of defiled dharmas and illusion, and criticizes it for departing from Asaṅga's teaching that ālaya is both true and illusory. But, as Hakamaya points out in the above article, the basic text of Asvabhāva is consistent with other passages from Asaṅga's text, and Ui seems to be mistaken.

⁶T. 31, p. 136c. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 67.

⁷T. 30, p. 581b-c.

⁸I translate the term āśraya-parivṛtti as the conversion of the basis. The meaning of vr̥tti is to turn, and it is related to the root of the word conversion, vertere, to turn. The prefixes pari and con both mean around. Thus parivṛtti and con-version equally mean a turning around. I have hyphenated the term in order to avoid the English language connotations of an emotional turning toward the divine.

⁹See Akiko Osaki, "What is meant by Destroying the ālayavi jhāna," IBK, XXVI, 2 (1978), pp. 1069-1064.

¹⁰T. 30, p. 579a.

¹¹T. 31, p. 701b.

¹²T. 31, p. 565b.

¹³Hakamaya Noriaki, "Ālaya-shiki sonzai no hachi ronshō ni kansuru shobunken," Komazawa daigaku bukkyō gakubu kenkyū kiyō, XXXVI, p. 8 and p. 16. In this article Hakamaya compares the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions of the Abhidharmasamuccaya with the Tibetan translation of the Yogacarabhūmi, and the Chinese translation of the Vikhyapana, and offers a Japanese translation based upon these texts. It is this translation which I follow in the subsequent passages on the proofs for the existence of ālayavijñāna.

¹⁴Hakamaya, "Butsu no shakai," p. 23.

¹⁵Hakamaya, "Butsu no shakai," p. 19.

¹⁶Confer Hakamaya Noriaki, "Nirodhasamapatti - Its Historical Meaning in the Vijñaptimātrata System," JIBS, XXIII, 2 (March 1975), pp. 1084-1074.

¹⁷This translation is from Nagao Gadjin, "What Remains in Śūnyatā: A Yogācāra Interpretation of Emptiness," in Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation, ed. Minoru Kiyota, p. 71.

¹⁸Yamaguchi Susumu, Bukkyōni okeru yū to mu to no tairon, Tokyo, 1941, p. 20 and p. 29.

¹⁹T. 31, p. 134c. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 35.

²⁰T. 31, p. 133b. Lamotte, La Somme, pp. 13-14.

²¹T. 31, p. 136b-c. Lamotte, La Somme, pp. 67-68.

²²T. 31, p. 137b. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 84.

²³T. 31, p. 137c. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 85.

²⁴T. 31, p. 134a. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 23.

²⁵T. 31, p. 134a. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 26.

²⁶T. 31, p. 134b. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 29.

²⁷Confer Nagao Gadjin, "Anne no shikitempensetsu ni tsuite," Chūkan to vuishiki, p. 346. The term "synergy" is borrowed from the technical vocabulary of the medieval European debates on the nature of justification. In the

doctrine of Luther's disciple, Melancton, justification is synergistic in that it arises from the co-operation of the two forces of grace and free will. The term is here used not in any technical meaning from Western theology, but to mean: the joint and interdependent arising of two factors, whose result is greater than the sum of these factors. Thus the arising of consciousness is due to the synergistic co-operating of both ālaya and the evolving consciousnesses.

²⁸ Nagao, "Anne," p. 346.

²⁹ Nagao, "Anne," p. 346.

³⁰ Nagao Gadjin, "Tenkan no ronri," Chūkan to yuishiki, p. 241.

³¹ Triṃśikāviññaptibhāṣya, ed. Sylvain Lévi, Paris, 1925 p. 16.16. Quoted by Nagao Gadjin, "Yuishiki-i no konpon toshite sanshōsetsu," Chūkan to yuishiki, p. 459.

³² Nagao, "Tenkan no ronri," p. 243.

³³ T. 31, p. 135b. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 46. The quotation from the Madhyāntavibhāga is from chapter one, verse nine. Nagao Gadjin, Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya, A Buddhist Philosophical Treatise edited for the first time from a Sanskrit Manuscript, Tokyo, 1964, p. 21. An alternate translation can be found in Theodore Stcherbatsky, Madhyānta-vibhanga, Discourse on Discrimination between Middle and Extremes, Moscow, 1936, p. 54.

³⁴ Nagao, Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 21. The text of the two Chinese translations and the Tibetan of this passage can be found in Yamaguchi Susumu, Kanzō taishō Benchūhenron, Tokyo, 1966, pp. 10-11.

³⁵ T. 16, p. 692b. Lamotte, Samdhinirmocana, p. 185.

³⁶ T. 30, p. 280b.

³⁷ T. 30, p. 651b.

³⁸ Katsumata Shunkyo, Bukkyō ni okeru shinishikisetsu no kenkyū, p. 330. Hakamaya Noriaki in "Ālaya-shiki sonzai no hachi renshō ni kansuru shobunken," KDBGKK, XXXVI, pp. 24-25 notes that Ui Hakuju in his Bukkyō shisōkenkyū (p. 258), argues that the distinction of a seventh manas as a distinct consciousness from ālaya

does not represent the early teaching of Yogācāra, but was introduced by Dharmapāla, and is "a very strange theory in Buddhist thought." He takes Asaṅga's references to manas as referring to ālayavijñāna in a different aspect. This dissertation follows the opposite opinion, and is based upon Katsumata's argumentation, as it appears in the places referred to below.

³⁹T. 31, p. 666a. Walpola Rahula, Le Compendium de le Super-doctrine, p. 17. The Abhidharmasamuccaya is a compendium of terms, almost a glossary, of Yogācāra technical terms.

⁴⁰T. 31, p. 480b-c.

⁴¹T. 31, p. 133c. Lamotte, La Somme, pp. 15-17.

⁴²Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, p. 225. Vasubandhu's verse characterizes manas as manyanātmakam, which Hsüan-tsang's translation renders as 思量為性相, i.e., it has the nature of deliberative or evaluative thinking.

⁴³T. 31, p. 138a. Lamotte, p. 92.

⁴⁴T. 31, p. 173c. Lamotte, La Somme, pp. 87-88.

⁴⁵Nagao Gadjin, Madhyāntavibhāga-Bhāṣya, p. 17. For a comparison of the various texts and a Japanese translation and exegesis, confer Yeh A-yüeh, Yuishiki shisō no kenkyū, Tokyo, 1975, Appendix, p. 1.

⁴⁶Yamaguchi Susumu, Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhāgatīkā Exposition Systématique du Yogācāravijñaptivāda, Tokyo, 1966, Tome I, pp. 13-20; Tome II, pp. 17-26.

⁴⁷T. 31, p. 138a. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 90.

⁴⁸Lamotte, La Somme, p. 90, n. 3.

⁴⁹T. 31, p. 138a. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 91.

⁵⁰See Nagao Gadjin, "Tenkan no ronri," Chūkan to yuishiki, p. 244.

⁵¹T. 31, p. 139b. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 110.

⁵²Nagao Gadjin, "I-mon (paryāya) to iu kotoba," Chūkan to yuishiki, pp. 406-413.

⁵³Lambert Schmithausen in Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt in der Vinīścayasamgrahāṇī der Yogācārabhūmiḥ, Vienna, 1969,

argues that āśraya is to be understood as "the physical constitution of personality," or simply as "the body." It is true that āśraya at times does mean "the body." But both Takasaki Jikidō in his "Tenne - āśrayaparivṛtti to āśrayaparāvṛtti," Nihon bukkyō gakyue nempō, XXV, pp. 89-101 and Nagao Gadjin in "Tenkan no ronri" and in "Daijōshōgonkyōron ni okeru 'shoe (āśraya)' no gogi," both in Chūkan to Yuishiki, argue convincingly for the traditional interpretation of āśraya as ālayavijñāna, inasmuch as it appropriates both the body and its sense organs. Thus āśraya means both consciousness and body, the total existential continuity of personality, and not merely its physical component.

⁵⁴T. 31, p. 149b. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 268.

⁵⁵T. 31, p. 141a. Lamotte, La Somme, pp. 126-127.

⁵⁶See note 9 on page 236 of this study.

⁵⁷T. 31, p. 685b-c. Rahula, Le Compendium, p. 127. Quoted in Hakamaya Noriaki, "Sanshu tenne kō," JIBS, II (November 1976), p. 52.

⁵⁸T. 31, p. 742c. Hakamaya in the above article, "Sanshu tenne kō" points out that the terms citta-āśraya, mārga-āśraya, and dausthulya-āśraya are to be understood as tatpuruṣa compounds, and analyzed as cittasya āśraya, the basis of the mind, mārgasya āśraya, the basis of the path, and dausthulyasya āśraya, the basis of the propensities.

⁵⁹See Nagao, "Tenkan no ronri," Chūkan, p. 255.

⁶⁰T. 31, p. 140a-b. Lamotte, La Somme, pp. 120-122. For a full discussion of this passage, see Hakamaya Noriaki, "Yuishiki ni okeru butsu no shakai (shinshu sei jōhō) no kōzō," KDBGKK XXXIV (March 1976), pp. 25-46.

⁶¹Hakamaya, "Butsu no shakai," p. 37.

⁶²Hakamaya, "Butsu no shakai," p. 28. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 121.

⁶³Hakamaya, "Butsu no shakai," p. 33. For Asvabhāva's quotation from the Mahāyānasamgrahopaniṣandhāna, see p. 43, n. 50.

- ⁶⁴ Nagao Gadjin, Madhyāntavibhāga-Bhāṣya, p. 27. For this entire theme, confer Nagao Gadjin, "Bukkyō ni okeru [sezoku] (saṃvṛti) to iu kotoba no ichikaishaku," Chūkan to yuishiki, pp. 305-321.
- ⁶⁵ Nagao, Madhyāntavibhāga-Bhāṣya, p. 41.
- ⁶⁶ Nagao Gadjin, "Chūkan tetsugaku no konponteki tachiba," Chūkan to Yuishiki, pp. 40-41.
- ⁶⁷ Nagao, "Chūkan tetsugaku," Chūkan, p. 41.
- ⁶⁸ Hakamaya, "Butsu no shakai," p. 29.
- ⁶⁹ Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā, Vaidya ed., p. 2, I. 10 - p. 3, I. 2.
- ⁷⁰ Nagao, Madhyantavibhāga-Bhāṣya, p. 41.
- ⁷¹ Hakamaya, "Butsu no shakai," p. 27.
- ⁷² Hakamaya, "Butsu no shakai," pp. 27-28.
- ⁷³ Hakamaya, "Butsu no shakai," pp. 27-28.
- ⁷⁴ On anivṛtāvyākṛtaṃ see Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Vi jñaptimatratasiddhi, p. 152.
- ⁷⁵ Hakamaya, "Butsu no shakai," p. 33.
- ⁷⁶ Nagao Gadjin, "Chūkan tetsugaku," Chūkan, pp. 70-74.
- ⁷⁷ Kenneth K. Inada, Nāgārjuna, A Translation of his Mūlamadhyamikakārikā, p. 146.
- ⁷⁸ Nagao, "Chūkan tetsugaku," Chūkan, p. 70.
- ⁷⁹ Nagao, "Chūkan tetsugaku," Chūkan, p. 72.
- ⁸⁰ Nagao, "Chūkan tetsugaku," Chūkan, p. 78.
- ⁸¹ Nagao, "Chūkan tetsugaku," Chūkan, p. 44.
- ⁸² On this theme see Nagao Gadjin, "Buddha no chimmoku to sono chūkanteki imi," Chūkan to yuishiki, pp. 158-179.
- ⁸³ Nagao, Madhyāntavibhāga-Bhāṣya, p. 22.
- ⁸⁴ Nagao, "Chūkan tetsugaku," Chūkan, p. 84.

⁸⁵See pp. 166-167 of this study.

⁸⁶T. 31. p. 149a. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 267.

⁸⁷T. 31, p. 149a. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 268.

⁸⁸T. 31, p. 149a-b. Lamotte, La Somme, pp. 269-274.

⁸⁹T. 31, p. 149a. Lamotte, La Somme, pp. 266-267.

⁹⁰T. 31, p. 149c. Lamotte, La Somme, 281.

⁹¹T. 31, p. 151c. Lamotte, La Somme, pp. 330-331.

⁹²Nagao Gadjin, "On the Theory of Buddha-Body," Eastern Buddhist, I, (May 1973) 1, p. 37. The Japanese text of this article is contained in Chūkan to yuishiki, pp. 266-292.

⁹³M. P. Masson-Oursel, "Trois corps du Bouddha," Revue Asiatique (mai-juin 1913), pp. 586-587. Both this article and a prior one by Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "The Three Bodies of a Buddha," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Oct. 1906), pp. 943-977, are early Western attempts to interpret the trikāya doctrine. Both labor under the serious difficulty that few texts were then available. They also overly depend upon D. T. Suzuki's translation of The Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith, which does not represent the earlier Yogacara teachings. Nevertheless Masson-Oursel has clearly perceived the pivotal role of sambhogakāya, much as Nagao Gadjin was to do years later.

CHAPTER TEN

An Alternate Yogācāra Synthesis:

The Mind of Original Purity

There are Yogācāra texts and Yogācāra thinkers that do not fall within the doctrinal circle of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Rather than seeing ālayaviññāna as the cause only of defiled dharmas, they understand consciousness as being somehow originally pure and luminous, as being the seed or embryo (garbha) from which enlightenment issues. While Asaṅga and Vasubandhu passed over in silence those passages of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra which treated the original purity of the mind, these texts and thinkers were heavily influenced by them.

In Asaṅga's teaching the con-version of the basis resulted in a state, which, although occurring within the same paratantric consciousness, yet resulted in a state disjunctive from and discontinuous with all prior phenomenal consciousness. Apparently some could not accept this teaching, for how can a consciousness that is itself incapable of producing good dharmas ever be capable of even listening to the dharma teaching? And if original purity is not to be considered as the basic nature of the mind, then how can it be grounded within consciousness at all?

Answers to such questions could be found within

the Tathāgatagarbha tradition. Even the pre-Asaṅga Yogācāra texts frequently make use of Tathāgatagarbha doctrines. The basic content of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra is heavily dependent upon Tathāgatagarbha ideas. And the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra explains the beginningless realm (anādikāliko dhātuḥ), which is equated with ālayavijñāna by Asaṅga, as the common support for all dharmas. Although Asaṅga interprets this passage by differentiating a support (āśraya) from a cause (hetu) and can thus explain that ālaya can support all dharmas, while being the cause only of defiled dharmas, yet it is not clear that this was the original intention of the passage at all.

The attempt to assimilate Tathāgatagarbha thinking within the context of Yogācāra is present in the formative stages of Yogācāra doctrine. But in the classical formulation of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, which focuses upon the nature and functioning of phenomenal consciousness, these Tathāgatagarbha themes were either ignored or re-interpreted, for even if a pure mind were to exist, people are not phenomenally aware of it. Yet, although this classical formulation did become the dominant version of Yogācāra, it did not carry the day entirely.

The tendency to synthesize tathāgatagarbha and ālayavijñāna is apparent in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra:¹

Mahāmati, tathāgatagarbha holds within it the cause for both good and evil, and by it all the forms of existence are produced. . . . Because of the influence of the permeations that have been variously accumulating by false reasoning since beginningless time, what here goes under the name of ālayavijñāna is accompanied by the seven vijñānas, which give birth to a state known as the abode of ignorance. It is like a great ocean, in which the waves roll on permanently but the [depths remain unmoved. i.e., the ālaya] body itself subsists uninterruptedly, quite free from fault of impermanence, unconcerned with the doctrine of ego-substance, and thoroughly pure in its essential nature. 2

Here tathāgatagarbha is understood as the reality underlying what is called ālayavijñāna, and it is seen as originally pure in contrast to the other seven evolving consciousnesses.³ As Takasaki Jikidō has pointed out,⁴ this explanation reflects that of the Śrīmāladevīsiṃhanādasūtra, as the Lankāvatāra itself states:

This, Mahāmati, was told to me in the canonical text relating to Queen Śrīmāla. . . . 5

Takasaki thus concludes that the Lankāvatārasūtra has amalgamated the ālayavijñāna with the tathāgatagarbha of the Śrīmāladevīsiṃhanādasūtra. He points out that the Śrīmāla differs from other Tathāgatagarbha texts in that it treats the relationship between the original purity of the mind (prakṛtivyavadānacitta) and the momentariness of phenomenally conscious states, and thus offers the possibility for an interpretation of phenomenal consciousness from the teaching of Tathāgatagarbha thinking.⁶

Tathāgatagarbha is not only identified as ālaya-vijñāna in the Lankāvatāra, but also is equated with the ultimate pariniṣpanna.

What is pariniṣpannasvabhāva? This refers to the object realm of realized wisdom, which is far-removed from the discrimination of names and marks. Mahāmāti, this is pariniṣpanna, which is the heart of tathāgatagarbha (tathāgatagarbhahrdaya). 7

Again it is stated:

In the sūtras tathāgatagarbha is explained by the Bhagavan as original purity (adiviśuddha), because, since it is pure (viśuddhi), it is originally luminescent purity (prakṛtiprabhāsvara). Endowed with the thirty-three major marks [of Buddha], it exists in the bodies of all sentient beings (sarvasattva dehāntaragata). But just like a priceless mani jewel might be covered by a dirty garment, it is covered over by the clothing of the skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus, and soiled by the dirt of illusory discrimination of covetousness, anger, and delusion, while it is yet explained by the Bhagavan as being eternal (nitya), constant (dhurva), quiescent (śīva), and unchangeable (śāśvata). 8

However, as Katsumata Shunkyo notes,⁹ there are many other passages in the Lankāvatārasūtra which treat ālaya-vijñāna without identifying it with tathāgatagarbha. It would thus seem that, while the Lankāvatāra has on the one hand inherited the teachings of the Asaṅga line of Yogācāra thinking, on the other hand it has assimilated it to the Tathāgatagarbha themes in a rather haphazard fashion.

The Avatamsakasūtra also takes up this same refrain:

Just as the moon behind a cloud is in its nature constantly clear and bright, so is the storehouse consciousness (藏識). It is included within the permeations of all the object realms of the evolving consciousnesses, but yet it is constantly pure. 10

The Mahāyānaśraddhotpādaśāstra¹¹ also assimilates both Vijñaptimātra thinking with Tathāgatagarbha themes:

The teaching herein explained is the mind of sentient beings. This mind comprises all worldly and transcendent dharmas. Depending on this mind, the meanings of Mahāyāna are revealed. 12

This passage seems to echo the famous quotation from the Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra on the beginningless realm being the support for all dharmas, whether the worldly destinies or the transcendent nirvāṇa. In explaining this mind, the Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda continues to interpret the mind as both ālayavijñāna and tathāgatagarbha.

The revelation of the true meaning [of Mahāyāna] relies on the fact that the one mind (一心) has two aspects. The first is tathatā, and the second is samsāra. . . Tathatā of the mind is dharmadhātu. . . As for samsāra of the mind, because it depends upon tathāgatagarbha, there exists this samsaric mind. Neither born nor destroyed and yet joined to birth and destruction, neither one nor many, it is called ālayavijñāna. This consciousness is to be understood in two manners, for it is able to support all dharmas and give rise to all dharmas. The first is the meaning of enlightenment, and the second is the meaning of non-enlightenment. 13

Because of tathāgatagarbha the mind is originally enlightened (本覺), but due to samsaric activities the ālayavijñāna becomes extraneously defiled. This passage seems to have been composed with Asaṅga's ideas on the distinction between a support and a cause in mind, for it affirms that the tathāgatagarbha-ālayavijñāna consciousness is able to both support and give rise to

all dharmas. Since for Asaṅga there is no pure mind underlying ālayavijñāna, the mind cannot give rise to pure dharmas. But for the author of the Mahāyānaśraddhotpādaśāstra the mind of tathāgatagarbha, being the reality underlying ālayavijñāna, can give rise to pure dharmas. But due to the devolutions from that pure mind, samsaric consciousness comes about.

The causes of samsāra are sentient beings, because of the evolutions (轉, pariṇāma) of their minds and their mental consciousnesses. This means that due to ālayavijñāna ignorance (無明) exists. 14

Hirakawa Akira explains this passage as follows:

In a word the cause of samsāra is the activities of the mind and mental consciousness. By the mind is meant tathāgatagarbha, inasmuch as the samsaric mind exists in dependence on tathāgatagarbha. Tathatā, which is neither born nor destroyed, in one respect does not maintain its own nature, and thus becomes ālayavijñāna, because of the conditioned arising of the permeations of ignorance. 15

Thus the Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda, because it holds the doctrine of the original enlightenment of tathāgatagarbha, sees the ālaya as a devolution from that purity because of the evolutions of consciousness (viṣṇānapariṇāma). The tension is entirely between this originally pure mind and phenomenal defilement. Asaṅga's notion of the synergistic relationship between pre-conscious ālaya and the objectified, conscious pravṛttivijñāna is lost, while the trisvabhāva teaching is nowhere mentioned. It would thus seem that the Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda is more

of a Tathāgatagarbha text, which incorporates some Vijñaptimātra ideas, than a Yogācāra text, which employs some Tathāgatagarbha themes, for its main focus is on the original purity of the mind of tathāgatagarbha. In any event, it is a text which attempts to amalgamate these two trends of thinking.

Two trends then can be seen in regard to the understanding of the relationship between the mind and tathatā. The option of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, focusing consistently upon a critical understanding of phenomenal consciousness, avoids attributing any ultimate purity to that consciousness, and thus can adequately describe the phenomenal, existential arising of consciousness as prapañca, identify its underlying structure as paratantra, and explain enlightenment as a complete, radical conversion of the basis of that consciousness, which, while occurring within that paratantric consciousness, is yet disjunctive with and heterogeneous to those phenomenal states of consciousness. In so explaining the mind, the only cause capable of bringing about such a disjunctive rupture of consciousness must be dharmadhātu itself, and thus the cause of the arising of the āryamārga is the purity of the dharma teaching, which is an outflow from the dharmadhātu, and which, when practiced, leads to a realization of wisdom and a purification of consciousness. Original purity

is not identical with consciousness, but is rather the horizon within which all is included.

But questions arise. How can the mind be even receptive to such an outflow from the pure dharmadhātu? Asaṅga answers that, because of its paratantric nature, which is neither pure nor impure, it can do so. But how can the mind be neutral, since it constantly causes impure dharmas?

The second option solves these questions by grounding original purity within consciousness, for ālayavijñāna is tathāgatagarbha. Thus there is no problem in the mind coming to realize what has been there all along.

But, in this second option, the question arises that, if the mind is essentially and originally pure, then how does it become involved in defilement in the first place? Does this simply not ignore the common experience of sentient beings, who are well aware of defilement, and can accept that their own minds are pure and luminescent only by a leap of faith? Moreover, does it not resurrect the prapañca thinking that would attribute an essence (svabhāva) to the mind?

The tension between these two trends and the attempts to overcome it by mutual assimilation are not only apparent in Indian texts, but also in the transmission of these texts into China. As Ui Hakuju notes in regard

to the various schools of Chinese Yogācāra:

The differences in the theories of the three [Chinese] schools of Ti-lun (地論), She-lun (攝論), and Fa-hsiang (法相) reflect the changes in the theories of the Yogācāra sect in India more than their interpretation in the history of Chinese Buddhism. 16

While it is quite true that, since the Indian texts were transmitted in an unsystematic fashion and thus brought about some confusion as to how they were to be interpreted, it is also true that the Indian translators, who came to China, reflected the doctrinal disputes then current in India. In point of fact, the earliest translations of texts dealing with Yogācāra themes by Gunabhadra (437-468) included not only the Samdhinirmocana, but also the Lankāvatārasūtra and the Srīmāladevīsīṃhanāda-sūtra. Thus these divergent interpretations of the relationships between the mind and the ultimate were presented to the Chinese from the very beginning. Attempts to overcome the apparent contradictions between Vijñapti-mātratā and Tathāgatagarbha are thus evident in the formation of the schools of Chinese Yogācāra. Inasmuch as these schools reflect the state of Indian argumentation, they will be briefly outlined.

The Ti-lun school (地論宗) takes its name from the Daśabhūmikaśāstra of Vasubandhu (十地經論). Almost from its inception, this school was divided into a Northern and a Southern sect. The proponents of each

of these sects trace their origin back to a dispute between Bodhiruci (active in China ca. 508-535) and Ratnamati (active ca. 508), who, while engaged in a joint translation of the Daśabhūmikaśāstra, could not agree upon the correct interpretation of ālayavijñāna.¹⁷ As reported by Chang-jan (湛然 711-782), the Sixth Patriarch of Tendai:

Even before the Ch'en (557-587) and Liang (502-556) dynasties, the two masters of Ti-lun did not agree. The Northern sect held ālaya to be the support [of consciousness], while the Southern held tathatā to be that support. Both masters looked to Vasubandhu, and yet their ideas were as different as fire and water.¹⁸

The Northern sect's emphasis on ālayavijñāna as the support of consciousness (梨耶真識依持說) paralleled the teaching of the somewhat later She-lun school, and it was soon absorbed into She-lun. No texts of this sect remain, but it appears from other sources that ālaya was regarded as the support of consciousness, because it was equated with tathāgatagarbha.¹⁹

The Southern school, however, prospered and three texts remain that allow one to examine their teachings. Fa-shang (法上 495-580) wrote the Shih-ti lun i-shu (十地論義疏), and Hui-yüan (慧遠 523-592) wrote the Ta-ch'eng i-chang (大乘義章) and the Shih-ti lun i-chi (十地論義記). In these texts there is clear evidence of Tathāgatagarbha thinking.

Fa-shang writes:

Dharmakāya is dharmatākāya. Citta is the seventh citta. Mano is the sixth mano. Vijñāna is the consciousness of the five [sense] consciousnesses. Thus the Lankāvatārasūtra says: Citta is the subjectivity of accumulation, mano is all the accumulating, and the appearing consciousnesses are the five [sense] discriminations. The turning away from these seven kinds of consciousness is wisdom. Thus it is said that only wisdom is the basis. (唯智依止). 20

Here Fa-shang proposes a schema of seven consciousnesses, all of which serve to bring about karmic defilement. But apart from these is the wisdom of dharmakāya, i.e., of the ultimate. Citta, which for Asaṅga is synonymous with the eighth ālayavijñāna, becomes the seventh karmic consciousness in contrast to the ultimate dharmakāya. Thus it is that the Southern sect held that tathatā, being apart from phenomenal consciousness, is the basis for true wisdom (真如依持說).

Fa-shang has no need for the tripartite structure of the trisvabhāva doctrine, for the only basis is the wisdom of dharmakāya.

In its three marks of identity wisdom is: 1) dependently co-arisen, 2) the mark of error, and 3) tathatā. Dependent co-arising is the seventh ālayavijñāna, which is the root of samsāra. The mark of error is the mind (意) of the other six consciousnesses, which erroneously give rise to discrimination and wrongly cling to the six impure objects. Tathatā is buddhadhātu, paramārtha, paramārthaśūnyatā. Because we understand these three to be not differentiated, they are termed marks of identity. 21

This is a total reworking of the terminology of

the trisvabhāva doctrine, as it appears in Asaṅga and Vasubandhu texts. But it does resemble the treatment of the trisvabhāva in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra.²² The understanding of ālaya is not focused upon the phenomenal modalities of consciousness and does not explain ālaya as being the paratantric axis for the con-version of the basis from parikalpita to pariniṣpanna. Rather one must turn away from all phenomenal consciousness in order to realize wisdom, for above the illusory ālaya, there is tathatā. Fa-shang further explains that illusion depends upon reality, because tathāgatagarbha is the basis of all dharmas.²³

But in his Ta-ch'eng i-chang Hui-yüan does interpret ālaya as the eighth consciousness:

Ālaya is correctly interpreted as not disappearing (無沒), because it is not lost, although it is involved in samsara. Thus it is correct to say that it is a separate eighth consciousness. Also it is said that tathāgatagarbha is called this storehouse consciousness. It is called garbha, because the Buddha dharmas, as numerous as the sands of the River Ganges, lie hidden in this consciousness. . . . It is also called pure consciousness or undefiled consciousness, because its essence is not defiled. Thus the sūtras speak of the originally pure mind (自性淨心). . . .²⁴

Hui-yüan identifies ālaya as the eighth consciousness, but only because he then equates it with the pure mind of tathāgatagarbha. He would thus appear to approach the position of the Northern sect that ālaya is the support of true consciousness. But in his Shih-ti lun

i-chi he clearly holds that tathatā is the basis.

After identifying citta as the seventh consciousness, mano as the sixth, and vi jñāna as the five sense consciousnesses, he writes:

Because it is apart from all these (i.e., cittamanovi jñāna), it is separate from citta, etc., . . . We should understand that this is precisely to take tathatā consciousness as the essence, for reality pervades the first seven [consciousnesses], and they are joined together with the eighth consciousness. 25

Thus ālaya is the basis only inasmuch as it is identical with tathatā consciousness. And the shifting of the enumeration of the various consciousnesses is perhaps due to the fact that the focus of Ti-lun is not upon the functioning of phenomenal consciousness at all, but rather upon tathatā, upon the pure mind of tathāgata-garbha. If ālayavi jñāna be identified with tathāgata-garbha, then it can serve as the basic support for true consciousness, while the other seven consciousnesses describe the devolution from that pure garbha. But if ālaya be conceived as being able to cause only defiled dharmas, then it could not serve as the basis of true consciousness in any way whatsoever.

The She-lun school (攝論宗), as its name implies, takes as its basic text Asaṅga's Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra, not in its original form, but rather as interpreted through Paramārtha's translation of Vasubandhu's commentary,

the Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya. In the preceding chapter Asaṅga's interpretation of the beginningless realm was presented,²⁶ but Paramārtha (499-569) appends an additional interpretation of ālayavijñāna as tathāgata-garbha to the text of Vasubandhu's commentary on this passage. Such an interpretation is not found in Asvabhāva's Mahāyānasamgrahpanibandhana, nor in Dharmapāla's Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra.²⁷ But it does accord with the interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāgaśāstra.²⁸ It would thus appear that Paramārtha is attempting to harmonize Asaṅga's thinking with traditional Tathāgata-garbha themes. As that text is crucial for an understanding of She-lun, it is given in full as follows:

The text [of Mahāyānasamgraha] begins its explanation by saying that we should understand that the support of the knowable (jñeyāśraya) is termed ālayavijñāna, and we should understand where the Bhagavan has spoken about this consciousness and explained it. As the Bhagavan has explained in a verse from the Abhidharmasūtra: "The beginningless realm is the common support of all dharmas. Because of this, there exist all the destinies and the access to nirvāṇa."

Asaṅga quotes this āgama to demonstrate the essence and name of ālayavijñāna. The āgama is called the Mahāyānābhidharma, for therein the Buddha Bhagavan said these verses. Dhātuh (realm) has enlightenment (覺) as its nature. This dhātuh has five meanings. The first is its essential characteristic: all sentient beings are not apart from this essential characteristic, because this essential characteristic is not differentiated from sentient beings. Second is the meaning of cause, because the teachings of all saintly men, the fourfold stage of mindfulness, etc., arise by taking this dhātuh as their object of understanding. The third is the meaning of arising, for

the dharmakāya attained by all saintly men reaches full perfection (parinispāna) because they believe in and seek the path of this dharma-dhātu. The fourth is the meaning of reality (tattva), for in the world [this dhātuh] is not destroyed, is transcendent to the world, and is not exhausted. The fifth is the meaning of garbha, because if one is in accord with the essential goodness of this dharma, he will cause to grow the inner [seed]. But if one externalizes this dharma, although he be mutually related to it, he will cause to grow only the outer covering. Concerning this dhātuh the Bhagavan has taught: "Oh monks, initially sentient beings are unable to understand, because ignorance is a covering and they are bound up in consciousness, whenever they are in process of transmigrating or have attained a destiny, whether that destiny be in the hells, among animals, hungry ghosts, fighting spirits, men, or gods. Monks, in this manner you all experience suffering for a long time, increase covetousness, and constantly experience pain." Understanding this, know that from beginningless time, as the sūtra says, the Bhagavan [considers] this dhātuh of consciousness to be the basic support (aśraya), the support (ādhāra), the stable ground (sthāna), which is constantly (dhurva) associated with and not apart from or rejecting of wisdom. It is unconditioned and constantly characterized by merits of all Buddhas, more numerous than the sands of the River Ganges. It is the basis, the support, the stable ground for all conditioned dharmas, which are not associated with, are apart from, and do reject wisdom. Thus it is said that it is the common support of all dharmas, as the sūtra says. Bhagavan, if tathāgatagarbha exists, because people do not understand, they are able to say that samsāra exists, or that all the destinies exist, as the sūtra says. Bhagavan, if tathāgatagarbha does not exist, in suffering there would be no oppressive evil, and for nirvāṇa no earnest seeking. Thus it also says that there exists the access to nirvāṇa. 29

Thus the She-lun is based not upon Asaṅga's understanding of consciousness, but rather upon the Tathāgata-garbha explanations of Paramārtha interpretation.

However, although the basic nature of the mind is

explained as being originally pure, the experiential defilement of consciousness is an existential fact that must be treated. Why is consciousness covered over by kleśa and defilement? In his various translations, Paramārtha appears to have attempted to respond to these questions.

In the Chuan-shih lun (轉識論), which is an interpretation of Vasubandhu's Triṃśikāvi jñaptimātratā-siddhikārikā,³⁰ two kinds of vi jñānapariṇāma are described:

There are two kinds of evolutions of consciousness. The first is the evolution that leads to [belief in] sentient beings (i.e., ātman), and the second is the evolution that leads to [belief in] dharmas. All objects are included in these two, but in reality they do not exist at all. These evolutions of consciousness produce these two aspects. Know that [the consciousness] that can intend an object is of three kinds: Karmic retributive consciousness (果報識), i.e., ālayavi jñāna, clinging consciousness (i.e., 執識 adanavi jñāna), and defiled consciousness (塵識), i.e., the six other consciousnesses. Karmic retributive consciousness is so called because it is brought about by the actions of passion (煩惱業). It is also called the foundational consciousness (本識, mūlavi jñāna) and the support of all conditioned seeds (一切有為法種子所依止, sarvasaṃskṛtabījakāśraya), the storehouse consciousness (宅識), the ground (栖處) for all seeds, the treasury consciousness (藏識), and the latent ground (降伏之處) for all seeds. . . . The essence of this [consciousness] is non-defined. . . . This is called the first consciousness. With this consciousness as its [supporting] condition, there exists the second clinging (執) consciousness, which takes clinging as its essence and is associated with the four delusions of ignorance, belief in self, pride in self, and love of self. This mind

is said to be defiled, but not defined (有覆無記). . . This is the second consciousness. The third is defiled consciousness, which in its conscious evolutions (parināma) appears as defilement, and forms the six kinds [of the five sense consciousnesses and mental consciousness]. As explained above, the evolutions of consciousness (vi jñānaparināma) appear as defilement." 31

There are basic differences between this explanation of vi jñānaparināma and that of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu had described the nature of ālayavi jñāna as being "non-defiled, non-defined" (無覆無記), but the Chuan-shih lun says only that it is non-defined, while omitting the phrase, non-defiled, for all the phenomenal manifestations of consciousness are defilements covering over the pure mind. There is then no pure aspect to the basic seed consciousness.

Paramārtha's description of ādānavi jñāna, which is better translated as clinging consciousness rather than appropriating consciousness in this context, parallels the manas of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. The identification of this ādānavi jñāna as the seventh consciousness is entirely without precedent in the Indian texts.³² It is not described as appropriating (執持) the body with its sense organs, but rather as attachment to delusion, for it clings to the eighth consciousness as if to its own ātman, just as does the kliṣṭa-manas in Asaṅga's explanation. But whereas the manas for Asaṅga had the

two functions of being the antecedent condition (saman-antarapratyaya) and being the defiled (kliṣṭa) manas, Paramārtha's ādānavijñāna has only clinging as its nature and is only defiled. While Vasubandhu explains vijñāna as constituting the six sense consciousnesses and mental consciousness, Paramārtha adds that they are all defiled.

Thus the explanation of vijñānaparināma in the Chuan-shih lun is aimed at describing the devolutions of consciousness from original purity to the experiential condition of defiled consciousness. There is no room for any understanding of the paratantric nature of consciousness, and the tension between pre-conscious, pre-objectified ālayavijñāna and the objectified and verbally conscious pravṛttivijñāna is lost. And so, where Asaṅga and Vasubandhu in their interpretation of trisvabhāva emphasize the function of paratantra as the central, pivotal item, the Chuan-shih lun, much in the fashion of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, sees both parikalpita and paratantra as defiled coverings (saṃvṛti) over the ultimate truth that is pariniṣpanna.

The first two [natures] are saṃvṛtisatya, while the last one is paramārthasatya. 33

In Paramārtha's translation of the San-wu-hsing lun (三無性論)³⁴ this same point is stated:

These self clings all rely upon the mūlavijñāna. . . . Know that the mūlavijñāna has two meanings, which are the support for . . . the belief in self.

The first is that which is able to produce seeds and give rise to the belief in self. The second is that which produces the objects and the realms of that belief in self, and leads to the arising of illusory self-clinging. 35

Thus, as Suguro Shinjō has pointed out,³⁶ in this interpretation all consciousness is defiled. Consciousness becomes nothing other than the activity of discriminating and clinging to dharmas and ātman.

Consequently the con-version of the basis implies the total leaving behind of the existential structure of phenomenal consciousness, and results in a purification that is totally transcendent to all prior consciousness. The Chüeh-ting-ts'ang lun (決定藏論)³⁷ reads:

If they realize the four truths and attain the clear wisdom of the wisdom eye, then they will be able to destroy (破壞) ālayavijñāna. But those who do not have insight into the four truths will not be able to destroy it. When then will they be able to gain insight into ālayavijñāna? If they progress in practice, whether they be śrāvakas or bodhisattvas, when they enter the realm of no-returning (avinivartaniyabhūmi), and come to penetrate (通達) dharmadhātu, then they will be able to come to insight and see in this consciousness the accumulation of all kleśas. Both internally and externally they then see that their own bodies are bound by kleśa. . . By cultivating practices, they then cut off (斷) ālayavijñāna, and this is precisely the con-version of their nature as worldlings (轉凡夫性). Having abandoned (捨) the dharmas of worldlings, ālayavijñāna is destroyed (滅). Because this consciousness is destroyed, all kleśas are destroyed. Because ālayavijñāna is suppressed, they realize pure consciousness (amalavijñāna, 阿摩羅識). Ālayavijñāna is transitory (anitya) and contaminated (saśrava), but amalavijñāna is eternal (nitya) and pure (anaśrava). Having attained the path in which tathatā is the object, they realize amalavijñāna. 38

The usage of the term amalavi jñāna as a pure consciousness distinct from the other eight consciousnesses is specific to Paramārtha, and reflects an attempt to elucidate the pure mind of Tathāgatagarbha within the Vijñaptimātratā framework. Thus all phenomenal consciousness, being coverings over that pure mind, are to be destroyed and cut off. The con-version of the basis of paratantric consciousness from parikalpita to pari-niṣpanna becomes a turning away from the worldly nature (prthagjana), and the constituting of oneself in a totally transcendent dimension of the originally pure mind.

Amalavi jñāna is the originally pure mind. However, because it is defiled by adventitious impurities, it is said to be impure. When such adventitious defilements are exhausted, then it becomes pure. 39

Wisdom is then the realization of amalavi jñāna. As Katsumata Shunkyo shows by a comparison of Paramārtha's Chüeh-ting-ts'ang lun with Hsuan-tsang's Yu-ga lun (both translations of the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra), where Hsuan-tsang speaks of āśrayaparivṛtti, Paramārtha inserts the term amalavi jñāna.⁴⁰ Thus while for Asaṅga's lineage, the con-version of the basis from parikalpita to pari-niṣpanna takes place on the ground of paratantric ālaya, for Paramārtha, the con-version of one's worldly nature is a falling away from all phenomenal consciousness that reveals the originally pure amalavi jñāna. Paramārtha writes:

All conventional dharmas have ālayavi jñāna as their basis. But all transcendent dharmas . . . have amalavi jñāna as their basis. 41

But how can a phenomenally defiled mind become aware of this amalavi jñāna? What enables one to begin to practice? Chi-tsang (549-623) in his Chung-lun shu remarks:

The She-lun masters consider the eighth consciousness as illusory and the ninth as reality. However they say that the eighth has two aspects: illusion and reality. The nature of enlightenment (解性) is reality. The karmic consciousness is illusion. 42

In the above quotation from Paramārtha's translation of the Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya, Paramārtha added that the beginningless realm has the nature of enlightenment (解性). He further explained:

The basis (āśraya) of a saint is the joining together of the hearing of the dharma (śruta-vāsanā) with the nature of enlightenment. 43

Thus, because the pure consciousness (amalavi jñāna) of tathāgatagarbha underlies and pervades ālayavi jñāna as the potential for enlightenment, it brings it about that one can listen to and ponder the dharma teaching. That teaching is not then an outflow from the pure dharmadhātu to the phenomenal mind, but rather the outflow from the pure nature of consciousness itself.

These themes are further thematized in the Fo-hsing lun (佛性論), which Takasaki Jikidō thinks is probably a composition of Paramārtha.⁴⁴ This text states:

Next, there are three kinds of Buddha-nature, and you should understand the specific meaning of each. These three refer to the three causes and the three kinds of Buddha-nature. The three causes are the causes of attaining, of intensified effort, and of perfect fulfillment.

The cause of attaining is tathatā, which is manifested in the two emptinesses [of self and dharmas]. It is because of these emptinesses that one attains the aspiration to elicit bodhi, intensifies effort, etc., and after [practicing] the path, reaches dharmakāya. Thus it is called the cause of attaining.

The cause of intensified effort means that aspiration to elicit bodhi. Because of this aspiration one is able to attain the thirty-seven elements [of bodhi], the ten bhūmis, the ten pāramitās, the assisting dharmas, and, after [practicing] the path, reach to dharmakāya. This is called the cause of intensified effort.

The cause of perfect fulfillment is that intensified effort. Because of intensified effort, one attains the perfect fulfillment which is cause, and the perfect fulfillment which is result. The perfect fulfillment, which is cause, means the practices of merit and wisdom. The perfect fulfillment, which is result, means compassion and merit, which are severed from knowledge. The first of these three causes has the principle of unconditioned tathatā (無為如理) as its essence. The last two have conditioned vows as their essence.

The three kinds of Buddha-nature mean that there are three natures in the causes that are attained.

The first is abiding in the original nature. The second is eliciting that nature. And the third is realizing that nature.

This means that the abiding in the original nature refers to all worldly beings before [entry into] the path. Eliciting that nature refers to all those who have already elicited the aspiration [to attain bodhi] up to those who have finished all their training (aśaikṣa). The realization of that nature refers to those saints in the stage of no-training. 45

Thus Buddha-nature is always present, but has to be cultivated. The full perfection, which is the result,

is described as being being cut off from knowledge (智斷). This would seem to mean that, upon the realization of this fulfillment, all phenomenal understanding and awareness is severed. One wonders then how the tasks of compassion can be carried out in the phenomenal world. Paramārtha further treats the theme of tathāgatagarbha in the following passage:

You should know that there are three meanings of tathāgatagarbha. The first is the garbha which is supported (所攝藏). The second is the hiding and covering over of that garbha. The third is the garbha which can support.

That which is supported is our abiding in original tathatā as explained by Buddha, i.e., the fact that all sentient beings are tathāgata-garbha. . .

The hiding and covering over of that garbha means that tathāgata is hidden and does not appear. Thus it is called garbha (embryo). . . Because of the coverings of kleśa sentient beings do not see. . .

The garbha which can support means that in the result realms everything surpasses merits innumerable as the sands [of the River Ganges], and, when one abides in tathāgata and attains that nature, he supports it to the full. . . 46

As Katsumata Shunkyo points out,⁴⁷ these three meanings of tathāgatagarbha parallel the three meanings of ālayavijñāna as that which can store (能藏), that which is stored (所藏), and the storehouse of that which is clung to (所執藏). But the use of the term garbha in the Fo-hsing lun is directed to the description of the relationship between the Tathāgata and sentient beings, while the intent of Asaṅga's treatment of ālayavijñāna is to describe the various functioning of

phenomenal consciousness. While Asaṅga and Vasubandhu consistently maintain the context of meaning that focuses upon interiority, Paramārtha seems to be more concerned with using doctrine as a propaedeutic for religious practice. In employing the terms of Vijñaptimātratā his intent is not to render explicit the implicit structure and functioning of consciousness, but rather to outline the devolutions of that consciousness with an eye to their final elimination.

Thus both Ti-lun and She-lun reflect the attempt to assimilate Vijñaptimātra themes with Tathāgata-garbha thinking. They focus not on an understanding of phenomenal consciousness, but rather upon the pure mind of tathāgata-garbha, and regard the synergistic functionings of consciousness (vi jñānaparināma) as defiled devolutions from that pure garbha. They do not emphasize the tripartite structure of the trīsvabhāva doctrine, for enlightenment is simply the uncovering of the always present pure mind. Consequently, while the understanding of vijñaptimātratā was central with Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, Paramārtha is brought to distinguish:

Now vijñaptimātratā has two meanings. The first is an upāya, for when one realizes that only ālayavijñāna exists and that there are no other objects, he becomes aware of the two emptinesses of the objects known and the knower. This expelling and final exhaustion of illusory consciousness is upāyavijñaptimātratā. The second is the true understanding of vijñaptimātratā, for when one expels and purifies the mind of

samsaric, illusory consciousness, and when all objects whatsoever are purified and exhausted, then there exists only the pure mind of amala-vijñāna. 48

For Asaṅga the understanding of paratantric consciousness enabled one to understand both the genesis of prapañca and the underlying synergistic functioning of consciousness, which enabled one to convert the basis of that consciousness from parikalpita to pariniṣpanna. Vijñaptimātratā was then the doctrinal embodiment of meaning in the context of interiority, which grounded all doctrinal discourse. But for Paramārtha phenomenal understanding was not a major concern, and is in fact only provisionally valid (upāya), for upon the realization of purity, all such understanding falls away. Thus both the external object and internal consciousness disappear (境識俱泯), and the entire endeavour to understanding understanding is undermined. Paramārtha's version of Vijñaptimātra (consciousness only) could perhaps be better expressed as cittavyavadānamātra, the purity of the mind only.

But, without an understanding of understanding, is one not in danger of externalizing tathāgata-garbha, and clinging to an imagined construct? Is religious parikalpita not a real possibility? And can not both Ti-lun and She-lun be criticized for departing from the doctrine of the Prajñāpāramitā literature, of Nāgārjuna's Madhyamika

dialectic? It would seem that the attempts of Ti-lun and She-lun, of Paramārtha, were aimed at the amalgamation of the critical theoretical understanding of meaning of Asaṅga's Yogācāra with the more common sense context of Tathāgatagarbha themes. But contexts of meaning are for the most part disparate, and do not flow one into the other. One cannot explain the theories of quantum physics in common sense terms. Neither can one reduce the insights of a critical understanding of interiority to terms of everyday awareness. Furthermore, the demands of common sense have no need to develop such a critical understanding of consciousness. Enlightenment can as well be attained by the philosophically untutored, as by the greatest dialecticians.

It would appear then that, because the Ti-lun and the She-lun both vacillated between these two contexts of meaning, they were fated to either abandon theoretical endeavours in favor of a more pastoral orientation, or to whole-heartedly embrace that theoretical endeavour. It is in this doctrinal milieu that Hsüan-tsang, confused as to the meaning of Yogācāra, set out for India in search of the correct understanding. That understanding became the Fa-hsiang school, which emphasized the phenomenal marks of the dharma (法相), i.e. the tripartite structure of trisvabhāva, and became the dominant East Asian tradition of Yogācāra, while the previous

Ti-lun and She-lun became absorbed into the theoretical schools of Chinese Hua-yen and T'ien-t'ai. This examination of the Chinese understanding of Yogācāra is meant to highlight the doctrinal options reflected in the first transmission of Indian texts into China, and thus throw some light on the state of Indian Yogācāra that was being transmitted.

When Hsüan-tsang returned from India, he brought with him the understanding of the Dharmapāla lineage of Yogācāra. It is to this lineage that attention will now be directed, for it forms the doctrinal background for the interpretation of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, to which we have been leading all these many pages. But, as Dharmapāla's understanding of Yogācāra was greatly influenced by Dignāga's critical epistemological thought, we must devote a prior chapter to Dignāga.

Notes

¹Opinion on the place of the Lankāvatārasūtra in the development of Yogācāra thought differs. Katsumata Shunkyo, Bukkyō ni okeru shinishikisetsu no kenkyū, p. 601, thinks that it was written after Vasubandhu, and belongs to a second stage of the assimilation of ālaya-vijñāna with tathāgatagarbha. Takasaki Jikidō, Nyorai shiso no keisei, p. 326, places it in a much earlier period. Kajiyama Yuichi, "Later Madhyamikans on Epistemology and Meditation," Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation, ed. Minoru Kiyota, p. 134, appears to agree with Katsumata when he writes: "It seems that this sūtra, which was compiled after the establishing of basic Yogācāra doctrines. . ."

²The Lankavatara Sutra, tr., D. T. Suzuki, p. 190. Also confer Takasaki, Keisei, pp. 327-328.

³Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, pp. 625-626.

⁴Takasaki, Keisei, p. 328.

⁵Suzuki, p. 192.

⁶Takasaki, Keisei, p. 328.

⁷Suzuki, p. 60.

⁸Suzuki, pp. 68-69.

⁹Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 625.

¹⁰T. 16, p. 638a.

¹¹The question of whether the Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda (大乘起信論) is an original Sanskrit Indian text or a Chinese composition has divided the scholars. See Paul Demiéville, "Sur l'authenticité du Ta Tch'eng K'i Sin Louen," Bulletin de la Maison Franco-Japonaise, II (1929), 2, pp. 1-78 for a discussion of the question. Walter Liebenthal in "New Light on the Mahāyāna-śraddhotpāda-śāstra," T'oung Pao XLVI (1958), pp. 155-216, argues that it is a Chinese composition, possibly by the sixth century Tao-ch'ung, in part because its doctrine was unknown in Indian Buddhism. This argument seems unconvincing, inasmuch as the major theme of this śāstra is a synthesis of Tathāgatagarbha and Vijñaptimātrata, as is also the case with the Mahāyānasūtrālmkāra and the Laṅkāvatārasūtra. Furthermore, since we do possess two separate translations by Paramārtha (T. 32, n. 1667) and by Śikshānanda (T. 32, n. 1668), it seems probable that there was a Sanskrit original.

¹²Hirakawa Akira, Daijō Kishinron, Tokyo, 1973, p. 56. Yoshito S. Hakeda, The Awakening of Faith, New York and London, 1967, p. 28.

¹³Hirakawa, Kishinron, p. 69 and 95. Hakeda, Awakening, p. 32 and 36.

¹⁴Hirakawa, Kishinron, p. 163. Hakeda, Awakening, p. 47.

¹⁵Hirawaka, Kinshiron, p. 165.

¹⁶Ui Hakuju, "Shintai sanzō ni kansuru ni-san mondai," Ui Hakuju chosaku senshū, Tokyo, 1968, VI, 90.

¹⁷Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, pp. 644-656, discusses the complex historical evidence relating to this question.

¹⁸In the Fa-hua hsuan-i shih-ch'ien (法華玄義 釋義), T. 33, p. 942c.

¹⁹Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 673.

²⁰Shih-ti lun i-shu, T. 85, p. 763c. The quotation from the Lankavatara is given by Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 658: *cittena cīyate karma manasā ca vicīyate/ vijñānema vijñānati dr̥śyaṃ kalpatī pañcabhiḥ* // 106// Suzuki, p. 42, translates: "Karma is accumulated by citta, reflected upon by manas, and rendered conscious by vijñāna, and the visible is discriminated by the five [senses]."

²¹T. 85, p. 764b.

²²See pp. 161-166 of this study.

²³T. 85, p. 771b-c.

²⁴T. 44, p. 524c.

²⁵Quoted by Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 675. This text is not contained in the Taisho Tripitika. It is found in FL, 71, 3, p. 218.

²⁶See p. 183-184 of this study.

²⁷Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 635, n. 53.

²⁸Takasaki, Study p. 290.

²⁹T. 31, p. 156c-157a. Given in Yūki Reimon, Yuishikishisōshi, pp. 272-273.

³⁰Yūki Reimon, Yuishiki gakuten sekishi, Tokyo, 1962, reports that, although this text is attributed to Vasubandhu, its authorship is unclear, for it propounds a theory of consciousness quite distinct from that usually associated with Vasubandhu. During Edo times in Japan, Ingen's (1592-1673) disciple Dōtō issued it together with the San-shih wei-shih lun (三十唯識論),

and later thinkers, among whom was Ui Hakuju, advocated that it was an alternate translation of Vasubandhu's Trimśikā. Yūki also treats this text at length in his Seshin yuishiki no kenkyū, pp. 73-139.

³¹T. 31, p. 61c-62a. Yūki, Seshin yuishiki, pp. 79-84.

³²Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 731.

³³Yūki, Seshin yuishiki, p. 97.

³⁴This text is also attributed to Vasubandhu. See Yūki, Yuishiki gakuten sekishi, p. 87 and p. 296.

³⁵T. 31, p. 869c.

³⁶Suguro Shinjō, "Joyuishikiron ni okeru Hogo setsu no takushoku," Yūki Kyōju ju-su kinen, bukkyō shisōshi ronshū (Tokyo 197), p. 236.

³⁷A partial translation of the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra. See Yūki, Yuishiki gakuten sekishi, p. 249.

³⁸T. 31, p. 1020b.

³⁹T. 31, p. 863b.

⁴⁰Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 699 sq.

⁴¹Quoted by Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 699.

⁴²T. 42, p. 104c.

⁴³T. 31, p. 175a-b.

⁴⁴Takasaki Jikidō, "The Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine in Paramārtha's Translation of Vasubandhu's Commentary on the Mahāyānasamgraha - and its Relationship to the Ratnagotravibhāgaśāstra," Yūki Kyōju ju-su kinen, bukkyō shisōshi ronshū, pp. 241-242.

⁴⁵T. 31, p. 794a.

⁴⁶T. 31, p. 796a.

⁴⁷Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 610.

⁴⁸In Shih-ba-ku lun (十八空論), T. 31, p. 864a.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Dignāga's Critical Epistemology

Dignāga (480-540) is most well known as the developer of Buddhist logic, but the focus of this chapter will be upon his explication of a critical epistemology, for it is in this regard that his relationship to prior Yogācāra thinking is most apparent. He is reported by Bu-ston to have been a pupil of Vasubandhu. After having found the teachings of the Vātsīputrīya sect inadequate,

he departed and finally came to the teacher Vasubandhu. With the latter he studied the texts of the Three Vehicles, and became especially versed in the Vijñānavāda and in logic. 1

Thus according to Bu-ston, his epistemology would be expected to follow the thinking of Vasubandhu. But the bulk of his works leave central Vijñānavāda themes untouched. He never mentions ālayavijñāna and does not treat vijñānaparināma. This lack of the technical terminology of Yogācāra led Theodore Stcherbatsky to think that Vijñānavāda "has no importance [for the logical school of Dignāga]; it was entirely superseded by the study of logic."²

The main theme of this chapter is then to determine just what was Dignāga's relationship to the earlier thinking of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. In order to examine

this question, Dignāga's Prajñāpāramitāpinḍārthā will first be considered. This is a brief commentary upon the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra, in which he summarizes and classifies Prajñāpāramitā thought. Its style and vocabulary is traditional, and thus it is an important document for determining the question under consideration.

Then the discussion will turn to his more strictly epistemological thought, and focus on the Pramāṇasamuccaya, his last work, which sums up all his prior thinking on epistemology.

Guisepppe Tucci remarks concerning the Prajñāpāramitāpinḍārthā that it "follows strictly the points of view of Asaṅga."³ Its classification of the sixteen modalities of emptiness parallels that of the Madhyānta-vibhāga. He explains that "there is nothing extraordinary in this, since the works of Maitreya-Asaṅga were considered as the most authoritative by the school to which Dignāga belonged."⁴

His treatment of the ten distractions (vikalpa-vikṣepa) echos that of both the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra (XI, verse 77) and the Mahāyānasamgraha (Lamotte, p. 115).

In his treatment of emptiness, Dignāga reinstates the central Yogācāra negation of extroverted consciousness:

When it is again said [in the text of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra] that form and form-substance are empty, this means that it negates the experience of extroverted perception. 5

Thus the theme of consciousness only is affirmed by Dignāga. He further explains this by means of the trisvabhāva doctrine:

Prajñāpāramitā is taught in reliance upon three: parikalpita, paratantra, and pariniṣpanna. By means of the phrase "it does not exist," parikalpita is refuted. By means of metaphors, such as that of a magical illusion, paratantra is explained. By means of the four kinds of purity (caturdhāvyavadāna) pariniṣpanna is explained. 6

Thus it would indeed seem that Dignāga follows Asaṅga. However his understanding of original purity (prakṛtivyavadāna) does not appear to be that of Asaṅga, for whom original purity did not imply that the basic nature of consciousness was pure at all. But Dignāga writes:

The awareness (jñāna) of ordinary people is originally pure (prakṛtivyavadānika). 7

As Ui Hakuju notes,⁸ this is equivalent to Tathāgata-garbha thought. It would thus appear that Dignāga has attempted to assimilate Yogācāra to Tathāgatagarbha and understands original purity to be the basically pure nature of the mind. Thus he was faced with the dilemma of how to account for the commonly experienced awareness of impurity and ignorance. From this perspective then we turn to an examination of his works

on epistemology.

However, it is no easy task to understand Dignāga's epistemology. Not only is it inherently complex, but it does not employ the commonly accepted vocabulary of the earlier Vijñānavādins. Rather he adopts and reworks the epistemological vocabulary then current in non-Buddhist circles. Thus both he and his successors are called Vijñāvādins of the logical tradition (nyāyānusārino vijñānavādinah) to distinguish them from the earlier Vijñānavādins of the scriptural tradition (āgāmānusārino vijñānavādinah).⁹ The historian, Taranatha, notes that Dignāga was active as an apologist in the city of Kañci, the seat of the Pallava Kings, who patronized all kinds of learning. He was thus exposed to the ideas and doctrines of many sects and schools.¹⁰ In such a pluralistic environment the authority of the traditional Yogācāra scriptures would be of little avail. This then would be a factor leading Dignāga to undertake the study of epistemology and logic, so as to lay a firm, universally recognizable basis from which to express his Buddhist thinking.

But his adoption of the technical vocabulary of non-Buddhists was not merely due to this pluralistic environment or to the need for an apologist to speak in a recognizable language. Any theoretical discourse

functions only to the degree in which it creates and rationalizes a technical language in a systematic fashion. It would thus seem that Dignāga adopted the vocabulary of non-Buddhist epistemologists and logicians because he found it a more adequate tool to express his own thinking.¹¹ Consequently, in order to facilitate an understanding of his epistemology, a prior sketch of the type of epistemological thought current in his times must be given, for such formed the background against which he thought. Thus we turn to a brief examination of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.

The central question that Indian epistemology sought to answer was how one could be sure that consciousness is not deceptive. How can knowledge attain certitude? The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika understood consciousness to be an attribute of the self, and thus had to somehow construct a bridge from that inner consciousness to the external world. This bridge was termed pramāṇa, the measure or true criterion by which a thing is determined or an idea defined. Pramāṇa then means the appropriate instrument of consciousness, the means which lead to valid cognition, and exclude approximations or errors. The object of knowledge to be established by the pramāṇa is termed prameya, that which is to be known.¹²

Earlier thinkers had admitted a variety of valid

pramāṇa, but Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika reduced all to the two pramāṇa of direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna).¹³

Guiseppe Tucci defines pratyakṣa as "that which falls under the eye."¹⁴ It refers to the direct, immediate consciousness of a thing. But in almost all the systems of Indian epistemology it includes not only sense perception, but also mental perception, i.e., the immediate experience of pleasure, pain, and other mental states, which are perceived by the manas, the mind conceived as a sixth sense. Furthermore direct perception also includes the intuitive consciousness of the mystic, which is also immediate and immune to error.¹⁵

In the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama direct perception is defined as consciousness, which comes from contact of the sense organs with their specific objects, and which is inexpressible, non-erroneous, and definite.¹⁶ In order to be able to maintain that these organs actually do validly contact their specific objects, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that there exists a rapport of the same nature, a union, or conjunction, between these objects and the senses which perceive them. This is so because all sense perceptions, which are themselves supra-sensible, are joined together with the physical elements which constitute the world. Sight, localized in the eye, is joined together with the element fire, i.e.,

light. Hearing, in the ear, is joined with the ether. Smell, in the nose, with the element earth. Taste, in the tongue, with the element water. And touch, in the skin, is joined together with the element air. To each of these elements there corresponds a quality or property (guna), i.e., color, sound, smell, taste, and touch. It is this given correspondence between the object, the property of the element joined to the sense organ, and the sense organ itself that renders contact possible between the organs of sense and their objects. All three factors must converge in order to have sense perception. The sense organs emit vibrations, which touch their respective objects, and thus a contact between the former and the latter is established. In this manner, direct perception implies the reaching to an object.

If the sense organs became active without really arriving at their proper objects, one would be able to perceive things even when they were on the other side of a wall. 17

However this contact is itself not adequate to bring about perception. Perception is possible only inasmuch as there is a mediating function between the sense experience and the self. This mediating function is that of manas, the mind. Thus manas, an internal, immaterial substance, becomes the connecting link between the self and the external world. We become aware of an

opposing object only when we turn our attention to it. We become aware of internal mental states only inasmuch as manas conveys them to us.

Thus manas characterizes a second kind of perception, i.e., mental perception, which is distinct from the external perception active in the five senses.

But even although perception does come into contact with external objects, we do not perceive their substance (dravya), i.e., earth, water, fire, wind, ether, time, place, soul, and mind. These substances underlie the perceived properties (guna).¹⁸ The contact of a sense organ with a specific object comes to consciousness by the intervention of manas. The explanation of this process is quite complex and involves a series of steps. Upon coming into contact (samyoga) with a substance (dravya), one perceives a property (guna) which is inherent in that substance (samyukta-samavāya). That property in turn inheres in the really existent universal (samyukta-samavēta-samavāya). The the property (guna), which is inherent in the substance, becomes present to and inheres in the physical sense organ (samavāya). Perception then occurs when one perceives the general character of that property, for there inheres in that property the respective sensation (samavēta-samavāya). Finally there comes together the particular quality and that which is

so qualified (viśeṣanata-viśeṣa-sambandha).¹⁹ This explanation is indeed abstruse, and its presupposition of naive realism will be constantly criticized by the Vijñānavādins. Once one has assumed the dichotomy of subject-object to be actually real, then it is simply impossible to construct any bridge from the one to the other. No matter how many steps are involved, no matter what inheres in what, the bridge is constructed only by assuming that it is already there.

The definition of direct perception (pratyakṣa) in the Nyāyasūtra also states that it is inexpressible, i.e., it is not joined to words. This means that direct perception is prior to all verbal imagination, and, as such, is indeterminate. The commentator Vatsyāyana explains:

In the case where the object and the name that designates it are not known, this perception of the object is itself not expressed in words. But when this conjunction is affirmed, then we become aware that this name is the word which expresses that object. . . . As long as there is no name, that object cannot be known from others.²⁰

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika then considers direct perception to be a continuous process, distinguished into two moments. The first offers immediate, indeterminate sense data. The second constitutes true and correct perception, in which those sense data enter into consciousness and become definite. The first is called nirvikalpa,

indeterminate, while the second is called savikalpa, determinate. Direct sense perception is the process in which one proceeds from a non-verbalized, inarticulated sensation of "something" to the verbalized judgment that that something is a cow, etc. The sensation is the point of departure, and the judgment the point of arrival. Thus in the final analysis direct perception must be definite, specific, and able to be associated with a name.

Inference (anumāna) is the process of correct reasoning, which is based upon perceptive judgments, and pertains more to the study of logic than to epistemology.

Dignāga also admits only the two same pramāṇas, but his explanation is quite different. He adopts the vocabulary used in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (and other non-Buddhist systems), but re-examines the nature of consciousness in light of the Yogācāra teachings. While Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika assumes the real existence of external units of meaning, Dignāga follows the doctrine of Vijñaptimātra. While in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika there is no fundamental difference between sensibility and consciousness and the same process includes not only sensation, but also judgments, Dignāga in his Pramāṇasamuccaya defines direct perception as devoid of any conceptual construction:

Direct perception is devoid of any conceptual construction (kapanāpodha). The cognition,

in which there is no conceptual construction,
is direct perception. 21

Thus for Dignāga direct perception is completely indeterminate and immediate, for it is not determined nor mediated by any kind of conceptual idea or judgment. This direct perception also includes mental perception (manāsa-pratyakṣa) and mystic perception (yogi-pratyakṣa), but in all cases it is free from any mental construction whatsoever. What then does Dignāga understand by this conceptual construction?

The association of name (nāman), genus (jāti), etc. [with a thing perceived, which results in verbal designation of the thing is conceptual construction.] 22

Such conceptual construction is then the function of inference (anumāna-pramāna), which, when correctly carried out, develops meanings in a valid, consistent fashion. To highlight the difference between direct perception and inference, Dignāga in the Pramāṇasamuccaya cites a passage from the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā of Yaso-mitra:

One who has the ability to perceive perceives something blue (nīlam vijānāti), but he does not conceive that "this is blue" (nīlam iti vijānāti).23

He further explains:

. . . the object to be cognized has [only] two aspects. Apart from the particular (svalakṣaṇa) and the general (sāmānyalakṣaṇa), there is no other object to be cognized, and we shall prove that perception (pratyakṣa) has only the particular

for its object, and inference (anumāna) only the universal. 24

Svalakṣaṇa is then the particular, immediate, indeterminate experience, which is present to consciousness without any dependency on any other factors, such as verbal conventions, while sāmānyalakṣaṇa is the general, mediated, determined experience, which occurs only because of verbalization.

It is quite clear that sāmānyalakṣaṇa are mental constructs without any real external existence. However, Dharmakīrti in his Nyāyabindu (I-14) does state that svalakṣaṇa really exists (paramārtha-sat). As Kitagawa explains,²⁵ Dignāga himself does not explicitly state that svalakṣaṇa really exists, but since, in contrast to sāmānyalakṣaṇa, which, being the product of mental construction, does not exist, he treats svalakṣaṇa as the object of non-discriminative consciousness (pratyakṣa), he must have at least have accorded it a higher degree of reality.

Is then svalakṣaṇa to be understood as an existent thing? Even although it can not be verbalized, does perception reach to external objects? Is svalakṣaṇa the reintroduction in a different guise of svabhāva? This does not seem to be the case, for in his Ālambana-parikṣa Dignāga soundly refutes the idea that the objects

of cognition are any kind of external reality.

The internal form (内色), which appears (pratibhāsa) as if it were external, is the object of consciousness. 26

Thus the object of consciousness in no way whatsoever is any entity existing external to the mind. It does not exist "out there" in a world of imagined extroversion. The svalakṣaṇa is then precisely this internal form or image, which is present to consciousness prior to any verbalization or conceptual thinking. The object of consciousness is not the substance (dravya, svabhāva) of a thing, nor the properties (guṇa) of that substance. Both such options presuppose the understanding of understanding as "taking a look," as a search for extroverted meaning. But for Dignāga meaning is rather constructed within consciousness by an insight into the internal image, and the subsequent conceptualization and logical performance of correct judgments.

The terms svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa are not to be understood as judgments on the particular and on the universal. Any judgment is the result of conceptual construction (kalpanā), and thus pertains to an understanding of sāmānyalakṣaṇa. The judgment that "this is a particular horse named Trigger" is not given in direct perception. All that is given therein is an image in the mind. The subsequent attending to that image issues

in the conceptual awareness embodied in the phrase "the horse named Trigger." Dignāga's use of these terms, the particular and the general, are not then parallel to their use in Western philosophy, in which the particular is frequently taken to refer to the individual thing, such as a particular horse, while the general or the universal refers to the general category, such as horseness, abstracted from many instances of particular horses. Rather for Dignāga concepts of both particular horses and general categories are sāmānyalakṣaṇa. His definition of sāmānyalakṣaṇa includes both the naming (nāman) of particular things and the construction of general categories (jāti).

How then does Dignāga understand the structure of consciousness? This theme is treated in his theory of the three bhāgas, or divisions, of consciousness. In the Pramāṇasamuccaya he says:

Every cognition is produced with a twofold aspect, namely, that of itself [as subject] (svābhāsa) and that of the object (viśayābhāsa). The cognizing of itself as [possessing] these two appearances, or the self-cognition (svasamvitti) is the result [of the cognitive act]. 27

The appearance of the object (viśayābhāsa) is the presence in consciousness of an image. In the case of direct perception this image is svalakṣaṇa. In the case of inference it is sāmānyalakṣaṇa. Later interpreters term this image nimitta 相, the sign, mark, or image

which is the object of consciousness, ālambana, or, which is that which is to be known, prameya. Thus the first division of consciousness comes to be termed nimittabhāga.

The appearance of itself as subject (svābhāsa) is the insight into that image. In the case of direct perception, it is pre-verbal and immediate. In the case of inference, it is verbalized and conceptualized. Again later interpreters call this darśana, insight, which is subjective consciousness of the internal object, or that which knows, pramāṇa. Thus the second division of consciousness comes to be termed darśanabhāga.

The consciousness of having insight into the image is self-cognition, or self-consciousness (svasamvitti), for, not only do we know objects, but we also know that we know them. Thus the third division of consciousness is termed svasamvittibhāga.

This theory is restated in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra:

Consciousness appears under the aspect of the object to be known (prameya, i.e., nimitta). Consciousness, inasmuch as it has the aspect of "taking hold of" and the consciousness of consciousness is respectively the means of cognition (pramāṇa, i.e., darśana) and the result of these means (pramāṇaphala, i.e., svasamvitti). These three are not separate from consciousness. 28

Consciousness is not a composite of three distinct parts. Rather the one dynamic consciousness arises and

appears in the two modalities of subjective insight (pramāṇa, darśana) and of its objective referent (prameya, nimitta).²⁹ This explanation echoes that of the Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra:

Consciousness arises in the appearance of external objects, sentient beings, a self, and understanding. 30

Unreal imagining (abhūtaparikalpa) exists, but the duality [of subject and object] is not found within it. 31

Here unreal imagining is the paratantric arising of consciousness, but the duality in which it appears is that which is merely imagined (parikalpita), and thus lacks any reality whatsoever. It is in this context that Dignāga explains that:

Thus [it should be understood that] the roles of the means of cognition (pramāṇa) and of the objects to be understood (prameya), corresponding to different aspects of the cognition, are [only] metaphorically attributed (upacaryate) to the respective [distinctive] factor in each case, because [in their ultimate nature] all elements of existence, [being instantaneous,] are devoid of function. 32

In his definition of paratantra in the Prajñāpāramitā-piṇḍārthā Dignāga notes that paratantra is explained by means of metaphors (upamādidrṣṭāntaiḥ). Thus the metaphorical nature of the subject-object appearance seems to point to its paratantric nature.

A similar passage is found in Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā:

Concepts of the self and dharmas do not imply

the existence of a real self or real dharmas,
but are only metaphorical attributions (upacāro).³³

The originally pure mind, which, as explained in the Prajñāpāramitāpinḍārthā, characterizes pariniṣpanna, arises in dependency on insight (darśana) into image (nimitta), i.e., in a paratantric fashion. But as long as one does not realize this metaphorical, paratantric nature of darśana-nimitta, the conceptual constructions (kalpanā) of discriminative thinking, which impute to these divisions (bhāga) of consciousness the extroverted meanings of a real subject (ātman) or real things (dharma), are parikalpita.

In such an understanding the paratantric nature of consciousness must always be accompanied by both insight and image. Thus Dignāga identifies himself with the theory of sākāra-jñāna-vāda, i.e., that understanding is always accompanied with an image or internal form (ākāra). Again the Pramāṇasamuccaya states:

The means of cognizing is simply [the cognition's] having the form of the object. . . . A thing is known only through this, [viz., through the cognition's having the form of it].³⁴

Dignāga has derived his thinking of this point from the Sautrantika school, which he regarded as being properly critical of Sarvāstivāda realism. He is credited with synthesizing Sautrantika thought with Yogācāra, and consequently his thought, together with that of

Dharmakīrti, is sometimes called Sautrantika-Yogācāra.³⁵

The Sarvāstivādins, because of their rigid separation of consciousness, cognitive faculty, and the object of cognition, were led to the conclusion that consciousness only illumines, the cognitive faculty only perceives, and the object is only cognized. Thus consciousness is like a pure crystal, is not in any way changed or transformed when knowing occurs. Thus it does not contain any form, image, or representation, when it knows an object. The form (ākāra) of the object cognized belongs to that object, and not to unchanging luminescent consciousness. As Kajiyama Yuichi has explained,³⁶ when we see a book, for example, the book is seen as having the form of a book, our visual faculty sees it, and our consciousness illumines or understands. In the terminology of Indian philosophy, this kind of theory is called anākāra-jñāna-vāda, or the theory that knowledge is not endowed with an image.

The opposing theory is held by the Sautrantika school, and is that of sākāra-jñāna-vāda. For these thinkers, the external object throws its form or image into consciousness, and thus what we know is the image or representation in the mind. When we see a book, we are actually seeing the representation (ākāra) of the book in our minds. Thus external objects themselves

are not perceptible. However, in order to account for the arising of the image, their existence must be inferred.³⁷

Dignāga has reworked this Sautrantika sākārajñāna theory in two important ways. In the first place, true to his Yogācāra training, he denies that the actual existence of the external world must be inferred at all. And in the second place, in line with the Madhyāntavibhāga, he explains that not only is an image present in consciousness, but that insight (darśana) into that image (nimitta) must also occur.³⁸

Thus Kajiyama Yuichi notes that, because Yogācāra denies the extroverted existence of a "real" world out there,

all the Yogācārins must be sākāravādins so far as the cognition of common people is concerned. A problem, however, appears in regard to the emancipated person, who is supposed to have acquired nirvikalpajñāna or non-conceptual, supermundane knowledge. Some Yogācārins thought that knowledge of an emancipated person is freed from the fetter of cognitum and cognizer, and accordingly is clear like a clear crystal without specks. And they held that this clear imageless knowledge is the essence of cognition, regarding images as false, unreal stains born due to our vāsanā. This is the essential [point] of the nirākārajñānavāda. But others from the same school criticized this theory, saying that what is not real can never be manifested, since otherwise it would entail the unfavorable doctrine of asatkyāti (i.e., the non-existence of any causes). Every cognition, inasmuch as it is knowledge, must have an image, and yet there is no harm in that an emancipated person's knowledge is with an image, if he is freed from conceptual thinking, the fundamental [nature] of

which is the bifurcation of cognitum and cognizer. This is the essential point of sākārajñānavāda of the Yogācārins. 39

As Kajiyama notes, this account represents a fairly late aspect of the controversy, which developed subsequent to Dharmakīrti, and reached its final phase in the dispute between the Nirākāravādin Ratnākaraśānti and the Sākāravādin Jñānaśrīmita in the eleventh century. Thus we are not very sure of the state of the controversy before Dharmakīrti. 40

However, although Dignāga does not thematize this question of whether an image is present in all consciousness or not, yet it would appear that, even in the case of nirvikalpa-jñāna, he would maintain the theory of sākārajñāna. 41 In his treatment of yogi-pratyakṣa, the direct, immediate, non-verbal perception of the mystic saint, he explains it as devoid of all conceptual construction, but yet it has as its object svalakṣaṇa, because it is direct perception. And such svalakṣaṇa is indeed an image or inner form (内色). Furthermore, the arising of consciousness (svasamvitti) as insight (darśana) into image (nimitta) is paratantrasvabhāva, and the awareness of paratantra for Dignāga is in no way contradictory to the state of Mahāyāna enlightenment. The supposition that this structure of consciousness implies the bifurcation of the real world over against the real subject, and

the consequent clinging this entails constitutes parikalpita, that which is totally imagined, or in Hsuan-tsang's translation 遍所計執性, that which is clung to as totally imagined, is contrary to Mahāyāna enlightenment. But the absence of such imagined clinging does not entail the absence of the paratantric functioning of consciousness as insight into image. Thus Dignāga seems to indeed have been a Sākārajñānavādin.

But, if the image does become present to consciousness, where does it come from? If there is no external object, does it come then from within? And if it arises from within, then why do not all perceptions arise at the same time?

These questions reflect a misunderstanding of the intent of Dignāga's, and indeed Yogācāra's, rejection of realistic thinking. The point of that rejection, and therefore of cittamātra, is not the denial of objective reality in favor of subjective reality. Although at times Yogācārins do appear to argue for a thoroughgoing subjectivism, such as does Vasubandhu in his Vimśikā, yet the main intent of mind-only is not subjectivism. Rather it is aimed at the critical understanding that both objective reality and subjective reality arise interdependently in consciousness, and are not, as they appear, real elements of any real world. Thus

Dignāga does not ask whether the image in the mind' is a reality "out there," nor does he say that it arises from "in here." Rather he holds that this dichotomy between knowing and the known is of a metaphorical nature. Conscious understanding is not a spacial transition from "in" to "out," nor vice versa. Rather, consciousness reveals itself (svasamvitti) in insight into image. In place of either the naive realism of assuming an objective world "out there," or of assuming a subjective world "in here," Dignāga offers the self-revelatory nature of consciousness itself. As Theodore Stcherbatsky explains:

It is a fundamental thesis of the Sautrantika-Yogācāra school that all consciousness is self-consciousness. . . . Knowledge is self-luminous (svayam-prakāśa). Like a lamp that illumines the neighboring object and its own self at the same time, not being dependent on a foreign source of light for its own illumination, just so is knowledge self-luminous, since it does not depend on any other source of conscious light in order to be known. 42

This theme is reported in the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa of Bandhuprabha:

The Pramāṇasamuccaya says that all citta-caittas, which are conscious of their own essence, are called direct perception. If this were not so (i.e., if consciousness were not self-conscious), then there would be no memory or recollection, just as if [perceptions] had never occurred. . . . 43

Then an objection is raised against consciousness being self-luminous:

But is this not contrary to the way dharmas function in the world? A knife does not cut itself, and the tip of one's finger does not touch itself. 44

This objection understands consciousness as the instrument whereby we know, and thus takes consciousness as distinct from both the knowing and the object known, just as a knife is distinct from both the act of cutting and the object cut. Hattori Masaaki⁴⁵ points out that the same objection is raised against the non-distinction of pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala by both Kamārila, who cites that an ax is different from the cutting down of a tree, and by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, who says that, just as a scythe is different from the mowing down of rice, so when a man perceives a pot, the subject, the object, and the instrument are all distinct.

The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa passage responds in an explanation that finds an exact parallel in the Nyāya-binduṭīkātippanī, which is a sub-commentary of Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, itself a commenatry on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu, and thus belongs to Dignāga's Sautrantika-Yogācāra lineage.

Have you not noticed that lamps are able to illumine themselves?

But, [it is objected,] how do you know that lamps are able to illumine themselves?

One directly perceives that in the absence of darkness [light] clearly appears. If [lamps] were not self-luminous, they would be enveloped in darkness and would not appear at all. Because

of this [direct perception] I know that lamps are self-luminous. Since lamps negate darkness, what need is there then for them to be illumined [by another light]? As for pots, or a piece of clothing, etc., although their essence does not necessitate that they be not in darkness, yet, in the absence of lamps to illumine them, they remain enveloped in darkness and are not directly perceived. But when lamps do illumine them, they emerge from that enveloping darkness and are able to be directly perceived. Lamps are such that, when their essence arises, the enveloping darkness is expelled and they become directly perceptible. Thus they are said to illumine themselves.

All citta-caittas, whether strong or weak, are able both to know external objects and internally to be aware of their own essence (svasamvitti), just as the brightness [of lamps] is able both to illumine other things and to illumine themselves. It is not anything like knives, and cannot be compared to such things. 47

Thus consciousness comes not from the image in the mind, not from the insight into that image, but rather from the self-revelation and self-awareness of consciousness itself, which arises in the paratantric functioning of insight into image. Consciousness needs no push from either image or from insight, for its original nature is luminous and pure (prakrtivyavadāna). Dignāga then interprets this original purity, not in terms of the inner purity from defilement, but rather in terms of the luminous, revelatory nature of consciousness. Such originally luminous consciousness is intrinsically independent of either image or insight, but extrinsically its arising does depend upon the paratantric functioning

of insight into image. The point of departure is not the image, and thus Dignāga does not emphasize the source of that image. Consciousness is not a blank, neutral surface upon which meaning is inscribed by establishing a bridge over to the objective units of meaning found in some external world. Rather all understanding and questioning occurs within the ongoing self-revelation of consciousness. We do not just ask the questions. We are the questions. There is no ātman lurking behind the questioning mind, but rather the continuity of personal existence is consciousness.

Does all this mean that everyday things, such as chairs, do not exist at all? And if they do not, then what is it that I trip over in the dark?

Dignāga would respond that the idea of a chair, since it is a

cognition of empirical reality (saṃvṛti-saj-jñāna), is not a true perception, because it superimposes something extraneous upon things, which are only empirically true (saṃvṛti-sat), and thus functions through the conceptualization of the forms of these [extraneous things]. 48

But yet one remains convinced that there is something out there, over which to trip. Perhaps it is the svalakṣaṇa? Many have tripped there before.

Dignāga himself, who occasionally tripped over things, nowhere denies that empirical things empirically exist (saṃvṛti-sat), and are empirically valid. In the

above quotation, he says that they do empirically exist.

The Samdhinirmocanasūtra argued that the conscious appropriation of the body and its sense organs issues in a biological extroversion, which does see other things as external. As empirical realities these things are certainly valid. But the point is that, while such extroverted thinking is adequate for everyday affairs, it becomes illusory when assumed to be the only manner of understanding. One can take a chair and move it out of the way, or beneath one's buttocks. But how does one take meaning? Where can it be found? The ultimate truth (paramārthasatya) is that the meaning of truth cannot be found anywhere out there. In his writings Dignāga is simply not talking about chairs. He does not function on the level of common sense meaning, and thus common sense objections miss the point. He is dealing with theory, but non-critical theoretical objections also miss the point, because they tenaciously insist that understanding is still somehow the taking of a look, the bridging over from subject to object.

But what of Nāgārjuna, who functioned on the level of apophatic, mystic meaning? Did he not reject all pramāṇa?⁴⁹ Did he not say that he had no proposition (prati jñā) to uphold? What are we to make of Dignāga, who certainly has many propositions to uphold?

Dignāga is to be understood as following the Yogācāra tradition, which takes its stand upon conscious interiority, and analyzes consciousness in order to not only identify the causes of prapañca, but also to outline an alternative non-prapañca mode of understanding. In his development of a critical epistemology, Dignāga not only offers insights into the paratantric functioning of consciousness, but also manages to incorporate the doctrine of the originally pure nature of that consciousness, while maintaining the empirical validity of everyday constructed meanings.

Although he does not use the term vi jñānapariṇāma, yet the bhāgas of three bhāgas do describe the synergistic, interlocking functioning of consciousness. Although he does not use the term ālayavi jñāna, yet the notion of pratyaksapramāṇa as pre-conceptual awareness does embody the earlier understanding of ālayavi jñāna.

His thinking is further important, because it exercised a deep influence upon later Yogācārins. Dharmapāla adopted his ideas, much of his vocabulary, and re-inserted it within the more familiar Yogācāra framework of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Having briefly outlined some of Dignāga's central themes, the next chapter will turn to Dharmapāla, and describes the immediate context from which the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa arose.

Notes

¹Bu-ston, History of Buddhism, trans. E. Obermiller. Heidelberg, 1931, II, p. 149.

²Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Leningrad, 1930, II, p. 528.

³Guiseppe Tucci, "Minor Sanskrit Texts on the Prajñā-pāramita I. The Prajñā-pāramitā-piṇḍārthā of Diṇnaga," The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (1947), pp. 53-75. The Chinese text, Japanese translation, and copious notes are found in Ui Hakuju, Jinna chosahu no kenkyū, Tokyo, 1959, pp. 233-329.

⁴Tucci, "Diṇnaga," pp. 54-55.

⁵Tucci, "Diṇnaga," p. 56. Ui, Jinna, p. 238. The Sanskrit reads: rūpaṃ rūpasvabhāvena śūnyam ity uktitah punah/ bāhyāny āyatanāṇika bhogyāni pratiṣiddhavan.

⁶Tucci, "Diṇnaga," p. 57. Ui, Jinna, p. 243. Tucci on p. 67, note 2, apparently following the commentary of Triratnadāsa, gives the four purities as: ran-bshin gyis rnam-par-byan, i.e., prakṛti-vyavadāna; dri-mamed paḥi rnam-par-byan, i.e., vaimalya-vyavadāna; dmigs paḥi rnam-par-byan, i.e., ālambana-vyavadāna; and rgyu-mthun paḥi rnam-par-byan, i.e., sāpakṣya-vyavadāna. The first three find parallels in the Mahāyanasamgraha, but the fourth has replaced mārga-vyavadāna. The term sāpakṣya means "relating to" or "in respect of," and thus Tucci renders sāpakṣya-vyavadāna as "all dharmas are analogical to the absolute." However, both Nakamura Hajime (Bukkyōgo daijiten, p. 10052) and Hirakawa Akira (Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, III, p. 26) give rgyu-mthun as niṣyanda, outflow. Rgyu means cause, and mthun means to be equal to. Thus Chandra Das (p. 317) defines rgyu-mthun as a cause equal to the production of the desired result. This then comes to mean the resultative outflow, i.e., niṣyanda. In this case sāpakṣya-vyavadāna would then be the purity of the resultative outflow that comes from the teaching (ālambana), i.e., the practice of the path (mārga-vyavadāna). It would thus appear that Tucci's interpretation is not correct. The Chinese text gives 平等清淨, samatā-vyavadāna, the purity of equality, which Ui follows. This reflects neither rgyu-mthun nor the text of the Mahāyanasamgraha in any way. It is thus appropriate

to emend 平等 to 流, nisyanda, on the supposition that a scribal error replaced 流 with 等, to which the term 平 was then added. In the Mahāyānasamgraha, nisyanda is used to explain the nature of ālambana-vyavadana as an outflow from dharmadhātu. Here it would mean that mārga is an outflow from ālambana, that the practice of the path results from the hearing of the dharma teaching. The above emendation has the virtue then of maintaining the doctrinal content of the Mahāyānasamgraha, although, as Ui notes (Jinna, p. 296) the textual data are unclear.

⁷Tucci, "Dinnaga," p. 58. Ui, Jinna, p. 246 and p. 304. The Sanskrit reads: prthagjānanam 'ajjñānam prakṛtivyavadānikam.

⁸Ui, Jinna, p. 296.

⁹Hattori Masaaki, Dignāga on Perception, Cambridge, 1968, p. 73, n. 1.

¹⁰Hattori, Dignāga on Perception, p. 1.

¹¹This does not mean that logical topics were not discussed by earlier thinkers. There are sections of the works of Vasubandhu and Asaṅga which treat such themes, as did Nāgārjuna. But it appears that logic was not of such paramount importance with these masters as it was with non-Buddhist thinkers before Dignāga, and thus was not as well developed.

¹²Giuseppe Tucci, Storia della filosofia indiana Bari, 1957, pp. 197-198.

¹³Kitagawa Hidenori, Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū Tokyo, 1965, p. 9.

¹⁴Tucci, Storia, p. 204.

¹⁵Tucci, Storia, p. 204.

¹⁶Tucci, Storia, p. 206.

¹⁷From the Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara, p. 23, and the Nyāyabhaṣya of Vātsyāyana, II, I, p. 19. Quoted in Tucci, Storia, p. 207.

¹⁸For a chart of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories, see Richard Robinson, Classical Indian Philosophy (reprint from Chapters in Indian Civilization, Madison, 1967), p. 37.

- ¹⁹Tucci, Storia, pp. 209-210.
- ²⁰Quoted in Tucci, Storia, p. 210.
- ²¹Hattori, Dignāga on Perception, p. 25.
- ²²Hattori, Dignāga on Perception, p. 25.
- ²³Hattori, Dignāga on Perception, p. 26 and p. 88, n. I.36.
- ²⁴Hattori, Dignāga on Perception, p. 24.
- ²⁵Kitagawa, Ronrigaku, p. 79, n. 25.
- ²⁶T. 31, p. 888c: 内色如外現為識所緣緣.
Also found in Aiyaswami Sastri, The Alambanaparīkṣa and Vṛtti by Dignāga with the Commentary of Dharmapāla, Adyar Library, 1942, pp. 48-49.
- ²⁷Hattori, Dignāga on Perception, p. 28.
- ²⁸Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Viññaptimātratāsiddhi, La Siddhi de Hiuan-tsang, p. 131. Poussin attributed this passage to the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, while I rather think that the original text is the Viññaptimātratāsiddhi, which the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa quotes. He also notes that the Sanskrit of this passage has been preserved in the Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanto Bhaṭṭa: yadābhāsam prameyamtat pramanphalata punah/ grāhakarāsamvittiyos trayam nātaḥ pṛtak kṛtam.
- ²⁹Hattori, Dignāga on Perception, p. 28.
- ³⁰Nagao Gadjin, Madhyāntavibhāga-Bhāṣya, p. 18.
- ³¹Nagao Gadjin, Madhyāntavibhāga-Bhāṣya, p. 17.
- ³²Hattori, Dignāga on Perception, p. 29.
- ³³Poussin, La Siddhi, p. 6.
- ³⁴Hattori, Dignāga on Perception, p. 29.
- ³⁵Kajiyama Yuichi, "Later Madhyamikans," Buddhist Meditation, ed. Minoru Kiyota, p. 115.
- ³⁶Kajiyama, "Later Madhyamikans," Buddhist Meditation, p. 121. In this entire discussion I closely follow Kajiyama's explanations in this article, and also in his

"Controversy between the sākāra- and niākāra-vādins of the yogācāra School - Some Materials," JIBS, XIV, 1 (December 1965), pp. 429-435, and in his Bukkyō no shisō 3 kū no ronri, Tokyo, 1969, pp. 172-184.

³⁷Kajiyama, "Later Madhyamikans," Buddhist Meditation, p. 121.

³⁸Kajiyama, "Later Madhyamikans," Buddhist Meditation, p. 122.

³⁹Kajiyama, "Controversy," pp. 29-30.

⁴⁰Kajiyama, "Controversy," p. 30.

⁴¹Kajiyama, "Controversy," p. 30 reports that Yamaguchi Susumu in his Chūkan bukkyō rinkō identifies Dignāga, Dharmapāla, and Dharmakīrti as followers of Sākāravāda, while Guṇamati and Sthiramati represent Niākāravāda. As Kajiyama notes, this outline seems to be based on later accounts of Bodhibhadra and Hsüan-tsang, but probably does reflect an historical fact in the development of this question.

⁴²Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, I, 163.

⁴³T. 26, p. 303a.

⁴⁴T. 26, p. 303a.

⁴⁵Hattori, Dignāga on Perception, p. 99, n. I.57.

⁴⁶Poussin, La Siddhi, pp. 129-130.

⁴⁷T. 26, p. 303b.

⁴⁸Hattori, Dignāga on Perception, p. 28.

⁴⁹See pp. 78-83 of this study.

CHAPTER TWELVE: Dharmapāla's Lineage

In the East Asian tradition of Yogācāra, i.e., Fa-hsiang (法相), the position of Dharmapāla is paramount. This is principally so because Hsüan-tsang (玄奘, 596-664), being dissatisfied with and confused concerning earlier Chinese understanding of Yogācāra texts, set off in 629 to go to India in search of a correct interpretation, arrived at the monastery of Nālandā in 634, and studied under Dharmapāla's disciple, Śilabhadra (529-645).¹ Upon his return to China, Hsüan-tsang gained imperial support and headed a translation project. His translations and his interpretation of Yogācāra superseded the earlier transmission, especially the translations of Paramārtha. Due mainly to the efforts of Hsüan-tsang's principal disciple, Kuei-ch'i (窥基, 646-682), this Dharmapāla lineage absorbed the then extant schools of Ti-lun and She-lun,² and became the orthodox statement of Yogācāra in China, and subsequently in Japan.

However, none of Dharmapāla's works are extant either in the original Sanskrit or in Tibetan translation. But four texts remain in Chinese translation. With the advent of modern Buddhology in Japan and its heavy emphasis on original texts and their literal Tibetan translations, some scholars have questioned

whether these Chinese translations represent the thought of Dharmapāla, or have been, in many instances, interpolated by their translator, Hsüan-tsang. This is especially true in regard to the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra, which is a commentary upon Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā, and which became the chief source and the regulative criterion for the later study of Yogācāra in China, Korea, and Japan.

The history of this text is fraught with confusing questions.³ Kuei-ch'i's biography reports a number of texts, which Hsüan-tsang studied at Nālandā under Śīlabhadra, but no mention is made of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi.⁴ In his Ch'eng wei-shih lun chang-chung shu-yao,⁵ Kuei-ch'i also relates an account that Dharmapāla had a rich lay benefactor, whose name he gives as Hsüan-chien (玄鑑). To this layman Dharmapāla is said to have entrusted the commentary, which he composed on the Triṃśikā, with the instruction that he was to give it only to a very spiritual and intelligent person. Unfortunately, so the account continues, such a person was not to be found, until the arrival of the pilgrim Hsüan-tsang, to whom the hitherto unknown text of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi was then given. Thus it was not known even to Dharmapāla's Indian disciples, and through Hsüan-tsang was transmitted directly to China.

But this account does not appear to be historically accurate, for Dharmapāla's disciple Bandhuprabha in his Buddhabhūmyupadeśa quotes entire passages from the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra and thus was conversant with this text.⁶

If then we can regard the above account as a product of Kuei-ch'i's constructive imagination, then it can perhaps be seen as an attempt to maintain the pre-eminence of the position of both his master, Hsüan-tsang, and of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, even although Śilabhadra evidently did not deem this text important enough to teach it to Hsüan-tsang.

But the question remains as to why he did not deem it important? A possible answer can be found in the nature of the relationship between Śilabhadra and Dharmapāla, for although Śilabhadra is usually considered to be the disciple of Dharmapāla, they were more or less contemporaneous. Dharmapāla was born in 530, and became a master at Nālandā some twenty years later. He retired from his post in 558, and died in 561 at the age of thirty-two.⁷ It is thus not surprising that Śilabhadra (529-645) would not have included the work of his contemporary among the classic Buddhist texts to be imparted to Hsüan-tsang. Although Śilabhadra might have revered Dharmapāla as his teacher, he would not have placed his

work on a level with those of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu. Thus Śīlabhadra's omission of this text from Hsüan-tsang's curriculum does not argue for its non-existence in India. It can then be conjectured that Dharmapāla's Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra in some form did exist in India, and was available to Hsüan-tsang.

However, the Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi is attributed to Dharmapāla and others (等), and purports to be a combined commentary of ten masters on the Trimśikā verses. In fact it presents the "orthodox" view of Dharmapāla, while refuting views it (often erroneously) attributes to other masters.⁸ Whether this arrangement was made by Dharmapāla himself, or by some later hand, it nevertheless is true that this text does present the Dharmapāla lineage of Yogācāra thinking.

Futhermore, the Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi is not the only textual source for Dharmapāla's thinking. The most important of the other three Chinese translations is the Śataśāstravaipulyatīka (大乘廣百論釋), which is a commentary on Āryadeva's Śataśāstra. Especially crucial is the chapter entitled Guruśiṣyavyavasthopaśeṣa (Explanations and Instructions for Students by Masters), for therein is treated the question of the paratantric nature of consciousness.⁹

Depending upon these two texts, this chapter will

attempt to delineate Dharmapāla's lineage of Yogācāra thinking.

The preceding chapters have outlined the classical formulation of Yogācāra by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, and pointed out some problems with that formulation, for the question of just what is meant by the purity of object (ālambana-vyavadāna) being an outflow (niṣyanda) from dharmadhātu, and just how the hearing of the dharma teaching (śrītuavāsanā) can lead to the con-version of the basis (āśrayaparivṛtti) were not fully answered. Such questions lead to the alternate Yogācāra position, which accepted the premise of an originally pure mind, and which, in Paramārtha's translations, is covered over and defiled by the evolutions of consciousness (vi jñāna-pariṇāma). But although this interpretation easily accounts for the possibility of the con-version of the basis, yet it overlooks the pivotal nature of paratantra-svabhāva and regards all conscious activity as being entirely defiled before that con-version.

Dignāga's critical epistemology deepened the awareness of consciousness. While admitting the original purity of the mind, he did not regard all conscious activity as defilement, but rather affirmed the validity of empirical thinking. Dignāga's system did not, however, directly address the alternate Yogācāra view of Paramārtha's assimilation of Tathāgatagarbha themes, for it did not

move within the traditional framework or vocabulary of Yogācāra, but rather attempted to develop an explicit epistemology and logic for all discourse, which could thus serve as a firm foundation for apologetic endeavours.

Dharmapāla's lineage of Yogācāra attempts to adequately respond to the dilemmas posed above by incorporating basic insights from Dignāga. It would appear that the main thrust of his thinking was to champion the validity of paratantric consciousness, i.e., of vi jñānapariṇāma, as not totally defiled, while at the same time evolving an answer to the question of how consciousness, which is empirically defiled, can be capable of a con-version of its basis to a transcendent horizon, i.e., how the con-version from parikalpita to pariniṣpanna can occur within paratantra. Influenced by Dignāga's epistemology, he applied the basic Yogācāra themes of vi jñānapariṇāma and trisvabhāva to questions occasioned by the incorporation of Tathāgatagarbha thought into Yogācāra. These questions are: 1) Is the structure of consciousness as described by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu valid only until the realization of the con-version of the basis, or does it somehow continue even after that con-version? Does this explanation hold for only defiled consciousness, or does it also describe

the true nature of consciousness itself? And 2) What are the relationships between original purity (prakṛti-vyavadāna) and the realization of enlightenment (vaimalya-vyavadāna)?

In affirming the validity of the paratantric evolutions of consciousness, Dharmapāla affirms that such an understanding of consciousness is not applicable only to defiled consciousness, but represents a true, correct understanding of understanding. This affirmation is expressed in his identification of the evolutions of consciousness with the two conscious aspects of insight (darśana) and image (nimitta), and the equating of such with paratantrasvabhāva.

The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, in describing the mode of activity (ākāra) and the object of consciousness (ālambana), introduces the theory of the four aspects or divisions (bhāga) of consciousness in order to explain the functionings of conscious understanding. The traditional Yogācāra texts had spoken of two aspects of consciousness, subjective insight (darśanabhāga) and objective image (nimittabhāga). Dignāga in his Pramāṇasamuccaya developed a theory of three aspects:

Every cognition is produced with a twofold aspect, namely, that of itself [as subject] (svābhāsa) and that of the object (viśayābhāsa). The cognizing of itself as [possessing] these two appearances, or the self-cognition (svasamvitti) is the result [of the cognitive act]. 10

In like fashion, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi argues that the two aspects of insight, which is the mode of the activity of consciousness (見分名行相), and image, which is the object of understanding (相分是所緣), must find their supporting essence (所依自體) the the self-realization (svasamvittibhāga, 自證分) that constitutes conscious awareness.

Dharmapāla then, by way of further refinement, adds a fourth aspect, the svasamvitti-samvittibhāga (證自證分), which is the realization (samvitti) that self-realization (sva-samvitti) of insight (darśana) into image (nimitta) has occurred.¹¹

This would mean that the first three bhāgas describe the conscious act of understanding something through insight into image, while the fourth bhāga is the understanding of understanding, which can critically ground all acts of understanding within consciousness.¹²

This fourth bhāga is not, it appears, again mentioned in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, and does not constitute in any sense a major theme of Dharmapāla. Its purpose seems to be that of avoiding the possible objection to Dignāga's theory that if svasamvittibhāga grounds and validates insight into image, then what grounds and validates that svasamvittibhāga? When we know something through insight into image, how do we know that we know it? If it is

simply by means of another conscious realization (svasaṃvitti) that we know that we know, then there is the specter of an infinite regression, for how can we be sure of that realization? Dharmapāla then understands the three bhāgas as describing the consciousness implicit in any act of understanding, and offers the fourth svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti-bhāga as the explicit consciousness that one is conscious. It is different from the other three bhāgas, for it is not the awareness of any particular content, of any specific object understood through insight. Rather it is the consciousness of being conscious. Inasmuch as it is different from the other three bhāgas, it grounds and validates conscious activity within consciousness. To be conscious of a tree involves the consciousness that is implicit in gaining insight into the image of a tree in the mind. But the consciousness of being so conscious is of a different order, for there is no image that can trigger insight. Rather such consciousness is rendered present simply by being aware of conscious functioning, by taking note of understanding when it occurs. Being of a different order than the other three bhāgas, it can ground and validate all conscious activity within consciousness, without the necessity for an infinite regression, for an infinite series of svasaṃvitti realizations, each of which would validate the preceding one.¹³ Indeed the overall intent

of Yogācāra is to become fully conscious of consciousness, to make explicit the implicit nature of consciousness.

In the context of these aspects of consciousness Dharmapāla explains vi jñānapariṇāma. Conscious realization (svasamvitti) evolves (pariṇāma) in the two aspects of insight and image.

The seventh verse of Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā reads:

Consciousness evolves in that which discriminates and that which is discriminated. 14

Dharmapāla comments:

All these evolutions (pariṇāma 能變)¹⁵ appear in the two aspects of insight (見) and image (相), and therefore they are termed evolutions. 16

Thus all the interdependent, synergistic functioning of consciousness is summed up in the appearance of insight and image. Furthermore, these two aspects are not merely imagined (parikalpita), but exist dependent on causes (paratantra). The Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi rejects the opinion that these two aspects of darśana and nimitta are parikalpita, and presents Dharmapāla's interpretation:

The mind and its mental states, because of the force of permeation evolve in two aspects. Because these evolved aspects arise from causes, they are paratantra, just as [svasamvittibhāga] is paratantra. But because of illusory clinging people universally imagine set [ideas] of being, non-being, identity, difference, both [being and non-being, identity and difference], neither [being nor non-being, identity nor difference], etc. It is thus that these two aspects are termed parikalpita. 17

The evolutions of consciousness, all the functioning of conscious understanding, whereby one is conscious of insight into image, are dependently co-arisen, and do exist as paratantrasvabhāva, but clinging to the ideas so generated results in parikalpitasvabhāva. This theme is repeated in the Śataśāstravaipulyatīka:

Because of clinging to what is merely imagined (parikalpita) the evolutions of the mind appear externally as all the defilements. And dependent on these defilements, there arises unstable clinging. Because of these unstable clings, [people] cling to and imagine the existence of a self and others. But all the impure and pure dharmas, whose essence corresponds to subject and object, are actually dependent on others (paratantra). 18

This point is highlighted by comparing Dharmapāla's commentary with Āryadeva's exposition of the Madhyamikan notion of emptiness in the Śataśāstra. Āryadeva argues that the subject who speaks and the object spoken about do not exist.¹⁹ But Dharmapāla qualifies this by saying:

The speaker, his words, and the object of those words are all non-existent in ultimate truth, but do exist conventionally (世俗). . . This means that they are established dependent on others (paratantra). . . All that which is not validated by being dependent on others is like the horns on a hare. 20

Thus the paratantric evolutions of consciousness issue saṃvṛti meaning, which is not, like the horns on a hare, simply non-existent. As Nagao Gadjin states,²¹ it was Dharmapāla's "meritorious service" to develop this

understanding of viññānaparināma as understanding through insight into image, and to affirm it to be paratantra, i.e., samvrti. In so doing, his intent seems to have been the maintaining of the Vijñaptimātra understanding of consciousness as valid, for only if such understanding is valid can one proceed to the development of theoretical understanding.

Consequently for Dharmapāla the evolutions of consciousness are not entirely defiled, but in their basic nature are conventionally valid. As noted above, defilement arises from clinging to discriminated concepts, but discriminative imagining pertains only to the mano and manas consciousnesses, and not to all eight consciousnesses.

The clinging to self and dharmas of the mind and its mental states of the sixth and seventh [consciousnesses] is that which can imagine [and thus issue in parikalpita].

The crucial consciousness here is manas, for it has evaluative thinking as its nature.²³ But even manas is not totally illusory and defiled, for Dharmapāla affirms a clear distinction between the defiled (kliṣṭa) manas and the world transcendent manas.²⁴

The paratantric functioning of consciousness is then not totally defiled, as it is in Paramārtha's translations. Viññānaparināma does not describe the devolutions from original purity to the coverings of

defilement. Paratantra is not non-existent and is not severed upon the attainment of insight into emptiness, but rather perdures even into the realization of wisdom.

Vasubandhu in verse four of the Triṃśikā writes:

The ālayavi jñāna is abandoned at the stage of arhat. 25

But Dharmapāla interprets this as follows:

Arhats sever the heavy dross of passion (kleśa-daṣṭhūlya) in that [ālaya] consciousness, which is completely exhausted at the final stage [of vajropamasamādhi], and they no longer cling to the storehouse ālayavi jñāna as if it were an inner self. It is because it forever loses its name of ālaya that it is said that it is abandoned, and not because they abandon the entire essence (體) of the eighth consciousness. 26

Just as ālaya continues into the state of wisdom and enlightenment, so all the other seven consciousnesses are transformed into the four wisdoms of mirror wisdom (ādarśana jñāna), equality wisdom (samatā jñāna), insight wisdom (pratyavekṣana jñāna), and duty fulfillment wisdom (krtyānuṣṭhāna jñāna). 27

In treating the traditional themes of non-discriminative wisdom (nirvikalpajñāna) and subsequently attained wisdom (prṣṭhalabdhajñāna), Dharmapāla explains that non-discriminative wisdom has insight (darśana) into tathatā, but does not develop any image (nimitta), for then it would not have insight into tathatā, but into that image. 28 However the wisdom attained subsequently to that non-discriminative wisdom does have both insight

and image (darśananimittabhāga), for it deals with the empirical reality of samvrtisatya, and must distinguish images in order to teach the dharma.²⁹ Thus discrimination is not intrinsically defiled at all, but becomes so only by clinging to what has been discriminated.

The Śataśāstravaipulyaṭīka reads:

If all dharmas are entirely non-existent, then distinguishing (vibhāga 差別) would not exist. But to cling to any dharma as existent also renders distinguishing non-existent. 30

As paratantric insight into image, distinguishing does exist, but when that image is clung to as real, it precludes the possibility of insight, and thus of paratantric distinguishing. If an image of the Buddha be clung to as representing a real Buddha out there, then that image becomes hypothetized and no longer serves as a mediating factor leading to insight into enlightenment. Meaning is not then realized by insight into image, but assumed to be already given in the presence of the image. The text continues to explain that, although distinguishing is empty in regard to paramārthasatya, yet it is valid in regard to conventional being.³¹ Since wisdom involves not only insight into the inexpressible tathatā, i.e., paramārthasatya, but also insight into samvrtisatya, it entails the presence of both distinguishing and the distinguished image.

This understanding of wisdom as both with and without

image places Dharmapāla within the tradition of Sākārajñānavāda, i.e., the doctrine that knowledge is always accompanied with image, and even in the state of wisdom is not completely imageless. As described in the last chapter, this is Dignāga's position which Dharmapāla is here following.³²

In this context Dharmapāla then explains that ādarśanajñāna, being free from all discrimination, is the con-version of ālayavi jñāna; samatā jñāna, which has insight into the equality of all dharmas, is the con-version of manasvi jñāna; pratyavekṣanajñāna, because it discerns all the individual and common marks of dharmas,³³ is the con-version of manovi jñāna; and kṛtyānuṣṭhānajñāna, because it manifests itself in all phenomenal realms, is the con-version of the five sense consciousnesses.³⁴

Consequently, even in the attainment of wisdom (mahābodhi), the structure of consciousness, although transformed and con-verted, yet remains.

In the thinking of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, ālayavi jñāna was principally characterized as being samsaric consciousness. Indeed in chapter fifty-one of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, ālaya and āśrayaparivṛtti are described as being mutually opposed, and in the Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra the hearing of dharma teaching (śrutavāsanā), as an

outflow from dharmadhātu, is not comprised in ālayavijñāna.³⁵ But the question of whether the paratantric nature of consciousness continued into wisdom was not specifically thematized, and thus Asaṅga's thought was open to the interpretation that the entire Yogācāra understanding of consciousness had only a provisional validity, and would be entirely transcended upon the realization of wisdom. It was probably in response to such an interpretation that Dharmapāla asserts the doctrine of the con-version and transformation of the eight viññāna into the four jñāna.³⁶

Consequently in contrast to Asaṅga, for whom the con-version of the basis, although taking place upon the same paratantric nature of consciousness, issued in a state of wisdom discontinuous with and heterogeneous to all prior consciousness, Dharmapāla maintains a basic continuity and homogeneity between wisdom and samsaric consciousness.³⁷

This same theme is reflected in Dharmapāla's treatment of the two truths and the three natures. Again his interpretation seems to owe much to Dignāga. In the Śataśāstravaipulyatīka Dharmapāla employs Dignāga's distinction between svalakṣaṇa (自相), which, as the object of direct perception, does really exist and sāmānyalakṣaṇa (共相), which, as the object of inference, is

merely mental constructions (kalpanā). Dharmapāla writes:

Names express what is to be described and are all common marks (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). But the individual marks (svalakṣaṇa) of all dharmas are entirely apart from names and words. The individual marks are not non-existent, and the common marks are not existent. 38

This same theme is repeated in the Vijñaptimātratā-siddhiśāstra:

Impure (sāśrava) evolutions of consciousness can be summarized in two kinds. The first is the evolution [produced] by causes and conditions. The second is the evolution [produced] by the force of discrimination (vikalpa). The first necessarily have a real function, and the second are simply the objects that are understood. 39

This clearly seems to reflect Dignāga's teaching on the two pramāṇa.⁴⁰ Dharmapāla thus advocates Dignāga's epistemology, but he goes further in relating that thought to the traditional Yogācāra endeavours, for he applies these categories to his discussion of the two truths.

From of old the model teachers [have said that], because of the differing dispositions [of sentient beings], we establish the two truths. Conventional truth, which is mediated by words, reveals to conventional dispositions [of sentient beings], but the truth of ultimate meaning, which is far removed from words, manifests the absolute (實事 dravya-vastu?). Although worldly conventional dharmas are addressed to the conventional dispositions [of sentient beings], yet in reality they are empty. Thus they are not truly real (諦實). Furthermore, the dependently co-arisen form-mind (緣起色心), which is realized in direct perception (現量) cannot be described in words, and thus cannot be conventional truth. 41

Since direct perception (pratyakṣapramāṇa) is admitted

as a valid means of cognition by Dharmapāla, it must issue in true understanding. And, since all understanding is comprised in the two truths, if direct perception is not conventional truth, then it must be paramārthasatya. There is simply no other option. It is thus that above svalakṣaṇa are described as being apart from words and names. Ultimate truth is present to consciousness in every act of direct perception. But its verbal objectification is a mental construction, and thus is equated with verbal, conventional truth.⁴²

It would seem then that in this passage Dharmapāla has reinterpreted Asaṅga's division of paratantrasvabhāva into its pure and defiled aspects.⁴³ For the dependently co-arisen form mind realized in direct perception (現量證緣起色心) parallels the pure aspect of paratantra, because it is prior to all the discrimination that can lead to parikalpita, just as ālayavijñāna is pre-conscious and pre-objectified. By implication the dependently co-arisen form mind realized in inference is the defiled aspect, because its conceptual constructions can indeed lead to parikalpita.

Asaṅga in his Mahāyānasamgraha characterizes ālayavijñāna under the three aspects of verbal permeation (abhilāpavāsanā), permeation of belief in self (ātma-drstivāsanā), and permeation of the elements of existence

(bhavangavāsanā).⁴⁴ Among these verbal permeations is the basis for nine of the eleven manifestations (viññapti) of consciousness, and so it plays the main role among the three. Dharmapāla has refined this teaching by distinguishing the non-verbal direct perception of paratantric ālayaviññāna from the verbal inferential perception of the pravṛttiviññāna. He identifies the belief in self and in dharmas as issuing from the discriminative manas and mano consciousnesses. But even this discrimination is not parikalpita until it is clung to as if it were real, until the images in the mind become frozen as pictures of reality rather than serve as mediating symbols. Thus the pure aspect of paratantra is the valid consciousness attained not only through direct perception, but also through non-clinging inference, while the defiled aspect becomes limited to the discriminated mental concepts of inference that are clung to. Defilement is then for Dharmapāla not a natural state of consciousness, for it is not intrinsic to the valid functioning of paratantric consciousness. Defilement comes from the subsequent clinging to ideas that have been conventionally constructed.

Speech in the world all comes from the mind, and is established by means of common traditions and conventional thinking. Therefore, if a dharma can be spoken, it is conventional and not ultimate. That which is not conventional is the ultimate, and certainly cannot be spoken. All

that can be spoken is custom formed and not ultimate. . . . Thus that which can be clung to is conventional and not ultimate. 45

The svalakṣaṇa, as the object of direct perception, which is pre-verbal, cannot be clung to, because no verbal image is present. It can not then issue in parikalpita. Rather it is the pure aspect of paratantra, and as such is orientated toward pariniṣpanna, i.e., ultimate truth. The sāmānyalakṣaṇa, as the object of inference, which is verbal, although it is not itself defiled and does constitute a valid means of conventional consciousness, because its images can be clung to, does issue in the defilement of parikalpita, and thus is the basis of the defiled aspect of paratantra.

When the con-version of the basis occurs, this structure of conscious understanding is transformed, but remains structurally intact. Ādarśana-jñāna, as the transformation of ālaya-vijñāna, is described above as being non-discriminative, for, although it reflects all images as in a mirror, yet, just as direct perception, it is pre-verbal. The other three wisdoms become increasingly involved in verbal discrimination and discernment, and represent a non-clinging functioning of inference. And so the con-version from the defiled aspect of paratantra to its pure aspect is a realization of the basically valid nature and operation of

consciousness.

This would seem to be yet another "meritorious service" of Dharmapāla, for not only does he identify paratantra as the consciousness of insight into image, but, by means of Dignāga's theory of the two valid means of cognition, he also further clarifies the pivotal role of paratantra as being the source of both valid, true insight, and of being the source of the parikalpita defilement of extroverted clinging and imagining.

But a question remains. Just what does it mean to say that the ultimate truth is present in every act of direct perception? Is the mind originally pure?

In his Prajñāpāramitāpinḍārtha Dignāga admitted the notion of the original purity of the mind of all sentient beings.⁴⁶ But he did not relate this to his epistemological thinking. How does Dharmapāla understand this original purity of the mind?

In his explanation of the four kinds of nirvāṇa in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra Dharmapāla describes the first as that nirvāṇa which is pure in its original nature (本性自性清淨涅槃, anādikālika prakṛti-vyavadāna-nirvāṇa).⁴⁷ He states that this is the ultimate principle (如真理) of all dharmas and marks, and that all sentient beings have this originally pure nirvāṇa (一切有情有初一).⁴⁸ He thus agrees with

Dignāga. But this does not mean that sentient beings are easily enlightened. Even though all beings have this original purity, even though the ultimate is present in direct perception, this does not necessitate the conscious realization of wisdom (vaimalya-vyavadāna), because that unlimited, unrestricted ultimate purity becomes conceptually limited and restricted, and being clung to, issues in parikalpita. How then is it possible to realize wisdom?

Asaṅga offered the explanation that such an attainment of undefiled purity is rendered possible because of the permeations of hearing the dharma teaching (śruta-vāsanā), which, as the purity of object (ālambana-vyavadāna), is an outflow from the pure dharmadhātu, and which, upon correct reflection, leads to the implementation of doctrinal insight in the purity of the path (mārga-vyavadāna).

It would appear that Dharmapāla found this explanation inadequate to explain just how hearing the dharma teaching, which is characterized by impure outflows (sāśrava), as are all samsaric actions, can result in the totally pure (anāśrava) attainment of enlightenment. He argues that such an explanation implies that the presence of the potential (bīja) for purity comes only from outside of consciousness, and he rejects such an interpretation in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra.⁴⁹

Just as paratantra was distinguished into a pure and a defiled aspect, so Dharmapāla argues that śruta-vāsanā is to be divided into a pure (anāśrava) and an impure (sāśrava) aspect.

Śrutavāsanā is not only defiled. When one hears the true dharma teaching, the innate pure seeds (本有無漏種子, prakṛti anāśrava-bīja) are permeated so as to gradually increase and develop until they give rise to the transcendent mind. Thus these pure seeds are also termed śruta-vāsanā. The impure nature of śrutavāsanā is severed by the practice of meditation (bhavanā-heya), but it does bring about a pre-eminent maturation (vipāka) and is the pre-eminent dominant condition (adhipatipratyaya) [of the transcendent mind, but not its direct cause (hetupratyaya)]. The pure nature of śrutavāsanā is not severed as it is the proper, direct cause (hetupratyaya) of transcendent dharmas. This proper direct cause is subtle, hidden, and difficult to understand. This is why some texts, such as the Mahāyānasamgraha, concern themselves only with the impure hearing of the teaching (sāśrava-śrutavāsanā), and by upāya provisionally say that it is the seed of the transcendent mind, while it is only the grossly manifested dominant condition.⁵⁰

Dharmapāla thus assumes that, if the Mahayanasamgraha were to speak clearly without the use of upāya, it would agree with his interpretation that the hearing of the dharma teaching can only issue in the realization of wisdom, if its direct cause (hetupratyaya), the innate pure seeds, is present. Without such an inner pure potential, listening to any words of the teaching would remain circumscribed within the sphere of the contaminated (sāśrava) world and be unable to give rise to the purity of the transcendent mind. In such a case the holy

path (āryamārga) could never come into existence.⁵¹
 The pure aspect of śrutavāsanā is the innate pure seed or potential for enlightenment, which enables the dominant condition, the actual hearing of the teaching, to come to fruition. This ability of consciousness to correctly hear and ponder the dharma teaching is to be equated with the pure aspect of paratantra. Seeds (bīja) are not then to be understood as any kind of pure elements within the mind. Rather the use of the term seed is a metaphor expressing the basic ability of consciousness to directly perceive the ultimate in pre-verbal immediacy, and to express that awareness in verbal doctrinal symbols.

This explanation is clarified in the Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi's refutation of the teaching of the original purity of the mind, as it was propounded by Abhidharma scholars.

Certain of the Vibhajyavādins [do not admit pure innate seeds to be the hetupratyaya of pure dharmas]. They think that the nature of the mind is originally pure, but, because it becomes defiled by adventitious kleśa, it becomes impure. When it is separated from such kleśa, it then becomes pure again. . . 52

Dharmapāla examines this theory by questioning what is meant by the nature of the mind (心性). It cannot, he argues, be emptiness (空理), because, since emptiness is unchanging, it cannot be a cause that leads the mind

forth to wisdom. Furthermore this innately pure mind cannot be the mind itself, because such would imply that a pure mind has devolved from purity to defilement, i.e., from a pure essence that remains unchanged, even although its characteristic evolved into defilement. Such an understanding would approach Saṃkhya and negate the entire understanding of the mind as paratantric consciousness.⁵³ This rejection of the Vibhajyavādin's theory of the original purity of the mind is, in fact, a rejection of any attribution of essential purity to consciousness, i.e., of any extroverted imagining of the essence of the mind to be pure, or impure, as if the mind were an inner unit of meaning to be known by taking an inner look. The fundamental insight of Yogācāra is that one becomes conscious of consciousness, not by taking such an inner look, but simply by being aware of conscious operations as they arise, i.e., in their interdependent, synergistic, paratantric functioning. But Dharmapāla does admit a paratantric understanding of original purity.

When [the sūtras] speak of the purity of the mind, they refer to tathatā, which is manifested by the principle of emptiness, because tathatā is the real nature of the mind. 54

Tathatā, because it is immediately present in direct perception, is the real nature of the mind (心眞實性), but one consciously realizes this purity only when such

is manifested by the principle of emptiness, i.e., when it is manifested as dependently co-arisen. Such a manifestation can occur only because consciousness is dependently co-arisen, only because of the occurrence of insight into image. The mind can have no essence (svabhāva) that could be seen to be either intrinsically pure or impure. Extroverted consciousness is not then the basic nature of consciousness. Thus Dharmapāla adds:

Or perhaps, because [the sūtras] mean to say that the essence of the mind is not kleśa, they say that its original nature is pure. 55

Paratantric consciousness is defiled only by its clinging to the verbalized objects of inference, and its basic nature is therefore not impure. This is not Asaṅga's notion of prakṛti-vyavadāna as the all inclusive horizon of tathatā, within which all is contained, whether conscious of it or not. In Dharmapāla's understanding, original purity refers to the paratantric nature of consciousness, to which the ultimate is present in direct, immediate awareness. But neither is it Paramārtha's understanding of original purity, for that account seems to be based on extroverted consciousness that would attribute a svabhāva to consciousness, and thus overlook its paratantric functioning.

However, there yet remains a problem. For if everyone

has such an innate pure seed, then upon hearing the dharma teaching, it should grow and elicit wisdom. But, alas, many are called, but few are chosen. Not only did all hearers not cultivate the dharma teaching, but many probably dismissed it out of hand. Thus Dharmapāla was led to emphasize the theory of the five gotras, according to which some people are simply devoid of the pure seed and have no potential for enlightenment at all. They are destined not to attain nirvāṇa (非涅槃法, nirvāṇādharmaka).⁵⁶ Others, however, although they have no potential to overcome the obstacle to bodhi, i.e., the obstacle of knowledge (jñeyāvarāṇa), yet have the potential to overcome the obstacle of the passions (kleśāvarāṇa), and can thus attain the nirvāṇa of a śrāvaka or a pratyekabuddha. But only those who have the potential (bīja) to overcome both obstacles can ever become a tathāgata.⁵⁷ Thus Dharmapāla developed a doctrine of predestination, in which only the elect have the innate potential to realize full wisdom and enlightenment, to be a bodhisattva or a tathāgata. Even although tathatā is present in direct perception, yet some have no potentiality to ever come to the realization of the reality of their own consciousness. They lack the seed that is the only direct cause (hetu-pratyaya) of such a realization.⁵⁸

Thus Dharmapāla furthered the examination into consciousness by identifying the synergistic, inter-dependent functioning of consciousness as issuing in the performance of insight into image. He was then an advocate of Sākārajñānavāda. Furthermore, by means of Dignāga's theory of the two pramāṇa, he further explained the role of paratantric consciousness as being both the source of true, valid insight and of being the basis for illusion. By applying Dignāga's notion of the objects of these two means of cognition, i.e., svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa, to the two truths, he reworked the notion of original purity, for the ultimate is explained as present in every act of direct perception. Yet he maintained empirical, conventional understanding as at basis valid when inference occurs without the subsequent clinging that renders the mind defiled.

But yet points are not clear. Just how is the ultimate present in direct perception? How can some people have the pure seed, while others are devoid of it?

Such questions were taken up by the followers of Dharmapāla's lineage in India. The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, which is the combined work of Śilabhadra and Bandhuprabha, attempts to clarify the nature of wisdom, i.e. the Buddha realm, in the context of Dharmapāla's thinking. The next chapter will consider the Buddhabhūmisūtra,

the scriptural basis for the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, and offer an interpretation of its place in the history of Yogācāra thinking. The following chapter will then focus on the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, and attempt to clarify the meaning of its doctrine.

Notes

¹See E. Frawallner, "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic," WZKO, V (1971), p. 133.

²See Yūki Reimon, "Genjō to sono qakuha no seiritsu," Sōretsu jūgo shūnen kinen ronshu II, Kyoto, 1955, pp. 329-372, for a consideration of the process whereby Fa-hsiang became the dominant school of Yogācāra in China.

³The first half of Katsumata Shunkyo's Bukkyō ni okeru shinishikisetsu no kenkyū is devoted to an examination of these questions.

⁴T. 50, pp. 238c-239a.

⁵T. 43, p. 608b.

⁶Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, pp. 165-191.

⁷Ui Hakuju, Daijō buten no kenkyū, Tokyo, 1963, p. 608.

⁸Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, pp. 191-293 compares the Viññaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra's presentation of Sthiramati's opinions with the Sanskrit text of his Triṃśikāviññapti-bhāṣya, and shows many discrepancies and misrepresentations.

⁹Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, pp. 295-318 is an examination of this text. The Chinese canon also contains two other works of Dharmapāla, The Ālambanaparikṣa-vṛtti (觀所緣論釋) is a commentary on Dignaga's Ālambanaparikṣa. This text focuses on the negation that any external object can be the object of understanding (ālambana), and is not of great use for clarifying

Dharmapāla lineage of Yogācāra thinking. The other text is the Viññaptimātratāsiddhiratnasambhava (成唯識寶生論), which purports to be a commentary on Vasubandhu's Viñśikā, but in fact is much more than a commentary. Ui Hakuju in his Daijō buten no kenkyū, pp. 607-813, gives a Japanese translation and copious notes. He characterizes this text as scholastic verbosity (p. 610), and he seems to have a point. It discourses mainly on heretical opinions and seems to be apologetic in character. There are no commentaries on it and it is extremely difficult to understand. Furthermore, it was not translated by Hsüan-tsang, but by I-ching in 710. From a perusal of Ui's translation, it does not appear to be particularly helpful in highlighting Dharmapāla's thinking.

¹⁰Hattori Masaaki, Dignāga on Perception, p. 28.

¹¹Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Viññaptimātratāsiddhi, La Siddhi de Huian-tsang, pp. 128-135. Wei Tat, Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun, Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness, Hong Kong, 1973, pp. 138-143. Wei Tat's translation includes the Chinese text. It is an adequate English translation that follows closely Poussin's French translation, while omitting most of Poussin's notes.

¹²See the appended translation of the Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa, pp. 572-583, where these issues are treated.

¹³Poussin, La Siddhi, pp. 133-134. Wei Tat, Doctrine, p. 143.

¹⁴Poussin, p. 416. Wei Tat, p. 500.

¹⁵For a discussion of Hsüan-tsang's translation of pariṇāma as 能變 see Nagao Gadjin, "Anne no shikiten setsu ni tsuite," and "Yuishiki gi no kompon toshite sanshōsetsu," in Chūkan to Yuishiki, pp. 365-366 and pp. 459-460.

¹⁶Poussin, p. 417. Wei Tat, p. 502. Confer Poussin, p. 124, and Wei Tat, p. 137.

¹⁷Poussin, p. 523. Wei Tat, p. 630.

¹⁸T. 30, p. 248a.

¹⁹T. 30, p. 243a.

²⁰T. 30, p. 243a.

²¹Nagao Gadjin, "Yuishiki gi no konpon toshite sanshōsetsu," Chūkan, p. 464.

²²Poussin, p. 517. Wei Tat, p. 626.

²³See pp. 201-204 of this study.

²⁴Poussin, p. 269. Wei Tat, p. 310.

²⁵Poussin, p. 163.

²⁶Poussin, p. 166. Wei Tat, p. 182.

²⁷These four wisdoms were first developed in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra. See pp. 171-173 of this study. They will be further treated in the Buddhabhūmisūtra and the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa.

²⁸Poussin, p. 587. Wei Tat, p. 688.

²⁹Poussin, p. 599. Wei Tat, p. 698.

³⁰T. 30, p. 244b-c.

³¹T. 30, p. 244c.

³²See pp. 289-293 of this study.

³³Thus pratyaśavekṣanajñāna functions by both direct perception and inference, since the individual and common marks correspond to these two means of cognition. This means that the structure of consciousness before the attainment of wisdom remains intact and functions after its attainment.

³⁴Poussin, pp. 681-685. Wei Tat, pp. 766-770.

³⁵Suguro Shinjō, "Joyuishikiron ni okeru Hogo no tokusho," Yūki kyōju shōju kinen bukkyō shisōshi ronshū Tokyo, 1964, p. 228.

³⁶See Katsumata Shunkyo, Shinishikisetsu, pp. 116-117, for the relationship between Dharmapāla and the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, which first developed these four wisdoms, and pp. 135-136 for Dharmapāla's possible reliance on Asvabhāva.

³⁷This is the basic point of the above cited article by Suguro Shinjō in note 35.

- ³⁸T. 30, p. 247c.
- ³⁹Poussin, p. 140. Wei Tat, p. 150.
- ⁴⁰See pp. 282-286 of this study.
- ⁴¹T. 30, p. 247a.
- ⁴²See Matsumata Shirō, "Dharmapāla no nitai setsu," JIBS XXVII, 2 (March 1979), pp. 184-185.
- ⁴³See pp. 208-210 of this study.
- ⁴⁴Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga, p. 89.
- ⁴⁵T. 30, p. 245a-b.
- ⁴⁶Guisepppe Tucci, "Minor Sanskrit Texts on Prajñā-pāramitā," p. 58.
- ⁴⁷Poussin, p. 670. Wei Tat, p. 758.
- ⁴⁸Poussin, p. 672. Wei Tat, p. 760.
- ⁴⁹Poussin, p. 109. Wei Tat, p. 119. This opinion is there identified as that of Nanda and Śrīsenā, i.e., the opinion that all bījas are born as the result of vasanā.
- ⁵⁰Poussin, p. 114. Wei Tat, p. 123.
- ⁵¹Poussin, p. 115. Wei Tat, p. 124.
- ⁵²Poussin, p. 111. Wei Tat, p. 118.
- ⁵³Poussin, pp. 111-112. Wei Tat, p. 120.
- ⁵⁴Poussin, p. 112. Wei Tat, p. 120.
- ⁵⁵Poussin, p. 112. Wei Tat, p. 120.
- ⁵⁶Poussin, p. 115. Wei Tat, p. 122.
- ⁵⁷Poussin, p. 115. Wei Tat, p. 124.
- ⁵⁸The question of the meaning of the five gotras will be treated in chapter two of Part Three, pp.383-385.

PART TWO: CHAPTER ONE

The Buddhabhūmisūtra

The Buddhabhūmisūtra is a small text of one chüan, which was translated by Hsüan-tsang in the year 646. The original Sanskrit is lost, but two translations exist. The Tibetan translation is entitled Hphags-pa sañs-rgyas kyi sa shes-bya-ba theg-pa chen-paḥi mdo.¹ The Chinese version is named 佛地經.² This text is the only Yogācāra work devoted specifically to the theme of wisdom, i.e., the Buddha realm. It does not discuss samsaric consciousness at all, and thus such basic terms as ālayavijñāna and vi jñānaparināma do not occur. Rather it is devoted to explaining the nature and functioning of that wisdom, which is realized after the conversion of the basis.

The text is divided into three sections. The first is an introduction, which describes the setting in which the sūtra was spoken by Buddha. The second section is the body of the work and treats the five dharmas which constitute Buddha realm. These are pure dharma realm (dharmadhātupariśuddhi) and the four wisdoms of the mirror, equality, intellectual mastery, and duty fulfillment. The third section concludes by offering two metaphors to illustrate the nature of wisdom, and four verses which summarize the meaning of the entire text.

The plan of this chapter is to first attempt to place the Buddhabhūmisūtra in the historical development of Yogācāra thinking, and then to briefly outline its doctrinal lineage. A specific treatment of its doctrinal themes will be left to the next chapter, where they may be considered in light of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, the only extant commentary on the Buddhabhūmisūtra.

A) The Place of the Buddhabhūmisūtra

The question of just where the Buddhabhūmisūtra fits in the development of Yogācāra thinking is a difficult one. Some hold that it precedes the composition of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, and is thus one of the earliest Yogācāra works. Others assign it a date much later and see it as a post-Asaṅga text. In regard to the internal evidence presented in the text, there are two sections to examine: the introduction and the concluding metaphor and verses.

The introductory section, which appears in many other texts, describes the Buddha, the pure land in which he spoke this sūtra, and the assembly of bodhisattvas and mahāśrāvakas.³ This same introduction is also found in the Samdhinirmocanasūtra in almost identical terms.⁴ It also occurs in chapter ten of the Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra, where it is attributed to "The Sūtra in a Hundred Thousand [Verses] of the

Bodhisattva Collection" (菩薩藏百千經).⁵

Paramārtha in his translation of the Mahāyāna-saṃgrahabhāṣya adds the explanation that:

In the Bodhisattva Collection there is a particular Pure Land Sūtra. This Sūtra has one hundred thousand verses. Thus it is called the One Hundred Thousand [Verse] Sūtra.⁶

But such a work is completely unknown. Étienne Lamotte thinks that this title may well indicate the Samdhinirmocanasūtra, which certainly belongs to the Bodhisattva Collection, and which once did have a version in one hundred thousand verses.⁷

In any event the Mahāyānasamgraha does not identify the source for the introduction as the Buddhabhūmisūtra, as one would expect if it were one of the basic sūtra sources for Yogācāra. Thus, because the Samdhinirmocana is constantly identified as a basic sūtra for the teaching of the Yogācāra śāstras, it can be probably assumed that the Samdhinirmocana is the original source for this introductory section. And as the present text of the Samdhinirmocana is no later than the beginning of the third century,⁸ this would give a terminus a quo for the composition of the Buddhabhūmisūtra.

The Buddhabhūmisūtra also has a close relationship with the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, for one of its concluding metaphors and all of its summarizing verses are also present in the Bodhi chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra.

As these passages are central to the argumentation, they are here given in full. The metaphor reads:

Bhinnāśrayā bhinnajalāśca nadyaḥ alpodaḥ
譬如種種大小眾流未入大海各別
kṛtyaprthakkāryaḥ/ jalāścitapraṇitanūpabhogya
所依異水少水水有增減隨其
bhavanti pātālamasaṃpraviṣṭaḥ//82//

水業所作各異少分依持水族生命。
Samudravistāśca bhavanti sarvā ekāśrayā
若入大海無別所依水無差別
ekamahājalāśca/ miśraikakāryasca mahopabhogya
水無限量水無增減所作業一
jalāśritapraṇiganasya nityaṃ//83//

廣大依水族生命
Bhinnāśrayā bhinnamahāśca dhīraḥ svalpābodbhāḥ
如是菩薩若未證入如來清淨法界大
prthāgatmakṛtyaḥ/ parittasatvārthasādhopabhogya
海各別所依異智少智智有增減隨其智業
bhavanti buddhatvamsampraviṣṭaḥ//84//

所作各異少分眾生成熟善根之所依止。
Buddhatvaviṣṭāśca bhavanti sarve ekāśrayā
若已證入如來清淨法界大海無別所依
ekamahāvabodbhāḥ/ miśraikakāryasca mahopabhogyaḥ
智無差別智無限量智無增減受用和合一
sadā mahāsatvaganasya te hi//85// 9
味事智無量眾生成熟善根之所依止。

These passages show that the Sanskrit of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra directly parallels the Chinese of the Buddhabhūmisūtra. The principal difference is that the Buddhabhūmisūtra has the phrase 如來清淨法界 (the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu) in place of the more simple buddhatvam (buddhahood) of the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra.

Immediately following this section the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra gives four summarizing verses, which are again paralleled in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra.

Sarvadharmadvayāvāratathatāśuddhilakṣaṇaḥ
vastujñānatadālam bavaśitākṣayalakṣaṇaḥ //56//
一切法真如 二障清淨相
法智彼所緣 自在無盡相
Sarvatastathatājñānabhāvanāsamudāgamaḥ
sarvasatvadvayādhanasārvathā'ksayatāphalaḥ //57//
普遍真如智 修習證圓滿
安立衆生二 諸種無盡果
Kāyavākścittanirmānaprayogopāyakarmakaḥ
samādhidhāranidvāradvayāmeyasamanvitaḥ //58//
身語及心化 善巧方便業
定及總持門 無邊二成就
Svabhāvadharmasambhoganirmānairbhinnavṛttikaḥ
dharmadhāturviśuddho'yaṃ buddhānāṃ samudāhṛtaḥ //59//
自性法受用 變化差別轉
如是淨法界 諸佛之所說

10

The identity of these passages makes it clear that textual borrowing has indeed occurred. But there is no conclusive internal evidence as to the direction of that borrowing.

But there is some external evidence that argues that the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra has borrowed from and is thus dependent upon the Buddhabhūmisūtra. Both Sthiramati in his commentary on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, the Sūtrālaṃkāravṛttibhāṣya,¹¹ and Asvabhāva in his shorter Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāraṭīkā both state that the source of the teaching on the five dharmas is the Buddhabhūmisūtra.¹² Following Hakamaya's summary of these commentaries, we read:

The general consideration of bodhi has been presented above [in verse fifty-six of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra]. After this a special consideration will be attempted from the aspects of its proper nature (svabhāva), cause (hetu), result (phala), activity (karman), associated [qualities] (yoga), and function (vṛtti). Until now bodhi has been considered according to various sūtras. However, the following part is based on the Buddhabhūmisūtra. This sūtra declares: "The Buddha realm is comprised in five dharmas, namely, dharmadhātupariśuddhi, ādarśanajñāna, samatajñāna, pratyavekṣajñāna, and kṛtyanuṣṭhānajñāna." Hence the topic of this part [of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra] should be considered according to the order of the five dharmas in this [Buddhabhūmi] sūtra. 13

Because of this evidence, both Hakamaya Noriaki¹⁴ and Nishio Kyōo¹⁵ hold that the Buddhabhūmisūtra was composed before the Bodhi chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra and is the source for the above parallel passages.

However, recently Takasaki Jikidō has offered the opinion that the Buddhabhūmisūtra is dependent upon the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, and is in fact a comparatively late composition.¹⁶ Takasaki has not argued his opinion at length. But it is based upon the literary style of the Buddhabhūmisūtra, which approaches that of a śāstra rather than a sūtra, and would thus be more likely a later composition. Furthermore, the fact that no Yogācāra thinker before Sthiramati (6th-7th century)¹⁷ and Asvabhāva (ca. 450-550) mentions the Buddhabhūmisūtra suggests that that it was not known and did not exist when Asaṅga and

and Vasubandhu composed their many śāstras.

Perhaps more light can be cast on this question by consulting the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa. According to this commentary, many of the teachings of the Buddhabhūmisūtra were composed to answer objections. And wherever the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa indicates that a specific passage from the Buddhabhūmisūtra is intended to answer a particular objection, the Bodhi chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra contains a passage that could have easily triggered the objection under consideration. In particular the ten metaphors of the Buddhabhūmisūtra which compare dharmadhātu to empty space seem to be connected with the ten profundities of action (karmaṇāmbhīrya) of the Buddha, as described in the prose commentary of the Bodhi chapter. The point of these metaphors is that dharmadhātu, while remaining transcendent and uncontaminated (anāśrava), is yet totally involved in the phenomenal, contaminated world of samsāra. This also seems to be the intent of the doctrine of the Buddha's action, for although these actions flow from the purity of enlightenment in the uncontaminated realm, yet they are also involved in the samsaric world.

The first metaphor on dharmadhātu in the Buddhabhūmisūtra states that, although the pure dharmadhātu pervades all kinds of knowable objects, yet it cannot be said to

have any perceptible characteristics, just as empty space includes all forms without itself being characterized by those forms.¹⁸ The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa comments:

Next we will explain the mark of the pure dharmadhātu. We must be careful in our analysis of pure dharmadhātu, because there is an objection, namely, if dharmadhātu of all Tathāgatas is its nature, then that dharmadhātu would become active. If tathatā is its essence, then that tathatā becomes the common mark of all dharmas. But all dharmas certainly do have various distinctions. Therefore so should dharmadhātu [have distinctions]. How could it not have these various distinctions? And if it does have them, then how can it be pure? 19

Verse thirty-two of the Bodhi chapter reads:

Just as the operation of the sun's rays contains no possessiveness, just so there is no possessiveness in the operation of the Buddha's wisdom.²⁰

The prose commentary of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra interprets this verse to refer to the non-discriminative action (avikalpanakarma) of the Buddha. Thus this teaching in the Bodhi chapter that the Buddha's actions are in the world and yet non-discriminative could easily have occasioned the above objection, which would have been then answered in the Buddhabhūmisūtra.

The second metaphor of the Buddhabhūmisūtra states that, although dharmadhātu pervades the minds of all sentient beings, yet it is not defiled by their faults.²¹ The Buddhabhūmiupadeśa explains:

Again there is an objection. For, if the pure dharmadhātu pervades all knowable objects, then it must also be associated with the defiled common

marks of all the kleśas, such as covetousness, etc. But then how can it not become itself defiled. . . ? 22

Verse thirty-three of the Bodhi chapter reads:

Just as the world is illumined by the rays from the sun in a single emission, just so all knowable objects are simultaneously illumined by means of the Buddha's wisdom. 23

The prose commentary identifies this teaching as the profundity of the action of wisdom with various aspects (citrākārajñānakarma). Here again the objection could be raised that if the Buddha's wisdom illumines all objects, even the minds of sentient beings, then it must itself become defiled, even as they are defiled. Again the Buddhabhūmisūtra can be understood as responding to such an objection.

The third metaphor of the Buddhabhūmisūtra states that, although the pure dharmadhātu encompasses all the transformations (變化) of wisdom and all the phenomenal activities that benefit sentient beings, yet it itself has no arising activity at all.²⁴ The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa explains:

Again there is an objection. If the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu has tathatā as its nature, then it has no prapañca and no arising activity. How then can it encompass the arising of wisdom, which is the cause for those phenomenal activities that benefit sentient beings? If it did encompass the arising of wisdom, then, because it would have arising activity, how could the Tathāgata's tathatā be its mark? 25

Verses twenty-nine and thirty of the Bodhi chapter read:

Immesurable light rays blend in the disc of the sun, always performing a common function and illuminating the world. Just so in the uncontaminated realm (anāśravadhātu) immeasurable Buddhas are blended, and in their tasks they have a common activity, i.e., emitting the sunlight of wisdom. 26

The prose commentary identifies these verses as teaching the profundity of the action of creating magical transformations (nirmāṇādikṛtyakarma). It would seem that this teaching is the occasion for the objection given in the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, and answered in the Buddhabhūmisūtra.

The fourth metaphor in the Buddhabhūmisūtra states that, although all benefiting activities are born and perish in dharmadhātu, yet dharmadhātu itself is not born and does not perish.²⁷ The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa explains:

Again there is an objection. If dharmadhātu pervades all knowable objects and is not free from following upon them, then dharmadhātu must also be born and destroyed. If it is not, then it cannot pervade all realms. . . 28

Verse thirty-one of the Bodhi chapter reads:

As when a single light ray is emitted from the sun, all rays are emitted, just so one should understand the emission of wisdom from all Buddhas.²⁹

The prose commentary in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra identifies this verse as teaching the profundity of the

action of the arising of wisdom (jñānapravṛttikarma). It seems again that the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa has this teaching in mind, for its stated objection appears to be leveled precisely at the idea that the pure dharmadhātu can have arising (pravṛtti) activity without being born and perishing.

The fifth metaphor of the Buddhabhūmisūtra states that, although the sacred teachings, which are included in the pure dharmadhātu, have increase and decrease, yet dharmadhātu itself has no increase or decrease.³⁰

The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa comments:

Again there is an objection. If pure dharmadhātu pervades everything and is not apart from the appearance of the Tathāgata's sacred teachings, which have increase and decrease, then dharmadhātu must likewise have increase and decrease. And if this is so, then dharmadhātu cannot be pure. 31

Verse twenty-eight of the Bodhi chapter reads:

Because it (i.e., anāśravadhātu) is full of merit and wisdom, it resembles the full moon. And because it emits the light of wisdom, it resembles the great sun. 32

The prose commentary identifies this verse as teaching the profundity of the action of manifesting the dharma teaching (dharmadarśanakarma). Again the objection mentioned in the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa could easily have been directed to this passage in the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra. And thus, according to the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, the Buddhabhūmisūtra is concerned with responding

to objections aimed at the teaching of the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra.

The sixth metaphor of the Buddhabhūmisūtra states that, although dharmadhātu establishes unlimited benefiting activities, yet it has no going or coming, no moving or changing.³³ The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa explains:

Again there is an objection. If the Tathāgata's dharmadhātu is its essence, and yet it also bestows benefit and happiness upon all sentient beings, whether they are going or coming, then dharmadhātu is not separated from this [going and coming], and, just as other dharmas, it must be characterized by such going and coming, such birth, etc. If this is so, then dharmadhātu cannot be pure. On the other hand, if dharmadhātu has no activity of going, coming, etc., then it cannot bestow benefit and happiness upon sentient beings in the ten directions. 34

The second half of verse twenty-seven of the Bodhi chapter reads:

It (i.e., enlightenment) resembles a great rain-cloud for the harvest of the world's virtue. 35

The prose commentary identifies this verse as teaching the profundity of the action of bringing sentient beings to maturity (satvaparipācanakarma). Again the basic teaching that appears to have led to the Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa's stated objection is this doctrine of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra.

The seventh metaphor of the Buddhabhūmisūtra states that, although the realization of samyak-sambodhi and mahāparinirvāṇa appear in dharmadhātu, yet dharmadhātu

does not perfect samyak-sambodhi nor enter parinirvāṇa.³⁶

The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa comments:

Again there is an objection. For if the pure dharmadhātu is apart from going and coming, etc., how can it reach to samyak-sambodhi and parinirvāṇa, since it has no going or coming? ³⁷

The first half of verse twenty-eight of the Bodhi chapter reads:

Because it is full of merit and wisdom, it resembles the full moon. ³⁸

The prose commentary identifies this verse section as teaching the profundity of arriving at culmination (niṣṭāgamanakarma). Such a teaching can be understood as implying that the Buddha action in anāśravadhātu has the activity of going and coming to culmination (niṣṭa), and thus again could easily lead to the objection as stated in the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa.

The eighth metaphor of the Buddhabhūmisūtra states that, although in the realm of sentient beings, which depends upon pure dharmadhātu, sins against the rules of training can occur, pure dharmadhātu is not altered nor afflicted on that account.³⁹ The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa explains:

Again there is an objection. For if pure dharmadhātu pervades all kinds of sentient beings, how can those sentient beings have any sin? In dharmadhātu there is no such sin, because its nature is pure. Thus the establishment of [the rules] of training would be useless, because sentient beings would have no sin. ⁴⁰

The ninth metaphor of Buddhabhūmisūtra states that, although dependent on pure dharmadhātu, the skandhas of morality (śīla), contemplation (samādhi), and wisdom (prajñā), of liberation (mokṣa) and liberation wisdom (mokṣajñāna) can occur, yet dharmadhātu is not characterized by these.⁴¹ The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa explains:

Again there is an objection. For if pure dharmadhātu pervades all dharmas, then it has the marks of the uncontaminated (anāśrava) skandhas, such as śīla, etc. But if they are not different from it, then they would not have the nature of being skandhas.⁴²

The first half of verse twenty-seven reads:

Enlightenment resembles a jewel mine of Buddha qualities, the powers, and so forth. . .⁴³

The prose commentary identifies this verse as teaching the profundity of action based on the jewels of the virtues favorable to enlightenment (bodhipākṣādi-ratnāśrayakarma). This doctrine of Buddha's action in anāśravadhātu being based on conditioned (samskrta) virtues, i.e. pure skandhas, in order to control sin seems to be the basic source for the objections stated in the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, and responded to in the eighth and ninth metaphor of Buddhabhūmisūtra.

The tenth metaphor of the Buddhabhūmisūtra states that, although in pure dharmadhātu all Buddha assemblies are included, yet dharmadhātu has no arising activity that could distinguish such assemblies.⁴⁴ The Buddha-

bhūmyupadeśa comments:

Again there is an objection. For if the pure dharmadhātu of all Buddhas is its essence, then there would be no experience of discriminating this from that. How then could it have differences of assemblies? On the other hand, if it does discriminate that which is experienced, then how can it be the pure dharmadhātu of all Buddhas? 45

Verse thirty-five of the Bodhi chapter reads:

Just as it is on account of knotting that coloring is brilliant or faint on cloth, so it is on account of effort that wisdom is brilliant or faint in liberation. 46

The prose commentary identifies this verse as teaching the profundity of the action of a particular wisdom on a similar liberation (vimuktisāmānyajñānaviśeṣakarma), i.e., that various assemblies, such as śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha or bodhisattva, may all alike attain liberation, but yet have different grades of wisdom. Such a teaching then means that there is a difference of assemblies, upon which the action of the Buddha works. Thus it could easily be the source for the above objection, and be answered by the doctrine of the Buddhabhūmisūtra.

This same conclusion is also apparent in the treatment of ādarśanajñāna in the Buddhabhūmisūtra. According to the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa the first three marks of mirror wisdom, explained in the first three metaphors, are not directed against any particular objection.

Rather they appear to present the basic teaching on the nature of mirror wisdom. However, from the fourth to the eighth metaphor specific objections are given. The objection in the fourth metaphor is that, since a cause cannot be differentiated from its result, mirror wisdom either must be just as differentiated as its results are, or it cannot give rise to them at a particular time.⁴⁷ The objection in the fifth metaphor is that results must be essentially present in their causes, and thus the images of mirror wisdom cannot arise conditionally.⁴⁸ The objection in the sixth metaphor is that a cause must be limited to its result.⁴⁹ All these three treat the nature of that causality whereby mirror wisdom gives rise to wisdom images. Again the original source that gave occasion for such objections can perhaps be traced to the Bodhi chapter, verse six of which reads:

Buddhahood is both possessed of all dharmas and bereft of all dharmas. Because it gives birth to the jewel of the Dharma, so great and vast, it is like a mine of Dharma jewels. As it is the cause of a vast increase in the harvest of virtues among beings, it is like a raincloud in showering upon beings a rain of Dharma, great, well-explained, and inexhaustible. 50

The prose commentary further explains:

Because it is the cause of the production (prodbhūternimittatvād) of the jewel of the Dharma, so great and vast, it is like a jewel mine. Because it is the cause for the great abundance (prasavaHetutvān) of living beings in the harvest of virtue, it is like a raincloud in showering living beings with the Dharma. . . 51

Thus the nature of buddhahood, i.e., wisdom, as the cause for the production of wisdom images, i.e., the jewel of the Dharma and the harvest of virtues, is clearly asserted in the Bodhi chapter, and it is probably to this teaching that the objections mentioned in the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa are leveled, and which are responded to in the Buddhabhūmisūtra.

The objection in regard to the seventh metaphor of ādarśana jñāna questions the ability of mirror wisdom to give rise to wisdom images in the Three Vehicles.⁵²

Verse fourteen of the Bodhi chapter reads:

Since it is equal in liberating śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, it has an equal function (vimuktisāmānyena śrāvaka pratyekabuddhasanā vṛttiḥ). . . . Because it is present in the teachings of all vehicles, it has a universal function (sarvayānopadeśagotatvatsarvagatā vṛttiḥ).⁵³

Thus again the seventh metaphor of mirror wisdom in the Buddhabhūmisūtra appears to be intended as a response to objections raised against the doctrine found in the Bodhi chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra.

The objections mentioned in the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa in regard to the last three metaphors on mirror wisdom raise the question of why wisdom images do not arise among those who are, in one way or another, unfit vessels.⁵⁴

Verse sixteen of the Bodhi chapter reads:

As in a broken water pot the moon's reflection is not seen, just so the Buddha's reflection is not seen in evil sentient beings.⁵⁵

Thus the last three items of mirror wisdom also refute objections to the doctrine found in the Bodhi chapter.

Thus it is that whenever the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa says that there is an objection which is responded to in the Buddhabhūmisūtra, the doctrine that triggered that objection can be traced to the Bodhi chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra. This would suggest that, according to the authors of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, Śilabhadra and Bandhuprabha, the Buddhabhūmisūtra was composed in order to respond to objections against the teaching of that Bodhi chapter, and is therefore a later composition.

I would thus tentatively follow Takasaki's opinion and place the composition of the Buddhabhūmisūtra between the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra and Asvabhāva, i.e., ca. 400. This does discount the testimony of Sthiramati and Asvabhāva, but they were doctrinal commentators, and not textual historians. Their testimony merely demonstrates that the Buddhabhūmisūtra was extant in their times, and as a sūtra, it would be natural for them to assign it to an age earlier than the composition of the Yogācāra śāstras.

B) Doctrinal Lineage

This section will attempt to identify the doctrinal lineage of the Buddhabhūmisūtra within the development of Yogācāra thinking as outlined in Part One. But

again the question becomes difficult, because the two translations of this text do not always agree. Nishio Kyōo lists a number of differences between the Tibetan translation and the Chinese translation of this text,⁵⁶ and in most cases these differences appear to be merely variations in translation style. However there are three cases where doctrinal differences can perhaps be detected.

In regard to dharmadhātupariśuddhi Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation reads:

And just as empty space, although it pervades all forms and is not apart from them, yet is not defiled by their imperfections, so the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu, although it pervades the minds of all sentient beings, since it is their reality, and is not apart from them, yet is not defiled by their imperfections. . . .⁵⁷

The Chinese reads: 遍一切衆生心性由真實故不相捨離 . . . This would seem to imply that pure dharmadhātu is the true reality (真實) of the mind. However, the Tibetan translation reads: sems-can thams-cad dan sems mñam-pa-ñid kyi yoñs-su-grub-pas, tha-mi-dad par shugs. . . , i.e., because it is the full, complete perfection (yoñs-su-grub-pa) of sentient beings and of the equality of their minds, it is not apart [from them], but is involved with them.⁵⁸

Thus where the Chinese says that pure dharmadhātu pervades (遍) the mind of sentient beings, the Tibetan states that it is involved with them (shugs-pa, i.e. it

approaches or descends to them). And where the Chinese has "because it is their reality" (由真實故), the Tibetan reads "it is [their] full perfection" (yoñs-su grub-pa). The Chinese reading seems to favor the Tathāgatagarbha interpretation of the mind of original purity. This is no surprise, if, as argued above, the Buddhabhūmisūtra has such a close relationship with the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, for that text does explicitly adopt the Tathāgatagarbha thesis. But it is somewhat unusual for Hsüan-tsang to have so strengthened this interpretation, since he follows Dharmapāla's lineage of Yogācāra thinking. However Dharmapāla himself did hold to a notion of the original purity of the mind.⁵⁹ Perhaps then the Chinese text should be understood as affirming Dharmapāla's notion of the pure mind, which interprets that purity to be the basic paratantric nature of consciousness in its pure aspect. In any event the above Chinese reading is not Asaṅga's interpretation of prakṛtivyavadāna as the total horizon within which all occurs, for it is here identified with the mind itself. The Tibetan reading seems to favor the interpretation that wisdom implies the approach of pure dharmadhātu to the mind, and thus that wisdom is discontinuous with all prior samsaric consciousness. This corresponds to the teaching of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra,

which understood the con-version of the basis to result in a totally discontinuous state of consciousness from all prior defiled samsaric consciousness.⁶⁰

The second case involves the treatment of mirror wisdom. The Chinese text reads:

Thus, dependent on the Tathāgata's wisdom mirror, images of all sense organs, objects, and consciousnesses appear. 61

The text reads: 如是依止如來智鏡, 諸處境識衆影現. Here the phrase 諸處境識 is a compound subject and refers to all the eighteen dhātus of the six sense organs, their objects, and the resulting consciousnesses.⁶² However, the Tibetan states:

Thus, dependent on the Tathāgata's wisdom mirror, images of consciousness in regard to sense organs and their objects appear. 63

The text reads: skye-mched dan dehi yul la rnam-par śes-paḥi gzygs brñan. Here only images of consciousness (rnam-par śes-pa) appear, but they appear in regard to (la, i.e. dative case) both sense organs (skye-mched) and their objects. Thus the Tibetan limits mirror wisdom to giving rise to consciousness, and mirror wisdom does not discriminate sense objects at all. But the Chinese has such discriminated objects present within mirror wisdom itself. According to Dharmapāla the paratantric structure is precisely insight into image, and even in wisdom this structure

continues. Thus the Chinese seems to be affirming Dharmapāla's notion of the paratantric continuity of consciousness once again. Because the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra teaches that all samsaric consciousness is defiled and that paratantra is only the basis of error, its understanding of wisdom does not admit of any basic continuity. The Tibetan translation seems to adhere more closely to this interpretation.

The third case involves the use of the phrase "the phenomenal wisdom all of one, unified taste." The Chinese translation has the word 事,⁶⁴ rendered here as phenomenal. But the Tibetan translation has no such term.⁶⁵ Once more the Chinese text emphasizes the continuity of paratantric consciousness, while the Tibetan seems to affirm the non-continuous, non-discriminative nature of wisdom.

Thus, following Nishio Kyōo,⁶⁶ we can conclude that the Chinese text represents the Yogācāra lineage of Dharmapāla, Hsüan-tsang, and Bandhuprabha. It can then be conjectured that the above differences in translation have resulted from Hsüan-tsang's somewhat creative translation of the original Sanskrit. The Tibetan would then represent a closer rendition of the original, and follow the lineage of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra's teaching.⁶⁷

Moreover, no matter what lineage of Yogācāra thinking is present in the Buddhabhūmisūtra, it does teach that images are indeed present in wisdom. As Kajiyama Yuichi has pointed out,⁶⁸ we are not well informed concerning the early stages of the dispute on sākāra and nirākāra-jñāna vāda. Both the Chinese and the Tibetan translations of the Buddhabhūmisūtra agree that mirror wisdom and the other three wisdoms do give rise to numerous images. They disagree only regarding the question of whether such images are discriminated by mirror wisdom or not. Thus this comparatively early text seems to presage the development of sākārajñānavāda, the theory that all consciousness, even wisdom, is accompanied by image.

Thus the original doctrinal content of the Buddhabhūmisūtra probably followed the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra's teaching rather closely, for it nowhere emphasizes the paratantric continuity of consciousness, but rather suggests that the pure dharmadhātu approaches and becomes involved in consciousness. But under the hand of Hsüan-tsang, the text began to reflect Dharmapāla's thinking, and so does come to stress the paratantric continuity of consciousness from beginning to end.

Many points, however, remain to be clarified. What does it mean to say that pure dharmadhātu is the

reality of the mind? Is this simply tathāgatagarbha?
 If consciousness is continuous, then what is the meaning
 of the con-version of the basis of consciousness?
 Such questions are treated in the next chapter, which
 will examine Bandhuprabha's Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, show
 how it has built upon the earlier commentary of Śilabhadra,
 and attempt to elucidate the basic doctrinal themes
 of the Buddhabhūmisūtra.

Notes

¹I have followed the Tibetan text as given by
 Nishio Kyōo, The Buddhabhūmi-sūtra and the Buddhabhūmi-
vyākhyāna, Nagoya, 1939, Part I, pp. 1-24.

²T. 16, pp. 720-724.

³T. 16, p. 720b-c.

⁴For Bodhurucci's translation see T. 16, p. 665c.
 For Hsüan-tsang's translation, see T. 16, p. 668c. Also
 confer Étienne Lamotte, The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, p. 167.

⁵T. 31, p. 151a. Étienne Lamotte, La Somme, p. 317sq.

⁶T. 31, p. 263a.

⁷Lamotte, La Somme, p. 62*.

⁸Lamotte, Saṃdhinirmocana, p. 25.

⁹Levi, Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, p. 149, for the Sanskrit
 text. The Chinese is from the Buddhabhūmisūtra, T. 16,
 pp. 720-724. For an English translation of the Sanskrit
 see Thurman, Ornament, pp. 105-106. For an English
 translation see the appended translation, pp. 795-801.

¹⁰ibid.

¹¹mDo sde rgyan gyi hqrel bśad, P. ed., No. 5531,
 Mi, 149b1-160a2.

¹²Theg pa chen pa hi mdo sdehi rgyan gyi rgya cher bśad pa, P. ed., No. 5530, Bi, 80b5-83b8.

¹³Hakamaya Noriaki, "Asvabhāva's Commentary on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra IX. 56-76," JIBS, XX, (Dec. 1971), 1, pp. 472-471.

¹⁴Hakamaya Noriaki, "Shōjō hokkai kō," Nantō Bukkyō, XXXVII (Nov. 1976), p. 1, n. 3.

¹⁵Nishio Kyōo, Buchikyōron no kenkyū, Tokyo, 1939, Part II, pp. 1-32. This work is the only modern study on the Buddhabhūmisūtra and the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa. Part I (Nagoya 1939) presents the Tibetan text of both works plus a glossary of technical terms. Part II (Tokyo 1939) contains various articles related to germane themes, a Japanese translation of the Buddhabhūmisūtra, and a Japanese translation of the Tibetan version of Śīlabhadra's commentary.

¹⁶In his A Study of the Ratnagotravibhāga, pp. 403-404, Takasaki agrees with Nishio's opinion, but he has since altered his opinion. In "Hōshin no ichigenron - Nyoraizō shisō no hō kannen," Bukkyō ni okeru hō no kenkyū, p. 239, n. 38, and in Nyoraizō shisō no keisei, pp. 346-347, he presents the opinion that the Buddhabhūmisūtra depends upon the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra.

¹⁷The date of Sthiramati is somewhat problematic. The above date is derived from Bu-ston, who in his History of Buddhism, E. Obermiller, trans., pp. 147-148, reports that Sthiramati was active during the time of King Śrīharṣa, i.e. the 6th and 7th centuries. However Sthiramati is also credited with the authorship of the Mahāratnakūṭasūtraśāstra (T. 26, pp. 204-230), which was translated into Chinese by Bodhiruci the Elder, who flourished ca. 520 a.d. Baron A. von Stael-Holstein, A Commentary to the Kāśyapaparivarta, edited in Tibetan and Chinese, Peking, 1933, pp. ix-x, suggests that there may have been two different Sthiramatis.

¹⁸T. 16, p. 721a.

¹⁹T. 26, p. 304b-c.

²⁰Levi, p. 39. Ui, p. 151. Thurman, p. 86.

²¹T. 16, p. 721a.

²²T. 26, p. 305a.

- ²³Levi, p. 39. Ui, p. 151. Thurman, p. 86.
- ²⁴T. 16, p. 721a.
- ²⁵T. 26, p. 306a.
- ²⁶Levi, p. 39. Ui, pp. 149-150. Thurman, pp. 85-86.
- ²⁷T. 16, p. 721a.
- ²⁸T. 26, p. 306c.
- ²⁹Levi, p. 39. Ui, p. 150. Thurman, p. 86.
- ³⁰T. 16, p. 721a.
- ³¹T. 26, p. 306c.
- ³²Levi, p. 38. Ui, p. 148. Thurman, p. 85.
- ³³T. 16, p. 721a.
- ³⁴T. 26, p. 307a.
- ³⁵Levi, p. 38. Ui, p. 148. Thurman, p. 85.
- ³⁶T. 16, p. 721a.
- ³⁷T. 26, p. 307b.
- ³⁸Levi, p. 38. Ui, p. 148. Thurman, p. 85.
- ³⁹T. 16, p. 721a-b.
- ⁴⁰T. 26, p. 308a.
- ⁴¹T. 16, p. 721b.
- ⁴²T. 26, p. 308b.
- ⁴³Levi, p. 38. Ui, p. 148. Thurman, p. 85.
- ⁴⁴T. 16, p. 721b.
- ⁴⁵T. 26, p. 308b.
- ⁴⁶Levi, p. 39. Ui, pp. 151-152. Thurman, p. 87.
- ⁴⁷T. 26, p. 311a.

- 48T. 26, p. 311b.
- 49T. 26, p. 311b.
- 50Levi, p. 34. Ui, pp. 135-136. Thurman, pp. 76-77.
- 51Ibid.
- 52T. 26, p. 312a.
- 53Levi, p. 36. Ui, pp. 141-142. Thurman, pp. 80-81.
- 54T. 26, p. 312c, p. 313a, p. 313b.
- 55Levi, p. 36. Ui, p. 143. Thurman, p. 81.
- 56Nishio, Buchikyōron, p. 90.
- 57T. 16, p. 721a.
- 58Nishio, Buddhabhūmisūtra, p. 5.
- 59See pp. 327-329 of this study.
- 60See pp. 157-161 of this study.
- 61T. 16, p. 721b.
- 62Nishio, Buchikyōron, p. 96. This theme is discussed by Nishio on pp. 96-98.
- 63Nishio, Buddhabhūmisūtra, p. 8.
- 64T. 16, p. 722c.
- 65Nishio, Buchikyōron, pp. 98-101.
- 66Nishio, Buchikyōron, p. 101.
- 67Nishio, Buchikyōron, p. 101, states that the Tibetan translation represents one current of the "Old Yogācāra." It seems that one can go a bit farther and argue that that current is specifically the teaching of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra.
- 68Kajiyama Yuichi, "Controversy between the sākāra- and nirākāra-vādins of the Yogācāra School - Some Materials," JIBS, XIV, 1 (Dec. 1965), p. 30.

CHAPTER TWO: The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa

The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa is an extensive commentary on the Buddhabhūmisūtra. It is preserved in the Chinese canon, where it is attributed to Bandhuprabha and others (親光菩薩等).² The Tibetan Tripiṭaka contains a parallel text, the Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, which is there attributed to Śīlabhadra.³

Śīlabhadra (529-645) is the well-known Yogācāra master, who was active at Nālandā during the time of Dharmapāla. Although he is traditionally considered to be the disciple of Dharmapāla, from this Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, his only extant text, he does not seem to be particularly close to Dharmapāla's thinking. Rather it is in the main a straight commentarial work, and, if any doctrinal lineage can be detected, it would be that of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, because its tathāgata-garbha teachings have been incorporated.

It is this Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna of Śīlabhadra that serves as the basis for Bandhuprabha's Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, for roughly one half of Bandhuprabha's text is identical with Śīlabhadra's work. The other half is taken almost entirely from Dharmapāla's Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra, and inserted in appropriate places in the original Sanskrit text authored by Śīlabhadra. It would seem then that the intent of Bandhuprabha was to rework that

basic text so as to bring it in line with Dharmapāla's lineage of Yogācāra thinking. Thus the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa is itself an important source for the nature of Dharmapāla's thought.

The Chinese attribution of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa to Bandhuprabha and others would then mean that, while Bandhuprabha was the final redactor and arranger of the text, its original author was Śīlabhadra, and, furthermore, the author of most of the material incorporated by Bandhuprabha was Dharmapāla himself. Bandhuprabha's actual role in the composition of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa was then relatively minor. This is not surprising, because in the history of Indian Yogācāra nothing is known about him, except that he was active at Nālandā sometime after Dharmapāla.⁴

As stated above there are many parallel passages between the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa and the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra. It is clear that one text is dependent on the other. Louis de La Vallée Poussin thinks that the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa is a source for the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra,⁵ but this does not seem to be the case. With few exceptions⁶ the sections of Bandhuprabha's Buddhabhūmyupadeśa that have no parallel in Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmivvyākhyāna are precisely those which either quote the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra or summarize its

thinking. If the Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra were dependent upon the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, then the present form of that Buddhabhūmyupadeśa would have existed as an independent text before the Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi. In such a case it is extremely unlikely that the Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi would have restricted its borrowing to only those passages that are not shared by the Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, without ever quoting a passage that is shared by both texts. Furthermore, as Katsumata Shunkyo argues,⁷ the internal evidence of a number of passages strongly suggests that the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa assumes that the doctrinal content of the passages it shares with the Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi are already known and need not be explained at length. Thus it can be concluded that the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa of Bandhuprabha has drawn upon the Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi of Dharmapāla in order to bring it within the circle of his thinking.

In order to delineate the doctrinal content of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, each of the five dharmas, i.e. the pure dharmadhātu and the four wisdoms (jñāna) will be considered. In this context the teaching of the three vehicles (triyāna) and the three bodies of Buddha (trikāya) will be briefly examined.

The second simile of the Buddhabhūmisūtra treats

the relationship of dharmadhātu pariśuddhi to consciousness:

Just as empty space, although it pervades all forms and is not apart from them, yet is not defiled by their imperfections, just so the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu, although it pervades the minds of all sentient beings, because it is their reality, and is not apart from them, yet is not defiled by their imperfections. 8

The commentaries of both Śīlabhadra and Bandhuprabha explain:

. . . just as the Buddha's own mind is absolutely pure (眞實清淨, yoñs-su-grub-pa rnam-par-dag pa), because its original nature is luminous (本性光潔, ran-bshin gyis hod-gsal-shin) and pure (本性清淨, yoñs-su-dag-pa), so it is with the minds of sentient beings. The original nature is absolute, the original nature is pure. The original nature of the mind is tathatā. 9

Both Śīlabhadra and Bandhuprabha agree in affirming the originally pure nature of consciousness. Thus, while these commentaries do not describe the pure dharmadhātu as a wisdom, i.e., it is not Asaṅga's notion of undefiled purity (vaimalyavyavadāna), neither is it Asaṅga's understanding of original purity (prakṛtivyavadāna) as the horizon within which all things occur. In these commentaries pure dharmadhātu is original purity in the sense of the originally luminous mind.

In another section the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa explains dharmadhātu in ten meanings. The first four of these are shared by Śīlabhadra's text, but the last six seem to

have been taken from the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi.¹⁰

Pure dharmadhātu means that 1) it is separated from the adventitious defilements of passion and knowledge, 2) it is the unfailingly true nature of all conditioned and unconditioned dharmas, 3) it is the cause from which all sacred dharmas arise, 4) it is the true essence of all Tathāgatas, 5) it is essential purity from the beginningless beginning (無始時來自性清淨), 6) it is endowed with all kinds of essential qualities, which surpass the number of atoms in the ten directions, 7) it is neither born nor destroyed, just like empty space, 8) it is pervasive in all dharmas and equally present to all sentient beings, 9) it is neither identical with nor different from all dharmas, and 10) it is realized only by the wisdom of pure saints, because, being separated from all marks, all discrimination, all naming, it is unattainable [by such means].¹¹

Although the phrase 自性清淨, prakṛti-vyavadāna, occurs only in Bandhuprabha's text, nevertheless, from the above passage, Śīlabhadra also affirms dharmadhātu to be the original purity of the mind.¹² Bandhuprabha states that this original purity, while being "equally present to all sentient beings," yet is "realized only by the wisdom of pure saints." Why is this so?

Both commentaries explain:

... imperfections mean covetousness, etc., which are able to lead the mind to commit faults and become defiled. Although [such imperfections] function by means of adventitious discriminations (客塵分別所轉, āgantukavikalpapravṛtti), they are not the essence [of the mind]. That [essence] cannot be completely lost and is able to bring about purity. We are here dealing with a mystery (密意). The pure luminous dharmatā of this original mind (此心本性清淨光潔心之法性) is termed mind. It is not the case that, apart from this dharmatā of the mind, there is any

pure mind of another nature. 13

This is clearly not the Yogācāra of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. It is rather an assimilation of Tathāgata-garbha thinking. It would appear that Śīlabhadra and Bandhuprabha have attempted to incorporate this teaching in order to explain how the mind can ever become pure, for Asaṅga's explanation of śrutavāsanā never explained just how the defiled ālayavijñāna could ever come to consider the pure dharma teaching.

Futhermore, the phrase 客塵分別 is not found either in Asaṅga or in Vasubandhu, who understand discrimination 分別 to be the natural result of unreal imagining (abhūtaparikalpa) and in no sense adventitious 客塵. But Śīlabhadra and Bandhuprabha, in order to maintain the teaching of the originally pure nature of consciousness, must hold that such discrimination is not in any sense the intrinsic nature of consciousness. They are then faced with the question of just why such an originally pure mind is defiled in the first place.

How then can the mind of sentient beings have covetousness, etc.? They can have such because they are supported by the power of their own discrimination. While the delusions (viparyāsa) of the mind have not yet been finally severed, these [defilements] do arise from the power of ignorance. It is just as the nature of empty space, although originally pure, is made to appear impure, because illusory marks are seen by eyes damaged by cataracts. Just so, although the

original nature of dharmadhātu is pure, because of the causal force of covetousness, etc., which arise from one's own discrimination, since the cataracts of ignorance damage the wisdom eye, illusory marks make it appear to be impure. But the universally pure wisdom eye (一切種清淨慧眼, thams-cad du yōṅs-su-dag paḥi śes-rab kyi miq) is never defiled. Furthermore, inasmuch as pure dharmadhātu is non-discriminative, such universal purity is termed dharmakāya of all Tathāgatas, or their true essence, because it is constantly without change. Therefore, because dharmadhātu is present in the continuity of the minds of sentient beings, they are equal (samata). Thus it is said: "All sentient beings are the embryo of the Tathāgata," and "All sentient beings have Buddha-nature." 14

Both Śīlabhadra and Bandhuprabha have then incorporated Tathāgatagarbha themes into Yogācāra. Does this mean that they have weakened the focus upon interiority in favor of an abstract principle? Asaṅga and Vasubandhu seem to have avoided Tathāgatagarbha themes precisely because they could not be easily grounded within consciousness.

The third simile of the Buddhabhūmisūtra describes dharmadhātu as "encompassing all wisdoms, all transformations, and all phenomenal activities that benefit sentient beings."¹⁵ Both commentaries explain that dharmadhātu, while abiding in its own nature, yet establishes activities that benefit sentient beings. Śīlabhadra says that dharmadhātu is the cause for the arising (skye-baḥi rgyu-mtshan) of these activities, while Bandhuprabha states that it is their assisting cause (助力因). How is dharmadhātu a cause for phenomenal

activities? In an earlier section, which treats the five dharmas from the standpoint of cause and result, both commentaries state that:

The cause (因) is pure dharmadhātu, because it is the cause that is able to give rise to and increase sacred dharmas. 16

This echoes the teaching of the Mahāyānasamgraha that dharma teaching is an outflow from the pure dharmadhātu. But the commentaries further explain:

The results are those sacred wisdoms which arise with it as object (緣彼生), because they depend upon it. Because [mirror wisdom] has dharmadhātu as its object (緣法界, chos kyi dbyiñs la dmiga-pa), it completely supports the hearing of the dharma teaching. 17

Here dharmadhātu is specified as the ālambana-pratyaya of wisdom consciousness, i.e. dharmadhātu is the objective of the pure mind. It is the ever present, originally pure objective, which defines the basic structure of consciousness as luminous. It is because of this original intending of the mind toward that object (ālambana), dharmadhātu, that one is able to hear dharma teaching (śrutavāsanā).

However, dharmadhātu cannot be an object as are other phenomenal dharmas, for it is completely unrestricted and can never be grasped by the mind. Thus dharmadhātu as object is not an external ultimate out there nor an internal essence in here to which consciousness is directed. Rather it is precisely

the unrestricted orientation of consciousness toward the undefinable dharmadhātu, which becomes defined only in the hearing of dharma teaching. Dharmadhātu is here interpreted in terms of conscious interiority, for it is the movement of the mind constantly seeking and questioning. It is defined only in terms of this movement or orientation, for any attempt to define it in itself would result in the imagining of some essence either external to consciousness or lying at the base of consciousness. The outflow from dharmadhātu is not then an outflow from an extra-mental ultimate, which encounters at best a neutral mind, but rather is the orientation of consciousness itself as it tends toward or issues in the completely unrestricted desire to be totally and completely conscious.

This is the grounding within consciousness of the anticipatory awareness of wisdom described on the first page of this study. It is the pre-conceptual tendency of the mind toward bodhi. Dharmadhātu is then not identical with consciousness, for it is the intended objective of consciousness. But neither is it separate from consciousness, for it is the functioning structure of consciousness. It is thus that dharmadhātu encompasses all benefiting phenomenal activities, for all wisdom actions are particularizations of this unrestricted

ēlan of conscious awareness.

Thus Śīlabhadra and Bandhuprabha have not weakened the focus on interiority, but by means of this notion of dharmadhātu as ālambanapratyaya have synthesized Tathāgatagarbha thought within the context of Yogācāra meaning.

The fourth simile of the Buddhabhūmisūtra states that, although all the activities of wisdom appear to arise and pass away within dharmadhātu, yet that dharmadhātu has no arising or passing away.¹⁸ Both commentaries explain:

In paramārthasatya all dharmas of form, etc., are neither born nor do they pass away. But in saṃvrtisatya we do establish arising and passing away, and thus we say that these things appear [to arise and pass away].¹⁹

Paramārthasatya is then awareness of the originally unrestricted luminescence of consciousness as intending dharmadhātu, which is prior to and beyond all conceptual thinking, and is thus silent. As that inner thrust of conscious movement becomes conceptualized in doctrinal thinking, it becomes saṃvrtisatya.

The fifth simile notes that, while the sweet dew of the Tathāgata's teachings, which are manifested in dharmadhātu, do have increase and decrease, yet dharmadhātu has no increase or decrease.²⁰ Again both commentaries interpret this by means of the two truths:

When it is said that [these teachings] appear [with increase and decrease], this means that the transformations of conventional consciousness appear as having increase and decrease. But such is not their true nature (眞性) in pure dharmadhātu, for therein all dharmas of form, etc., are far-removed from conceptual discrimination (prapañcavikalpa). 21

Samvṛti refers then to a mode of consciousness that is characterized by conceptualization. In contrast paramārtha refers to the prapañca-free mode of consciousness, i.e., to the awareness that the original, basic nature of the mind is not expressed in any conceptual, limited manner, but rather, just as it is (tathatā), constitutes a constant, all pervading dynamic élan toward dharmadhātu.

In the commentaries to the sixth simile it is said that:

Although it (i.e., dharmadhātu) has no movement, yet its dominating force (増上力) can issue in activities (事轉) that bring benefit and happiness. . . 22

Thus pure dharmadhātu is not a direct cause (hetu-pratyaya) which has the ability to bring about an effect. Rather it is a dominating condition (adhipatipratyaya) which can bring about an effect only in synergy with other direct causes. These other causes are the cultivation of good roots by sentient beings. Dharmadhātu serves only as the enabling condition, which allows teaching to be heard and wisdom roots to be cultivated.

Although the mind is originally pure and luminiscent, yet it does not issue in wisdom on that account. The presence of adventitious discrimination does not mean that the defilements of discriminative clinging are merely incidental and can be easily swept away. Rather it means that such discriminative clinging is not the basic nature of consciousness. Both commentaries read:

In paramārthasatya, dharmadhātu is the essence of all Tathāgatas, and is pervasively present in the continuity of all sentient beings. Due to the maturing force of their own good seeds and the dominating condition of dharmadhātu, when such consciousness arises, such activities [of cultivating good roots] become clearly manifested. 23

It is due to the dynamic orientation of the originally pure mind toward pure dharmadhātu as the dominant, enabling condition that sentient beings are able to cultivate their good roots and realize the unmeasurable activities that flow from and express that originally pure mind, which is defined by having as object pure dharmadhātu.

The seventh simile of the Buddhabhūmisūtra states that

in the Tathāgata's dharmadhātu there appears the realization of samyak-sambodhi, which has unlimited marks, or there is manifested the entrance into parinirvāṇa, and yet dharmadhātu does not perfect samyak-sambodhi nor enter nirvāṇa. 24

Both commentaries explain that the realization of samyak-sambodhi and nirvāṇa is said by saṃvṛtisatya, for in paramārthasatya they do not really exist (非真實), because that which really does exist does not cast off its own marks (自相) and take on other marks.²⁵

As described above²⁶ Asaṅga in the Mahayanasamgraha treats the four pure dharmas under pariniṣpanna, i.e., under paramārtha. Thus undefiled purity, which is the attainment of enlightenment, pertains to paramārtha. But here the attainment of wisdom and the entry into nirvāṇa are saṃvṛti, because they involve a change.

But just because such attainment is saṃvṛti does not render it invalid. Samvṛti is the conceptualization of the unrestricted orientation of the originally pure mind toward dharmadhātu. The entire path system and the realization in which it culminates are valid as saṃvṛti and must be followed, since they constitute the only direct cause that can lead to wisdom. Even though dharmadhātu is the dynamic structure of consciousness, yet it remains unfulfilled unless good roots are cultivated.

Thus in both Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna and in Bandhuprabha's Buddhabhūmyupadeśa Tathāgatagarbha themes have been reworked and synthesized within the Yogācāra context of interiority. The originally pure mind is so because it is orientated toward the completely

unrestricted dharmadhātu. But this does not guarantee the realization of wisdom, because consciousness functions in a continuity of restricted, limited moments and by a process of constantly arising conceptualizing. If such conceptualizing be clung to and assumed to convey real unity of meaning, if consciousness remains extroverted, then the awareness of this originally pure orientation of consciousness is covered over (sam-vṛta) by parikalpita. The con-version of the basis of consciousness is precisely the turning away from the erroneous delusion that conceptual extroversion constitutes meanings that can be clung to as stable, and the turning to an awareness of the basic nature of consciousness as constituted by its original orientation to pure dharmadhātu. Thus this con-version is both discontinuous and continuous. It is discontinuous and disjunctive, because wisdom is a realization of the inner orientation of the pure mind, such as has never occurred before. It is continuous and conjunctive, because that realization is a full unfolding of the basic nature of consciousness itself.

In addition to the above analysis that is common to both Śīlabhadra and Bandhuprabha, the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa presents further explanations that have been taken from Dignāga and Dharmapāla. Quoting the Pramāṇasamuccaya Bandhuprabha notes:

All mind and mental states which realize their own essence (自性) are called direct perception.²⁷

Here the object of direct perception (pratyakṣa) is clearly not an individual, external object, but rather the understanding of the essence of the mind itself, i.e., the understanding of the mind as originally pure. Direct perception is then identified with consciousness of consciousness (證自性). This act of consciousness does not turn back upon the mind as if it were an inner essence to be inspected, but is rather simply a self-awareness of being conscious in any act of knowing. It is an awareness of the constantly on-going process of thinking and questioning.

Bandhuprabha further analyzes the nature and functioning of consciousness by means of Dharmapāla's theory of the four aspects (bhāga) of consciousness in order to explain just how this luminous mind functions.²⁸ In accord with Dharmapāla he identifies this interdependent, synergistic functioning of consciousness with paratantrasvabhāva. In commenting on the sūtra passage that says the uncontaminated wisdom of Buddhas and bodhisattvas have both darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga and are yet free from parikalpita, Bandhuprabha writes:

This is because their dependently co-arisen nimittabhāga and darśanabhāga are comprised in that which is dependently co-arisen. Only if because of these two aspects, they were to falsely

imagine things external to the mind, or that fixed essences really existed, would we say that they cling (i.e., parikalpita). 28

The presence of such images (相) is essential to the functioning of wisdom:

The activity that illuminates objects, which is internally realized in pariniṣpannasvabhāva, is the manifestation of such appearing objects and is termed wisdom. 29

Here Bandhuprabha expresses Dharmapāla's ideas on the nature of paratantra as insight into image, and identifies this conscious functioning as luminous. Thus Bandhuprabha, while maintaining the teaching of the original purity of consciousness, does not negate paratantra, as did the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra. Rather awareness of this purity is interpreted to be the pure aspect of paratantra (pariniṣpannabhāgika). Having analyzed the nature of the pure mind in a thorough-going context of interiority, he is then able to outline the functions of wisdom in his description of the four wisdoms.

Following Dharmapāla's teaching that both image and insight are present in wisdom, Bandhuprabha describes mirror wisdom as follows:

When it takes the limit of paramārthasatya as the object of understanding, it is called non-discriminative wisdom. When it takes the limit of samvrtisatya as the object of understanding, it is called subsequently attained wisdom. 30

These terms, 眞義邊 and 俗義邊 refer to

yathāvadbhāvikatā and yāvadbhāvikatā³¹ and mean that this most basic wisdom is not restricted to a non-phenomenal, totally transcendent awareness of the ultimate, but rather is immersed in an understanding of all that is, just as it is (tathatā).

Although its essence is one, yet its activities of manifesting truth are many. It is then distinguished into these two [non-discriminative and discriminative] wisdoms, without any logical inconsistency. [But] it is only when it reaches paramārthasatya that it can understand saṃvṛti-satya.³²

Only when one is aware that the original structure of consciousness is not to be entangled in clinging to any given meaning, but is dynamically open to and orientated toward the unlimited can one truly understand phenomenal things.

In discussing the other three wisdoms Bandhuprabha continues to emphasize the basic continuity of consciousness. Samatājñāna is described as being the awareness of the equality of all dharmas, because it is the realization of dependent co-arising.³³ Because it is far-removed from differentiating things as if they had a svabhāva, it is the source of compassion.³⁴ Śīlabhadra identifies the highest compassion as objectless compassion (anālambanakarunā), because, being wisdom, he says, it cannot discriminate objects.³⁵ But Bandhuprabha corrects this and states that the highest compassion

of Buddha does have sentient beings as its object.³⁶

The eighth item in regard to equality wisdom in the Buddhabhūmisūtra states that tranquility from the world is all of one taste, because the dharmatā of equality is fully perfected.³⁷ In his Buddhabhūmi-vyākhyāna Śīlabhadra states:

The cause and ground of this tranquility is the path and nirvāṇa. 38

But Bandhuprabha expands this explanation in a somewhat surprising fashion:

The cause of tranquility is the holy path and its ground is in the paratantric nature of nirvāṇa (从涅槃依他起性). 39

The constant emphasis upon the validity of paratantric consciousness is highlighted here. That consciousness functions through insight into image. This structure remains present in wisdom, but the direction seems to have changed. In samsaric consciousness one gains insight into images that come from sensation, and is thus limited by the presence of the image. But in wisdom, insight uses images to express its unlimited awarenesses. In discussing the wisdom of wondrous insight (pratyavekṣajñāna) we read:

In one dharma it can support all dharmas. In one expression, it can support all expressions. In one meaning, it can support all meanings. 40

Bandhuprabha explains that, because insight (darśana) and self-consciousness (svasamvitti) of Buddhas are

unlimited, in one image (nimittabhāga) they can manifest all dharmas.⁴¹ The many images of pratyavekṣajñāna are not then given through sense perception, but arise from wisdom insight itself.

The wisdom essence in its darśanabhāga is able to be the cause for the arising of such [image] consciousness. . . . Because it can manifest these [images], it is said to be the cause for their arising.⁴²

The last wisdom of duty fulfillment (krtyānuṣṭhānajñāna) is described as the wisdom which, bringing about transformations (nirmāṇa) in body, speech, and thought, adapts images to whatever level is appropriate to the sentient beings addressed.⁴³

But despite all the phenomenal activities of wisdom, not all sentient beings seek bodhi. Thus in line with the Yogācāra tradition, both commentaries affirm that there are three vehicles of enlightenment. Although Chinese Fa-hsiang was severely criticized and even said to be unworthy of being called Mahāyāna because it taught triyāna, the lines between ekayāna and triyāna were not so strictly drawn in India.⁴⁴ Indeed the first thinkers to develop a systematic explanation of ekayāna were followers of the triyāna tradition.⁴⁵ The Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra, while holding that ekayāna was an upāya aimed at attracting those of indeterminate lineage to the Buddha vehicle, gave an interpretation

of ekayāna that was afterwards repeated many times by Ekayānist. As Nagao Gadjin notes,⁴⁶ whether ekayāna or triyāna is held to be true, in India the basic teaching of the texts is almost identical. In this context, the Buddhabhūmisūtra states that the Buddha desires to lead sentient beings to enlightenment by means of their respective vehicles of śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha, and bodhisattva.⁴⁷ The Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa comments:

There are differentiations in the maturation of the good roots of individuals. Those of determinate lineage attain deliverance by means of their respective vehicles. Those of indeterminate lineage attain deliverance by means of the Mahāyāna or one of the other vehicles.⁴⁸

The reason for this differentiation of vehicles is that the basic potential for practice differs from person to person.

All individuals of the three vehicles use their own seed nature (種子) as direct cause (hetu-pratyaya) and the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom as the dominant enabling cause (adhipatipratyaya).⁴⁹

This teaching that there are differences in the course of sentient beings toward the same dharmadhātu probably reflects historical conditions in India. The Mahāyāna bodhisattva ideal was seen as the fulfillment of earlier Buddhist models, but not as their complete negation, for Hīnayāna practitioners were always at hand. Thus the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says that the three vehicles

are not inexistent (na tu yānatrayaṃ nāsti).⁵⁰ This reminds one of Asaṅga's statement that the unreal imaginings of paratantra are non non-existent.⁵¹

But the question becomes more complex, for it appears that there are some who have absolutely no seed or potential for practice at all, and are therefore destined never to attain enlightenment.

The theme of icchantika is raised in the Mahā-parinirvāṇasūtra, but the evidence there is confusing. Some passages affirm that even icchantikas will eventually cast off their nature of being icchantika and attain enlightenment, while other passages state the reverse.⁵² The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra does teach that there are some who are not destined to attain nirvāṇa, just as Dharma-pāla's Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi affirmed.⁵³ Thus besides those of the lineage of the three vehicles and those of indeterminate lineage, there are the agotra, i.e., those without any lineage or potential for practice. As Tokiwa Daijō notes,⁵⁴ the classical formulation of this five gotra theory is found in Bandhuprabha's Buddhabhūmyupadeśa. But there the intent is not simply to explain the five gotras, but rather to offer an explanation of why the merits of the Buddha are inexhaustible.

All Tathāgatas originally elicit an encompassing vow to seek mahābodhi for the sake of sentient beings. If then all sentient beings finally attain parinirvāṇa, then, at that time would not

all the conditioned merits of Buddha come to an end?

There will never be such a time when all the realms of sentient beings will attain final cessation, and thus the Buddha's merits will never come to an end.

This is because of the basic nature of the dharma (dharmatā). From the beginningless beginning all sentient beings are divided into five kinds of lineage (gotra). The first is the śrāvaka lineage, the second the pratyekabuddha lineage, the third the tathāgata lineage, the fourth the indeterminate lineage, and the fifth the lineage that is without transcendent merits. Their characteristics are as described in other sūtras and śāstras. The first four of the above will ultimately attain final cessation due to the compassionate upāya of all Buddhas, although they have no fixed time period [in which to do so].

But the fifth lineage, because it lacks the causal power of merit that transcends the world, will never reach a time of final cessation. All that the Buddhas are able to do for them is to manifest their spiritual powers by means of upāya and to explain to them the dharma teaching of avoiding evil destinies and being born in good destinies. But even although they might rely on that teaching, cultivate good causes, and attain birth in the human destiny, when they reach the place of no thought and no non-thought (naiva-saṃjñāna-saṃjñāyatana, i.e., the highest realm in the triple world), they inevitably fall back and sink into evil destinies. All Buddhas will again manifest their powers by upāya, and explain to them the transformations of dharma teaching, and they will again cultivate good and attain birth in good destinies. But later they will again fall back and experience suffering. Again by upāya the Buddhas will succour them. Like this their transmigrations will never come to an end, and they will not be lead to any ultimate, final cessation. 55

This obviously contradicts the above teaching that all sentient beings have the embryo or potential of becoming Tathāgatas. Bandhuprabha accepts this

conclusion.

Although other sūtras declare that all sentient beings whatsoever have Buddha-nature, and all will become Buddhas, this refers only to the dharmakāya Buddha lineage, or it is said by upāya and refers only to a small part of sentient beings, or it is said in order to lead those sentient beings of indeterminate lineage to decide to quickly arrive at the result of supreme enlightenment. 56

Thus the entire prior explanations of the originally pure mind are limited to only those of dharmakāya lineage. There is a tradition that when Hsüan-tsang read this passage, he objected to transmitting it to China, knowing that it would be rejected.⁵⁷ As it turned out, he was right, for almost all of the Chinese schools of Buddhism adopted the ekayāna teaching, and held that all sentient beings were able to be enlightened. Some even thought that trees and inanimate things shared in that enlightenment. But Bandhuprabha seems to have embraced this opinion not only from an elitist standpoint, but because he could not adequately explain just how the Buddha was eternal and unchanging if everybody one day would be saved. The entire Mahāyāna proposal of the bodhisattva ideal would simply become extinct if there was nobody upon which to exercise compassion. And Bandhuprabha was not evidently willing to admit that the greatest upāya of them all is Buddhism itself.

Nevertheless, for those who are able to bear it, the Buddha's wisdom is manifested in the world. This manifestation is summed up by the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa in its last chapter on trikāya, almost all of which is without parallel in Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna. One of the summarizing verses states:

It (i.e., tathatā) displays the differentiations of essence, the experience of dharma, and transformations. 58

The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa comments:

The essence refers to the essence of the Tathāgata's svabhāvikakāya, which is eternal and unchanging. . . . Because it is the support for all the merits, such as the powers of fearlessness, etc., it is also called dharmakāya. Experience (sambhoga) means that sambhogakāya is able to experience the various kinds of great dharma joy both for itself and for others. Transformations mean that nirmāṇakāya is able to manifest various kinds of transformations, because it desires to benefit and gladden sentient beings. 59

Bandhuprabha offers two interpretations of the relationship between the five dharmas and the three bodies. The first is that dharmadhātu and mirror wisdom support svabhāvikakāya, equality wisdom and intellectual mastery wisdom support sambhogakāya, and duty fulfillment wisdom supports nirmāṇakāya. The second interpretation is that dharmadhātu supports svabhāvikakāya, while the four wisdoms in different ways support the other two bodies. In either interpretation, the three bodies of Buddha are understood as the manifestation of wisdom,

in accord with the teaching of the Mahāyānasamgraha.⁶⁰

Dharmakāya is further described as being beyond all discriminative thinking.

The dharmakāya of all Buddhas is not associated with reflective thought (vitarka) and is not an object of reflection. It surpasses all reflective thinking and mental fabrication. 61

It has the ultimate con-version of the basis as its mark.⁶² Thus dharmakāya is the embodiment of the full consciousness of the originally pure mind of dharmadhātu. And just as the four wisdoms mediated that consciousness in images and perceptible forms, so the other two bodies embody the pure, non-reflective consciousness of dharmakāya in perceptible images. These two bodies are then the manifestations of dharmakāya in mediating images. When manifested to bodhisattvas in the course of the ten bhūmis, that manifestation is sambhogakāya, and when manifested to those who are not yet embarked upon the course of the bhūmis, it is nirmāṇakāya.⁶³ Sambhogakāya is then that which is realized in the con-version of the basis of the evolving consciousnesses, and is thus verbally objectified in images.⁶⁴

The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa further develops the trikāya doctrine by distinguishing two kinds of sambhogakāya.

There are two kinds of sambhogakāya. The first is the embodiment of one's own joy (svasambhogakāya), which is the completion of the practices

of three innumerable kalpas. The second is the embodiment of joy for others (parasambhogakāya), so that all bodhisattvas might experience the joy of dharma. 65

The svasambhogakāya is here understood as the pivotal factor between the ultimate dharmakāya and the fully perceptible nirmānakāya. The nature of bodhi embraces not only the attainment of wisdom, but also the practice of compassion. Thus the realization of the joy of the dharma by bodhisattvas who have completed their course includes not only their own enlightenment, but also flows out in upāya images and teaching to others.

One's own enjoyment of dharma joy is the actual body of form, etc., which is realized in the completion of self-benefiting practices cultivated for three innumerable kalpas, and which leads to the experience of that wondrous joy. The experience of dharma joy by others is that transformed body (nirmānakāya) of form, etc., realized by the full perfection of benefiting others cultivated for three innumerable kalpas in order that all bodhisattvas might enter that great land. 66

This parasambhogakāya is then distinguished from the third body, nirmānakāya, in that it is open only to those bodhisattvas in the bhūmis, while the third nirmānakāya is directed to all sentient beings, even before they have thought of practicing the path.

Thus the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa comes to distinguish four aspects of trikāya:⁶⁷

Trikāya has four aspects. The first is the experience of joy that does not include transformation, which is the true sambhogakāya of the aspect of self-benefit. The second is

transformation which does not include the experience of joy, which are the transformations of bodies (nirmanakāya) for the sake of converting various kinds of beings who have not yet reached the bhūmis. Whether gross or subtle, whether productive of joy or alarm, these transformations are not determined. We term it the transformation which does not include the experience of joy, because it does not necessarily lead to the experience of dharma joy. The third is transformation which does include the experience of joy, which are the various transformation bodies (parasambhogakāya) manifested for bodhisattvas in the ten bhūmis, because they do cause all those bodhisattvas to experience dharma joy. These transformations vary according to circumstances and are not determined. The fourth is neither the experience of joy nor transformation. This is svabhāvikakāya. 68

Thus while the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa does introduce this distinction of the two aspects of sambhogakāya, it remains in accord with the traditional Yogācāra treatment of trikāya of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, and sees that sambhogakāya as the pivotal, mediating factor between the other two bodies.⁶⁹

The main contribution of these commentaries on the Buddhabhūmisūtra is then not in the area of trikāya doctrine, even although the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa does devote a full chapter to this topic. Rather it lies in the development of the notion of dharmadhātu as constituting the original purity of consciousness, because it is the objective cause (ālambanapratyaya) that makes consciousness to be what it is (tathatā). This is taught by both Bandhuprabha and Śīlabhadra.

The overall contribution of Bandhuprabha was to add to the original text many passages that reflect Dharmapāla's thinking. Furthermore it would seem that he is to be credited with the concise formulation of the doctrine of the five gotras, according to which some poor souls forever transmigrate.

This discussion of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa is, however, an oversimplification of the teaching of this extensive tract. It is thus fitting that in the appendix to follow a complete annotated translation is presented.

Notes

¹T. 26, pp. 291-328.

²Étienne Lamotte, La Somme, p. 61* reports that Paul Demiéville, (Journal Asiatique (Oct.-Dec. 1936), pp. 651-652, thinks that 親, 光 is better rendered as Prabhāmitra or Prabhābandhu, but as Bandhuprabha is commonly accepted, this reading is herein followed.

³P. ed., No. 5498.

⁴Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, p. 166.

⁵Louis de La Vallée Poussin, La Siddhi, p. 599.

⁶The discourse on the five gotras on p. 298a seems to have been composed by Bandhuprabha himself, as it is without parallel in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. The account concerning Maitreya and Sakyamuni on p. 327a is also found in the Avadānaśataka and the Mahāvibhāsaśāstra. See the appended translation, pp. 493-497.

⁷Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, pp. 165-189.

⁸T. 16, p. 721a.

⁹T. 26, p. 305b. Nishio, Buddhabhūmisūtra and Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 65; Buchikyōron no kenkyū, p. 216. See p. 603 of the appended translation.

¹⁰Poussin, La Siddhi, pp. 670-671. Wei Tat, Ch'eng Wei-shih lun, p. 759.

¹¹T. 26, p. 302a. Confer Nishio, Buchikyōron, pp. 132-135. See p. 550-553 of the appended translation.

¹²Thus I do not agree with Hakamaya Noriaki, "Seijō hōkai ko," Nanto Bukkyō, XXXVII (1976), pp. 9-13, where he holds that only Bandhuprabha, and not Śīlabhadra, affirms the original purity of the mind. Nor do I think such a notion represents a "degeneration" (p. 13) of Vijñaptimātrata, for it is present in the pre-Asaṅga Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, a basic text for Vijñaptimātrata.

¹³T. 26, p. 305b. Appended translation, pp. 605-606. Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 67; Buchikyōron, pp. 217-218.

¹⁴T. 26, pp. 305b-c. Appended translation, pp. 606-607. Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 66; Buchikyōron, p. 217.

¹⁵T. 16, p. 721a.

¹⁶T. 26, p. 302b. Appended translation, p. 556. Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 58; Buchikyōron, p. 210.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸T. 16, p. 721a.

¹⁹T. 26, p. 306c. Appended translation, p. 619. Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 71; Buchikyōron, pp. 230-231.

²⁰T. 16, p. 721a.

²¹T. 26, p. 307a. Appended translation, p. 622. Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 72; Buchikyōron, pp. 221-222.

²²T. 26, p. 307b. Appended translation, p. 624. Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 73; Buchikyōron, p. 222.

²³T. 26, p. 307b. Appended translation, p. 625.
Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 74; Buchikyōron, p. 223.

²⁴T. 16, p. 721a.

²⁵T. 26, 307b. Appended translation, p. 628.
Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 75; Buchikyōron, p. 224.

²⁶See pp. 214-219 of this study.

²⁷T. 26, p. 303a. Appended translation, p. 569.

²⁸T. 26, p. 303b-c. Appended translation, pp. 572-585.

²⁹T. 26, p. 314b. Appended translation, pp. 831-832.

³⁰T. 26, p. 302c. Appended translation, p. 564.

³¹See pp. 120-122 of this study.

³²T. 26, pp. 302c-303a. Appended translation, p. 565.

³³T. 26, p. 314a. Appended translation, p. 697-700.

³⁴T. 26, p. 314b. Appended translation, p. 700-702.

³⁵Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 99; Buchikyōron, p. 242. T. 26, p. 314b. Appended translation, p. 703.

³⁶T. 26, p. 314b. Appended translation, p. 703.

³⁷T. 16, p. 721a-b.

³⁸Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 101; Buchikyōron, p. 244.

³⁹T. 26, p. 315c. Appended translation, p. 713.

⁴⁰T. 26, p. 315c. Appended translation, p. 718.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²T. 26, p. 316b. Appended translation, pp. 723-724.

⁴³T. 26, p. 318b. Appended translation, p. 754 et sq.

⁴⁴Nagao Gadjin, "Ichijō sanjō no rongi o megutte," Chūkan to yuishiki, pp. 536-537.

⁴⁵Nagao, "Ichijō," p. 528.

⁴⁶Nagao, "Ichijō," p. 535.

⁴⁷T. 16, p. 721c.

⁴⁸T. 26, p. 312b. Appended translation, pp. 678-679.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Levi, p. 68. Thurman, p. 142.

⁵¹See p. 205 of this study.

⁵²For an examination of these passages from the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra see Mizutani Kosho, "Issendai kō," Butsudai kenkyū kiyo, XL (1961), pp. 63-107.

⁵³Tokiwa Daijō, Busshō no kenkyū, 83-127 for the doctrine of the Yogacarabhūmiśāstra and pp. 150-162 for the Viññaptimatratasiddhiśāstra.

⁵⁴Takiwa, Busshō no kenkyū, p. 163.

⁵⁵T. 26, p. 298a. Appended translation, p. 493-495.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷This tradition is discussed by Tokiwa Daijō, Busshō no kenkyū, pp. 169-174. It is first recorded in Tao-lun's (道倫) Yu-ch'ieh shih-ti lun-chi (瑜伽師地論記) in an almost unintelligible form. (For a discussion of the name Tao-lun, see Yūki Reimon, "Yu-ch'ieh lun-chi no choshamei ni taisuru gigi," Shukyo kenkyū, VII, 3, pp. 53-62.) However, the same account is repeated in Saichō's Hokeshūku (法華秀句). Tokiwa reconstructs the Lun-chi account in light of Saichō's readings. It seems that, when Hsüan-tsang was about to leave India for China he approached Śīlabhadra and asked his permission to omit this passage from his Chinese translation. Thereupon Śīlabhadra chided him and insisted that the passage be kept intact. However, this seems unlikely as the passage in question does not appear in Śīlabhadra's text at all. Either Hsüan-tsang approached Bandhuprabha, for which there is no evidence, or perhaps this

tradition was invented to lend authority to Fa-hsiang's doctrine of the five gotras, which was under heavy attack from all the Chinese schools of Buddhism.

⁵⁸T. 16, p. 723b.

⁵⁹T. 325c. Appended translation, p. 846.

⁶⁰See pp. 227-233 of this study.

⁶¹T. 26, p. 326a. Appended translation, p. 848.

⁶²T. 26, p. 325c. Appended translation, p. 847.

⁶³T. 26, p. 326a. Appended translation, p. 852.

⁶⁴T. 26, p. 325a. Appended translation, p. 851.

⁶⁵T. 26, p. 325a. Appended translation, pp. 854-855.

⁶⁶T. 26, p. 327b. Appended translation, p

⁶⁷Nagao Gadjin, "On the Theory of Buddha-Body," Eastern Buddhist, VI, 3 (May 1973), pp. 42-43. It says that "it is a well known fact that the Buddha-bhūmi-śāstra (i.e. Buddhabhūmyupadeśa) and the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun expound a theory of four Buddha-bodies by dividing the Enjoyment Body into the Own-enjoyment Body and Other's-enjoyment Body." But it would seem more accurate to say that for the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa and the Vijñapti-mātratāsiddhiśāstra, there are only three bodies, which, because of the distinction of sambhogakāya, have four aspects. The point of distinguishing the two kinds of sambhogakāya is not to add another body, but to emphasize the pivotal role of sambhogakāya as partaking both in the mediated awareness of dharmakāya and the compassionate activities of nirmāṇakāya.

⁶⁸T. 26, p. 327b-c. Appended translation, p. 876.

⁶⁹See p. 233 of this study.

Appendix

The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa

An Annotated Translation

PREFACE

This translation is intended to be a translation of the Chinese text of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa (佛地經論). It is not intended to be a comparative translation of both that Chinese text and Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna in its Tibetan version. Thus although frequent reference to Śīlabhadra's Tibetan text will be made for the purpose of clarifying the meaning of a word or a passage, this does not constitute by any means a comparative study. In fact most of the word study of Tibetan parallels that will occur in the notes to the following translation have been drawn from "The Tibetan Index," edited by J. Rahder, which is included in the second part of Nishio Kyōo's Buddhabhūmisūtra and Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna. This Index gives the Tibetan terms that appear in the text, their Sanskrit equivalent, and the Chinese parallel. It is through the use of this Index that many of the Tibetan terms appear in the following footnotes, and not because of any comprehensive study of the Tibetan text itself.

However, as explained above, the Chinese text of Bandhuprabha is twice as long as the Tibetan text of Śīlabhadra. It has seemed necessary then to indicate in some fashion those sections which have been added

by Bandhuprabha. Whenever possible then those sections that appear only in the Chinese text of Bandhuprabha's Buddhabhūmyupadeśa will be indented. This is possible where Bandhuprabha has added whole sections to the text, but not where Bandhuprabha has simply reworked Śīlabhadra's text. Thus the indented portions serve only as a rough estimate of the reworking of the original text by Bandhuprabha.

The Chinese text is divided into seven chapters (chüan), but these divisions result not from any logical division of the themes treated, but from the length of the rolls (chüan) upon which the Chinese was originally written. Thus the section titles on this translation are mine. For that portion which has a Tibetan parallel, I follow Nishio's divisions in his Buchikyōron.

There does exist another work, the Buchikyōron Shūmoku (佛地經論條目), which is preserved in woodblock copy in the Ōtani library in Kyōto, Japan. This work dates from the year 1784. It is not a commentary on the text, but rather presents subject headings for four sāstras, one of which is the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa. I have consulted this work for some of the section headings, when I have been able to decipher the somewhat obscure wood-block characters.

INTRODUCTION

I bow down in reverence before the unexcelled,
prospering field,

Before the three bodies, the two truths, and the
assembly of the one vehicle.¹

Now, according to my ability, I relate this
śāstra,

So that the dharma may continually abide and deliver
the multitude of beings.

I have understood the explanations² of all the
masters, and already see with purity,³

But I am concerned, lest those of small wisdom⁴
fail to understand.

In order to lead them to elicit supreme merit
in purity,

I extensively interpret the land of the Sage.⁵

¹The Chinese text differs substantially from that of Śīlabhadra, which simply alludes to the Three Jewels here. The Chinese further interprets Buddha as trikāya, Dharma as satyadvaya, and Saṃgha as the ekayāna assembly.

²The Tibetan reads, dgongs-pa for 意, thoughts. Rahder explains this as abhipraya, the intention or sense of a word or passage. It would thus seem that what is here being referred to are previous commentaries of the themes treated in the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa.

³Following the Tibetan, dag mthoñ nas. The Chinese has simply 我已淨, I have already been purified.

⁴The Tibetan reads, rnam-par-rmoñs-pa, those who are perplexed.

⁵The words 略釋 are here a compound and correspond to rnam-par-dgrol-ba, to interpret fully. 牟尼, i.e. Muni, correspond to thub-pa, and refer to the Buddha.

The commentary explains: The Buddhabhūmisūtra is the embodiment of all wisdom (sarvajñāna) and all kinds of wisdom (sarvākārajñāna),⁶ which are free from the obstacles of passion and of knowledge.⁷ In all

⁶ 一切種智, sarvākārajñāna is thematized in the first two verses of the Bodhi chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra: "By means of hundreds of incalculable and difficult practices, of incalculable stores of good [actions], in an immeasurable time period, and by the overcoming of innumerable obstacles, sarvākārajñāna is realized, cleansed of all obstacles. Like a basket of uncovered jewels, such a one is called buddha." See Lévi, Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, p. 33; Ui Hakuju, Daijō-shōgonkyoron, p.133; Thurman, ed., Maitreya's Ornament of the Scriptures, p. 75.

Vasubandhu's prose commentary explains that the essence of buddha is the realization of sarvākārajñāna. Philologically this term comes from sarva, all, ākara, kind, and jñāna, wisdom. But to render ākara simply as kinds does not fully grasp its meaning. Ākara comes from the verb ā-kṛi, to bring near, and its meanings are given by Monier-Williams as: form, figure, shape, stature, appearance, external aspect or gesture of the body, expression of the face (as furnishing a clue to the disposition of the mind). Thus sarvākārajñāna refers to the wisdom that knows all appearances and their inner meanings, i.e., not just a transcendent wisdom, but one involved in all the aspects of phenomenal life.

⁷ 煩惱障, kleśāvarana, is the obstacles of the passions, which cling to objects as if they were actually real. 所知障, jñeyāvarana, is the obstacle of the known, which is the process of discriminating and projecting actuality upon external objects. These two function in synergy and form a unit to produce the everyday world of samsāra and ignorance. In Yogācāra thinking the entire process of gradual enlightenment is a progressive liberation from these two obstacles, from discriminative clinging, from the extroversion of meaning. As explained later, kleśāvarana is an obstacle to nirvāṇa, inasmuch as it precludes quietude and cessation. Jñeyāvarana is an obstacle only to bodhi. One can thus realize the nirvāṇa of the arhat or the prayetikabuddha, while yet having jñeyāvarana, but not the wisdom (bodhi) of the bodhisattva.

dharmas and in all kinds of marks,⁸ [such wisdom] is able to open upon enlightenment (bodhi) both for oneself and for all sentient beings, just as one might awaken from a dream, or just as a lotus flower blossoms. Thus [this embodiment of wisdom] is called the Buddha land.

This means that the ground (āśraya), practice (carita), and embodiment (parigrāha)⁹ [of the Buddha land] are precisely the experience¹⁰ of phenomena as of one unified taste, as the pure dharmadhātu, mirror wisdom, equality wisdom, the wisdom of intellectual

⁸ 相, lakṣaṇa, phenomenal marks or characteristics, images. One of the basic thrusts of Yogācāra thinking is the emphasis on explaining the origin and validity of phenomenal occurrences, of the marks that appear to consciousness. In China the dominant Yogācāra school was known as Fa-hsiang, the phenomenal marks of the Dharma.

⁹ The ground (āśraya) of the Buddha land is clearly pure dharmadhātu, as will be explained later in the śāstra. The practice 所行, carita, is that of the four wisdoms herein thematized. The embodiment 所攝 parigrāha, is the content embraced in those wisdoms, i.e., the embodiment of wisdom in phenomenal experience, the insight into all things in a non-discriminative manner.

¹⁰ 受用 translates the terms upabhoga, enjoyment, pratisamvid, experience, anubhava, experience. In the broadest meaning of this term it seems to mean simply experience, and as it occurs most often with this meaning, I render it as experience. It is a crucial term, for it is the Chinese translation for the technical term, sambhogakāya, 受用身, the intermediate body of Buddha.

mastery, and the wisdom of duty fulfillment.¹¹

Because this is the ground, the practice, and the embodiment of enlightenment (buddha), [this text] is entitled Buddhabhūmi. Because this meaning runs through and upholds it, it is called a sūtra,¹² for the Buddha's sacred teachings run through and uphold both the meaning they explain and the beings they transform. You should understand that the Buddha land expounded in this sūtra is of extreme benefit to sentient beings.

This sūtra receives its name just like the Pratītya-samutpādasūtra¹³ or the Ratnasamuccayaśāstra.¹⁴

¹¹These are the five dharmas that are thematized in the Buddhabhūmisūtra:

清淨法界, dharmadhātupariśuddhi, the pure dharma realm.
 大圓鏡智, adarśana-jñāna, the wisdom of the great round mirror.
 平等性智, samatā-jñāna, the wisdom of impartial equality
 妙觀察智, pratyavekṣa-jñāna, the wisdom of intellectual mastery.
 成所作智, kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna, the wisdom of duty fulfillment.

¹²經, sūtra derives from sūtr, to string together, to put together, which comes from the root siy, to sew [thread]. Monier Williams (p. 1241) quotes the Bhāgavata Purāṇa: that which, like a thread, runs through or holds together everything [is sūtra].

¹³The Pratītyasamutpādasūtra is a short work of one chüan, which was translated by Hsüan-tsang. T. 2, p. 547.

¹⁴The Ratnasamuccayaśāstra ? 集宝論 is not extant. The meaning here is that, just as these texts derive their titles from the content they treat, so the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra is so titled, because it treats the Buddha land.

Specifically¹⁵ the meaning embodied in this sūtra is the manifestation of the Buddha land, which is established in the plenitude of the Bhagavan Buddha's land, in the plenitude of his merits, and in the plenitude of its retinue, [as will be explained at length shortly].

[This sūtra manifests] the phenomenal wisdom all of one unified taste, which is experienced in the five dharmas both individually and jointly.¹⁶ Grounded upon dharmadhātu, these merits are divided into the three bodies.¹⁷

Thus we will successively explain the following questions: Where does the Tathāgata abide? What are his merits? How is his multitude established? In this manner we will arrange the explanations of that land.

¹⁵ 略說 here means to speak definitively, or or specifically. The corresponding Tibetan term is don-bsdus-pa, the precise meaning.

¹⁶ The five dharmas refer to dharmadhātu and the four wisdoms. In stating that each of these five wisdoms involves the experience of wisdom, the Chinese text seems to imply that dharmadhātu is the originally pure ground of consciousness itself, for it is not an external realm of purity. Without such a pure ground, the four wisdoms could not be realized.

¹⁷ Since dharmadhātu is the pure ground of consciousness, its merits are the meritorious qualities of pure consciousness. Thus the trikāya, being the divisions of those merits, are divisions of pure consciousness, and not three forms of an externalized Buddha presence. It is with this meaning that the trikāya are the manifestations or the arising of the mind of wisdom.

His place of abiding refers to the Buddha land, i.e., his broad, extensive palace, which is adorned with eighteen kinds of plenitude. His merits refer to the Buddha Bhagavan's twenty-one kinds of victorious merits. His multitude refers to that incalculable multitude of mahāśrāvakas and mahāsattvas, who perfect all kinds of wondrous merits.¹⁹ The different meanings of that land refer to the five dharmas of this wisdom land, which both individually and jointly experience phenomena as one unified taste. (291c) All this will be explained in detail later.

There are three parts to this sūtra. The first explains the cause for the arising of this teaching. The second deals with the explanations of the teaching. And the third treats the devout practice, which is based on the teaching. [The first part] in general explains the occasion when this teaching was heard and arose, and specifically describes the Lord of the teaching and the place where it arose. Since those to be converted by the teaching are precisely the cause for the arising of the teaching,²⁰ this part is entitled the cause

¹⁹The Tibetan here adds a passage describing these śrāvakas and bodhisattvas, which occurs on p. 298a of the Chinese text.

²⁰That is, compassion is the cause for teaching.

for the arising of the teaching.

The second part is entitled the explanations of the sacred teaching, since it explains the differences in the various kinds of dharma doors²¹ described in that sacred teaching.

The third part is entitled the practice based on that teaching, since it explains how the multitude, who had heard the Buddha's teaching at that time were elated and put it into practice.²²

²¹These entry doors of the dharma teaching are the five dharmas.

²²These three parts are the overall divisions of the entire sūtra, and consequently of the commentary. The first part corresponds to the introduction of the sūtra, in which the Buddha land, the Buddha, and his multitude are treated. The second part corresponds to the explanations of the five dharmas, which form the bulk of the work. The third part corresponds to the concluding description of the response of the hearers to this explanation of the five dharmas, and forms a brief conclusion to the text.

PART ONE: CHAPTER ONE

The Arising of the Teaching

The sūtra says: Thus have I heard: At one time the Bhagavan . . .

The commentary explains: The phrase Thus have I heard refers to the enunciation of what has already been heard. The transmitters of the Buddha's teaching say: "What I have heard is precisely this."

Now there are four kinds of meaningful speech. The first is analogical. The second is exhortatory. The third is responsive to questions. And the fourth is provisional.²³ Analogical speech is exemplified by the sentence: Monks are like treasures. Exhortatory speech is exemplified by the sentence: This is the manner in which you should read and understand the sūtras and śāstras. Responsive speech is exemplified by the sentence: What I am proclaiming is precisely what I have heard.²⁴ Provisional speech is exemplified

²³ 許可, to make allowances. The Tibetan reads dam-bcah-ba, to confirm or promise, which is identified by Rahder with prati jñā, to acquiesce or consent. It is thus an upāya mode of speech which takes into account the dispositions of the hearers and seeks to elicit their consent. The Tibetan adds a fifth kind, the meaning of words. All five kinds are to be found in the Samdhinirmocanasūtrasyavyākhyāna, P. ed., Mdo-hgrel., 125, 6a5.

²⁴ The sūtras, are held to tally with the needs of beings, and thus their enunciation is responsive.

by the sentence: For your sake I must think like this, act like this, and speak like this. However, such is spoken provisionally.

[There are three opinions on how many kinds of meaningful speech is involved in the enunciation of the sūtra.]

The first opinion holds that in regard to this [question] only provisional speech is possible. When assembled all the bodhisattvas ask: Please speak just as you have heard. Those bodhisattvas, who transmit the dharma, then speak by making allowances for them and say: I must indeed speak just as I have heard. It is in this manner that the faith [of those other bodhisattvas] can be examined and confirmed. Or they might say: The dharma that I have heard conforms to my utterances, and in all instances my speech is in conformity [with it] and in nowise different.²⁵

The second opinion holds that responsive speech is also involved. When questions arise [the transmitters

²⁵This first opinion of Bandhuprabha's text is that which is accepted by both Śīlabhadra and by the Samdhinirmocanasūtrasyavyākhyāna (Nishio, Buchikyōron, p. 184). The underlying issue is the question of whether the content of the Buddha's enlightenment can be expressed in words. Since the sūtras purport to do just this, the question devolves into the nature of the discourse employed therein. Śīlabhadra's opinion identifies sūtra discourse as entirely and exclusively provisional, and thus upāya. The words of sūtras, although normative, are so only as pointers toward the inexpressible.

of the dharma] must respond in accord with what they have heard. And therefore they say: This have I heard.

The third opinion holds that all four kinds of speech are involved. [Sūtra discourse] is analogical in that what must be said depends upon analogy to words and phrases already known. It is exhortatory in that, when it was spoken, the multitude must have been enjoined to listen to the content of what was heard by the transmitter.²⁶

The word I refers to the conventionally erroneous view of the skandhas.²⁷

The word hear refers to the auditory sensation of the evolving consciousness of the ear organ.²⁸ By

²⁶ 我昔所聞 , what I have heard. I here refers to the narrator or transmitter of the Buddha's word.

²⁷ 蘊, skandhas, i.e., the five heaps or factors that underlie the continuity erroneously believed to be a self.

²⁸ 聞謂耳根發識聽受. The Tibetan of Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna reads: thos-pa ni ñan-nus-paḥi rna-baḥi dbaṅ-po zin-paḥo: Hearing is the auditory sensation of the sense of hearing. Bandhuprabha in the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa has expanded this by the addition of the words 發識, i.e., pravṛttivijñāna, the evolving consciousness. This tendency to further specify and clarify by adding material is a constant characteristic of Bandhuprabha's text, even though it is not always pointed out in this translation. Examples of this tendency are simply too many to be able to be always mentioned. Furthermore, at times Bandhuprabha has so reworked the basic Sanskrit text, represented by Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, that it is extremely difficult to indicate the differences merely by noting vocabulary changes.

disregarding these distinctions, people generally say:
I hear.

[There are two opinions concerning the
nature of the cause of the Buddha's discourse.]

The first opinion holds that by the dominant
enabling cause²⁹ of the Tathāgata's compassionate
vow, images of words and meanings are produced
in the consciousness of the hearers. Although
these images of words and meanings do depend
immediately³⁰ on the power of one's own good roots,
yet, since they are strongly caused [by the
Tathāgata's vow], they are called Buddha discourse.
Thus when the sūtra says I hear it means that
the mind itself is transformed through the power

²⁹ 增上緣, adhipatipratyaya. Adhipati comes from
adhi-pa, a ruler, commander, king. Pratyaya refers to
a cause or force that acts in co-operation with other
causes and enables them to be effective. Thus adhi-
patipratyaya is a commanding, dominant cause that
can have an effect only in synergy with other causes.
It is distinct from the direct, immediate cause,
hetupratyaya, in that it is not the immediate cause
that directly leads to an effect. Note however, that
all causes arise in synergy, for all effects are depen-
dently co-arisen.

³⁰ 親, immediate, i.e., hetupratyaya. The immediate
cause for the arising of all consciousness is found
within that consciousness, and is a function of the
purity or defilement of the individual seed-nature
of each consciousness. Thus the Buddha's vow can enable
one to cultivate good roots, but cannot force anyone
to do anything.

of the ear organ.³¹

The second opinion holds that, by the power of the dominant enabling cause of good roots and the power of the original vow, images of (292a) words and meanings are produced in the consciousness of the Tathāgata. These images arise from the good roots by which the Buddha benefits others, and are thus called Buddha discourse. The hearer, although he does not grasp them, yet, because images³² which appear to be like them do become present, says: I hear.³³

You should understand that the phrase Thus have I heard implies the avoidance of any increase or decrease [in what was heard]. It means that one declares in accord with the dharma heard from Buddha, and not according to any explanation concocted by another. Such a hearer

³¹This opinion seems to represent a Yogācāra version of Pure Land thinking, which describes the efficacy of the Tathāgata's compassionate vow in terms of the dominant enabling cause. It thus avoids the thesis of an extra-mental Buddha and safeguards the context of cittamātra. In the Pure Land thinking of Shinran the same term, adhipatipratyaya is used. But rather than being contrasted with hetupratyaya, it assumes the role of an all-pervasive and totally efficacious cause, which alone can deliver beings, who simply have no ability nor any good roots which might be cultivated in this degenerate age.

³²相分, nimittabhāga, i.e., the image aspect of consciousness.

³³Thus the cittamātra theme is maintained.

has profound ability in that all he hears avoids the errors of increasing or decreasing. He is not like the fool, who lacks such ability and is thus incapable of avoiding these errors.

The transmitters of the Buddha's dharma, when they gather up the dharma, base themselves on the Tathāgata's teachings, and begin by saying these words (i.e., Thus have I heard) in order to lead sentient beings to revere, respect, believe, and accept [that teaching]. They say: Just as I have heard from the Buddha, these words and meanings are established with neither increase nor decrease. Thus [the hearers], having correctly heard, must truthfully consider them and then put them into practice.

The phrase at one time refers to the time of hearing, and means a continuous series of moments without interruption.³⁴ The time within which speaking and hearing occur is generally termed one time. If this were not so, then words, names, and phrases would be different when they are spoken and when they are heard. How then could words be the same [for both speaker and hearer]?

³⁴The Abhidharma schools that recognized the reality of external dharmas, yet saw that reality as in a constant momentary flux. Yogācāra, following Nāgārjuna, denies any such reality to dharmas, but yet understands their appearance in consciousness as being momentary.

When³⁵ one who can speak attains dhārāṇi,³⁶ in one word, in one instant, he can convey all dharma doors. And when one who is able to hear attains a pure ear organ, in one instant, when he hears but one word, everything [becomes clear to him] without any obstacles. Because all these are capable of such an experience, it is said to occur at one time.

Or, perhaps, because the time period when these images are encountered is not discriminated, the text says one time.

This means that the phrase at one time refers to the encountering of the common marks of speaking and hearing.

Time is a conventionally established conditioned dharma.³⁷ Or it is established as such in the mind, because its images all depend upon form and mind (rūpacitta), and are conventionally established. It consists in actions

³⁵ Following the alternate Taisho reading of 時 in place of 或. The Tibetan gives yañ, furthermore.

³⁶ 陀羅尼, dhārāṇi, from dhṛi, to hold, support. These are mystic verses, which can hold the mind in steadfast focus on the dharma.

³⁷ Yogācāra divides all dharmas into five categories: 1) citta, the mind, i.e. the eight viññānas; 2) caitta-sikadharma, mental dharmas, which include various states of consciousness; 3) rūpāṇi, forms, which include the basic sensations, 4) cittaviprayuktāḥ saṃskāra dharmas, actions unassociated with mind, which comprise various items which, while being established by the mind, are

unassociated with the mind.

Why then, [it is asked,] is not [time] explained by dividing [it into successive moments] as is done below in the passages [of the sūtra]? If we were able to speak only about one time, then the divisions of day and night could not be established or referred to in speech.

According to one opinion, the meaning [of the phrase at one time] is that [the time when the sūtra was spoken] is not determined. Thus we cannot ascertain whether it was spoken just in one moment or in a continuity of moments. Thus the images [of words] are generally said [to occur] at one time.³⁸

The term Bhagavan³⁹ comes from six interrelated meanings. The first is self-abiding, the second is

³⁷cont. not directly associated with mind; and
5) asamskr̥tā dharmāḥ, unconditioned dharmas, which are conceived as being beyond the world of change and suffering. For a full discussion, see Hirakawa Akira, ed., Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Tokyo 1977), Part One, pp. xx-xxiv. Time is the twenty-first item of the citta-viprayuktāḥ saṃskārā dharmāḥ.

³⁸The intent of this question is that, since the sūtra does relate events in a sequential time continuum, then why explain time as occurring all in one moment. Bandhuprabha's explanation suggests the almost universal religious conception of time as primordial, i.e., not determined by empirical standards. See Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, (New York 1957), pp. 68-113.

³⁹薄伽梵, Bhagavan, from the root bhaj, to share, distribute, and thus a Lord who dispenses blessings.

brilliant plenitude, the third majesty, the fourth the meaning of the name, the fifth blessedness, and the sixth nobility. As the verse says: "Self-abiding, brilliant plenitude, and majesty, name, blessedness, and nobility. These six kinds of meaning are all attributed to the term Bhagavan."

Since all Tathāgatas are endowed with these qualities and do not lack any of them, they (292b) are called Bhagavans. This is to be interpreted as meaning that since all Tathāgatas are eternally unattached to all passions, they are abiding. Since they are consumed by the fire of flaming wisdom, they are brilliantly replete. Since they are adorned with the thirty-two major marks,⁴⁰ they are majestic. Since they are replete with all victorious merits, they are all-knowing, and thus are endowed with the meaning of the name, [Bhagavan]. Everywhere in the world they are revered and praised, and thus they are blessed. Since their merits are constantly active and, by upāya benefit and bring peaceful joy to sentient beings without ceasing, they are noble.

Futhermore, since they are able to destroy the four

⁴⁰ 三十二大士相筭, dvātrimśadvaralakṣaṇa, the thirty-two physical marks of a Buddha, such as curly hair and a ten foot halo. See Soothill, A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms (Reprint: Taipei 1972), p. 60, for a full listing. Later associated only with sambhogakāya.

māra enmities,⁴¹ they are called Bhagavans. These four māra enmities are the passions, the skandhas, death, and the Paranirmitavaśavartin devil.⁴²

Thus Buddha is designated by these ten qualities, [i.e., the six meanings of the term Bhagavan and the four meanings of destroying māra]. The reason why the transmitters of the Tathāgata's teaching place this name, Bhagavan, at the beginning of all the sūtras is that it is honored over all the world. Even heterodox teachers all refer to their founders as Bhagavan. This one name encompasses a multitude of qualities, and, because it is unlike other names, it is always placed at the beginning of sūtras. Later we will discuss these qualities of the Buddha.

⁴¹ 魔, māra, killing or destroying.

⁴² The four māra enmities are 1) kleśamāra, the passions that torment the body and mind; 2) skandhamāra, the five skandhas, which, being impermanent, give rise to suffering; mṛtyumāra, the fear of death; and 4) devaputramāra, the anthropomorphic devil, who belongs to that class of gods called Paranirmitavaśavartin, i.e., those who control [enjoyments] magically created by others. These are the highest gods of kamāvacara gods, who are at the apex of the realm of desire. Thus the devil abides, not in the depths of hell, but is comfortably ensconced in the highest heaven of pleasure.

PART ONE: CHAPTER TWO

The Merits of the Pure Land

The sūtra says: . . . [the Bhagavan's] abode was adorned with the seven jewels that shine brilliantly. It admitted a bright light that illuminated all the numberless realms. Its wondrous adornments were all arrayed about in these limitless places. The full, unlimited measure of these adornments themselves was also difficult to fathom, and surpassed anything that might be found in the triple world. It victoriously transcends the world, having arisen from good roots. The pure consciousness of utmost abiding is the mark of the Tathāgata's domain. Like clouds, all the great multitude of bodhisattvas gathered together. To an unmeasurable degree, gods, men, and all manner of supernatural beings followed after those bodhisattvas. Its expansive dharma taste sustained their delight and happiness, and brought about meaning and benefit for all sentient beings. It destroys the oppressive, defiled proclivities of passion. It is far removed from all māra enmities. Surpassing all [other] adornments is the Tathāgata's abode. The practice of great recollection and wisdom are taken as its path. Great cessation and wondrous insight are considered to be its vehicles. The deliverance of emptiness, of the unmarked, and of

the desireless are its entry doors. These are the adornments of limitless merit in that great palace, established by the multitude of the great flower king.⁴³

The commentary explains: This passage explains the plenitude⁴⁴ of the Tathāgata's abode, that is, it describes the pure land of the Buddha.

Since the pure land is characterized by eighteen

⁴³This introductory passage is found in a variety of other texts. It appears in:

- 1) Samdhinirmocanasūtra, T. 16, p. 665b.
- 2) Buddhaśānta's translation of the Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra, T. 31, p. 111b.
- 3) Paramārtha's translation of the Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra, T. 31, p. 131c.
- 4) Hsüan-tsang's translation of the Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra, T. 31, p. 151a.

It is commented upon in:

- 1) Samdhinirmocanasūtrasyavyākhyāna of Asvabhāva, P. ed., Mdo ḥgrel, XXXIV, 1-217.
- 2) Samdhinirmocanasūtrasyavyākhyāna, P. ed., Mdo-ḥgrel, CXXX, CXXVI, 1-217.
- 3) Samdhinirmocanasūtravyākhyāna of Yüan-ts'e, 卍續藏, 1, 34, 4-35.
- 4) Dharmagupta's translation of Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya, T. 31, p. 318a.
- 5) Paramārtha's translation of the Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya, T. 31, p. 263a.
- 6) Hsüan-tsang's translation of the Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya, T. 31, p. 376c.
- 7) Asvabhāva's Mahāyānasamgrahopanibandhana, T. 31, p. 445c.

⁴⁴圓滿, complete fullness. The Tibetan term, phun-sum-tshogs-pa translates as sampanna, complete perfection. The following passages describe that this fullness means not only the realization of an ideal perfection, but also the amassing of such a fullness of perfection that it flows over in compassion toward sentient beings. By use of the term plenitude, I intend to connote such an overflowing fullness.

kinds of plenitude, it is termed completely replete. These eighteen plenitudes are: 1) the plenitude of phenomenal appearances,⁴⁵ 2) the plenitude of beauty,⁴⁶ 3) the plenitude of measure,⁴⁷ 4) the plenitude of regions,⁴⁸ 5) the plenitude of causes,⁴⁹ 6) the plenitude of results,⁵⁰ 7) the plenitude of lords,⁵¹ 8) the plenitude of assembly,⁵² 9) the plenitude of retinue,⁵³ 10) the

⁴⁵ 顯色 , kha-dog phun-sum-tshogs-pa, varṇa-saṃpanna, the plenitude of its manifested form or color, and thus of its outward or phenomenal appearances.

⁴⁶ 形色 , dbyibs phun-sum-tshogs-pa, saṃsthāna-saṃpanna, the plenitude of form as being well-apportioned. Samsthāna means standing together, and thus the sense is that the forms of the pure land stand together in a coherent and pleasing interrelationship. Thus I translate beauty, i.e., the well proportioned arrangement of parts into a pleasing whole.

⁴⁷ 分量 , tshad phun-sum-tshogs-pa, pramāṇa-saṃpanna, the plenitude of measure of extent.

⁴⁸ 方所 , yul phun-sum-tshogs-pa, deśa-saṃpanna.

⁴⁹ 因 , tqyu phun-sum-tshogs-pa, hetu-saṃpanna.

⁵⁰ 果 , hbras phun-sum-tshogs-pa, phala-saṃpanna. The Samdhinirmocanasūtrasyavyākhyāna reads: rañ-bśhin, its natural condition, in place of hbras-sum-tshogs-pa. The meaning is, it would seem, the same, for the results of the pure land flow out from its natural condition of being replete.

⁵¹ 主 , bdaq-po phun-sum-tshogs-pa, adhipati-saṃpanna.

⁵² 輔翼 , phyogs phun-sum-tshogs-pa, pakṣa-saṃpanna.

⁵³ 眷屬 , sha-hbriñ phun-sum-tshogs-pa, sevala-saṃpanna.

plenitude of sustenance,⁵⁴ 11) the plenitude of action,⁵⁵
 12) the plenitude of benefit conferred,⁵⁶ 13) the
 plenitude of fearlessness,⁵⁷ 14) the plenitude of
 abode,⁵⁸ 15) the plenitude of paths,⁵⁹ 16) the pleni-
 tude of vehicles,⁶⁰ (29 c) 17) the plenitude of doors,⁶¹

⁵⁴ 任持 , rton-pa phun-sum-tshogs-pa. Rton-pa means that in which one can have confidence. Nishio, Buchikyōron, p. 43, gives the Sanskrit as upastambha, which means support or strengthening. The Samdhinirmocanasūtrasyavyākhyāna reads loṅs-spyod, enjoyment. The Chinese text translates as support. From the following commentary the meaning appears to be the maintenance or sustenance derived from the dharma teaching.

⁵⁵ 事業 , las (phrin-las) phun-sum-tshogs-pa, kārya-saṃpanna.

⁵⁶ 損益 , phan-hdog-pa phun-sum-tshogs-pa, upakāra-saṃpanna. The Vyakhyana reads: htshe-ba med-pa, the absence of injury.

⁵⁷ 無畏 , mi-hjigs-pa phun-sum-tshogs-pa, nirbhaya-saṃpanna. The Vyakhyana reads: phyir-rgol-pa med-pa, the absence of conflicting wrangling.

⁵⁸ 住處 , gnas (rten) phun-sum-tshogs-pa, pratisthā-saṃpanna.

⁵⁹ 路 , lam phun-sum-tshogs-pa, patha-saṃpanna. The Samdhinirmocanasūtrasyavyākhyāna reads: bdag-pahi gnas kyi bye-brag, the diversity of the abodes of its lords.

⁶⁰ 乘 , bshon-pa phun-sum-tshogs-pa, vāha-saṃpanna.

⁶¹ 門 , sgo phun-sum-tshogs-pa, dvāra-saṃpanna.

⁶² 依持 , gshi phun-sum-tshogs-pa, āśraya-saṃpanna. Gshi means the ground, foundation, or original cause. The Chinese corresponds rather to ādhāra, from ā-dhr, to hold, keep, support, prop, sustain. As this meaning seems to best accord with the following commentary, I translate as above.

and 18) the plenitude of support.⁶² These nineteen⁶³ phrases manifest the characteristics of the eighteen plenitudes.

This means that that august palace of such plenitudes is called the Buddha's pure land. This sūtra reports the manner in which Buddha abides in that great palace.

But is this land the land of blissful experience (sambhogabhūmi) or the land of transformation (nirmāṇabhūmi) of the Buddha?⁶⁴

⁶³The first two phrases refer to the first plenitude.

⁶⁴This entire section is not present in Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmuvyākhyāna. In the earliest Yogācāra texts, the question of whether a particular sūtra was spoken in sambhogabhūmi by sambhogakāya or in nirmāṇabhūmi by nirmāṇakāya did not arise, for the concept of sambhogakāya was not fully developed before the Mahāyānasūtra-ālaṃkāra. The Samdhinirmocanasūtra discusses dharma-kāya, which is inconceivable, in contrast with nirmāṇakāya, which is the body of Buddha that is born into this world by transformation. (T. 16, p. 708b-c; Étienne Lamotte, Samdhinirmocanasūtra, p. 257). Based on this distinction, the pure land must be nirmāṇabhūmi and its Buddha nirmāṇakāya, for no teaching could emanate from dharma-kāya. But with the development of the trikāya doctrine, and specifically with the introduction of the intermediate body of sambhogakāya, the above question enters the horizon of discussion. It is related to the earlier question of the nature of Buddha discourse, but here the focus differs, for both sambhogakāya and nirmāṇakāya are experiential bodies related to sentient beings. If the sūtra be spoken by nirmāṇakāya, then its discourse appears as any empirical speech, and does not imply any understanding on the part of the hearers. But if spoken by sambhogakāya, then deep understanding is implied, for that body is the experiential presence of Buddha to bodhisattvas in the bhūmis. Thus, as the content of bodhisattva wisdom, the sūtra would have greater authority.

[There are three opinions in regard to this question.]

The first opinion holds that this land is the land of transformation, and the Buddha who speaks this sūtra is nirmāṇakāya, because a great number of śrāvakas and their like dwell in this land, are present before the Tathāgata, and listen to him speak this sūtra. They are elated, receive it in faith, and put it into practice. Because of this manifestation of the Buddha's mind, his pure consciousness, which transcends the triple world, becomes phenomenally perceptible as the enunciation of the victorious dharma. He transforms this land in the presence of all kinds of sentient beings, and causes them to be elated and to embark upon practice. Instantaneously he transformed[their realm] into the pure Buddha land by the spiritual power of his wondrous nirmāṇakāya, and they were lead to quickly attain insight. If this were not so, the numbers of śrāvakas and their like would not all gain insight.⁶⁵

⁶⁵The traditional doctrine holds that only bodhi-sattvas witness sambhogakāya. Thus the presence of śrāvakas (hearers of the dharma) and other such beings implies that sambhogakāya was not experienced, and consequently the land of this sūtra is nirmāṇabhūmi.

The second opinion holds that this land is the land of blissful experience, and the Buddha who speaks this sūtra is the sambhogakāya, because this pure land is unlimited in measure,⁶⁶ and its paths, vehicles, and doors are all actually merits.⁶⁷ Moreover, they do experience this pure land as everywhere faultless, everywhere self-abiding, etc.⁶⁸ Furthermore the Samdhinirmocanasūtra says: "They attained birth above the triple world."⁶⁹ And the Buddha who spoke this sūtra is endowed with the twenty-one kinds of true merits, as will be explained later. When he spoke other sūtras, he did not enumerate such Buddha merits. If he instantly transformed [the realm of sentient beings] into this pure land by means of his wondrous [transformation] body,⁷⁰ in order

⁶⁶The nirṇānakāya, although transformed, is yet bound by the limits of the empirical world.

⁶⁷The sambhogakāya is frequently described as being the result of the amassing of merit for three innumerable kalpas. It is thus a "reward body."

⁶⁸Throughout this argument, such qualities as these are held to pertain to sambhogabhūmi, because they are not apparent to empirical consciousness.

⁶⁹The Samdhinirmocanasūtra shares this same passage, but no mention is there made about anyone being born above the triple world.

⁷⁰妙身, sadkāya, wondrous body, here equivalent to nirṇānakāya.

to benefit the multitude and lead them to gain insight, this would have been clearly stated, as it is in other sūtras.⁷¹ But it is not so stated here. Thus this land is the land of blissful experience and of the sambhogakāya. The multitude of śrāvakas and such like are transformations of Buddha, or, perhaps bodhisattvas appear in these bodies, because [it is clear that] they are the assembly to whom this dharma teaching is addressed in that adorned Buddha land.

But if this is so, then this land would be perceptible only to the bodhisattvas above the world. Why then has this [sūtra] been codified⁷² and preached to bodhisattvas who transmit the dharma teaching in this land of the transformed [empirical] Buddha?

[Indeed it has been codified and preached] in order to show that sarvajñāna⁷³ and its abode transcend all

⁷¹ Most sūtras begin by identifying the actual place where Buddha spoke them. In Paramārtha's translation of the Samdhinirmocana the place is identified as Vulture Peak at Rājagṛha. (T. 16, p. 711b).

⁷² 結集, gathered together. Here it refers to the gathering together of the scriptures after the Buddha's death, and thus the above translation. The question intends to ask why this sūtra is included in the canon at all, since it is claimed to be addressed only to world-transcendent bodhisattvas.

⁷³ Since sarvajñāna is transcendent, sarvākārajñāna can be seen as phenomenal, as on p. 399, n. 6.

worldly dharmas, and that [the Buddha] desires to cause those who are to be converted to give rise to gladness.⁷⁴ This was done so as to lead them to elicit the vow to be born into that pure land of Buddha, to see Buddha, hear that dharma teaching, and practice its causal force. It was done in order to give rise to victorious joy for sentient beings of extensive, victorious understanding⁷⁴ and for all bodhisattvas. It was done because he desires to strengthen such a victorious understanding of superior intentions.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ 欣樂, mos-pa. Mos-pa corresponds not only to 欣樂, gladness, but also to 勝解, victorious understanding. Chandra Das defines the verbal usage of mos-pa as: to be pleased, crave for, be inclined, all of which correspond to 欣樂. But in its substantive meanings, he equates it with the Sanskrit adhimukti, adhimokṣa, muktika, which mean the implicit faith, devotion, and adoration of the believer. In this sense it corresponds to 勝解. In his Buchikyōron, p. 182, Nishio translates mos-pa as 信解, faith and understanding, which is the usual Chinese rendering of adhimukti.

⁷⁵ 意樂, the inclinations of thought, which corresponds to the Tibetan basm-pa, which has the meaning of both thought and will. Thus it means purpose, orientation, or intention.

This section corresponds to an earlier part of Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, which treats the abode of the causal arising of the teaching. (See Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 27, and Buchikyōron, p. 182.) Bandhuprabha has again rearranged the text and woven this section into his discussion of the particular land in which this sūtra was spoken by Buddha.

For these reasons this sūtra has been codified and preached. Also, that dharma teaching was victorious for those who heard its proclamation. In such a case, the non-victorious nirmānakāya, in its phenomenal defilement, could not proclaim such words. Thus, this Buddha is sambhogakāya, dwelling in the land of blissful experience, and he spoke this sūtra for all bodhisattvas from the first bhūmi on up to the last, (293a) and caused them to codify and preach it.

But, if this is the case, then why did he not state that this dharma teaching was specifically addressed to them? Even if he did not so identify that place [where it was spoken], who would claim that he did not know it? He clearly could have identified it. Since all beings are so perplexed, he should have stated it explicitly.

The correct opinion is that, when Śākyamuni spoke this sūtra, a great multitude on earth saw his nirmānakāya dwelling on earth to preach the teaching, while a great multitude above the earth saw his sambhogakāya preaching this teaching in the Buddha's pure land. Although what they heard was identical, what they saw was different.

Although all were elated, received it in faith, and put it into practice, yet some understood in a shallow manner, while others understood deeply. He who transmitted this teaching gave rise to that pure land and witnessed to the Buddha merits in the presence [of the śrāvakas and their like,] in order to lead sentient beings to hear about his victorious, wonderful vow, and to cultivate its causal power. Thus the gathering of those who saw the Victor said: The Bhagavan dwells in utmost victory, and they discoursed on the Tathāgata's merits.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ Thus nirmānakāya and sambhogakāya are not two different objects of consciousness (所聞 . . . 同), but are distinguished by the level of insight (所見 各別) of the recipient. The same Buddha body, when seen with shallow insight, appears as nirmānakāya, but, when seen with deep insight, appears as sambhogakāya. Thus nirmānakāya is the object of phenomenal, empirical consciousness. It is the object of parikalpita consciousness. The classic passage from the Madhyantavibhāga states the nature of parikalpita as arthah parikalpitaḥ svabhāvaḥ, i.e., parikalpita means that objects have the nature of being projected [by the mind upon imagined reality]. (See Yeh A-yüeh, Yuishikishisō no kenkyū, pp. 2-4) Sambhogakāya is then "seen" only by the insight that comes from continued practice, and the consequent purification from passion and discrimination, i.e., from parikalpita. Such insight sees the projected nature of buddhakāya, and thus nirmānakāya is seen to be sambhogakāya. This insight corresponds with paratantrasvabhāva as abhūtaparikalpaḥ paratantrasvabhāvaḥ, i.e., unreal projections [of the mind] have the nature of being dependent. It is the insight that all projections of buddhakāya into the external world of supposed meanings actually arise in dependency on others. It is thus that sambhogakāya shares the pivotal role of paratantra and is the mediating factor between dharmakāya and nirmānakāya.

The First Plenitude: Phenomenal Appearances

The phrase . . . was adorned with the seven jewels that shine brilliantly means that that palace employed the seven jeweled adornments, which shine brilliantly, or that, because that great palace was adorned with the seven jewels, it was shining brilliantly.⁷⁷ These seven jewels are: gold, silver, aquamarine,⁷⁸ sapphire,⁷⁹

⁷⁷The Chinese reads: 薄伽梵住最勝光曜七宝莊, which literally gives: Bhagavan-abode-most pre-eminent-shining-seven-jewel-adornment. The Tibetan has: bcom-ldan-hdas gshal-med-khan-chen-po rin-po-che-sna-bdun-mchog-tu-hbar-ba bkod-pa, which can mean that the Bhagavan's great palace was adorned with the shining brilliance (mchog-tu-hbar-ba) of the seven jewels (rin-po-che-sna-bdun), or that it was brilliantly adorned (mchog-tu-hbar-ba bkod-pa) by the seven jewels. These alternate interpretations result from an original Sanskrit karmadhārya compound, in which the relationship between the members of the compound are not specified by case endings. That compound probably ran something like this: saptaratna-pradīpta-vyūha-namatravesman: seven jewels - shining brilliantly - adorned - great palace. As this does not specify the relationship of its terms, the original Sanskrit offers the above two possible interpretations mentioned by the Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa.

In this instance either interpretation is quite acceptable, as the meaning is the same, whether the shining comes from the palace or from the jewels. But the same type of question will arise later, with important doctrinal options involved.

⁷⁸ 吠瑠瑠 is the Chinese transliteration of vaidūrya. Nakamura Hajime, Bukkyōgo dai jiten (Tokyo 1976) p. 1205 defines it as the dog's eye stone, a kind of quartz produced on the island of Sri Lanka. Vaidūrya comes through the Greek beryllos and the Latin beryllus to the English beryl, which is identified with beryllium aluminum silicate crystals, usually blue, pink, green, or yellow. It is a very hard material. Aquamarine is a species of beryl.

⁷⁹ 卑婆洛揭婆 is the Chinese transliteration for

emerald,⁸⁰ red pearl (they are generally called red pearls because they come from worms and insects, or perhaps, because their essence is red),⁸¹ and quartz.⁸² These are what is referred to as the seven jewels.⁸³ In truth the pure land is beautifully arranged and adorned with limitless wondrous jewels, beyond the awareness of people on this earth.

79cont. musāra-galva, variously defined as sapphire, emerald, cat's eye, or coral. The Tibetan reads: spug, which is equated with karkenata, a species of quartz.

⁸⁰ 覺濕摩揭洛 corresponds to rdohi sñiñ, the pith of a stone, which Nishio translates as 砗磲, āśma-garbha, an emerald.

⁸¹ 赤蟲所出. The Tibetan reads: srog-chag kyi rigs. Chandra Das, Tibetan-English Dictionary (Calcutta 1902; third reprinting Tokyo 1977), p. 1296, explains srog-chag as comprising all animated beings, but in actuality referring to only worms and insects. This I take 蟲 to refer to both worms and insects. The entire Tibetan phrase above means a swarm of such insects. All of which does not appear to make much sense. Thus Bandhuprabha, or perhaps Hsüan-tsang, was led to offer the second alternative above, i.e., they are red because their essence is red, because he saw little connection between pearls and worms and insects. However, Chandra Das reports that pearls come not only from oysters, but some are obtained from the brains of elephants and cobras, and one variety comes from the leaves of a Southern Indian tree. Perhaps worm-pearls belong to this category.

⁸² 羯維怛諾伽. Nakamura gives 羯維都 as karketana, the Tibetan ke-ke-ru (Daijiten, p. 182). Monier-Williams (A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Delhi 1974, p. 256) defines the related term, karkenata, as a species of quartz.

⁸³ These lists of the seven jewels vary from text to text. Nakamura (Daijiten, p. 586) gives seven different listings of the seven jewels.

The phrase it emitted a bright light that completely illuminated all the numberless realms means that that great palace emitted a bright light and illuminated all the numberless realms, or perhaps, because that great palace in its essence encompasses the limitless realms, it emitted a bright light and illuminated everything.

These first two phrases explain the plenitude of the phenomenal appearances of Buddha's pure land.

The Second Plenitude: Beauty

What is its beauty? The phrase in unlimited places these wondrous adornments are displayed means that the wondrous adornments of that great palace were arranged in limitless places, or that these adornments, being limitless, were placed around about. The word unlimited can mean either that the number [of the adornments] was unlimited, or that the places were unlimited.⁸⁴ Since these adornments are arranged with wisdom at their head, it is said that they are wondrously displayed.

But how can it be that the pure mind of Buddha land becomes phenomenally marked? This is not done by

⁸⁴ 無量方所妙飾間列, gnas-tha-dad-pa sin-tu-rnam-par-phyi-ba tshad-med-pa rnam-par-gnas-pa. The original Sanskrit would resemble: apramāṇa-sthāna-ṣaṭ-sausthava, where apramāṇa can refer to sthāna, places, or to ṣaṭ-sausthava, the wondrous adornments.

some worldly craftsman working from the outside.⁸⁵
 The meaning of the sentence that these adornments are arranged with wisdom at their head is that the Buddha Bhagavan, previously when he was a bodhisattva, developed the wisdom of upāya, and by his earnest practice vowed to adorn the pure land. From the power of that vow of his previous earnest practice, in the stage of attaining the result, the Buddha's pure consciousness became manifested in this manner, even although he dwells in the wisdom of no conceptual activity,⁸⁶

⁸⁵ 非外工具世所成而有 . The Tibetan reads simply phyi-rol gyi dños, external activity.

⁸⁶ 無 . . . 戲論 , aprapañca. Nishio Kyōo, Buchikyōron, p. 191, points out that the Samdhinirmocana-sūtrasyavyākhyāna has spros-pa med-pa, the complete absence of activity. It equates this with lhum gyis grub-pa, effortless action, i.e., anābhoga. Since this commentary does affirm that wisdom is embodied in images and words, this lack of conceptual activity is to be understood as the absence of the conceptualizing of things as if they were externalized realities. Rather the images and words of wisdom are transformations of the pure mind. Basic non-discriminative wisdom (nirvikalpa-jñāna) is imageless and directly open to tathatā, but subsequently attained wisdom (prastahlabdha-jñāna) does employ concepts and mental images, inasmuch as such are required in order to embody the dharma teaching in perceptible terms. These images are not conceptually active, because they do not externalize meaning, i.e., they are not parikalpitāsvabhāva. But inasmuch as they arise from paratantrasvabhāva, i.e., dependent upon the pure mind of wisdom, they are able to embody wisdom teaching without that effort at trying to grasp or cling to imagined realities. This question is basic to the development of the entire commentary, and will appear under different guises throughout the text.

and (293b) this caused the consciousnesses of the bodhisattvas to be similarly transformed. Thus there is no contradiction. All the other passages [that refer to the phenomenal activities of the pure mind] should be explained according to this reasoning.

The Third Plenitude: Measure

The phrase its full, unlimited measure is difficult to fathom means that, because the measure which that palace encompasses (mandala) is unlimited, it is difficult to fathom. Or that, because the measure of that palace is itself unlimited, what it encompasses (mandala) is difficult to fathom.⁸⁷ Just as the directions of the compass⁸⁸ are unlimited, so its extent is difficult to fathom.

[There are three opinions concerning the relationship of pure land with sambhogakāya.]

The first opinion holds that the land of the Tathāgata's sambhogakāya, when proclaimed and manifested to those to be converted, cannot be determined as to its extent. Even although it may appear to be very extensive, yet it does

⁸⁷ 周圓無際其量難測, rgya yōns-su-ma-chad-pa.
 Śīlabhadra glosses the word rgya, mandala, as: rgya means the entire extent in its broadest aspects. The Sanskrit would be: maṇḍalāpariccheda.

⁸⁸ 東方等, east, etc.

have limits. Inasmuch as he perfects the wisdom of those bodhisattvas, who are present in that land, it is said to be unlimited and its measure difficult to fathom.

The second opinion holds that the land of the Buddha's sambhogakāya is the universal dharmadhātu, cultivated for three innumerable kalpas and influenced by limitless good roots. The bodhisattvas above the earth, and even all the Tathāgatas are unable to fathom its limitless measure. Thus they consider it to be unlimited from time without beginning.⁸⁹

The correct third opinion holds that there are two kinds of sambhogakāya lands. The first is svasambhogakāya, which refers to the unlimited dharmadhātu, cultivated by all Tathāgatas through three innumerable kalpas and influenced by unlimited good roots, by which they themselves (sva) experience the joy of the great dharma (sambhoga).⁹⁰

⁸⁹The first opinion emphasizes the phenomenal nature of sambhogakāya, and the second its ultimate nature. Thus the stage is set for the third correct opinion.

⁹⁰This sentence is a reworking of a passage from the Viññaptimātratāsiddhi, Poussin, La Siddhi, p. 705; Wei Tat, Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun, p. 792. The Siddhi's description of sambhogakāya as infinite real qualities is changed by Bandhuprabha to read 周遍法界, the unlimited dharmadhātu, thus casting the passage in the terms of the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra.

From the first moment when they attain buddha-hood until their last limit is exhausted, they continue without change. Even the bodhisattvas with all their merits cannot see this land. But they can hear about it. It is this pure land that is considered to be without limits. Even although all the Buddhas see it, yet they are unable to fathom the limits of its extent. The second is parasambhogakāya, by means of which all Tathāgatas lead the multitude of bodhisattvas above the earth to experience the joy of the great dharma. This body for others (para) advances and cultivates victorious conduct, and is manifested as appropriate. Whether superior or inferior, whether large or small, it is subject to change and is indeterminate, just like the nirmāṇakāya. It is in this manner that the pure land can be considered to have limits. The bodhisattvas above the earth and all Tathāgatas completely fathom its measure, but in the world it is said to be unfathomable. Thus the phrase its full measure is difficult to fathom should be understood by means of these two distinctions.

The Fourth Plenitude: Regions

We have now explained the plenitude of measure. But

how is it dissimilar to the places of the triple world? The phrase it surpasses anything that might be found in the triple world means that the regions in which that great palace is located transcend anything that might be found in the triple world. It is not like this world where covetousness and craving hold sway and the two obstacles of passion and knowledge with their [corresponding] objects ever increase. These [cravings] and these [obstacles] mature in various ways and become the dominant results [of life in this world].⁹¹ But one does not cling to that pure land by the covetousness of this world, because it is free from the two obstacles and does not mature in such various ways, nor has it such a dominant result. It is just like nirvāṇa, which transcends the realm of all the results of the various maturations of the triple world.

If this is so,⁹² then pure land is not

⁹¹ 異熟, vipāka, variously maturing, i.e., the process whereby karma matures in various manners and develops into its samsaric results. 增上果, adhipatiphala, i.e., the dominating results of this process.

⁹² The following section is a reworking of the discussion of pure dharmadhātu in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. (Poussin, pp. 695-699; Wei Tat, pp. 785-789). But the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa has interchanged the first and the third opinions of the Siddhi, thus affirming the third as the correct opinion. This passage is considered by Kastumata, Shinishikisetsu, pp. 184-186. All these three opinions are intended to explain how pure dharmadhātu, being anāśrava, can yet be related to the dhātus, the factors of phenomenal existence, which are clearly stated in the Abhidharma literature to be sāśrava.

comprised in the triple world. Then it must be uncontaminated (anāśrava). And if it is uncontaminated and comprised in the category of conditioned dharmas, it must be identical with the truth of the path (mārgasatya) and goodness itself. How then can this pure land employ form, voice, smell, etc. as its essential characteristics, for of the eighteen dhātus, fifteen are contaminated and eight are morally neutral.⁹³

[There are three opinions of this subject].

The first opinion holds that the eighteen dhātus may be either contaminated or uncontaminated, i.e., entirely good.⁹⁴ When it is said that, of the

⁹³ 十八界, the eighteen dhātus or factors of existence, i.e., the six sense organs, the six objects of those organs, and the six consciousnesses resultant upon their functioning. The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya teaches that of these factors, fifteen are exclusively sāśrava, namely, the first five sense organs, their objects, and the corresponding consciousnesses. (T. 29, p. 8a; Poussin, Kośa, I, 58.

It also teaches that the eight that can be morally neutral (avyakṛta) are the five sense organs, and the objects of smelling, tasting, and touching. (T. 29, p. 7b).

The question above again concerns the dilemma of how a completely pure consciousness can be involved in the obviously defiled world. If it is not involved, then it is of no relevance. But if it is involved, then how can it remain completely pure?

⁹⁴ The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi reads: "The qualities of the bodies and lands of the Tathagatas are comprised in the skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus, as is fitting. But these three can be either uncontaminated or contaminated." (Poussin, p. 698; Wei Tat, p. 787).

eighteen dhātus that fifteen are contaminated and eight morally neutral, this is directed to the gross marks of the objects [understood by those in] the Lower Vehicles.⁹⁵

The second opinion holds that the pure land is a transformation of the samādhi mind. Although it appears to be characterized by the five senses and their respective objects, it does not consist in them.⁹⁶ It is not attainable by the five senses in their worldly operations. Just as blue is the object of the contemplation of total absorption,⁹⁷ [so the samādhi mind does not function by means of worldly sensation]. Its form (rūpa)

⁹⁵ The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi reads: "Among the eighteen dhātus of non-Buddhas (Hinayanists and bodhisattvas in the ten bhūmis) only the last three dhātus (i.e., manas, dharmas, and manovijñāna) may be pure, but, as far as the Buddha is concerned, all eighteen are pure and incomprehensible to the saints of the Two Vehicles." (Poussin, p. 698; Wei Tat, p. 789).

⁹⁶ Following the alternate reading of 處, āyatana, in place of 界, dhātu, because this agrees with the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi's reading of 如來五根五境妙定生故. The Siddhi further adds that the āyatanas of the Tathagata are comprised in form that flows from the dharmadhātu (dharmadhāturūpa). See Poussin, p. 696.

⁹⁷ 遍處, kṛtsna-āyatana, the basis of the total [fixation of the mind]. This is a state of contemplation which takes as its object not any empirical datum, but rather evolves the image of blue from within, in order to quiet the mind and stop the flow of sensations. See Hirakawa Akira, Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, II, 136, for references, and Poussin, Kośa, VIII, 213. Perhaps the setting for such meditation is the blue sky of a summer day in an open field.

arises from abiding in and being supported in the dharmadhātu. Therefore, although pure land does employ form, etc., as essential characteristics, yet it is uncontaminated and good. There is no contradiction here.

But, [it may be objected,] if this is so, then the five sense consciousnesses of the bodhisattvas would not have that land of blissful experience as their object?

Although they do depend upon their own powers [of sensation], and their own consciousnesses are evolved in different manners, yet, because of the [differences in] the grossness and subtleness of the images [in their minds, those minds] do not resemble [the samādhi mind of the Buddha].⁹⁸

Is it possible then that the five sense consciousnesses of Buddha, which are not comprised in the five sense objects, have no object at all?

The phenomenal activities of Buddha that take as objects [sense objects] do resemble [worldly sensation], but he is said to have the five

⁹⁸The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi reads: "Although the consciousness of non-Buddhas functions in dependence upon objects (bodies and lands) which the Buddha develops, yet one must distinguish between the gross and the subtle. What the Buddha develops is subtle, and is not comprised in the objects of the five senses." (Poussin, p. 696; Wei Tat, p. 787).

sense consciousnesses only by conventional designation, while in truth he does not have them, because he constantly dwells in samādhi. Other texts state that by their nature the five sense consciousnesses are the essence of distraction (vikṣipta), because they lack samādhi.⁹⁹

If then this is so, [it might be objected] that then [his consciousness] would not arise from the five sense organs at all?

The five sense organs of the Tathāgata and their objects are so called only by convention, because [in his case] all the objects of form, etc., are transformations of the samādhi mind. In truth, they are forms produced from abiding in dharmadhātu.

If then this is so, [it might be objected] that the four wisdoms would not then be simultaneous, because many consciousnesses of the same kind do not arise simultaneously [in the same person].

⁹⁹The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi reads: "As to the five consciousnesses of the Buddha, they are not comprised in the five viññānadhātus, because a sūtra says that the mind of the Buddha is constantly absorbed in deep meditation, whereas, as noted in the Abhidharmaśāstra, the five viññānadhātus [of ordinary sentient beings] belong to the plane of distraction and confusion. (Poussin, p. 696; Wei Tat, p. 787).

What error is there in admitting [that they are not simultaneous?]¹⁰⁰

The third correct opinion holds that the land of the Tathāgata is most profound and wondrous. It is neither existent nor non-existent, neither contaminated nor uncontaminated, neither good nor evil nor neutral. It does not consist in the dharma doors of the skandhas and the dhātus, but is spoken of differently as appropriate. When other texts say that among the eighteen dhātus, fifteen are contaminated and eight are morally neutral, this refers to the gross

¹⁰⁰ This passage is almost unintelligible without consulting the Viññaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra, where, after describing the mind of the Buddha, the discussion turns to the theme of kṛtyānuṣṭhānañāna, the fourth wisdom, since this is the wisdom whereby the Buddha acts in the phenomenal world. The question is raised as to which consciousness corresponds to this kṛtyānuṣṭhānañāna, and the answer is given that it is manovijñāna. But since pratyavekṣaṇāñāna also corresponds to manovijñāna, both of these wisdoms would then arise in the one manovijñāna simultaneously, which the objector asserts is impossible. The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi, holding that these wisdoms are at times interrupted, simply states that it is possible: "It is not absurd to admit that these wisdoms are not simultaneous, but, on the other hand, one single consciousness may simultaneously function in two manners." (Poussin, p. 679; Wei Tat, p. 787). The objector in the Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa argues that, because the Buddha's consciousness is not comprised in the senses, it would arise only as needed and thus not be simultaneous and constantly in synergy. Bandhuprabha, admitting that wisdoms are at times interrupted, accepts this conclusion. His abbreviated version of the thought of the Viññaptimātratāsiddhi indicates that he felt sure these thoughts were already well known and needed only be alluded to by him.

discrimination of objects by those who are born in either of the Two Vehicles or who are fools (prthagjana), and does not touch upon the profound object realm of all the Buddhas and great bodhi-sattvas, as it is elsewhere explained that the Tathāgatas are not really comprised in the skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus, and manifest only what is good.

Is it then the case that the pure land is identical with the triple world? Or is it different from it?¹⁰¹

[Again there are three opinions]. The first opinion holds that it is different, because some texts say that it is found above the pure heavens of the gods,¹⁰² and others say that it is found

¹⁰¹ It would appear that Bandhuprabha has rearranged the opinions of the Siddhi so that the third opinion, which states the pure land is neither sāśrava nor anāśrava, would lead into this question of whether it is identical or different from this triple world.

¹⁰² 淨居天, śuddhāvāsa-prabhāva, the pure heaven [of the gods], i.e., the highest heaven of rūpadhātu. See Poussin, Kośa, III, 216, and VI, 233. In a prior section of the Siddhi, the question of the realm corresponding to enlightenment is treated. (Poussin, p. 440; Wei Tat, p. 539). In this section Poussin translates K'uei-chi's commentary as follows: "Cette réelle terre de rétribution située au-dessus des Śuddhāvāsikas, habitacle des Bodhisattvas de la dixième terre, fail-elle partie des trois Dhātus ou n'en fail-elle partie? La Buddhabhūmiśāstra (i.e., upadeśa) dit: Cette pure terre est habitée par le Parāsambohagakāya, car c'est le lieu où ce kāya enseigne le Dharma aux Bodhisattvas de la dixième terre. . ."

somewhere off in the West.¹⁰³

The second opinion holds that it is identical, since the pure land extends in its limits to the universal dharmadhātu.

The third correct opinion holds that the sambhogabhūmi does extend to the universal dharmadhātu, and has no place in which it is not present. But it cannot be said that it is either apart from this triple world, or that it is identical with it. If [by pure land one means that] which is appropriately manifested to bōshisattvas (i.e., parasambhogakāya), then it cannot be determined whether that place is above the pure heaven of the gods (294a) in rūpadhātu or away off in the West.

The Fifth Plenitude: Cause

Since pure land has such a plenitude of regions, then it transcends the realm of the variously maturing results of this triple world, and, like nirvāṇa, cannot have any cause. For if it had a cause, then it would necessarily be supported by this triple world. If it is said that pure land transcends this triple world, then it consequently transcends the causes of all the dharmas in this triple world. This lack of cause must then be

¹⁰³That is, the Western Paradise of Amitabha Buddha.

considered to be its characteristic.

How then are we to understand the phrase he victoriously transcends the world, having arisen from good roots? This means that that great palace has as its cause the good roots of both transcendental, non-discriminative wisdom (lokattaranīrvikalpajñāna) and subsequently attained wisdom (prṣṭhalabdhajñāna). It is thus that it arises. It does not lack a cause, but that cause is not the great Īsvara god¹⁰⁴ nor any other part of rūpadhātu.

How then can the pure land transcend this triple world and yet employ the transcendental, non-discriminative wisdom and the subsequently attained wisdom? Are not all pure dharmas in this world caused by the process of various maturation?¹⁰⁵

We did not say that pure land was caused by the process of various maturation, as are those [other worldly dharmas]. It arises from a cause other than these, a cause similar to that of the supreme worldly dharma

¹⁰⁴ 大自在天, maheśvara-deva, the highest god of the world of form.

¹⁰⁵ Śīlabhadra reads: "How can the pure worldly dharmas of non-discriminative and subsequently attained wisdoms be the vipāka cause of transcending the triple world? Vipāka causes do not do such." (Nishio, Buddha-bhūmivvyākhyāna, p. 32). It was stated above that pure land transcends the world and arises from good roots. These good roots are variously maturing (vipāka) and thus in the world. How then can pure land transcend the world?

of wisdom patience which understands suffering.¹⁰⁶

Both [pure land and wisdom] employ the uncontaminated good seeds of basic, non-discriminative wisdom, and by cultivating them for three innumerable kalpas, cause them to increase. This is the cause for the transformation that is pure land. Non-discriminative wisdom is termed world-transcending. Subsequently attained [wisdom] goes beyond this, and is called the victorious employment of transcendental, uncontaminated good roots. In other words, the holy path of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas is termed world transcendent, while the good roots of Tathāgatas surpass these. and are termed victorious. Thus the pure land of the Buddha takes as its cause these uncontaminated

¹⁰⁶ 善法智忍品世第一法, duḥkhe dharma-jñāna-kṣānti-laukihāgra-dharma. Laukihāgra-dharma refers to the highest dharma in the world. Duḥkhe dharma-jñāna kṣānti is the first of the eight kṣānti, patience, and is described in the Abhidharmakośa (T.29, p. 121 sq.) as being attained by the uncontaminated mind at the stage of bhāvanāmārga. It is the wisdom which gains insight into the truth of suffering (duḥkhasatya), the first of the four truths. Kṣānti here means not just patience, but receptivity to truth, the truth of dependent co-arising. It is a patient waiting upon or openness to truth. Perhaps then it would be best interpreted as docility to and openness to the truth of dependent co-arising, and the consequent ability to patiently abide in samsāra to carry out works of compassion.

good roots in the consciousness of the Tathāgata, and thus arises.

[There are two opinions on the nature of the causality of pure land.] The first opinion holds that pure land arises only from dominant enabling causality, because it is an external dharma.

The second correct opinion holds that pure land arises by direct causality, because it arises immediately.¹⁰⁷ If this were not so, then it would not have any direct cause, because the images of external dharmas [in consciousness] cannot be direct causes. All such external dharmas have as

¹⁰⁷ According to the Abhidharma-Yogācāra literature, all causes function in synergy (pratītyasamutpāda), but they are divided into four classes: 1) 因緣, hetu-pratyaya, the direct, immediate cause for the production of a result. 2) 等無間緣, samanantara-pratyaya, the causal force of an antecedent mental dharma in bringing about its subsequent moment. This category is needed, because, as dharmas have no svabhāva, essence, their continued phenomenal existence must be accounted for in another manner. 3) 所緣緣, ālambana-pratyaya, the immediate object of consciousness, which, because it is understood, brings the mind to be what it is. And 4) 增上緣, adhipati-pratyaya, a dominant, enabling cause, which, although it cannot immediately produce a result, yet enables the hetu-pratyaya to issue in a result.

The question in the above passage is whether the causal force of nirvikalpa-jñāna and prṣṭhalabdha-jñāna is direct and immediate (hetu-pratyaya) or enabling and mediated through other direct causes (adhipati-pratyaya).

For a parallel discussion see Paramartha's translation of the Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra, T. 31, p. 263b.

their cause the permeation¹⁰⁸ of internal dharmas.

But, [it might be objected,] if all external dharmas have such internal permeation as their cause, then all external dharmas would have a common existence. How then can sentient beings have individual seeds? Since the direct cause is in common, then it would produce one unified result.¹⁰⁹

How can small minds penetrate a great teaching?

How could it be that external things actually

have the essence of being composites of atoms?

There is no incompatibility between the individual

¹⁰⁸ 熏習, vāsanā, the perfuming or permeation of seeds, which are stored in ālayavijñāna. The image is that the seeds spread out their influence throughout consciousness and determine the nature of consciousness, just as aromatic seeds will perfume and their aroma will permeate whatever they are placed in.

¹⁰⁹ This objection appears to be that of the Sarvāstivādins as reported in the Siddhi, Poussin, pp. 44-45; Wei Tat, p. 53. It is a denial of the cittamātra theme, in that it holds that dharmas perceived by consciousness are really existent as atoms, which in combination, form real objects of consciousness. Individual atoms are not the objects of consciousness, but in combination, they become those objects. Thus according to these Sarvāstivādins the similarity of the world perceived by many individual minds is due to the actual real objects in the world. It is then objected that, since the Yogācārins hold that vāsanā is the cause of all external dharmas, and that this vāsanā, being similar in consciousnesses of various people, is the basis for the external world perceived similarly by many, then there is simply no room left for any individual differences in people. There would just be the one consciousness being conscious of itself. The question is complex, which perhaps accounts for Bandhuprabha's sarcastic response about small minds.

transformations of the different consciousnesses of sentient beings and the similarity of their support.¹¹⁰ It is just like the light from many lamps, or things seen in a dream.¹¹¹ Since the same kinds of causes produce the same kinds of results, the images [in consciousness] are indeed similar. By disregarding this support, one conventionally says that [these results of the similarity of the perceived world] are common [to everybody], while in truth each person has his own differences.¹¹² The Buddhas' pure land is like this, and the transformations of their individual minds encompass the universal dharmā-

¹¹⁰ 同處, i.e., the same āyatana, or basic support. Since sentient beings similarly depend upon the same kind of evolutions of consciousness (viññānaparināma), their minds develop similarly. But, dependent upon the variety of their individual seeds and karma, they differ within that broad similarity.

¹¹¹ That is, lamps, while being each different and individual, produce a similarity of light. And the contents of a dream, while all similarly resting upon the illusion of that dream, do appear to be distinct and different.

¹¹² This reflects the teaching of Dignāga that only svalakṣaṇa (individual marks) are real, while the samanyalakṣaṇa are only conceptualizations, abstractions. See Hattori Masaaki, Dignāga on Perception, p. 80, n. 1.14.

This is a difficult question for Yogācāra, for if the thesis of cittamātra is understood on a extroverted level of meaning, then it would seem to deny that external objects are real at all and it becomes then a thorough-going idealism. This is not however the intent of Yogācāra. See pp. 293-298 of the preceding study.

dhātu. But, because of the similarity of their support (i.e., nirvikalpajñāna and prṣṭahlabdhajñāna), it is said that they are common. Such is pure land's plenitude of cause.

The Sixth Plenitude: Result

What are the marks of its result? The phrase the pure consciousness of utmost abiding is its mark means that that great palace has as its essential mark the Buddha's uncontaminated mind of utmost mastery.¹¹³ This is so because only consciousness exists, and, apart from consciousness, there are no individually existing jewels, etc. [in pure land].¹¹⁴ That is, the pure mind of Buddha in its transformations appears as these multitudinous jewels, etc. As has been explained above, (294b)

¹¹³Nishio Kyōo, Buchikyōron no kenkyū, p. 192, reports that the Samdhinirmocanasūtrasyavyākhyāna adds: "This mark of purity (rnam-par-rig-paḥi mtshan-ñid), being pure for three innumerable kalpas, is severed from illusory projections (abhūta-parikalpa), because in its essence, it abandons the subject-object [dichotomy] (grāhya-grāhaka). . . Abiding means that those, who have perfected the state of total absorption, as they abide in complete mastery, since they are desireless for all phenomenal things, desire only that object which is the phenomenal mind." These passages mean that, according to the Samdhinirmocanasūtrasyavyākhyāna, these practitioners have totally interiorized consciousness, are free from externalizing meaning, and are thus able to realize the phenomenal mind of wisdom, i.e., cittamātra.

¹¹⁴Thus all the marks of pure land are clearly to be understood as symbols.

these object marks are like [the experience of a] person who has entered the state of total absorption of blue, etc.¹¹⁵

Such marks, which are manifested by consciousness, are the pure consciousness associated with the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom, because they are directly caused by the uncontaminated pure land seeds, which he has previously cultivated for his own benefit (i.e., svasambhogakāya). At all times and in all places, these marks do not wait upon any activity of thinking (manasikāra), but manifest themselves spontaneously. This land of blissful experience (sambhogabhūmi), adorned with its multitude of jewels, has as its ground svasambhogakāya. But, because it is directly caused by pure, uncontaminated seeds which benefit others, and manifests pure lands as appropriate for bodhisattvas, whether large or small, whether superior or inferior, this pure land also has as its ground parasambhogakāya. This means that, as appropriate for bodhisattvas in the first bhūmi, he manifests small and inferior [pure lands], and

¹¹⁵ 青等遍處定, nīla-ādi-kṛstna-āyatana-samādhi, See note 97. Any object of such a samādhi, such as blue, etc., is a transformation of consciousness. I conjecture that blue is chosen from the experience of meditating upon the blue sky.

as they develop through the other bhūmis,
these [pure lands] become larger and superior.¹¹⁶

This is how they function from beginning to end.
Such is the plenitude of pure land's results.

The Seventh Plenitude: Lords

But what of its lords? Every palace must depend upon a lord. The Tathāgata's domain is that palace, and all Buddha Bhagavans are its lords, because only they are so victorious. Only those associated with Bhagavans support and maintain it, for no others are capable of so doing.

Although svasambhogakāya and its land encompass dharmadhātu, yet there is no incompatibility with the successive transformations of each of its individual lords.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi reads: "The parasambhogakāya also rests on its own land. By the power of great benevolence and compassion, by virtue of the maturity of good causes which produce a pure Buddha land, causes which the bodhisattva has previously cultivated for the good of others, in conformity with the needs of bodhisattvas of the ten bhūmis, equality wisdom transforms itself into a pure land, either large or small, either superior or inferior, subject to change. It is on this land that parasambhogakāya rests." (Poussin, p. 713; Wei Tat, p. 803).

¹¹⁷Again this passage is dependent upon the Siddhi: "A Svasambhogakāya and its land pertain individually to each Buddha. Each, for himself, attains supreme enlightenment, and develops a body and land of personal sambhogakāya. And since all of these are infinite, they are not incompatible with one another." (Poussin, p. 714; Wei Tat, p. 803).

Although parasambhogakāya and its land are transformations of all Buddhas, there is no incompatibility with its being supported by lords, either as a unified body [of many Buddhas] or as an individual body [proper to one Buddha].¹¹⁸

Such is pure land's plenitude of lords.

The Eighth Plenitude: Assembly

There must also be an assembly, because every lord gathers around him an assembly. The phrase like clouds all the great multitude of bodhisattvas gathered together means that that great palace constantly has a cloud assembly of a community of innumerable great bodhisattvas.¹¹⁹ All those who stand before [Buddha] are called his assembly.¹²⁰ That is, there is a community

¹¹⁸ Again the Siddhi reads: "As to the last two bodies (i.e., parasambhogakāya and nirmāṇakāya), they are relative to the sentient beings that the Buddhas have to convert. These beings, for their conversion, depend upon several Buddhas, or on one single Buddha. From this it follows that the last two bodies are either common to several Buddhas, or proper to one Buddha." (Poussin, p. 714; Wei Tat, p. 803).

¹¹⁹ 無量大菩薩僧共所雲集, byañ-chub-sems-dpah dpag-tu-med-pahi dge-hdun, bodhisattvapramāṇa-saṃgha.

¹²⁰ The Taisho reading of 謂來朝者必為輔翼 is a bit problematic. Silabhadra reads: "They are accompanied by a community of innumerable bodhisattvas. Those who follow him are called (shes-bya-ba) his assembly, and it is these innumerable bodhisattvas who accompany him." (Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 34). Thus I follow the alternate reading of 必 for 必, and arrive at the above translation.

of innumerable great bodhisattvas. Because of these, who have entered that assembly, there is no evil capable of injuring them. All the śrāvakas and so forth are not like this at all.

This means that all bodhisattvas from the first bhūmi, although they are unable to assemble in the pure svasambhogabhūmi of any Buddha, yet, since the Buddhas in their own consciousness are compassionate, they reveal either gross or subtle lands to these bodhisattvas as are appropriate. The bodhisattvas, because of their own good roots and the power of their vows, elicit images in their own minds, which are similar to the pure lands produced by the Buddhas. And although their minds are each transformed differently, yet in their form, they all resemble that one place. This is what is meant by their gathering together in that one land.¹²¹

¹²¹In discussing parasambhogakāya and nirmānakāya the Siddhi reads: ". . .at the same time and in the same place, each of these Buddhas develops a nirmānakāya and a land. All these transformations resemble one another in appearance and do not represent obstacles to one another. They interpenetrate and intermingle in order to serve as the adhipatipratyaya, which leads sentient beings to be converted and to see such and such a nirmānakāya. The consciousnesses of these beings manifest themselves as images of nirmānakāya. . ." (Poussin, p. 714; Wei Tat, p. 805).

[There are three opinions as to whether] this pure land of the bodhisattvas above the earth is contaminated (sāśrava) or uncontaminated (anāśrava).

The first opinion holds that it is uncontaminated, because in their own minds these bodhisattvas are equipped with the seeds and the vow power of uncontaminated pure land, all of which are subsequently attained [after non-discriminative wisdom]. By transformations of their minds, they give rise to this pure land, and there experience the joy of the great dharma. (294c) All the multitude of these bodhisattvas, from the first bhūmi on up, realize the truth of tathatā, attain true uncontaminated support (i.e., tathatā) and the true dharma flow,¹²² dwell in that pure land, and constantly see all Buddhas. Therefore that transformed land consists exclusively in the truth of the uncontaminated path.¹²³

The second opinion holds that it is contaminated,

¹²² 法流, the continued flow of the true dharma without interruption.

¹²³ 無漏道諦, anāśravamārgasatya or anāśravavyavasthitasatya. The Vijñaptimatratasiddhi reads: ". . . that which is born of exclusively good and pure causes is comprised in the truth of the path (mārgasatya), and not in the truth of suffering (duḥkhasatya) or of the origin of suffering (samudayasatya)." (Poussin, p. 715; Wei Tat, p. 805).

because in their own minds these bodhisattvas, at the stage of intensified effort (prayoga-mārga), are equipped with the seeds and the vow power of a contaminated pure land. By the transformations of their minds, they give rise to this pure land, and there experience the joy of the great dharma. This is so, because, even although these bodhisattvas realize tathatā and attain a true uncontaminated state, yet, in the first seven bhūmis, passion still does arise. Even until the tenth bhūmi there are still present the seeds of passion, which have to be severed by the practice of meditation (bhāvanā-heyakleśabīja), and the obstacle of knowledge (jñeyāvarana), because the essence of the ālaya-vijñāna is able to support them, and receive their permeations (vāsanā).¹²⁴ And so this land consists in a morally neutral, contaminated nature (sāśrava-vyarthavyavasthita). Now, that which consists in the conditioned truth of the uncontaminated path is most definitely good. But, if in the ten bhūmis the essence of ālaya was good and uncontaminated,

¹²⁴The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi describes these passions and passion-seeds as being progressively less operative until their complete suppression in the tenth bhūmi. (Poussin, pp. 654-655; Wei Tat, p. 743).

then [the pure consciousness] of Buddha land would not be capable of receiving any permeation at all, because it would not be capable of supporting contaminated seeds.¹²⁵ The essence of ālaya-vijñāna consists in a morally neutral, contaminated nature. How then could pure land, which is a transformation of this consciousness, consist in goodness that is uncontaminated?¹²⁶

Furthermore, each sentient being has but one actual body, and, as long as he has it, it is contaminated. How then can a pure land of such a body¹²⁷ be uncontaminated?

The third correct opinion holds that the transformations of the minds of the bodhisattvas are of two varieties. In the case of a pure land, which is a transformation of ālayavijñāna, then, although its marks are pure and wondrous, yet it does consist in the contaminated truth of suffering, because it

¹²⁵ If ālayavijñāna could not receive permeations, this would negate basic notion of ālaya as sarvabījaka-vijñāna, for it constantly receives and produces seed-permeation until the realization of complete nirvāṇa. (Poussin, pp. 100-123; Wei Tat, pp. 109-135).

¹²⁶ 無漏, anāśrava. This term means any kind of worldly defilement, even that of bodhisattvas who have not attained the full realization of wisdom. It is thus equal to the term worldly in contrast with the transcendent.

¹²⁷ 所依, āśraya, the basis of support, here the body as the support of consciousness.

is an image (nimittabhāga) of a contaminated consciousness, and because it is supported by a contaminated body. Likewise, those [pure lands], which are manifested by intensified effort (prayoga), are also contaminated. But, if it is the case that the images (nimitta) of the pure lands are transformations of the uncontaminated subsequently attained mind (prsthālabdhānāśravacitta), [which is realized after the attainment of non-discriminative wisdom], then they consist in the truth of the uncontaminated path, because they consist in an uncontaminated image,¹²⁸ and arise from uncontaminated seeds.

This is pure land's plenitude of assembly.

The Ninth Plenitude: Retinue

Since there must be a retinue, the sūtra next says that to an unmeasurable degree gods, men, and all manner of supernatural beings followed after those bodhisattvas. This means that that great palace had as its surrounding retinue only such gods and so forth.

It did not have any other kinds of beings.

The phrase all manner includes yakṣas, gandharvas,

¹²⁸Such an image would be one that results from wisdom and is the embodiment of wisdom, rather than one that results from sensation, i.e., the contaminated body and mind of phenomenal existence. See p. 381 of the preceding study.

asuras, garudas, kinnaras, and mahoragas.¹²⁹

The mahoragas are great pythons.

But how can pure land transcend involvement in¹³⁰ this triple world, and yet have gods and so forth as its retinue? All such beings pertain to this triple world.

Pure land simply takes on their appearance¹³¹ in order to be adorned, and thus there is no incompatibility. Or perhaps, in order to bring sentient beings to maturity, it manifests various kinds of such transformations, just as in converting King Kapphina¹³² an innumerable number of universal rulers (cahravartin) was manifested around about.(295a). Or perhaps these innumerable transformations

¹²⁹These are the last six of the eight spirit protectors of the Buddhadharma. The first three are spirits. Garuda refers to a mythical bird. Kinnara refers to a heavenly musician. The above commentary identifies mahoraga as pythons. All of these mythical figures of ancient India have been elevated into being protectors of the Buddhadharma, thus putting their fabled abilities to use.

¹³⁰所行之處, spyod-yul, viṣaya, the realm in which one is involved.

¹³¹攝受變現, rnam-par-rig-pa snañ-ba yoñs-su-smin-par-bya-ba, i.e., taking up (攝受) their appearance (變現, pratibhāsa) in consciousness.

¹³²Kapphina is accounted to have been a king in the frontier city of Kukkuṭavati. In his search for wisdom, he heard of Buddha. Upon listening to and pondering his dharma teaching, he was converted and became an eminent disciple. On the occasion on which he was converted, the Mūlasarvāstivādinaya (根本說一切有部昆奈耶, T. 23, p. 670a) describes the Buddha as having been surrounded by all sorts of marvelous beings, among which were many universal rulers:如轉輪王千子圍繞。

of bodhisattvas in the forms of the bodies of the gods and the dragons, etc., dwelt in pure land in order to pay homage to Buddha.

Or perhaps the Buddha's own nirmāṇakāya took the form of these gods, dragons, etc. But, because they are the retinue of the Tathāgata, there is no fault here.¹³³

Such is pure land's plenitude of retinue.

The Tenth Plenitude: Sustenance

What is the sustenance of those who dwell there? The phrase its expansive dharma taste sustains their delight and happiness means that, nourished by the joy of the Mahāyāna dharma, they are able to dwell there. This is the meaning of their sustenance.¹³⁴

But it has already been explained that pure land surpasses anything that might be found in the triple world. How then can they eat there? Furthermore, uncontaminated dharmas cannot be said to be eaten. Eating can nourish sentient beings in this triple world, but since these pure land beings have severed their existence [in this triple world], they should not be

¹³³ As Nishio, Buchikyōron, p. 192, points out a parallel from the Mahāvānasamgraha: "In pure land there is not really any multitude of beings, but because he desires that it not be void, Buddha transforms all these kinds [of beings]." (T. 31, p. 263b)

¹³⁴ 食, zas, āhāra, the taking of food. The use of such a concrete metaphor leads to the following dilemma.

said to eat at all.

Because [that dharma taste] is the cause which supports them, the term sustenance is used. Now, even you admit¹³⁵ that when someone born into this rūpadhātu enters uncontaminated samādhi, he is said to be nourished. He is not said to be nourished because in the past he has eaten, because the past does not exist.¹³⁶ So it is with the above passage, for they are said to be nourished, because [that dharma taste] is the cause which sustains them.

Although contaminated dharmas are indeed obstacles to uncontaminated ones, yet, since they do sustain contaminated attainments (i.e., the earlier stages of the path), they are said to nourish. In like fashion, uncontaminated dharmas, although severed from contaminated dharmas, can also be said to nourish, because they sustain those contaminated dharmas.

In this pure land all Buddhas and bodhisattvas subsequently attain the uncontaminated state. It can be said that they are able to experience the taste of the great dharma and thus elicit

¹³⁵ 如汝宗中。宗 means prati jñā, proposition. It thus comes to mean one's position, or one's sect.

¹³⁶ Only the individual moment is real, for the past, being an abstraction (anumāna), has no reality.

great delight and happiness. Furthermore, the wisdom of the true essence (i.e., nirvikalpa-jñāna) experiences the taste of tathatā, and thus elicits great delight and happiness. It is able to sustain the body and prevent it from coming to harm. It can nourish good dharmas. Thus it is said to nourish.

Such is pure land's plenitude of sustenance.

The Eleventh Plenitude: Action

What kind of action does [pure land manifest]?

The phrase it brings about meaning and benefit for all sentient beings means that its [action] itself can bring about all meaning and benefit for all sentient beings, or that it can lead those sentient beings themselves to bring about all meaning and benefit.

Because it manifests benefits, it is called meaning. Because it makes these benefits present, it is called profit. In the world, it is called meaning, but transcendent to the world it is called profit. Because it avoids evil, it is called meaning. Because it supports good, it is called profit. Because it is blessed merit, it is called meaning. Because it is wisdom, it is called profit.

Although all these distinctions tranquilly abide in samādhi, yet due to the power of the vow, which has

been previously cultivated by intense effort, [its action] is able spontaneously to bring about all meaning and benefit for sentient beings.

Such is pure land's plenitude of action.

The Twelfth Plenitude: Benefit Conferred

What benefit is conferred? The phrase it destroys the oppressive, defiled proclivities of passion¹³⁷ means that there one is far removed from the proclivities of all passions and their oppression. All these passions are called proclivities, and thus they are the causes of all oppression. Since these proclivities to passion are not present there [in pure land], the oppression they bring about is also not present there.

Futhermore, these passions refer to the one hundred and twenty-eight basic passions. The proclivities are the lack of shame, etc. Defilements mean flattery, deceit, pride, etc. Oppression means (295b) the karmic actions that result from these. If the obstacle of knowledge (jñeyāvaraṇa) or its consequent blindness be termed a passion, then its arising is also termed a defiled proclivity. Consequent doubt

¹³⁷ 煩惱災橫纏垢。In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya the similar term 纏煩惱垢攝, pariyavasthana-kleśa-mala-saṃgrhita occurs. Pariyavasthana 纏 (fettters) is a state of being possessed, and in the Kośa is equated with kleśa (passion) and anuśaya (the propensity to

is called a defilement. The obstacle of knowledge and its consequent blindness is said to be oppressive.

But what is that pure land dharma which is said to be the benefit? It is precisely the severance of these oppressive, defiled proclivities that is termed the benefit. Just as a ruler of some worldly region, who might not actually cherish¹³⁸ [his people], yet because he does them no harm, such an official might be described as conferring benefit upon them, just so the realization and attainment of liberation from those oppressive, defiled proclivities of passion is a conferral of benefit, because it is a victorious, blessed wisdom. And so pure land, being free from inner oppression, is replete with benefit conferred.

137cont. evil). It is defined by F. Edgerton (Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, p. 334) as the (innate) propensity (inherent from former births). Thus I translate: the oppressive (災橫), defiled proclivities (纏垢) of passion (煩惱). The Tibetan reads simply: non-moṅs-paḥi dri-ma, the excrement of passion, which Rahder equates with kleśamala, the defilement of passion.

¹³⁸ 攝受, upa-grah, to erect, preserve, save. The meaning here is that he takes no active interest in the welfare of his subjects.

The Thirteenth Plenitude: Fearlessness

Also there must be no cause for dread there, and thus the text next explains its plenitude of fearlessness. The phrase it is far removed from all māra enmities means that there [in pure land] one is far removed from the enmities of passion, the [impermanent] skandhas, death, and the devil, or that one can cause others to be far removed from these four enmities. These four are the causes of all dread, because they are able to produce all kinds of dread. Since they are not present there, there is no dread.

The enmity of the passions refers to the basic one hundred and twenty-eight passions, and their accompanying passions. The enmity of the skandhas refers to the five aggregate heaps (skandhas) [that make up personal continuity]. The enmity of death refers to the fact that all internal contaminated dharmas are impermanent. The enmity of the devil refers to that ruler in the Paranirmitavaśavartin heaven in the realm of desire. Because these four are able to diminish and injure all good dharmas, they are called enmities. And from these four enmities arise all dread. Because the Tathāgata is eternally separated from these four enmities, he is fearless. Bodhisattvas from the

first bhūmi are also separated from them, and thus lack any of the five fears.¹³⁹

Such is pure land's plenitude of fearlessness.

The Fourteenth Plenitude: Abode

That abode must also be pre-eminent. Thus the text next explains the plenitude of its abode. The phrase surpassing all other adornments is the Tathāgata's adorned abode means that the Tathāgata's abode surpasses all the adorned abodes of bodhisattvas or of anyone else. For it is the only abode that has been wondrously arranged and adorned by the Tathāgata himself. Thus it surpasses all other adorned abodes, and is called the plenitude of abode. Such is pure land's plenitude of abode.

The Fifteenth Plenitude: Paths

What are the paths along which one travels there? The phrase the practice of great recollection and wisdom are taken as its paths means that

there great recollection, great wisdom, and the practice that follows upon them¹⁴⁰ are the paths

¹³⁹ 五怖畏, the five fears or dreads of beginning bodhisattvas: poverty, bad reputation, death, falling into evil, and fear of public speaking.

¹⁴⁰ 大念, 慧行, dran-pa dan blo-gros dan rtogs-pa chen-po. Thus great recollection (大念, dran-pa, i.e., smṛti) and wisdom (慧, blo-gros, mati) and understanding (rtogs-pa, adhiḡama). The Chinese has 行 in place of rtogs-pa, and thus the above translation.

to follow. Because they are that along which one walks, they are called the paths to follow.

This road has different names.,

As the wisdom that has been perfected by what has been heard (śrutamayīprajñā), it is called great recollection, because it articulates (abhivyāhāra) the unfailing meaning (aviparītārtha) of what has already been heard.

As the wisdom that is perfected by thinking (cintāmayīprajñā), it is called great wisdom, because it rationally discerns and attains certitude. As the wisdom that is perfected by practice (bhāvanāmayīprajñā), it is called great practice, because due to the force of such cultivation, it arrives at truth. Such recollection, wisdom, and practice are great, because they arise by taking the Mahāyāna dharma teaching as their object, and (295c) are its results.

Since by following these wondrous wisdoms the pure land is traversed, they are called its paths. This means that they are called its paths, because it is these three wisdoms, as the cause of bodhisattvahood, which realize entrance into pure land. As the great recollection of all Tathāgatas, they are identical with non-discriminative wisdom (nirvikalpañāna), because, due to such recollection, one peacefully abides in the truth

of tathatā. Great wisdom is the subsequently attained wisdom (pr̥sthalabdhajñāna), because it distinguishes all the conventional marks of the truth of all dharmas. It is these two which bring about the dominant action (karmādhīpatya) of pure land, and therefore they are called practical actions. Since, due to these two wisdoms, one attains birth in pure land, they are called its paths.

In other words, the practice of great recollection is the practice of self-benefit, since it is uttered only within the mind, while the practice of great wisdom is the practice of benefiting others, since it distinguishes externals. This is the sequence whereby the Tathāgata, by means of his wondrous understanding, gives rise to the two kinds of pure lands (i.e., svasambhogabhūmi and parasambhogabhūmi). Thus they are called its paths.

Such is pure land's plenitude of paths.

The Sixteenth Plenitude: Vehicles

There must also be vehicles, whereby one can ride along these paths. Thus the text next says that great cessation and wondrous insight¹⁴¹ are considered to be

¹⁴¹ 大止妙觀, shi-gnas dai lhag-mthoñ chen-po, samatha and vipasyāna. Samatha calm allows the insight of

its vehicles. Cessation means samādhi.¹⁴² Insight means wisdom. The meaning of the word great is as explained above [in the last plenitude]. Because these two (i.e., cessation and insight) are self-moving,¹⁴³ they are called vehicles.

Mounting upon this cessation and insight, one follows along the appointed course, and progresses along the path. The path is their general direction, and on it cessation and insight are identified as the vehicles.

Such is pure land's plenitude of vehicles.

The Seventeenth Plenitude: Entry Doors

There must also be entry doors, through which one enters by riding upon those vehicles. Thus the text next says that the deliverance of emptiness, of the unmarked, and of the desireless are its entry doors.

¹⁴¹cont. vipaśyana, to arise in consciousness.

¹⁴²As Nishio Kyōo points out, Buchikyōron, p. 193, n. 17, the Samdhinirmocanasūtrasyavyākhyāna reads, sems rtse gcig-pa, the mind [fixed on] one point. Thus this samādhi is one which quiets the mind by the focusing of attention on one particular point, thus arresting the flow of thoughts and impressions. Such is a preparation for wisdom insight.

¹⁴³等 運. Śīlabhadra's text reads: de gñis rañ-gi rañ-gis hjug-pa ni bshon-pa ste, de gñis de nas der hgro-bahi ro, These two are vehicles in that they move of themselves and by themselves, because both of them go from here to there. Thus the Chinese 等 運, spontaneous movement, corresponds to rañ-gi rañ-gis hjug-pa, automotion.

This means that these three deliverance doors are the entry doors to that great palace. Deliverance refers to transcendent nirvāṇa. Great emptiness and the other two are also called deliverance doors. Pure land is entered through these doors. Emptiness means the absence of self (anātman), for self is a dharma produced by clinging to what is merely imagined (parikalpita). Taking as the object of contemplation this [absence of self] is called the deliverance door of emptiness.

Marks refer to the ten marks of form, sound, smell, taste, contact, male, female, birth, old age, and death. Since nirvāṇa lacks any marks, it is called unmarked. A samādhi with such an object is called the deliverance door of the unmarked.

Desire means to seek after. But the insight into the suffering of this triple world lacks anything it might seek after. Thus it is called desireless. A samādhi with such an object is called the deliverance door of the desireless. Because one enters pure land through these three deliverance doors of emptiness, the unmarked, and the desireless, they are called its doors. The meaning of great is as explained above.

These paths, vehicles, doors, and so forth, which are associated with and located in pure land, serve the purpose of leading sentient beings

to the actual merits of delight and happiness.
This is the explanation of their function [in
pure land].

Such is pure land's plenitude of entry doors.

The Eighteenth Plenitude: Support

Like other palaces, this one also must have its support. Thus the text next explains the plenitude of support. The phrase it is adorned by a multitude of unlimited qualities¹⁴⁴ and placed (avasthita) among a multitude of great jewels and flower kings means that, just as the earth, etc., depend upon the wheel of the wind, and just as a palace in this world (296a) rests on the earth, just so that great palace is adorned by a multitude of unlimited qualities, and placed among a multitude of great jewels and red lotuses, the kings of flowers. This means that that palace is constructed from red lotus flowers and great jewels, and so arises from a multitude of unlimited qualities. Because these jewels are the best among all jewels, they are called great. Because these flowers¹⁴⁵ are the best among all flowers, they are called the kings of flowers.

Or, perhaps, because these flowers are the best of the red lotuses that arise from the good roots of

¹⁴⁴ 無量功德衆所莊嚴, ananta-guṇa-sambhāra-alamkṛta-vyūha.

¹⁴⁵ 寶 as it does not occur in the Tibetan.

bodhisattvas, they are called great.

The Buddha is the dharma king, and because these [flowers] arise from the eminent good roots of the Buddha, they are called the kings of flowers.

Furthermore, since these jewels and flowers are most difficult to find, they are said to be the kings of flowers. And because there is more than just one, and because their petals are many, they are said to be a multitude. This sūtra explains that the Bhagavan dwells in this multitude of flowers and there places his palace.

If that palace means that pure land is grounded upon the Tathāgata's true sambhogakāya, then we say that such a palace is coterminous with dharmadhātu,¹⁴⁶ and in such a pure land each and every buddha-sambhogakāya would be able to explain this sūtra as their basic theme.

But if that palace means the pure land that is grounded upon the Tathāgata's sambhogakāya, as it is appropriately manifested to the bodhisattvas, then its measure is indeterminate,¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁶The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi reads: "Inasmuch the svasambhogakāya has as its supporting basis the dharmakāya, which extends everywhere, it may be said that it too extends everywhere." (Poussin, p. 712; Wei Tat, 809)

¹⁴⁷Again the Siddhi: The dimensions of this body, like those of the land on which it rests, are indeterminate. (Poussin, p. 713; Wei Tat, p. 803).

and in such a pure land all Buddhas in unison would manifest one body,¹⁴⁸ and explain this sūtra. The measure of that palace cannot be specifically determined.

¹⁴⁸The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says that parasambhogakāya and nirmanakāya "are either common to several Buddhas or proper to one Buddha." (Poussin, p. 714; Wei Tat, p. 803).

PART ONE

CHAPTER THREE

The Buddha's Merits

The sūtra says: The Bhagavan's purest enlightenment does not elicit the two. He enters the unmarked dharma. He dwells in the Buddha abode. He realizes the equality of all Buddhas. He reaches the place of no obstacle. His dharma teaching is unfailing. His action is invincible. He attains equality in regard to the three times. His body issues forth to all worlds. His wisdom is without doubt in regard to all dharmas. In all his actions he perfects great enlightenment. In all dharmas his wisdom lacks uncertainty. All the bodies which he manifests cannot be discriminated. His is the wisdom that is well sought after by all bodhisattvas. He attains that victorious far shore of the Buddha's non-dual abode. That unconfused, deliverance wisdom of the Tathāgata is brought to full perfection. He has realized the equality of Buddha lands, which have no limit. He reaches to the ultimate dharmadhātu. He reaches to the limits of empty space, and will never come to an end.

The commentary explains: Next the sūtra describes how Buddha is different from other masters. This is why it explains that the Bhagavan's merits are pre-eminent. Also, so that others might elicit pure faith,

it explains the plenitude of the Bhagavan's merits.

You should understand that these comprise twenty-one kinds of pre-eminent merits.¹⁴⁹

Introductory Section: The Bhagavan's Complete Enlightenment (abhisambodhi) ¹⁵⁰

The phrase the Bhagavan's purest enlightenment¹⁵¹ means that the Buddha Bhagavan is completely enlightened as to all wisdom objects, whether associated with conditioned or unconditioned dharmas. It means that in wondrous plenitude he is completely enlightened to all

¹⁴⁹There are five different commentaries which explain these Buddha merits. This Śāstra contains two of them. The first is this listing of twenty-one, which begins with "the purest bodhi," and is common to both Bandhuprabha and Śīlabhadra. It is also found in the Samdhinirmocanasūtrasyavyākhyāna. The second commentary is found immediately after this first one in the same three texts, and in the Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra (T. 31, p. 141c). The third occurs both as an alternate commentary in the Samdhinirmocanasūtrasyavyākhyāna and in Asaṅga's Tibetan version of Aryasamdhinirmocanabhāṣya. The fourth commentary is common to both of these two texts. The fifth is found only the Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya (T. 31, p. 410c). All these have been studied by Nishio Kyōo, Buchikyōron no kenkyū, pp. 33-82.

¹⁵⁰In Śīlabhadra's text, this section is given as the first merit. Bandhuprabha, however, does not include it among the merits, but rather gives it as a general introduction to all the merits, as they are all contained in pure enlightenment. In order to arrive at the number of twenty-one, Bandhuprabha then must divide the last item into numbers twenty and twenty-one.

¹⁵¹最清淨覺, legs-par thugs-su-chad-pahi
blo dan idan-pa, which Rahder gives as suvisuddhibuddhi.

wisdom objects, that he is completely enlightened to the universal-nature-of-all-just-as-it-is (yathāvad-bhāvikāta) and to the limits-of-its-existence (yāvad-bhāvikāta).¹⁵² Thus this is called the Bhagavan's purest enlightenment.

The First Merit: Absence of Obstacles

The phrase that [the purest enlightenment] does not elicit the two¹⁵³ refers to that pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan completely lacks obstacles. This means that the Bhagavan lacks the two obstacles [of kleśāvarāṇa and jñeyāvarāṇa], which obtain among fools (prthagjana) and Hīnayānists. Fools elicit samsāra and bring about attachment to that samsāra. But śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas elicit nirvāṇa, gladden others, and are attached to that nirvāṇa. But since the Bhagavan does not elicit these two obstacles, it is said that he does not elicit the two.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵²See pp. 120-121 of the preceding study.

¹⁵³不二現行, kun-tu-spyod-pa gñis mi mnaḥ-ba, i.e., a-dvaya-samudācāra.

¹⁵⁴The presence of the obstacle of passion (kleśāvarāṇa) brings about the attachment to samsāra, while the presence of the obstacle of knowledge (jñeyāvarāṇa) brings about the attachment to nirvāṇa. Both are based upon extroverted understanding, which, by projecting meaning upon imagined external units, elicits attachment to those things, whether they be the objects of passionate longing or the desire for final release. The bodhisattva course is one of total non-attachment to either samsāra or to nirvāṇa.

The Second Merit: Taming Upāya

The phrase he enters the unmarked dharma¹⁵⁵ refers to the pre-eminent merit of the Buddha's taming upāya. This means that the unmarked dharma is nirvāṇa. The Buddha well understands the upāya, by which sentient beings, according to their level of ability, are tamed and transformed, and in this manner¹⁵⁶ he comes to speak to them in order to lead them to enter and realize the unmarked dharma.

¹⁵⁵ 入無相, mtshan-ñid med-paḥi chos la mchog-tu-gshol-bar mdsad-pa, i.e., alakṣaṇa-dharma-parayana. Nagao Gadjin, Chūkan to Yuishiki, pp. 78-81, explains that 入無相 constitutes a process that moves from the world of saṃvṛtisatya, where external objects appear but do not actually exist (境無) to the world of paramāthasatya, where consciousness alone exists (識有) as paratantrasvabhāva, i.e., the existence of consciousness is not an external datum, but rather exists in dependency on the entire range of synergistic causes. Thus, as the entry into the unmarked dharma is the embodiment of paramārtha in the world of saṃvṛti, it is the underlying basis for upāya, the conventional embodiment of ineffable truth. And so the full phrase 入無相方便相, as it occurs in the Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra, implies that upāya is grounded in paratantrasvabhāva, in that, being the conventional embodiment and manifestation of paramāthasatya, its images and words are not to be clung to as if they represented some fixed truth or absolute doctrine. In the Fa-hsiang context, this conventional embodiment of paramārtha tended to be so emphasized that paramārtha's nature as completely other was often overlooked.

Here the merit of entry into the unmarked dharma is described both as nirvāṇa and as the Buddha's understanding of upāya, i.e., both as paramārtha and as saṃvṛti.

¹⁵⁶ Emend 如實 to 如是, as the Tibetan gives de-bshin-du, thus, in this manner.

The Third Merit: Discernment ¹⁵⁷

The phrase he dwell in the Buddha abode ¹⁵⁸ refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan discerns [the qualities] of those who are to be tamed and transformed. This means that, dwelling in great compassion, ¹⁵⁹ day and night at the six times, ¹⁶⁰ he discerns the world.

¹⁵⁷ 觀所化, g(h)dul-bya la so-sor-rtoq-pa, i.e., the beholding (觀) or discernment (rtoq-pa) of those to be transformed. So-sor adds the note that each being is discerned individually, i.e., one by one.

¹⁵⁸ 住於佛住, saṅs-rqyas kyi gnas-pas gnas pa, i.e., buddha-vihareṇa-viharan.

¹⁵⁹ 大悲, mahākaruṇā. Thus the Buddha abode is identical with compassion. This passage seems to be based on verse twelve of the Bodhi chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrāṅkāra: "Abiding there [in subsequently attained wisdom] the Tathāgata looks down upon mankind, as if from the peak of a mountain, and is moved by compassion. . ."(Lévi, p. 36).

¹⁶⁰ 六時, these six times are the divisions of the day into early morning, midday, sunset, evening, night, and late night. They are Indian in origin and appear to be of monastic provenance, inasmuch as they were the times for religious services. Only monks get up in the middle of the night for religious services.

The meaning here is that the Buddha's compassion is constant and at all times, a theme also treated in the Mahāyānasūtrāṅkāra, where verses seven to eleven of the Bodhi chapter describe enlightenment as a constant, and unexcelled refuge for all sentient beings.

Allusions to the Mahāyānasūtrāṅkāra occur throughout this commentary, as both Śīlabhadra and Bandhu-prabha have adopted the notion of the pure mind of the garbha and interwoven it into the Yogācāra context of meaning.

The Fourth Merit: Similarity of Activity

The phrase he realizes the equality of all Buddhas¹⁶¹ refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan attains a phenomenal activity¹⁶² similar to that of all Buddhas. This means that all Buddhas are similar in their phenomenal activity, because of this equality.¹⁶³

The Fifth Merit: Absence of Obstacles¹⁶⁴

The phrase he reaches the place of no obstacle¹⁶⁵ refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan eternally severs what must be suppressed. This means that he has already realized liberation from the two obstacles of passion and knowledge, and is constantly severed from all obstacles.

¹⁶¹ 遠得一切佛平等性, sañs-rgyas thams-cad
dañ mñam-hid brñes-pa, i.e., sarva-buddha-samata-prāpti.

¹⁶² 事業, phrin-las mdsad-pa, work and activity, which I take to mean phenomenal activity, i.e., the work of the Buddha in this world.

¹⁶³ Following the Tibetan, punctuate after 事. The equality of the action of all Buddhas is also treated in the Bodhi chapter, verses twenty-nine and thirty, of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra.

¹⁶⁴ 所治, that which is to be controlled, i.e., vipakṣa, inimical forces or enemies. Here it refers to that which arises from the internal seeds (bīja) of the two obstacles. The Tibetan reads: mi-mthum-paḥi phyogs spañ(s)-pa, the complete rejection of disharmony.

¹⁶⁵ 到無障處, sgrib-pa med-paḥi rtogs-pa thugs-su-chud-pa, i.e., an-avarāṇa-gaṭiṃ-gataḥ.

The Sixth Merit: Unfailingness of Teaching

The phrase his dharma teaching is unfailing¹⁶⁶ refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan subdues heterodox teachings. This means that the true dharma teaching of the Buddha cannot be overturned by any heterodox teaching, because it has already subdued them in manifesting the true dharma teaching.

The Seventh Merit: Invincibility

The phrase his action is invincible¹⁶⁷ refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan subdues māra enmity. All actions have as objects form, etc. As these objects scatter the mind and hinder the good, they are called māra enmity. But the minds of all Buddha Bhagavans are well set in samādhi, and the objects [of their minds] are well disposed, so they are not scattered. Because this merit has arrived at full plenitude (296c), no evil object can hinder them. Thus they are able to subdue all object realms. And because all such actions [of understanding an object] do not impede them, their action is invincible.

¹⁶⁶ 不可轉法, phyir-mi-ldog-paḥi dan ldan-pa, i.e., apratyudāvartya-dharma.

¹⁶⁷ 所行無礙, spyod-yul gyis mi hphrogs-pa, asamhārya-gocara.

The Eighth Merit: Inconceivability of Teaching

The phrase that which he has established is inconceivable¹⁶⁸ refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan establishes the dharma teaching. This means that the dharma teaching, established by the Buddha, transcends the realm of rational inquiry.¹⁶⁹

The Ninth Merit: Equality of Time

The phrase he attains¹⁷⁰ equality in regard to the three times¹⁷¹ refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan prophesies¹⁷² the three times. This means that without obstacle he declares events of the past

¹⁶⁸ 其所成立不可思議 , bsam-gyis mi khyab-pa rnam-par-hjog-pa, i.e., a-cintaya-vyavasthana.

¹⁶⁹ 尋思境 , the object to be examined. Sīlabhadra reads, rtog-gehi spyod-yul, the activity of searching into. The Sanskrit would be paryeṣana, to examine.

¹⁷⁰ 游 , tshar-phyin-pa, niryāta, to go forth to, issue in. Here the meaning is that he goes forth to or reaches equality.

¹⁷¹ 游於三世平等法性 , dus gsum la mñam-pa fid tshar-phyir-pa, i.e., try-adhva-samata.

¹⁷² 記別 is usually translated as prophecy, which is valid as long as such prophecy is not restricted to future events. In Sanskrit vyākaraṇa comes from vy-ā-kr, and means to expound. The Tibetan bin-ston-pa translates as to instruct. As the word prophecy in the field of Western Christian theology means a definitive proclamation of events, and has no direct reference to the time frame in which these events occur, it seems appropriate to borrow this usage here. To be excluded then is the popular understanding of prophecy as only the foretelling of the future.

and future as if they were present.

The Tenth Merit: Manifestation of Nirmānakāya

The phrase his body issues forth to all world realms¹⁷³ refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan descends from the Tuṣita heaven. This means that in all world continents whatsoever, he manifests nirmānakāya, because at those times he enters his mother's womb.

The Eleventh Merit: Severance of Doubt

The phrase his wisdom is without doubt in regard to all dharmas¹⁷⁴ refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan is severed from all doubt. This means that in regard to all dharmas he has attained the wisdom of certitude (bhūṭaniścaya), which is able to expell all doubt.

The Twelfth Merit: Appropriate Manifestation of His Body

The phrase in all his actions, he perfects great enlightenment¹⁷⁵ refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan is able to manifest his body, as appropriate,

¹⁷³ 其身流布一切世界, hjiq-rten gyi-khams thams-cad-du shugs-paḥi sku, i.e., sarvaloka-dhatu-prasṛta-kaya.

¹⁷⁴ 於一切法智無疑滯, chos thams-cad la the-tsom med-paḥi mkhyen-pa mñah' ba, i.e., sarvadharmā niḥ-saṃcaya-jñāna.

¹⁷⁵ 於一切行成就大覺, spyod-pa thams-cad duṅ ldan-paḥi blo mñah'-ba, sarva-carya-samanvāgata-buddhi.

to sentient beings in any vehicle. This means that he completely understands the differences in the natures and habits of all sentient beings, and, as appropriate for them, manifests his body.

The Thirteenth Merit: Absence of Uncertainty in Teaching

The phrase in all dharmas his wisdom lacks uncertainty¹⁷⁶ refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby, in the wisdom that wondrously comprehends all dharmas, the Bhagavan is able appropriately and constantly to teach and admonish correctly. This means that, whereas all those who cling to uncertainty regarding any dharma lack such a profound ability to teach and admonish appropriately, the Buddha Bhagavan alone, in the full certainty of his wisdom, which understands all dharmas, is able to teach and admonish appropriately, unflinching, and ceaselessly.

The Fourteenth Merit: His Undeclared Body

The phrase all the bodies which he manifests cannot be discriminated¹⁷⁷ refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan is able to support his undeclared bodies. This means that all buddha-kāya do not arise

¹⁷⁶ 於諸法智無有疑或, chos mkhyen-pa la nem-nur mi mñah-ba, i.e., niḥkaṃkṣa-dharma.

¹⁷⁷ 凡所現身不可分別, rnam-par-ma-brtags-pahi sku, i.e., avikalpita-sarira.

from unreal imagining (abhūtaparikalpa), because they lack the defilements of passion, karma, and birth.¹⁷⁸ Thus the Tathāgata's bodies do not arise from defiled, unreal imaginings.

The Fifteenth Merit: Perfecting Bodhisattvas

The phrase his is the wisdom that is well sought after by all bodhisattvas¹⁷⁹ refers to the pre-eminent merit of his uninterrupted upāya, whereby the Bhagavan brings those of buddha-lineage (buddhagotra) to perfection. This means that all bodhisattvas, in order to maintain their buddha-lineage without interruption, intensely cultivate practice. Such is not the case with śrāvakas and such like. Thus that Buddha wisdom is well sought after only by bodhisattvas.

The Sixteenth Merit: Non-Duality (Dharmakāya)

The phrase he attains that victorious far shore of the Buddha's non-dual abode¹⁸⁰ refers to the pre-eminent merit of the Bhagavan's essential body (svabhāvika-kāya). This means that, because the Buddha's dharmakāya

¹⁷⁸ Reading the alternate 雜 in place of 離. The Tibetan has: ñon-moñs-pa dan las dan skye-bahi kun-nas-ñon-moñs-pa, the defilements of kleśa, karma, and birth.

¹⁷⁹ 一切菩薩正所求智, byañ-chub-sems-dpah thams-cad kyis ye-sēs yañ-dag-par-blañs-pa, i.e., sarva bodhisattva-sampratīcchita-jñāna. The Taisho mistakenly repeats the phrase 不可分別.

¹⁸⁰ 得佛無二住勝彼岸, sañs-rqyas kyi gnas-pa gñis-su-med-pa dam-pahi pha-rob-tu-phyin-pa, i.e., a-dvaya-buddha-vihara-parama-parami-prāpta.

is marked by non-discrimination, it is said to be non-dual. The Buddha's non-dual abode is precisely dharmakāya. Its substance is tathatā. Because it is marked by non-discrimination, the dichotomy of the two marks [of subject and object] does not arise in it. With such a victorious samādhi, he constantly dwells there [in non-duality]. Such dwelling in non-duality is precisely that victorious far shore. Since Buddha has already realized this, he is said to have attained it.

The Seventeenth Merit: Deliverance Wisdom (Sambhogakāya)

The phrase that unconfused, deliverance wisdom is brought to full perfection¹⁸¹ refers to the pre-eminent merit of the Bhagavan's sambhogakāya. This means that sambhogakāya is not confused, because each of the Tathāgata's sambhogakāya is individual.¹⁸² The wondrous

¹⁸¹ 不相間雜如來辭脫妙智究竟, de-bshin-gsegs-pa ma-hdres-paḥi rnam-par-thar-par mdsad-paḥi ye-ses kyi mthar-phyin-pa, i.e., a-sambhinna-tathagata-vimokṣa-jñāna-niṣṭhagata.

¹⁸² 體各各別故 because in their substance, each is distinct. Śīlabhadra reads: so-soḥi rgyud kyi sgo nas loṅs-spyod-rdsogs-paḥi skus, "The sambhogakāyas [dwell] in positions (sgo) of individual continuities." The Samdhinirmocanasūtrasyavyākhyāna has: rgyud tha-dad-par bshugs-pas na ma hdres-pa, "[They] are unconfused, because they dwell in different continuities."

The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi explains: "Svasambhogakāya with its land pertains properly to each Buddha; each for himself attains supreme enlightenment, develops a body and a land of personal sambhoga. Although . . . are different, yet all are infinite and do not oppose one another." (Poussin, pp. 713-714; Wei Tat, p. 803).

wisdom of the Tathāgata is able to cause all sentient beings to give rise to deliverance. Thus [the text] speaks of the deliverance wisdom of the Tathāgata. In this wisdom the Buddha has already attained full perfection, and thus the text says that the wondrous wisdom of the Tathāgata is unconfused. The sambhogakāya manifested in the pure Buddha land is also unconfused. In that assembly he manifests all kinds of bodies, and thus all the bodhisattvas experience the joy of the dharma, and are themselves also unconfused. The Tathāgata, in the bodies manifested by this wisdom, arrives at full perfection.

The Eighteenth Merit: Unlimited Tathatā

The phrase he has realized the equality of Buddha lands, which have no limits¹⁸³ refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Tathāgata realizes the mark of tathatā. This means that tathatā has no limits, because it is far removed from any limit marks, whether conditioned or unconditioned, and from any limit marks of place. And so tathatā is precisely the dharmatā of the equality of Buddha lands (buddhabhūmisamatādharmatā). Because

¹⁸³ 證無中邊徧地平等, mthah dan dbus med-pahi sañs-rgyas kyi sa mñam-pa ñid thugs-su-chud-pa, i.e., an-antamadhya-buddhabhūmi-samatā-adhigata.

he has realized the universal equality of these Buddha lands, he completely knows all conditioned and unconditioned dharmas without confusion.

The Nineteenth Merit: Pure Dharmadhātu

The phrase he reaches to the ultimate dharmadhātu¹⁸⁴ refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan attains the result. This means that he attains to the ultimate, pure dharmadhātu. This dharmadhātu is the result of cultivating the path.

The Twentieth and Twenty-first Merits: Inexhaustibility

The next two kinds of pre-eminent merits refer to the inexhaustibility of the Bhagavan's merits. The phrases he reaches to the limits of empty space¹⁸⁵ and he will never come to an end¹⁸⁶ refer to two inexhaustible,

¹⁸⁴ 極於法界, chos-kyi-dbyins dam-pa-can, i.e., dharmadhātu-paryanta.

¹⁸⁵ 盡虛空性, nam-mkhañi khams kyi mthas gtugs-pa, i.e., ākāśa-dhātu-paryavasāna.

¹⁸⁶ 窮未來際, phyi-maḥi mthañi mur-thug-pa, i.e., aparanta-koti-niṣṭha. Although this phrase is present in the Tibetan translation of the Buddhabhūmisūtra, it is not found in Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmivyākhyana. This omission is noteworthy, because this phrase will be the occasion for Bandhuprabha's discussion on the five gotras in a later section (298a), according to which those of no lineage (agotra) will never be enlightened and thus insure the eternal presence of the Buddha's compassion. However, the textual evidence is confusing. As Nishio points out, Buchikyōron, pp. 45-46, the phrase is also lacking in the Tibetan text of the Samdhinirmocana's presentation of these merits and in its Tibetan commentaries. It is found in the Chinese translation of the Samdhinirmocanasūtra of Bodhiruci (T. 16, p. 665c) and of Hsüan-tsang (T. 16, p. 688b). It is quoted in the

pre-eminent merits, whereby the Bhagavan's self-benefit benefits others. This means that, just as empty space, in the passage through the successive formations and dissolutions of world ages (kalpas), is constant and inexhaustible, so all the Tathāgata's true merits are also constant, uninterrupted, and inexhaustible.¹⁸⁷

Just as the future is not exhausted at any moment, so his merits, which benefit others, will never come to an end, because he constantly brings about benefit and joy for all sentient beings.

In the following section we are going to present another commentary [on the Buddha's merits], one which outlines the specifics on each of the sūtra phrases. The words of the sūtra are the standard, which are explained by these interpretations. Therefore this will

¹⁸⁶cont. Mahāyānasamgraha of Hsüan-tsang. But in Buddhaśānta's translation we find the words 最虛空界盡 (T. 31, p. 103c), and in Upagupta's translation of Vasubandhu's commentary on that text, we read 盡虛空界等 (T. 31, p. 293a), neither of which have any reference to future limits. To confuse the matter further, the Tibetan translation of the Mahāyānasamgraha has: nam-mkhahi khamis kyi mthas gtugs-pa phyi-mahi mur-thug-pa, in which the words phyi-mahi mur-thug-pa correspond directly to 窮未來際.

¹⁸⁷Śīlabhadra reads: . . . hkhor-bahi mthah ji-srid-par, . . . [they] exhaust the limits of samsara.

be a summary of the [same] dharma teaching which has just been explained on the twenty-one kinds of pre-eminent merits.

The First Merit: Unimpeded Enlightenment

The phrase his purest enlightenment does not elicit the two refers to that merit, evolved from wisdom, whereby the Bhagavan is free from all obstacles in all that he knows. This means that śrāvakas and the like do have obstacles to wisdom, and discriminate without limit as to time and place, because they lack the evolutions of wisdom in the dharma of all Buddhas. The Tathāgata is not like these, for in regard to time, place, and any discriminations at all, his omniscient wisdom (sarva-ākārajñāna) (297b) evolves without obstacle in the dharma of all Buddhas, and lacks the dichotomy of either knowing or not knowing in regard to all dharma marks. Thus it says that he does not elicit the two. It is because of this that the text speaks of the purest enlightenment. Other interpretations should be consonant with this.

The Second Merit: Non-Duality

The phrase he enters the unmarked dharma refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan is able to enter non-duality. This means that he is able to enter tathatā, which is itself marked by the constant absence of discrimination, by freedom from the proclivities of

all passion, and by purity from the marks of existence or non-existence. Moreover, he is able to cause others to so enter.¹⁸⁸

The Third Merit: Effortless Activity

The phrase he dwells in the Buddha abode refers to the pre-eminent merit, in which the Bhagavan's effortless Buddha activity is never at rest. This means that the activity, by which he effortlessly benefits sentient beings, is not interrupted or cut off, because he dwells in that transcendent heaven, in that brahman abode.¹⁸⁹

The Fourth Merit: Impartial Activity

The phrase he realizes the equality of all Buddhas refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan's bodies,¹⁹⁰ thoughts,¹⁹¹ and actions are not discriminated,

¹⁸⁸The Mahāyānasamgraha has: "... the merit of entrance into the pre-eminent purity of tathatā, which lacks the two marks of existence and non-existence." (T. 31, p. 347b).

¹⁸⁹聖天, āryadeva, the noble heaven of the gods, which transcends the empirical world. 梵住, brahma-vihāra, the abode of Brahman. This abode is symbolic for karuṇa-vihāra, the abode of compassion, the abode of those who practice the four immeasurable minds (四無量心) of compassion, mercy, joy, and abandonment (慈悲喜捨). Thus those who dwell there are 聖天. The Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra reports that those who practice these actions of compassion will most certainly be born in brahma-vihāra, in karuṇa-vihāra. (T. 14, p. 538b and p. 554b).

¹⁹⁰所依, āśraya, here with the meaning of body. The Samdhinirmocanasūtrasavyākhyāna as sku, body. (Nishio, Buchikyōron, p. 201, n. 3).

¹⁹¹意樂, mano-rama, good dispositions of thought. Śīlabhadra has dgons-pa, thought, consideration.

because they are grounded upon dharmakāya. This means that the activities, whereby he benefits others, are not discriminated, because of his pure wisdom of tathatā of all Buddhas, because of his thoughts that bring benefit and happiness to all sentient beings, and because of both his sambhogakāya and nirmāṇakāya.

The Fifth Merit: Suppression of Obstacles

The phrase he reaches the place of no obstacle refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan has already cultivated the suppression of all obstacles. This means that he has already cultivated the holy path, which suppresses all passion and knowledge obstacles, and has already arrived at that place, which is free from all obstacles. Place here means that on which he relies, that to which he has gone.

The Sixth Merit: Unfailingness of Teaching

The phrase his dharma teaching is unfailing refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan is not vanquished by any heterodox teaching. This means that the dharma, witnessed in his teaching, cannot be overthrown by others.

The Seventh Merit: Invincibility

The phrase his action is invincible refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan cannot be overcome by the worldly dharmas of gain, etc.,¹⁹² although

he appears in this world.

The Eighth Merit: Inconceivability of Teaching

The phrase that which he has established is inconceivable refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan establishes the true dharma. This means that that pre-eminent dharma teaching of twelve sections¹⁹³ transcends the activities of all rational inquiry. It is not something that fools can comprehend. Because he proclaims all individual and common marks [of this dharma teaching], the text says that he establishes [it].

The Ninth Merit: Non-Duality

The phrase he attains equality in regard to the three times refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby he is able to truly prophesy. This means that he declares the past and the future as if they were present, because the meaning of his words, which encompass the three times, produce prophecies in regard to what has appeared [in the

¹⁹²The eight worldly dharmas are gain, loss, defamation, ridicule, injury, flattery, pleasure, and pain.

¹⁹³These twelve sections are the divisions of the canon: sūtra, the scriptures spoken by Buddha, geya, verses that correspond to preceding prose sections, gāthā, metrical verses without prose, nidāna, tracts which deal with the links of this existence to previous existences, itivṛttaka, descriptions of events that arise out of circumstances, jātaka, accounts of former births, adbhuta-dharma, prodigies and miracles, avadāha, parables or metaphors, upadeśa, treatises on doctrinal themes, udāna, discussions spoken without being solicited, vaipulya, large, expanded sūtras, and vyākaraṇa, predictions.

past] and in regard to what has yet to be done [in the future]. These prophecies are unfailing. Because his insights into these three divisions [of time] are unfailing, the text uses the term equality.

The Tenth Merit: Manifestation of Bodies

The phrase his body issues forth to all world realms refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby, at the same time and in all world realms whatsoever, the Bhagavan manifests sambhogakāyas and nirmānakāyas. This means that in all world realms without limit, he manifests bodies as wondrously colored as precious gems, as such transformations are appropriate.

The Eleventh Merit: Severance of Doubt

The phrase his wisdom is without doubt in regard to all dharmas refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan (297c) severs all doubt. This means that he is firmly established [in wisdom] and can lead others to become firmly established.

The Twelfth Merit: Appropriate Manifestation of Bodies

The phrase in all his actions he perfects great enlightenment refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby he leads¹⁹⁴ [sentient beings] to undertake various

¹⁹⁴ 入種種行, to enter upon various actions. Śīlabhadra reads mdsad-pa, to do, to perform. However, Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 46, emends this to hdsud-pa, to lead, following the Samdhinirmocanasūtrasya-vyākhyāna (23b). I thus take 入 to mean to cause to enter, i.e., to lead.

practices. This means that, as appropriate for those sentient beings to be transformed, he appears in bodies similar to theirs, and leads them to undertake [those practices].

The Thirteenth Merit: Discernment

The phrase in all dharmas his wisdom lacks uncertainty refers to the pre-eminent merit of wondrous wisdom, whereby the Bhagavan discerns the arising of future dharmas. This means that his complete awareness transcends the range of śrāvakas and so forth, and unfailingly knows the subtlest good seeds [that upon cultivation will give rise to future good dharmas], just as one might recognize flecks of gold in stone pottery.

The Fourteenth Merit: Non-Discriminative Manifestation

The phrase all the bodies which he manifests cannot be discriminated refers to the pre-eminent merit of the Bhagavan's manifestations, which flow from his perfect understanding. This means that the Buddha Bhagavan, just like a wish-fulfilling (mani) gem, renders visible the bodies of the Tathāgata of a golden hue, because of the dominant power of all Tathāgatas and the power of his own victorious understanding, although he lacks any discrimination. As the scriptures all explain, all Tathāgatas have no discrimination and do not imagine [things] to be different from one another.

Fifteenth Merit: Support of Bodhisattva Mission

The phrase his is the wisdom that is well sought after by all bodhisattvas¹⁹⁵ refers to the pre-eminent merit of that upāya by means of which he tames the sentient beings to be converted through unlimited bodies. This means that the mission of conferring benefit¹⁹⁶ of all the bodhisattvas, who, because of the Tathāgata's dominant influence (adhipatibala), have attained wondrous wisdom through the process of hearing, reflecting on, and practicing the true dharma, progresses in an uninterrupted continuity.

The Sixteenth Merit: Non-Duality Replete with Pāramitās

The phrase he attains that victorious far shore of the Buddha's non-dual abode refers to the pre-eminent merit of the fulness of pāramitās of giving, etc. in the equality of dharmakāya.¹⁹⁷ This means that in the non-dual dharmakāya of Buddha land, all the pāramitās of giving, etc., are equally replete without confusion.

¹⁹⁵ The Taisho again mistakenly repeats the phrase 不可分別.

¹⁹⁶ 授受付囑. 授受 is here anugraha, the conferral of benefit, assistance. 付囑 is upanikṣip, entrustment or mission given by Buddha to preach the dharma teaching. Śīlabhadra reads: phan-btags-pa dañ yoñs-su-qtad-pa dag, the conferral of benefit and the entrustment.

¹⁹⁷ Śīlabhadra reads: chos-kyi-sku la pha-rol-tu-phyin-pa mñam-pa-ñid du grub-pa, the equal of paramita in dharmakaya.

The Seventeenth Merit: Manifestation of Buddha Lands

The phrase that unconfused, deliverance wisdom of the Tathāgata is brought to full perfection refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan manifests unconfused, pure Buddha lands, according to his perfect understanding. This means that he discerns the differences in the understanding of sentient beings, and [thus] manifests all kinds of unconfused, golden, etc., Buddha lands.

The Eighteenth Merit: Limitless Equality

The phrase he has realized the equality of Buddha lands, which have no limits refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the abode of the Bhagavan's trikāya has no limits. This means that, having realized this universal equality without [the divisions] of before and after, the three bodies of Buddha have no limitations of place in that Buddha land, in that pure Buddha realm.

The Nineteenth Merit: Unlimited activity of Dharmadhātu

The phrase he reaches to the ultimate dharmadhātu refers to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan reaches to the limits of samsāra, and constantly manifests and brings about benefit and happiness to sentient beings. This means that, because dharmadhātu is absolutely pure, it reaches to the limits of samsāra, and constantly gives rise to the teachings of the sūtras, which flow from

(niṣyanda) [that dharmadhātu], in order to constantly manifest and bring benefit and happiness to sentient beings who are to be converted in the future, as will be appropriate at that time. (298a)

The Twentieth and Twenty-first Merits: Inexhaustibility

The phrases he reaches to the limits of empty space and he will never come to an end refer to the pre-eminent merit, whereby the Bhagavan never comes to an end. This means that, just as empty space is constant and never exhausted, so the merits that arise from dharmadhātu of all Buddhas are also [constant and never exhausted].

And just as the limit of the future has no final end point, so the merits of all Buddhas by their very nature are constant and inexhaustible, because their efforts in bringing benefit and happiness to all sentient beings will never come to rest. Their final limits cannot be specifically determined. Therefore, because the merits of dharmakāya, of pure dharmadhātu, of the true essence are eternal, the merits of sambhogakāya and nirmāṇakāya also will never come to an end, although their nature is not eternal nor uninterrupted.

However, [it might be objected that] all Tathāgatas originally elicit an encompassing vow to seek mahābodhi for the sake of sentient beings.

If then all sentient beings attain final cessation, then, at that time would not all the conditioned merits of Buddha also come to an end?

But there never will be such a time, when all the realms of sentient beings will attain final cessation, and thus the Buddha's merits will never come to an end.

This is so because of the basic nature of the dharma (dharmatā). From the beginningless beginning all sentient beings are divided into five kinds of lineages (gotra). The first is the śrāvaka (hearer) lineage, the second the pratyekabuddha lineage, the third the Tathāgata lineage, the fourth the undetermined lineage, and the fifth the lineage without transcendent merits. Their characteristics are as described in the sūtras and śāstras, and are that the first four of the above will ultimately attain final cessation, due to the compassionate upāya of all Buddhas, although they have no fixed time period [in which to do so]. But the fifth lineage, because it lacks the causal power of merits that transcend the world, will never reach a time of final cessation. All the Buddhas are able to do for them is to manifest their spiritual powers (rddhi) by means of upāya,

and explain to them the dharma teaching of avoiding evil destinies and being born in good destinies. But even although they might rely on that teaching and attain birth in the human destiny, when they reach the place of no-thought-and-no-non-thought,¹⁹⁸ they will inevitably fall back and sink into evil destinies. All the Buddhas will again manifest their powers by upāya, and explain to them the transformations of the dharma teaching, and they will again cultivate good and attain birth in good destinies. But later they will again fall back and experience suffering. Again by upāya the Buddhas will succour them. Like this their transmigrations will never come to an end, and [the Buddhas] will not be able to lead them to ultimate, final cessation.¹⁹⁹

Although other sūtras²⁰⁰ declare that all the different kinds of sentient beings have Buddha-nature, and all will become Buddhas, this refers to the dharmakāya Buddha lineage,²⁰¹ or it is said

¹⁹⁸ 非想非非想處, naiva-samjñā-nāsamjñā-āyatana, the state of samādhi which transcends the dichotomy of thought or no-thought. This samādhi occurs in the fourth heaven of the formless world, the highest point of the triple world.

¹⁹⁹ This argument is here first presented in Mahāyāna Buddhist thinking. See Tokiwa Daijō, Busshō no kenkyū, pp. 163-174.

²⁰⁰ This is the doctrine of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra.

²⁰¹ This argument is found in other texts, as Tokiwa points out in Busshō, p. 166. He argues that this term

by upāya and refers [only] to a small part of sentient beings,²⁰² or again it is said in order to lead those of undetermined lineage (aniyalaika-gotra) to decide to quickly arrive at the result of supreme enlightenment.²⁰³

For these reasons the Buddha's merits, which benefit and bring happiness to sentient beings, will never come to an end. These merits, which benefit others, depend on the self-benefiting merits, and are therefore uninterrupted. Thus because the Tathāgata's (298b) conditioned merits arise from causes [in his self-benefiting merits], they will not come to an end, although from time to time they are destroyed.²⁰⁴ Because these

201cont. refers to Buddha nature as principle (理佛性), which includes all sentient beings. But, even although all in principle have this Buddha nature, yet it can only become actually realized if the uncontaminated seeds (anāśravabhīja) are present. Thus one must also have Buddha nature in operation (行佛性), which is what is lacking in the case of the abhāva-gotra.

202 This is the first instance of this argument, as noted by Tokiwa, Busshō, p. 166. He argues that, while all possess Buddha nature as principle, only a small part, according to Bandhuprabha, have Buddha nature in operation. One does, of course, wonder what good it does to have Buddha-nature in principle, if it can never be realized.

203 This is the reason given in Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter XI, verse 54. (Lévi, p. 68; Thurman, p. 142).

204 Parasambhogakāya, although not eternal, yet depends on svasambhogakāya, which is eternal.

Buddha merits do not come to an end, they perfect the purest enlightenment. All other interpretations must correspond to this one point by point.²⁰⁵

The reason why the text first treats the pure land of all Buddhas, and then the Bhagavan's merits is because it thus shows that all Buddha merits depend upon that pure land, that the Bhagavan, in depending on the pure Buddha land, is so endowed with merit.

²⁰⁵The basic, underlying question in the above discussion is not the nature of those without any transcendent lineage. Rather the dilemma is that, if there were not always someone to be converted, then the entire Mahāyāna ideal of the bodhi-being, the bodhisattva, as being superior to the Hīnayāna practitioners would be of only provisional validity. The Hīnayāna practitioner is directed toward the final goal of nirvāṇa. In contrast the goal of Mahāyāna is bodhi, which is of its essence a synthesis of wisdom and compassion. Such is the supreme enlightenment (anuttarasamyaksambodhi) of all Buddhas. But, if they save all beings, then their function will be over. If one then admits that, since all beings have Buddha nature and there is one universal vehicle that includes all, then the very basic nature of bodhi is rendered only provisional, and in the last analysis the Hīnayāna desire for nirvāṇa becomes the ultimate truth.

PART ONE

CHAPTER FOUR

The Merits of the Bhagavan's Retinue

The text next treats the plenitude of the Bhagavan's retinue. This refers to the great disciples (mahāśrāvaka) and the great bodhisattvas. Other sūtras say that they were completely docile and thus were his retinue, or that, being completely delivered, they were his retinue.²⁰⁶ It is thus that they are called the plenitude of the Tathāgata's retinue.

This sūtra says that the immeasurable multitude of mahāśrāvakas, together with the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas, being all docile sons of Buddha, abide in the Mahāyāna, roam in the Mahāyāna, etc. Thus the śrāvakas and the bodhisattvas, each in its turn, constitute the plenitude of retinue.

The reason why this sūtra first treats the śrāvakas and then the bodhisattvas is because of five items.

²⁰⁶The Mūlasarvāstivādivinaya reads: "At that time the Bhagavan crossed over the River of Wisdom (Candabhāga?). Since he had made [his followers] docile, they were a docile retinue. Since he had purified them, they were a pure retinue. Since he had delivered them, they were a delivered retinue. . . In this manner all those mahāśrāvakas and monks together crossed over to the other side of the river." (T.23, p. 670a).

In the first place, it does so in order that those who have doubts about Mahāyāna may abandon those doubts. In the second place, so that it may lead those bodhisattvas of undetermined lineage to give rise to firm faith. In the third place, it does so in order to lead all those mahāśravakas, who have already been purified, to discard the pride that puffs them up, i.e., at the head of that multitude it is the mahāśravakas who draw near the Bhagavan and are immediately converted, all these śrāvakas constantly attend upon Buddha, their appearance is similar to Buddha, and they are his inner retinue, [and thus are apt to become proud, so the text, after describing them, turns to the bodhisattvas]. In the fourth place, the text describes the mahāśravakas and then the bodhisattvas in order to cause the bodhisattvas to have respect for that multitude of śrāvakas, because as the sūtras teach, it is not proper for bodhisattvas to lack respect for śrāvakas, and therefore this sūtra praises the merits of the śrāvakas. In the fifth place, it so describes them in order to cause others to have pure faith in that multitude of śrāvakas.

There are also other multitudes gathered together in that dharma assembly. Since the śrāvakas and bodhisattvas are eminent, they are representative of the other multitudes. The sūtra says

that in this world a great multitude of gods, men, asuras, etc., heard what the Buddha said, were greatly elated, received it in faith, and put it into practice.²⁰⁷

Earlier it was explained that the pure consciousness of utmost abiding is the mark of pure land. How then can śrāvakas and their like be included in that assembly without contradiction?

What contradiction would there be? If the śrāvakas understood just the same as the bodhisattvas, then there would be a contradiction. Only if the ability of the śrāvakas and their like were the same [as the bodhisattvas] would there then be a valid objection. But, although they dwell in that assembly, all the śrāvakas and their like are like men born blind,

because their karma obstructs their [ability] to understand that pure wonder. Thus they are said to be completely unable to express that object of pure wonder.

But, [it might be objected], precisely because they are unable to understand, they should not have been included in that assembly.

[They are so included], because, even although they do not understand that pure wonder just as

²⁰⁷The concluding words of the sūtra, T. 16, p. 327c.

it is, yet they do see nirmānakāya speaking on this earth. Although that gathering is brought together into one, yet, because of the force of their karma, what each sees and understands is different.

It is like (298c) somebody seeing real gold and calling it fire.

Or it is like four different kinds of sentient beings each seeing [the same object] differently.

Or perhaps, because they receive the support (adhiṣṭhāna) of the Tathāgata's spiritual power, they are caused to attain the sight, hearing, and enunciation of that wondrous dharma teaching for a short time. There is no error in admitting that such transformations [can occur], for the Tathāgata's inconceivable power encounters no difficulty whatsoever in employing such states of meditation to deliver [sentient beings],²⁰⁸ because he desires to adorn that assembly, in which he speaks

²⁰⁸The phrase 从根地度等 is difficult. I take 根地 to be a shortened form of 根本地, and to mean dhyāna, meditation, as it occurs in the Abhidharma-kośabhasya. Or perhaps it is equivalent to 根本定為地, maula-dhyāna-bhūmi-katva, the fundamental meditation land. 度 would have its usual meaning of to ferry over, to deliver. 等 then means etc., and refers to any such acts that benefit sentient beings. This sentence thus explains that Buddha's ṛddhi are the adhiṣṭhāna that enables beings to see pure land by inducing meditation.

dharma teaching.

Or perhaps [these śrāvakas] are transformations of the Buddha himself, or of the bodhisattvas.

The sūtra says: There was there an unlimited community of mahāśrāvakas. They were all docile sons of Buddha. Their minds were completely liberated. Their wisdom was completely liberated. Their moral observances were completely purified. They came to seek the joy of the dharma. They had heard much, retained, and accumulated what they had heard. They thought good thoughts, spoke good words, and did good deeds. Their wisdom was swift, quick, incisive, salvific, penetrating, great, expansive, unequalled. They had perfected that wisdom jewel. They had completed the three insights. They had attained the happy abode of the highest manifested dharma. [They dwelt] in that very pure, rich field. Their deportment was inspiring. The perfection of their great patience and gentleness was without decrease. Already good, they practiced the sacred teachings of the Tathāgata.

The commentary explains: The phrase there was an unlimited community of mahāśrāvakas means that, because their full number is difficult to count, they are said to be unlimited. Since they hear

the Buddha's voice and enter the holy path, they are called hearers (śrāvaka). And, since they are monks, who have left their homes, they are called a community (saṅgha). Because all of these śrāvakas are of a lineage of extremely perceptive senses and pāramitās, they are called great.²⁰⁹

Another opinion holds that, since they all dwell at the result stage of no-training (aśaikṣa), they are called great.

But the correct opinion holds that they are called great, because these śrāvakas are all of undetermined lineage, even although they have as yet attained [only] small results. Because they are directed toward mahābodhi, [they are called great]. Or perhaps, because their number is large, they are called great.

The First Merit: Docility²¹⁰

Being such a great community, they were all docile.

²⁰⁹This discussion is not found in the Buddhabhūmi-vyākhyāna nor in the Samdhinirmocanasūtrasyavyākhyāna, both of which place the śrāvakas in the position of training (śikṣa), and therefore, since they do not regard them as great, have no need for any extended commentary upon the term, great.

²¹⁰Parallel descriptions of these śrāvaka merits are also found in Yüan-ts'e's commentary of the Samdhinirmocanasūtra and in Asaṅga's Samdhinirmocanabhāṣya, as indicated by Nishio, Buchikyōron, p. 61. The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, as is its wont, adds much material, as indicated below.

One opinion holds that they are called docile, because at the stage of training they are free from the one hundred and twelve kinds of discriminative, gross passions that are able to be severed by insight,²¹¹

and are not obstinate, but [are docile] like a tamed horse.

Another opinion holds that they are called docile, because at the stage of no-training they are free from the one hundred and twenty-eight kinds of passion that are able to be severed by the practice of meditation,²¹² are not unyielding, [but] like pure gold [are pliable].

The correct opinion holds that they are called docile, because they are all of a lineage that will turn toward bodhi and all have the capability to elicit great results. According to the Buddha's intentions, they will evolve skillful wisdom images.

The Second Merit: Sonship

The sūtra calls them sons of Buddha, because they are born from the true dharma teaching, as if they

²¹¹These are the various misleading views of the phenomenal world, and thus are gross. They are severed comparatively easily by the occurrence of insight into the teaching, i.e., darśana-prahātavya.

²¹²These are tenacious wrong views that can be severed only by the extended practice of meditation, bhāvanā-prahātavya.

were born from the Bhagavan's mouth.²¹³

Another opinion holds that they are called sons of Buddha, because, having become mahāśrāvakas, they are able to maintain Buddha lineage without interruption.

The Third Merit: Liberation

The phrase their minds were completely liberated means that they are free from the covetousness of the triple world. As it has been said: "Because they are free from covetousness, their minds have attained liberation." The phrase their wisdom was completely liberated means that they were already free from all defiled ignorance. As it has been said: "Because they are free (299a) from ignorance, their wisdom has attained liberation."

The Fourth Merit: Pure Morality

The phrase their moral observances (śīla) were completely purified means that, as the sūtra says: "Those who have completed the six branches [of the Rules for Liberation] are said to be completely purified in their moral observances." This means that they dwell in the complete self-protection of pure moral observances,

²¹³The Śrīmālādevīsīmaṇādasūtra has: "These sons of Buddha are born from Buddha's mouth, are born from the true dharma teaching, are born from the transformations of that dharma teaching." (T. 12, p. 222a).

and have perfected all their actions by modeling them on the Rules for Liberation (Prātimokṣa). They are most scrupulous in regard to even the smallest transgressions, and receive instruction in the path of training.

Or perhaps they are said to be completely purified because they have attained uncontaminated morality (anāśravaśīla).

The correct opinion is that they are said to be completely purified, because, dwelling in the stage of no-training, they turn toward Mahāyāna, because their own morality is pure, and because they practice bodhisattva morality.²¹⁴

The Fifth Merit: Upāya-Morality

The phrase they come to seek the joy of the dharma,²¹⁵ i.e., when they seek the true dharma, they desire to reach

²¹⁴ 菩薩戒, bodhisattva-samvara (śīla). The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter XVI, verses 53-56, thematizes this bodhisattva morality as including the avoidance of evil, the cultivation of good, and the actions of benefiting others. The Brahmajālasūtra also discourses on such morality. The main point is that all individual morality is to be directed to the benefit of others, and thus it is called bodhisattva-śīla, which, if need arise, would not only ignore "the smallest transgressions," but some large ones too.

²¹⁵ 趣求法樂. The Tibetan reads: chos ḥdod-pa rnam bde-bar phrad-pa ni, they all joyfully gathered together in seeking the dharma. Thus 趣, to come, is to be equated with phrad-pa, to gather together.

great joy. This means that Buddha wisdom does not seek after other things.

Or perhaps, when they seek the dharma, they avoid seeking things that might be censured²¹⁶ and any bad conduct, in order to lead others to joy.

The correct opinion holds that these mahā-śrāvakas single-mindedly seek the joy of the dharma, and not fame, profit, or reputation.

The Sixth Merit: Sūtra Learning

Because they are able to listen attentively to innumerable sūtras from beginning to end, they are said to have heard much. And because they are able to bear in mind the meaning that they have heard, the text says that they retain what they have heard. And because they frequently cultivate in meditation these words and meanings, and even memorize them, it says that they accumulate what they have heard.

The Seventh Merit: Goodness

The sūtra says that they thought good thoughts, spoke good words, and did good deeds because these world

²¹⁶ 過意. . Śīlabhadra has: kān-ka-tshol-baḥi bsam-pa med-pa, they have no thought of seeking what is censured (upālabha-abhiprayā). Thus 過意 here means kān-ka, upālabha, i.e., that which is to be censured.

transcending saints surpass and oppose those dharmas, whereby fools think evil thoughts, speak evil words, and do evil deeds.

The Eighth Merit: Wisdom

The sūtra says swift wisdom (aśuprajñā) because, since their three actions [of mind, speech, and action] are purified and they practice in accord with wisdom, they quickly penetrate the meaning of the teaching and the discipline (vinaya) taught by the Buddha. For the same reason it speaks of quick wisdom (jāvanaprajñā), because all their actions are said to be quick. Because they penetrate subtle meanings, it says incisive wisdom (tīksanaprajñā). Because they attain that wondrous wisdom that is able to transcend samsāra, the text says salvific wisdom (niḥsaranaprajñā). Because this wisdom is able to understand the cause for nirvāṇa, it is called penetrating wisdom (nairvedhikaprajñā). Because it arrives at certitude, it is called penetrating,²¹⁷ i.e., [it penetrates] nirvāṇa, inasmuch as it is able to understand its cause. Because it responds to questions with

²¹⁷ 勝決擇故名勝決擇 is a tautology, and as such means little. Śīlabhadra reads: gtan la bab-par-rtoqs-pa ni ṅes-par-rtoqs-pa ste, "In that it is absolutely certain, it is penetrating." The above translation follows Śīlabhadra's reading in this instance.

a certitude that is never exhausted, it is called great wisdom (mahāprajñā). Because in its deep and wide plenitude, it reaches everywhere, it is called expansive wisdom (prthuprajñā). Other texts also describe it as deep, wondrous wisdom (gambhīraprajñā),²¹⁸ which means that others are unable to exhaust its depths. Because it is superior to all those śrāvakas of dull sense organs (mrdendriya), and such like, it is called unequalled wisdom (asamaprajñā). Because this wisdom is able to elicit the highest meaning, it is called the wisdom jewel (prajñāratna). Because all these śrāvakas are endowed with this wisdom, they are said to have perfected that wisdom jewel.

The Ninth Merit: The Three Intuitions

The phrase they have completed the three insights means that they have attained the three insights of the stage of no-training (aśaikṣa), which are: 1) the intuition (abhi jñā) of the wisdom which recalls former abodes (pūrvanivāsānusmrtiprajñā), 2) the intuition of the wisdom of the [conditions of the] death and birth [of all sentient beings] (cyutyupapattiprajñā), and 3) the intuition of the wisdom of exhausting contaminated outflows (āśravakṣayaprajñā).²¹⁹

²¹⁸ The Buddhabhūmisūtra does not have the phrase 甚深妙慧. The Tibetan text does have: śes-rab-zab-pa.

²¹⁹ These three abhi jñā are the last three of the ten powers (daśabalāni) of a Buddha.

These three intuitions, which are attained by the sharp faculties of no-training, are called the three insights because they are free from either defilement or non-defilement, and from an illusory view (299b) of the three times.

One opinion holds that insight has wisdom as its nature, and, since such wisdom is able to expell darkness, it comes to be called insight (明).

Another opinion holds that since undeluded good roots (amohakuśālamulā) are its nature, [such insight] reverses ignorance.

The Tenth Merit: Contemplation

The phrase they attained the happy abode of the highest manifested dharma²²⁰ means that they realize the pre-eminent contemplation (dhyāna) that will not turn back (avivartya).

The Eleventh Merit: Fruitfulness

The phrase [they dwelt] in that very pure, rich field²²¹ means that, being free from passion, just like a good field, they are able quickly to give rise to extensive, great results.

²²⁰ 證得第一現法樂住, tshe hdi la bde-bar-pahi mchog thob-pa, i.e., parama-dṛṣṭa-dharma-śukha-vihāra-prāpta.

²²¹ (住)大淨福田, yon yons-su-sbyon-pa chen-po, i.e., mahādakṣiṇā-pariśodhaka.

The Twelfth Merit: Inspiring Conduct

The phrase their deportment was inspiring²²² means that they abide in the correct knowledge of all inspiring conduct.

The Thirteenth Merit: Patience

The phrase the perfection of their great patience and gentleness was without decrease²²³ means that they dwell together at ease in deep patience [that understands] suffering.

The Fourteenth Merit: Fullness of Practice²²⁴ means that all their practices have reached fulness.

²²² 威儀寂靜 , spyod-lam rab-tu-shi-pa phum-sum-tshogs-pa, i.e., praśanta-irya-patha-saṃpanna.

²²³ 大忍柔和成就無減 , bzod-pa dan des-pa chen-po dan ldan-pa, i.e., mahākṣānti-sauratya-saṃanvāgata.

²²⁴ 已善奉行如來聖教 , bde-bar-gśegs-paḥi bkah la śin-tu-shugs-pa, i.e., tathagata jñasupratipanna.

PART ONE

CHAPTER Five

The Distinction between Bodhi and Nirvāṇa
in regard to the Mahāśrāvakas²²⁵

The basic [intent] of the Tathāgata's sacred teachings is that sentient beings escape the sufferings of samsāra. Now all these śrāvakas having ascended to the state of no-training (aśaikṣa),²²⁶ do escape from samsāra, and the [intent of the] sacred teachings is faithfully accomplished. Since this is so, then why does [the Buddha] again [in this sūtra] teach them the dharma?

We answer that he does so in order to cause them to turn to mahābodhi.

But, [it is objected], all these śrāvakas dwell in aśaikṣa, and when they have finished this last existence, they will certainly enter eternally quiescent nirvāṇa.²²⁷ Furthermore, as

²²⁵The purpose of this chapter is to explain how śrāvakas, who are turned toward nirvāṇa, can yet be included in the Tathāgata's assembly, which would indicate that their aim was rather bodhi, i.e., the synthesis of both wisdom and compassion. Bandhuprabha answers this question by maintaining that these are not just ordinary śrāvakas. Sections of the following are translated by Poussin, La Siddhi, pp. 676-677.

²²⁶無學, aśaikṣa, i.e., the final stage of the path, the ultimate attainment, where no training is needed.

other śāstras teach, this peace of calmness (vyupaśamasukha) is the same as enlightenment.

Why then does he lead them to seek mahābodhi and experience suffering for such a long time?

We answer that in their transformed state²²⁸ there is no experience of suffering (duḥkha-vedanā). Therefore the objection [that they experience suffering] is not valid.²²⁹

²²⁷ 永滅無餘涅槃, nirodha nirupadhiśeṣa nirvāṇa, that is, the eternally quiescent (nirodha) nirvāṇa without any remaining support (nirupadhiśeṣa), i.e., without a body whereby one might maintain phenomenal existence. See the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi for a discussion of the four kinds of nirvāṇa, Poussin, pp. 670-671; Wei Tat, pp. 759-761.

²²⁸ 變易位, pariṇāṃikī, the existence of transformation. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi distinguishes two kinds of phenomenal existence: 1) 分段生死, paricchinṇa saṃsāra, the fragmentary samsaric existence that is the result of karmic maturation (vipāka) and is brought about by kleśāvaraṇa, and 2) 變易位, pariṇāṃikī-saṃsāra, which is the result of subtle (i.e., not easily perceived) and superior maturation (vipāka) created by pure actions and characterized only by jñeyāvaraṇa. This transformed existence is the result of compassion (karuṇā) and vows (praṇidhāna), by which the bodies of samsaric existence are transformed. Thus bodhisattvas, or in this case mahāśrāvakas, by means of this transformation, dwell in nirmāṇakāyas. Yet they have some jñeyāvaraṇa, so as to enable them to remain active in the phenomenal world. (Poussin, pp. 502-512; Wei Tat, pp. 609-615).

²²⁹ Asaṅga's Vikhyāpanaśāstra has: "The śrāvakas of the stage of no-training have completely exhausted rebirth. How can they then turn toward bodhi, and, after long exercises, realize it? [They do attain supreme enlightenment, but] certainly not with their body that is the maturation of their karma (karma-vipāka-kāya). (T. 31, p. 560a) This passage is repeated in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Poussin, p. 507; Wei Tat, p. 611.

But, [it is objected], because [this transformed existence] does involve the suffering consequent upon impermanence (saṃskāra-duḥka), [i.e., the suffering implicit in any phenomenal existence], this objection certainly is valid.

We answer that, although they do pass through these sufferings [inasmuch as they have a phenomenal existence], yet there is no validity in the objection, because they are led to attain the great joy and happiness of the Tathāgata's trikāya, [and thus their phenomenal existence is a manifestation of ultimate wisdom].

But, [the objection continues], all great happiness does not go beyond nirvāṇa, which they have already attained. What then is lacking [in that nirvāṇa] that they should again seek mahābodhi?

We answer that, although they do have the happiness of being calm and quiescent, yet they lack the phenomenal experience of happiness (sukhasamvedanā), the happiness of full wisdom (saṃbodhi). [Nirvāṇa] cuts off immeasurable qualities (guṇa), such as the experience of happiness, etc.

Of what possible use then is this conditioned

happiness [of full wisdom], which is characterized by the suffering consequent upon impermanence?

We answer that the conditioned state of being uncontaminated (samskrta-anāśrava) is similar to nirvāṇa. Because it is uncontaminated, it is not included in the suffering consequent upon impermanence. Moreover, they attain enlightenment in order to be able to convert the unlimited sentient beings who have to be converted, and to lead them to escape samsāra.

But, [the objection continues], do those who have already realized Buddhahood lack this ability [to convert beings]?

From the beginningless beginning the basic nature (dharmatā) of sentient beings is that different lineages of those who convert and those to be converted are interrelated. The absence of such a relationship implies the inability to convert. In this fashion by means of various kinds of upāya the Tathāgata converts all sentient beings and leads them to attain the Buddha result. He converts [those with whom he has a relationship], i.e., those he is to convert. [Thus śrāvakas can attain nirvāṇa without such a relationship.]

If this is the case, then the śrāvakas, whether [in their spiritual progress] they have eliminated seven rebirths, or [only] one rebirth, whether they have eliminated a rebirth in any superior realm, or whether they have remaining just one rebirth, i.e., whether in any of these stages they attain non-reflective cessation (apratisamkya-nirodha), or whether in all their births they [attain] non-reflective cessation,²³⁰ how could they again cultivate bodhi causes for the duration of three incalculable kalpas?

We answer that, although they do attain non-reflective cessation in all these various stages that are moistened by passion, (i.e., in all of their karmic rebirths) nevertheless, because of the power of their vows, they experience transformation births, and are thus able to cultivate bodhi causes for the duration of three incalculable kalpas. Therefore the objection is not valid.

²³⁰ 非擇滅, apratisamkhyā-nirodha, total cessation which has no reflection. It is contrasted with 擇滅, pratisamkhyā-nirodha, total cessation which has reflection. These are two of the three unconditioned dharmas of Yogācāra thinking. See Poussin, pp. 72-78; Wei Tat, pp. 81-87. They are not to be understood as external, existent dharmas, but rather as designations for tathatā. Non-reflective cessation is originally pure tathatā inasmuch as it is unrelated to wisdom. That same tathatā, as realized in wisdom, is reflective cessation.

Non-reflective cessation is not characterized by a multitude of causes,²³¹ and when it occurs there is the final cessation of rebirths. But this is not an eternal state of non-birth. For, while (299c) dwelling for a long time in samsāra, because of the power of their samādhi vows, they do have causes which produce birth, and thus their efforts are able to give rise to results for a long time,²³² and in their present body they develop and increase until they finally realize Buddhahood. Just as those arhats who conserve their long life energies (āyusamskāra),²³³

²³¹The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi reads: "That (bhūta-tathatā) which does not [arise] from the power of reflection is pure by nature, and is revealed by the absence of causes, is called apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha." (Poussin, p. 76; Wei Tat, p. 83). Thus the causes here referred to are the causes of wisdom, whereby one might realize pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha.

²³²The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi reads: "The vow of uncontaminated samādhi assists contaminated actions, so that the continuity of results attained (pratīḥadha-phala-santāna) continues for a long period of time without being severed, increasing and perfecting itself." (Poussin, p. 510; Wei Tat, p. 613). The Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa seems to have reworked this sentence.

²³³The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi again reads: "... by means of the power of their uncontaminated samādhi vows, just like those who conserve their vital energies (壽法), they assist the causes which produce their bodies, so that it bears results for a long time, and in this manner again and again their samādhi vows assist [the conservation of their bodies] until they realize supreme enlightenment." (Poussin, p. 510; Wei Tat, p. 613). As Poussin notes, this alludes to a passage from the Abhidharmakośa: "Arhats of undetermined class, by virtue

they do not receive birth. This is as explained in the [Yogācārabhūmi]śāstra:²³⁴

In that case, do these śrāvakas, who turn toward bodhi, abide in nirvāṇa without any remaining support (nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa) and thus elicit the desire for supreme enlightenment, or do they abide in nirvāṇa with remaining support (sopadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa)? ²³⁵

We answer that they abide only in nirvāṇa with remaining support, [i.e., their bodies]. If they were to abide in nirvāṇa without any remaining support, it would be impossible for them to produce any phenomenal actions, and all their endeavours would cease.

But, [it is asked], if they abide only in nirvāṇa and there elicit the desire for supreme enlightenment, how is it possible that they can realize this supreme enlightenment in just one lifetime? Arhats and such like certainly do not have support (upadhi) for another rebirth. How much less could they have a continuity of many rebirths, [which are necessary for the many practices that lead to supreme enlightenment]?

²³³cont. of the meditation of distant ages (dhyāna-prāntakotika), conserve their vital energies." (Poussin, Kośa, II, 120; VI, 268; and VII, 95.

²³⁴This entire passage is quoted from the Yogācāra-bhūmiśāstra, T. 30, p. 749a-b.

²³⁵有餘依涅槃, sopadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa, that nirvāṇa, which has a remaining support (upadhi), i.e., the body that enables one to remain active in the phenomenal world. One maintains continuity in the body by refraining from severing all obstacles. Kuei-ch'i explains that some jñeyāvaraṇa remains, inasmuch as one must provisionally admit the view of others as "real" in order to benefit them. If all jñeyāvaraṇa were severed, then dharmasūnyatā would ensue, and thus nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa, that nirvāṇa without any remaining support for continued phenomenal existence. (Poussin, p. 510; Wei Tat, p. 613).

We respond that because they increase their long life energies (āyusamskāras), they are able to accomplish this. In many ways the Bhagavan depends upon these śrāvakas, who have turned toward bodhi. In his deep meaning, he said: "Whoever has well cultivated the four spiritual powers,²³⁶ he is able to remain [in his body] for one kalpa, or again for another kalpa." This another kalpa can mean more than one kalpa. But, although they so increase their life span, and do elicit the desire for samyak-sambodhi, their practice is extremely halting, because they yet delight in nirvāṇa.²³⁷ They are not equal to those bodhisattvas, who have just elicited the mind [of bodhi], and are beginning to practice. However, having increased their long life energies, they maintain their sense bodies (śendriyakakāya) and each create a nirmāṇakāya, but in the presence of their brethren (sahadharmika) by upāya they manifest parinirvāṇa in [their entry into] nirvāṇa without remaining support, [i.e., they seem to die]. It is for this reason that all [their brethren] think: "So and so has passed into nirvāṇa without remaining support, has entered parinirvāṇa." But in fact, because of the sense bodies, which they have maintained, as they wish, they go to a distant place in this realm of Jambudvīpa and dwell there. Even the gods are unable to identify them. How then could other sentient beings be able to identify them? Because they greatly delight in nirvāṇa, they journey to various world realms and approach Buddhas and bodhisattvas in order to honor them. Being equipped with the practices of bodhi, they are in the sacred path. But when they become negligent (pramāda), then various Buddhas and bodhisattvas

²³⁶ 四神足, rddhipāda. These four are concentration, zeal, remembrance, and meditation. They enable one to attain supernatural powers, such as above.

²³⁷ The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi has: "The later (i.e., saints of the undetermined class whose minds are fixed on arhatship) have a great predilection for parinirvāṇa." (Poussin, p. 674; Wei Tat, p. 763).

exhort them, and, being so exhorted, they are able to be more careful in their practice.

Futhermore, these Śrāvakas, who turn toward bodhi, whether in the stage of training or of no-training, are able to renounce their Śrāvaka vows, [i.e., they are of undetermined lineage]. [They are in these stages] because their sense natures have differences, 238 and because their supporting causes have differences.

If they are in the stage of no-training, they will turn toward bodhi because of the force of their samādhi vows, (300a) and, because they manifest a body which has been previously created and variously equipped, they will give rise to a continuity of results for a long time. They will gradually increase their pre-eminence until they realize Buddhahood and their abilities are exhausted. Although these results are immediately produced by contaminated causes, yet they are assisted by uncontaminated samādhi vows.²³⁹ This is called the inconceivable transformation of samsāra (pariṇāmikī-samsāra).

²³⁸Those of sharp senses are able to discern subtle meanings, and thus quickly attain the stage of no-training, while those of dull senses are slow to get the point. The senses here referred to are not only the physical senses, but also the moral faculties, such as faith, etc. See Poussin, p. 508.

²³⁹The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "The vow formed in the pure meditation assists contaminated deeds in such a way that the series of results obtained continues for a long time without being severed." (Poussin, p. 510; Wei Tat, p. 613).

If they turn toward bodhi in the stage of training, either their remaining passion (kleśa) still has the force to produce rebirth, and then in that last rebirth they will surpress passion, because that last body will be equipped with the power to elicit samādhi vows. As above explained, they will reach the realization of Buddhahood. Or, since they have already turned their minds toward bodhi, they have suppressed all passion, because the body they manifest is equipped with the power to elicit samādhi vows. As above explained, they will also reach the realization of Buddhahood. But in either case they employ the assistance of uncontaminated samādhi vows. Those who have no passion are supported by inconceivable bodies of transformation (pariṇāmikī-kāya), while those who are yet influenced by the force of passion are supported by the fragmented bodies (paricchinna-kāya) of karmic maturation (vipāka).²⁴⁰ But,

²⁴⁰ In explaining the difference between paricchinna and pariṇāmikī, the Viññaptimātratāsiddhi has: "The body conserved by means of the assistance of contaminated samādhi vows is comprised in fragmented existence (paricchinna), because it is seen by the saints of the Two Vehicles and by common fools. But the body which is conserved by means of uncontaminated samādhi vows is comprised in transformed existence (pariṇāmikī), because it is beyond the range of those persons. It should be understood that this transformed existence is the [joint] result of both contaminated karmic

when we speak of the transformations created by the śrāvakas, it is not [always] necessary to make such fine distinctions.

240cont. maturation (sāśrava-vipāka) and of the uncontaminated dominance (anāśrava-adhipati) [of samādhi vows]. (Poussin, p. 511; Wei Tat, p. 615).

PART ONE: CHAPTER SIX

The Merits of the Bodhisattvas

The sūtra says: There also was present an unlimited number of bodhisattva-mahāsattvas, who had assembled from all Buddha lands. They all dwelt in Mahāyāna. They traversed that Mahāyāna dharma. Their minds were equal in regard to all beings. They were free from all discrimination of kalpa and non-kalpa. They had suppressed all māra enmity. They were far removed from the thought binding discrimination of all śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. They were sustained by the joy and happiness of that expansive, great dharma taste. They rose above the five dreads. They had assuredly entered the state of no-returning. They mitigate the oppressive lands that torment sentient beings and appear before them. These wondrously born bodhisattvas were of the highest order.

The commentary explains: They are called bodhisattva-mahāsattvas, because, in seeking bodhi, they understand all Three Vehicles, so as to select the greatest (mahā). Because the object is bodhi, they are called bodhisattvas. They have perfected the great vow, whereby self-benefit benefits others, since they seek mahābodhi in order to benefit sentient beings. Also the term sattva has the

meaning of courageous,²⁴¹ and thus they are called Buddhas, since they progress courageously. in seeking mahābodhi. Again, they are called mahāsattvas, because they completely understand all states of existence, in order to select that of supermundane bodhisattvas.

The sūtra praises the merits of these bodhisattvas in order to dispel any contemptuous feelings on the part of sentient beings. Others say that all the multitude of śrāvakas must respect all those bodhisattvas, who for a long time have practiced celibacy (brahma-cārya). Furthermore, these bodhisattvas are honored in order to lead sentient beings to elicit pure faith. How much more then [should they have pure faith in] the Tathāgatas. In praising the merits of these bodhisattvas, the text explains that they have three greatnesses, whereby they are called mahāsattvas (great beings). The first is the greatness of their numbers, in that they are immeasurable. The second is (300b) the greatness of their merits, which means that they abide in Mahāyāna, roam in Mahāyāna, and so forth. The third is the greatness of their action, in that they mitigate (praśamana) the passions of all sentient beings. Such a benefiting

²⁴¹The term sattva can be etymologically traced to sat, beautiful, wise, enduring, honest. Thus sat-tva can mean strength of character, resolution, and courage. See Monier-Williams, Dictionary, p. 1135.

and gladdening of sentient beings is the action of these bodhisattvas.

The phrase they assembled from all Buddha lands means that they came and assembled to hear the dharma teaching from all kinds of Buddha lands in the ten directions. There must have been some bodhisattvas from this world (sahāloka dhātu) among those bodhisattvas who assembled there, but the text says only that bodhisattvas from different places assembled there. They did not come to this assembly just because they wanted to control indolence (kausīdya) and pride, but rather they came from their realms freely because they wanted to hear the dharma teaching, and they were not led by others. They are all endowed with great spiritual powers (prabhāva) and have each come from their far-distant realms. But why is it that those other [śrāvakas] did not come to this assembly?

Above the text did not say that the multitude of śrāvakas came to that assembly, because they remained where they were. When it says that they came to that assembly from different places, this refers to the bodhisattvas. The text, however, speaks in general terms, and so does not make these distinctions.²⁴²

²⁴² Above on p. 424 it was explained that a great multitude of śrāvakas saw nirmāṇakāya on this earth.

In regard to the greatness of their merits, we must recognize nine kinds of merit greatness.

The First Merit: The Greatness of Their Zeal (Vīrya)

This means that they all dwelt in Mahāyāna because of the force of their zeal. Being firmly established in that Mahāyāna, they save sentient beings and cause them to escape samsāra, and lead them to elicit the desire for anuttarasamyaksambodhi.

The Second Merit: The Greatness of Their Cause

This means that they traversed that Mahāyāna dharma, i.e., the ten bhūmis, etc., in order to successively hear, reflect upon, and consider [that dharma teaching].

The Third Merit: The Greatness of their Object

This means that their minds were equal in regard to all beings, [who are the objects of their compassion], in that in regard to all sentient beings, they have attained the equality (samatā) of self and others, by means of their great compassion and impartial upāya.

The Fourth Merit: The Greatness of their Time

This means that they were free from all discrimination of kalpa (分別) and non-kalpa (不分別),

in that they are impartial to all time as if it were all one instant. [In the above sentence] kalpa (劫) is called vikalpa (分別). Because they are free from all discrimination (vikalpa)

in regard to all world ages (kalpa, 劫) or non-world ages (akalpa, 非劫), they do not discriminate (vikalpa, 分別) kalpa (劫) from non-kalpa (非劫), and, [not discriminating any time periods], they are able to practice for a long time without becoming weary. ²⁴³

The Fifth Merit: The Greatness of Their Non-Defilement

This means that they had suppressed all māra enmity, in that, because they abandon all acquisitions,

²⁴³This passage is rather difficult to render into acceptable English, because it involves a play on the words kalpa (time, age), and vikalpa (discriminate). Bandhuprabha points out that in the sūtra the word 分別 has two meanings: 1) kalpa, time-age, and 2) vikalpa, discrimination.

Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna avoids this confusion by having: bskal-pa dan bskal-pa-ma yin-pa rnam-par-rtoq-pa thams-cad-bral-ba, "they are entirely separated from all discrimination (rnam-par-rtoq-pa, vikalpa) of kalpa (bskal-pa) and non-kalpa (bskal-pa-ma)."

Nishio Kyoo, Buchikyōron no kenkyū, p. 207, points out that this point is further elucidated by Yüan-ts'e in his commentary on the Samdhinirmocanasūtra as follows: "In Sanskrit the word kalpa (劫) is interpreted as vikalpa (分別). Conditioned dharmas are supported by time-kalpa, and as each segment [of time] is differentiated, so they are discriminated (分別). Unconditioned dharmas are not supported by time-kalpa, and, because they have no segments of time-kalpa to be differentiated, they are termed non-discriminative (非分別)."

Thus the bodhisattvas not only do not discriminate the phenomenal flow of time into the segments of past, present, and future, but also they do not discriminate the unconditioned absence of time segments (asamskrta-akalpa) from the conditioned time flow (samskrta-kalpa). And, because they do not so discriminate, they do not cling to time periods and become weary. Thus they are able to practice the works of compassion in the world for long periods of time, i.e., until all sentient beings are saved.

they are able to suppress māra enmity As it is said:
 "When a bodhisattva knows that all those things that
 can be acquired have no enduring reality and in his
 mind he does not covet them, then he is able to suppress
 all māra enmity."²⁴⁴

The Sixth Merit: The Greatness of their Attention

This means that they were far removed from the thought
binding discrimination of all śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas
 in that they are far apart from and have severed all that
 kind of attention (manasikāra) which occurs in the Two
 Vehicles.

The Seventh Merit: The Greatness of their Sustenance

This means that they were sustained by the joy and
happiness of that expansive, great dharma taste, in
 that they take the joy of the Mahāyāna dharma taste
 as their sustenance.

The Eighth Merit: The Greatness of their Purity

This means that they rose above the five dreads,
 in that the purity of all the actions of their thinking,
 speaking, and moving delivers them from all dread.
 They do not transgress the śīla, nor have any reason to
 dread falling into evil destinies, etc. These five

²⁴⁴ Śīlabhadra quotes this as: "Those bodhisattvas of
 the sāgara-mūdra-samādhi, when they do not seek anything
 that can be acquired, destroy māra." This suggests that
 the quotation is from the Avatamsika lineage.

dreads are: insecurity,²⁴⁵ the dread of evil spells,²⁴⁶ the dread of dying, the dread of evil destinies, and the dread of going into crowds.²⁴⁷ When they realize the land of pure thought and happiness, (300c) all these five dreads are removed.

The Ninth Merit: The Greatness of Their Attainment

This means that they had assuredly entered the state of non-returning,²⁴⁸ which means that they single-mindedly have attained the prophecy of sarvajñāna, in that in this bhūmi they assuredly will not fall back. In the first seven bhūmis they still are involved in

²⁴⁵ 不活, htsho-pa med-pa, not having continued existence.

²⁴⁶ 惡名畏 is usually interpreted as the dread of a bad reputation. Śīlabhadra has: tshigs-su-gcad-pa med-pahi hjigs-pa, which Rahder equates with mi bsnags-pas hjigs-pa, the dread of not being praised. But literally the text of Śīlabhadra means: the dread of not being cut asunder by metrical verses, which is, to say the least, problematic. Nishio, Buchikyōron, p. 207, n. 3, points out that Yüan-ts'e's text reads: 惡誦畏, the dread of evil songs or verses. Perhaps the original meaning is this dread of evil incantations or spells, and, when later misunderstood, the negative med-pa was added.

²⁴⁷ 怯衆畏, dread of being nervous in crowds. Śīlabhadra has hkhor gyi naṁ du baq-tsha-bahi hjigs-pa, the dread of being afraid of going into crowds, i.e., the fear of publically preaching the dharma teaching. Such a fear is perhaps meant to describe the pratyeka-buddha, who delights only in solitude.

²⁴⁸ 不退轉, avaivartika, i.e., being so firm on the path to enlightenment that one is not liable to backslide, i.e., the state of being "predestined" or predicted to attain bodhi.

the work of intensified effort,²⁴⁹ and therefore have not attained the effortless path of non-returning. But in the rest of the bhūmis, because they are not so involved in the work of intensified effort, they have assuredly entered the bhūmi of non-returning. Because the bhūmi of non-returning is an effortless path, an assured entry, the text says that they assuredly enter the bhūmi of non-returning.

Then in the greatness of their action, they mitigate the oppressive lands that torment sentient beings and appear before them. This phrase means that all bodhi-sattvas are able to mitigate the oppressive lands of internal and external suffering that afflict sentient beings and for this purpose they render themselves visible before them. Since their land is one of great mercy and compassion, they are able to mitigate the sufferings of all internal ills, and the oppression that comes from the coveting of externals. Because these two [actions] bring benefit and happiness to sentient beings, those who have attained such are said to have come to the perfection of action.

²⁴⁹ 加行 , prayoga, i.e., prayogamārga, the path of intensified effort, the second of the five divisions of the path, in which insight into emptiness has not yet been attained, and one intensifies preparatory endeavours.

Again,²⁵⁰ that they all dwelt in Mahāyāna means that dwelling in pramuditābhūmi, when they realize the all pervasive paramārtha-dharmadhātu, they first attain the ultimate truth of the Mahāyāna dharma, and are therefore said to abide in Mahāyāna.²⁵¹

That they traverse that mahāyāna dharma means that in vimalābhūmi they practice bodhisattva śīla of the three sections.²⁵² The dharma teaching of the practice of Mahāyāna is identical with this śīla of three sections.

That their minds were equal in regard to all beings means that in prabhākarībhūmi they attain

²⁵⁰ This added commentary is not found in Śīlabhadra nor in any of the other parallel texts. It appears to be based on the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, and arranges the bodhisattva merits according to the daśabhūmi doctrine.

²⁵¹ The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "Pramuditābhūmi is the land of great joy. It gives rise to great joy, because, for the first time [the bodhisattva] attains the nature of a saint, realizes the two emptinesses, and is able to benefit both himself and others." (Poussin, p. 613; Wei Tat, p. 707). The realization of the two emptinesses of self and dharmas is paramārtha-dharmadhātu.

²⁵² 三聚戒 (三聚淨戒), i.e., bodhisattva-śīla. According to the Brahmajālasūtra these three sections are: 1) the śīla that supports the observances of vinaya, i.e., samvara-śīla, which are the ten pārājika or formal commandments, 2) the śīla that supports goodness, i.e., kuśala-dharma-śīla, and 3) the śīla that supports sentient beings, i.e., sattva-artha-kriya-śīla. These last two imply that bodhisattva śīla (morality), in benefiting others, is not bound by the formal observances in all cases.

all pre-eminent samādhis, elicit the four immeasurables,²⁵³ and impartially bring benefit and happiness to all sentient beings.

That they were free from all discrimination, etc. means that in arcismatibhūmi they attain the thirty-seven virtues favorable to enlightenment (bodhi-pākṣika), are apart from all kinds of discrimination, and do not distinguish discrimination from non-discrimination. Discrimination means the discrimination of ātmadrṣti, which is abandoned by insight. This is already severed at pramuditābhūmi. Non-discrimination means the innate ātmadrṣti, which is abandoned [only] by the practice of meditation. In this bhūmi it is severed.²⁵⁴

²⁵³ 四無量, catvāry-apramāṇāni, i.e., mercy, compassion, joy, and detachment. All four are elicited by means of samādhi and are directed to the benefit of others.

²⁵⁴ This commentary has dropped the play on words between kalpa and vikalpa (see note 243) in order to adjust the commentary to the thought of the Siddhi. The distinction here mentioned is found in the Siddhi: "Ātmagrāha (self-clinging) is of two kinds: innate (sahaja) and discriminated (vikalpita). Innate ātmagrāha is perpetually present to those with a body, because of internal causal influence of an illusory permeation, which has been going on from the beginningless beginning. Without dependency on false teachings or false reasonings, it operates spontaneously. . . . Being subtle, it is difficult to eliminate. It is only later in bhāvanāmārga that a bodhisattva . . . is finally able to annihilate it. Discriminative (分別) ātmagrāha does not only come from internal causes, but also depends on external factors, and so is not innate. . . . It is easily severed in darśanamārga. . ." (Poussin, pp. 16-18; Wei Tat, pp. 22-23).

All the dharmas associated with these two kinds of ātmadr̥ṣṭi are called all kinds of discrimination [in the sūtra], because the understanding of their functioning is different. Although they are progressively exhausted, yet this explanation gives their general characteristics, just as the fourth meditation (dhyāna) is said to be apart from both suffering and joy, or the result of the third [meditation] is said to be apart from the five lower obstacles.²⁵⁵

[But there are differences of opinion as to just which ātmadr̥ṣṭi is severed at this bhūmi.]

One opinion holds that at this [arcismati] bhūmi, the innate kleśa of the manas consciousness is completely severed.

A second opinion holds that ²⁵⁶ at this bhūmi

²⁵⁵ These are the 四禪, caturdhyāna, the four meditations of rūpadhātu. They are described as attaining an increasing degree of detachment from experiences of either adverse or pleasurable sensations and thoughts. The last, fourth dhyāna in single-minded recollection abandons all sensations of suffering or even the purest kind of pleasure. The five obstacles, or bonds 五下分(結), are variously given. One listing is covetousness, dislike, laziness, regret, and doubt. The point here is that, while the above description of the progressive elimination of ātma-grāha is quite specific as to what is eliminated when, it is no more than a general model, and admits of variations in individual cases.

²⁵⁶ This is the opinion of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: "The ātmadr̥ṣṭi associated with the manas consciousness is in opposition to the pure path. It ceases to appear in the eighth [acalā] bhūmi, but continues to appear in the

the innate ātmadr̥ṣṭi of the mano consciousness is completely severed, and not that of the manas consciousness, because in the seventh dūraṃgamābhūmi there still is some subtle functioning of subtle kleśa. If [such subtle kleśa] were lacking, then the manas consciousness would have no support for defilement,²⁵⁷ and consequently [the mano consciousness] would not be similar [in its support] to the five sense consciousnesses.²⁵⁸ If these subtle delusions of the manas consciousness were already severed, then the gross delusions of the

256cont. seventh [dūraṃgamābhūmi], serving as the supporting basis for the other kleśas. The ātmadr̥ṣṭi of the mano consciousness is gross, and therefore is suppressed first, while that of the manas consciousness is subtle, and is therefore suppressed later. Hence the ātmadr̥ṣṭi destroyed here in the fourth [arcīṣmati]bhūmi is associated only with the mano consciousness." (Poussin, p. 647; Wei Tat, p. 735).

257 無染依 is parallel to the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi's 與餘煩惱為依持. "Some subtle defilement of mano does exist in the first seven bhūmis, and therefore demands some supporting basis." (Poussin, p. 647; Wei Tat, p. 735).

258 The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi explains: "The Yogācāra-bhūmiśāstra establishes the necessity of the existence of the manas consciousness, which supports the mano consciousness, because that sixth mano consciousness must have a support similar to the five sense consciousnesses. If when the holy path arises or in the stage of no-training, the manas consciousness were not present as the support of the mano consciousness, the reasoning of the Yogācāra-bhūmiśāstra would be invalid. . ." (Poussin, p. 270; Wei Tat, pp. 313-315). From the manner in which the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa compressed the rather abstruse argumentation of the Siddhi, it seems clear that it presupposes that the reader is familiar with that work.

mano consciousness would not function in the fifth, sixth, and seventh bhūmis. And such would be contrary to the teaching of the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra²⁵⁹ and the Samdhinirmocanasūtra.²⁶⁰ Such a state would be similar to vajropamasamādhi as it occurs in the Two Vehicles. For if the delusions of manas together with the subtle kleśa of mano were both severed at the same moment, then [it would be the case of the arhat, where] the subtle kleśa of manas was severed first, (301a) and the gross kleśa of mano severed later.²⁶¹

²⁵⁹ Chapter fifty-one of the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra (T. 30, pp. 579-584) treats the relationships between the various consciousnesses, but this argument seems to have been drawn from the Mahāvānasamgrahaśāstra: "[If there were no kliṣṭamanas], then there would be no similarity between [mano] and the five [sense consciousnesses], and that would be an error. In effect, the five sense consciousnesses have for their simultaneous support (sahabhū-āśraya) the eye, etc. [In like manner mano must have its simultaneous support, i.e., manas]." (T. 31, p. 133c; Lamotte, La Somme, p. 18). This similarity consists in the fact that, since the sense consciousnesses each have their specific support in their respective organs, so mano must have its specific support in manas.

²⁶⁰ Since there is no clear idea of manas in the Samdhinirmocanasūtra, it is difficult to understand just why Bandhuprabha cites it here. Perhaps he had in mind the following passage from the Samdhinirmocana, which is cited in the Siddhi: "In the eighth bhūmi and above, all the kleśas are no longer operative, and there remains only jñeyavarāṇa." (Poussin, p. 273; Wei Tat, p. 317).

²⁶¹ In discussing the arhats of Hīnayāna, the Siddhi reads: "All the seeds of these kleśas [which are innate in manas], and which are extremely subtle, together with the kleśas of the lowest order, are severed at the same instant, because they are of equal force [in obstructing

Therefore in this fourth [arcīsmati]bhūmi one attains the wisdom cessation of anātman in the mano consciousness, but the innate ātman-dr̥ṣṭi is not yet severed and the subtle kleśa of manas consciousness, in addition to some delusions of mano consciousness, remain to be severed by the practice of meditation. Thus when the sūtra speaks of suppressing and being free [from all kinds of discrimination], this is not to be understood as an absolute cessation. When one reaches the diamond-like (vajropama) mind in the tenth dharmameghabhūmi, then all are instantaneously severed and annihilated, because their seeds have been severed by the practice of meditation.²⁶²

²⁶¹cont. nirvāṇa]. When vajropamasamādhi is attained, they instantaneously sever these seeds and attain the stage of arhatship, of no-training, where such will never again arise." (Poussin, p. 268; Wei Tat, p. 311). In the case of an arhat, when all kleśa is destroyed, they attain nirvāṇa, but a bodhisattva must retain some subtle kleśa, in order to maintain phenomenal existence. It is the nature of this subtle kleśa that is the focus in this discussion.

²⁶²The Siddhi has: "The seeds of jñeyāvarana to be severed by the practice of meditation (bhavanaheya) are progressively severed in the course of the ten bhūmis. At the moment of vajropamasamādhi they are completely abandoned. As to their manifestation, from the earlier bhūmis they are gradually suppressed until at the tenth bhūmi they are completely abandoned. In the eighth [acala] bhūmi and above, that which is joined to mano consciousness no longer functions, because the mind of uncontaminated insight and its results are continuous and are able to

That they suppress all māra enmity means that in surdurjayābhūmi they see that the four noble truths are all of an equal nature (samatā), and they suppress the māra enmity that makes distinctions between appropriating samsāra and nirvāṇa.²⁶³

That they were far removed from the thought-binding discrimination of all śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas means that in abhimukhībhūmi they gain the insight that the twelve nīdanas (i.e., the causal links of phenomenal existence), which give rise to both defilement and purity, are all of an equal nature (samatā), and they are thus far removed from the thought-binding discrimination of the Two Vehicles, which do distinguish between the defilement of oppression and the purity of joy.²⁶⁴

²⁶²cont. oppose [its functioning]. That which is joined to manas consciousness is yet able to function, but when the wisdom of the emptiness of dharmas and its fruits arise, then it will be suppressed... ." (Poussin, pp. 654-655; Wei Tat, pp. 743-745)

By identifying this passage of the Buddhabhūmisūtra with the Siddhi's description of arcīsmatībhūmi, Bandhuprabha seemed to imply that "all kinds of discrimination" were severed at this bhūmi, which is contrary to the Siddhi. Thus the attempt to co-ordinate it above.

²⁶³The Siddhi has: "... at this bhūmi one... synthesizes the two wisdoms of paramārtha and saṃvṛti." (Poussin, p. 615; Wei Tat, p. 709).

²⁶⁴The Siddhi has: "They dwell in pratītyasamutpāda-jñāna (住緣起智)." (Poussin, p. 615; Wei Tat, p. 709).

That they were sustained by the joy and happiness of that expansive, great dharma taste means that in dūramgamābhūmi they realized the unmarked truth, and in the wisdom of emptiness, they give rise to pre-eminent practice and experience the joy of the great dharma.²⁶⁵

That they rose above the five dreads means that in acalābhūmi, all kleśa no longer functions. It is because they are liberated from the causes of the five dreads that they are said to have risen above those five dreads. The fruits of these five dreads have already been severed at pramuditābhūmi.²⁶⁶

That they have assuredly entered the state of non-returning means that in sādhumatībhūmi they have certainly entered the state of non-returning, which is replete with all the ten [pāramitās] of bodhisattva practice.

²⁶⁵The Siddhi has: "[at this bhūmi] he arrives at the unmarked abode (無相住, animitta-vihāra). . ." (Poussin, p. 616, Wei Tat, p. 709). Unmarked thought is identical with the wisdom of emptiness.

²⁶⁶The Siddhi has: ". . . at this bhūmi, non-discriminative wisdom (nirvikalpa-jñāna) functions spontaneously and in a continuous series, and the kleśas, which are marked and effort-full, are unable to agitate it." (Poussin, p. 616; Wei Tat, p. 709).

That they mitigate the oppressive lands
that torment sentient beings means that in
dharmameghabhūmi they attain great dharmakāya,
 give rise to the cloud (megha) of great com-
 passion, rain down the great dharma rain, and
 eradicate all the oppressive elements that
 torment sentient beings.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁷The above commentary has aligned the Buddhabhūmi-
sūtra's description of the merits of the bodhisattvas
 with the explanation of the daśabhūmi in the Vijñapti-
mātratāsiddhiśāstra. Katsumata Shunkyo in his Bukkyo
ni okeru shinishikisetsu no kenkyū, although he treats
 many parallel passages between the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa
 and the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra, does not mention
 this section at all. The description of the daśabhūmi
 in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi is a traditional one and
 is paralleled in many other sources. (Samdhinirmocana,
 Lamotte, pp. 238-241; Mahāyānasamgraha, Lamotte, pp.
 196-211) Therefore, even if the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa's
 commentary is similar to the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi's
 account, it cannot on that account be concluded that the
 former is dependent on the latter. However, the section
 on arcīṣmatibhūmi occupies a relatively large section
 of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa's commentary, in order to
 avoid the unwanted inference that the phrase "all kinds
 of discrimination" means that at this fourth bhūmi
 all kleśa is severed. The reasoning in this section,
 as shown in the notes, seems to be clearly based on the
Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, and indeed to be difficult to
 understand without reference to the Siddhi. This would
 indicate that the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa was written in
 a milieu where one could assume familiarity with the
 teachings and the text of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra.
 Thus one could tentatively conclude that the text
 of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra was known in India,
 and was not, as the tradition claims, handed unseen to
 the pilgrim Hsüan-tsang.

Futhermore, these ten phrases from the sūtra could also be interpreted according to the ten pāramitās, the ten great vows, etc., because from pramuditābhūmi on each successive bhūmi supports the practices of all the bhūmis.

The phrase these wondrous bodhisattvas were of the highest order means that they are able to elicit the bhūmi of samādhi, which is replete with merit. They are said to be wondrously born, because these bodhisattvas have attained this bhūmi of samādhi. Because the names of these bodhisattvas are all expressive of the dharma,²⁶⁸ just like Maitreya, these wondrously born bodhisattvas are foremost in that multitude, and thus they are said to be of the highest order.

Below the sūtra will only speak of bodhisattvas, because it is summarizing what is here explained, and thus employs but one term. But the rest of that multitude should be understood to be included in that number. The intent of the compiler of this dharma teaching was simply to summarize, [and not to exclude the others from that multitude]. (301b)

²⁶⁸ 依法, dependent on the dharma. Śīlabhadra has: chos-ñid kyis rab-tu-phye-ba, they are named by means of the dharma, i.e., just as Maitreya is so called because he is merciful (maitrī), so all bodhisattvas are named in accord with their specific dharma characteristics, and are thus expressive of the dharma.

PART TWO
THE CONTENT OF THE TEACHING
CHAPTER ONE

An Analysis of the Five Bodhi Dharmas

The sūtra says: At that time the Bhagavan addressed the wondrously born bodhisattvas as follows: You wondrously born ones should know that there are five kinds of dharmas that comprise the land of mahabodhi: pure dharmadhātu, mirror wisdom, equality wisdom, intellectual mastery wisdom, and duty fulfillment wisdom.²⁶⁹

The commentary explains:²⁷⁰ We have now explained the first part, which deals with the cause for the arising of this teaching. This next part will explain the content of this sacred teaching.

²⁶⁹ These are: 清淨法界, dharmadhātu-pariśuddhi, the most pure dharma-realm; 大圓鏡智, adarśana-jñāna, the wisdom of the great mirror; 平等性智, samata-jñāna; 妙觀察智, pratyavēkṣana-jñāna, the wisdom of intellectual mastery; and 成所作智, krtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna, the wisdom of duty fulfillment.

²⁷⁰ This introductory analysis, which comprises the whole of chapter three of the Chinese text, is meant as an analysis of the nature of the five dharmas in order to lead the reader to an intelligent understanding of the following sections which treat each of these dharmas as they are presented in the similes of the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra. It is thus a propaedeutic to the body of the doctrinal content of the sūtra and the doctrinal interpretations of the commentary. Śīlabhadra's text has only the four headings of number, support, name, and discernment. Bandhuprabha inserts a length commentary after the third item, so as to emphasize Dharmapāla's thinking.

1) What audience was intended to receive this teaching?

The sūtra text says that he addressed himself only to the wondrously born bodhisattvas, because they were the recipients of this pre-eminent teaching. But why did he not address himself [also] to the multitude of śrāvakas?

This is because the minds of the bodhisattvas were set on seeking all wisdom (sarvajñāna), and only they, having heard such dharma teaching, would give rise to pre-eminent understanding. Only they, having given rise to pre-eminent understanding, would be able to penetrate [its depths]. Only they, having penetrated [its depths], would be able to correctly practice [its teachings]. Only they, having correctly practiced [its teachings], would be able to quickly carry it to completion. Śrāvakas are unable to seek all wisdom (sarvajñāna). Even if they were able to seek to hear such a dharma teaching, they would not give rise to pre-eminent understanding. Even if they were to give rise to pre-eminent understanding, they would not be able to correctly practice [its teachings]. Even if they were able to correctly practice [its teachings], they would not be able to carry it to completion. Thus he did not address them.

If this is so, then, when he spoke this sūtra, why

did he include [those śrāvakas] in the assembly [in the first place]? He did this so that, when he taught [this sūtra], that multitude would be extremely large,

So he transformed their lineage (gotra), so that he could lead those śrāvakas, who had turned toward bodhi, to elicit the desire for that great bodhi, and thus he drew them to enter that great multitude.

Or perhaps, there is no contradiction here, because it was actually bodhisattvas who manifested themselves under the visible appearance [of these śrāvakas].

Altogether there are four marks by which the Buddha land is established: number, support, name, and penetrating discernment (nirvedha-prabheda). We will now explain what is meant by these terms.

2) What is the number of dharmas that comprise bodhi?

Number means that there are five kinds of dharmas [that comprise bodhi]. Later we will explain their specific natures. Their number is really self-apparent [from the sūtra text], and it is here mentioned only to be perfectly clear: there are only five dharmas, no more and no less. Although dharma means that which supports an individual mark (svalakṣaṇa), this does not mean that they generate the results of karmic maturation

that can be clung to.²⁷¹

3) How do these dharmas support bodhi?

Support means that these five dharmas support the land of mahābodhi. Mahābodhi is enlightenment, which is endowed with the three bodies of the essence (svabhāvika), enjoyment (sambhoga), and transformation (nirmāṇa). These will afterwards be explained in detail. That land [of mahābodhi] is the entire range of the practice that is embodied upon the ground of mahābodhi.²⁷² We

²⁷¹ A dharma means that which supports svalakṣaṇa, for it is the unitary content of an act of understanding. As svalakṣaṇa, it is pre-verbal and immediate, because it is the object of pratyakṣa, direct perception. Any verbal understanding passes into anumāna, inference, and is valid only inasmuch as it arises from direct insight (pratyakṣa). Thus the understanding of any dharma is not the result of the parikalpita process that externalizes meaning units as external realities, but rather is the result of understanding the process of understanding. A dharma then is the content of a unitary act of conscious understanding manifested in the reasoned verbalization of direct, pre-verbal perception. Dharmas are clung to, not because they arise from either direct perception or inference, both of which are valid, but because they are imagined to be externally real.

²⁷² 大覺所依所攝所行境界 . Śīlabhadra has: de-dag-gi sā ni bgrod-pahi yul, Pure land is the place to be gone to (gamyadeśa). This merely recommends pure land as the goal to be sought. Bandhuprabha has evidently expanded the text. 所行 does not here mean gamyadeśa, but rather carita, the practice [of wisdom]. 所攝 appears to be equivalent to saṃgrahita, the embracing of the basis (所依, āśraya) by that practice. Since these are descriptions of the pure land as endowed with trikāya, the ground or basis (āśraya) corresponds with dharmakāya, the embodiment or embracing of that ground (所攝, saṃgrahita) is sambhogakāya, i.e., the awareness of the experience of bodhi, and the practice (所行, carita) is the phenomenal manifestation of that awareness in nirmāṇa-kāya.

establish a differentiation in the objects [of direct perception, which are] the individual marks (svalakṣaṇa), because all dharmas fall within the range [of mahābodhi]. To establish the object [of mahābodhi] means that [that object] includes everything. But to establish the individual marks (svalakṣaṇa) means that the essences (svabhāva) included therein are united with [that mahābodhi].²⁷³ (301c)

In that land of mahābodhi there are unlimited merits of two kinds: conditioned (samskrta) and unconditioned (asamskrta). Unconditioned merit is supported by pure dharmadhātu. That pure dharmadhātu is the unconditioned merit of tathatā. All such [merits] are [but mental] differentiations of the essence of tathatā.

²⁷³ 中立自相唯攝自體合為一故。Śīlabhadra has: de nid kyi phyir bsdus-pa shes bsad de, dehi bdaq-nid du gnas-pahi phyir ro. gcig-tu-bya ba ni rañ-gi mtshan-nid kyis bsdus-pa yin yo, "Because in fact, when we speak of what is embraced (bsdus-pa, saṃgrahita), because it dwells in the essence (bdaq-nid, svabhāva), its unity [with the essence] embraces svalakṣaṇa." (Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyana, p. 56). The point is that, in order to express doctrinal thinking at all, differentiations must be made, but the making of such differentiations does not imply the extroverted consciousness of a naive realism. For the essences (svabhāva) or dharmas known by a reasoning analysis (anumāna) of direct perception (pratyakṣa), i.e., the establishing in verbal concepts of svalakṣaṇa, are understood as mental processes, and do not imply that these concepts really point to actual things separated from the essence of wisdom, from the essence of consciousness. Thus Dharmapāla's lineage of thinking employs the terms svalakṣaṇa and svabhāva, not in the sense of external realities, but rather as the verbalized content of conscious acts of understanding.

Conditioned merits are supported by the four wisdoms, because, being uncontaminated (anāśrava), the activity of these wisdoms is strong. It is thus that wisdom is visibly manifested.

All kinds of beings that are characterized by consciousness or conscious states (citta-caittas), in paramārthasatya are endowed with each of these wisdoms, and support the dharma doors of all merit. But, when they are yet characterized by defilement, then the wisdom of intellectual mastery supports the four meditations²⁷⁴ and gains deep insight into all bodies, etc. Equality wisdom supports the four correct efforts²⁷⁵ and the four immeasurables.²⁷⁶ The four correct efforts, although they have zeal (vīrya) as their essence, are yet supported by the Tathāgata's equality wisdom and have no evaluative

²⁷⁴ 四念住, catvāri-smṛty-upasthānāni, the four stages of mindfulness, the first four of the thirty-seven bodhipāṅśika virtues. These four are: the meditation on the body as impure and filthy, on the constant suffering of consciousness, on the impermancy of consciousness, and on the transitory nature of things.

²⁷⁵ 四正斷, catvāri-samyak-prahāṇāni, i.e., the four correct efforts (勤): the effort to put an end to existing evil, to prevent future evil, to bring good into existence, and to develop existing good. These are the second category of the bodhipāṅśika virtues.

²⁷⁶ 四無量, catvāri-apramāṇāni, mercy, compassion, joy, and detachment. Śīlabhadra's text explains these as being supported not by equality wisdom, but by intellectual mastery wisdom.

marks.²⁷⁷ The four immeasurables, because their action is impartial and equal, are supported by equality wisdom. The steps to spiritual powers (rddhi),²⁷⁸ because they have samādhī as their essence, are supported by intellectual mastery wisdom. It is the support of all dharāṇī and samādhī practices, as will be explained below in the sūtra. Therefore, the dharāṇī and samādhī practices of other meditations (dhyāna), recollections (samāpatti), understandings (adhimukti), and contemplations (samādhī), the wisdom of peaceful resolve (araṇā-praṇidhī-jñāna), penetrating, unobstructed understandings (pratisamvid), the powers of the Tathāgata uncommon eighty Buddha dharma, the powers of fearlessness, etc., all these in their various aspects are supported by the wisdom of intellectual mastery.

The many aspects of wisdom insight of the spiritual powers²⁷⁹ are supported by duty fulfillment wisdom.

²⁷⁷ 無高下相, i.e., having no marks of high or low. Śīlabhadra has: dor-ba med ciñ b(q)shaq-pa med-paḥi mtshan-ñid, which Nishio (Buchikyōron, p. 209) translates as: "The mark of not rejecting (dor-ba) and not abiding (b(q)shaq-pa)."

²⁷⁸ 四如意足, rddhipāda, i.e., the third category of the bodhipakṣika virtues: concentration, zeal, recollection, and contemplation.

²⁷⁹ 神境智通, rddhi-visaya-abhiññā, i.e., the five spiritual faculties (pañca-indriyani) of the bodhipakṣika listing: faith, zeal, recollection, samādhī, and wisdom. These are insights gained from the prior practice of rddhipāda.

The spiritual power and the Buddha power of the wisdom that exhausts contamination²⁸⁰ are supported by all four wisdoms, inasmuch as they continuously destroy contamination, but, inasmuch as they have as their object nirvāṇa, which exhausts contamination, they are supported by mirror wisdom and equality wisdom. The wisdom powers of the seven all pervading practices²⁸¹ are supported by all four wisdoms. All the powers of wisdoms and of all basic wisdoms in their many aspects are supported by mirror wisdom and equality wisdom. The seven grades of bodhi²⁸² and the eight-fold path²⁸³ in their many aspects are supported in equality wisdom.

²⁸⁰ 漏盡智, āsrava-ksaya-jñāna, the wisdom that exhausts contamination. 漏盡智通, āsrava-ksaya-jñāna-rddhi, is one of the spiritual powers, attained by the arhat, which is based upon wisdom. 漏盡智力, āsrava-ksaya-jñāna-bala, is one of the Buddha's ten powers. Here they include the pañca-balāni, the five powers that form the fifth category of the bodhipāksika virtues.

²⁸¹ 七遍行行智力, i.e., 七覺分, the seven grades of bodhi. See following note. The powers of these virtues are supported by all four wisdoms, but, as stated below, the virtues themselves are supported by equality wisdom.

²⁸² 覺支, i.e., 七覺分, saptabodhyaṅga, the sixth category of the bodhipāksika virtues. They are: discernment of the true and the false, zeal in making progress, joy, removal of all heaviness of body and mind, remembrance of all contemplative states, samādhi power to maintain the mind without diversion, and abandonment of all distractions.

²⁸³ 道支, i.e., 八正道, asta-mārga, the eight-fold path, which is the seventh and last category of the bodhipāksika virtues. The point is that all the virtues favorable to wisdom are included in the four wisdoms, and thus these four comprise all that is to be known on wisdom.

The true uncontaminated state of the ten wisdoms of suffering, etc.²⁸⁴ in their many aspects are supported by mirror wisdom and equality wisdom. Mindfulness of the dharma in its many aspects is supported by mirror wisdom. Severance from continuous karmic maturation (vāsanā) in its many aspects is supported by pure dharmadhātu and mirror wisdom. The pāramitās, whether they be uncontaminated or yet appear as contaminated, in their many aspects are supported by pure dharmadhātu and mirror wisdom, but if they are really contaminated, then they are supported by the last two wisdoms.²⁸⁵

²⁸⁴These ten wisdoms are explained in the Abhidharma-kośa (Poussin, Kośa, 26) as saṃvṛti-jñāna, conventional wisdom; dharmajñāna, recognizing the truth of dharmas in rūpadhātu according to the Four Truths; anvaya-jñāna recognizing the truth of dharmas in arūpadhātu according to the Four Truths; duḥkha-jñāna, the wisdom that gains insight into suffering; samudaya-jñāna, the wisdom that gains insight into the origin of suffering; nirodha-jñāna, the wisdom that gains insight into the cessation of suffering; mārga-jñāna, the wisdom that gains insight into the path whereby suffering may be brought to cessation; para-citta-jñāna, spiritual mental telepathy; kṣaya-jñāna, the wisdom of the exhaustion of contamination; and anutpada-jñāna, the wisdom of no birth. They here correspond to the last category of the bodhipākṣika virtues, the eight-fold path.

²⁸⁵波羅蜜多若是無漏若似有漏多分攝在後=智中。
The Chinese text appears to have omitted a phrase here. Śīlabhadra reads: pha-rol-tu-phyin-pa zaq-pa med-pa rnam kyañ chos-kyi-dbyiñs rnam-par-daḡ-pa dañ me-lon-lta-buñi ye-śes kyi bsdus so. zaq-pa-dañ-bcas-pa rnam ni ye-śes tha-ma gñis kyis bsdus so: "Anaśrava-paramita are supported in pure dharmadhātu and saśrava [paramita] are supported by the last two wisdoms." (Nishio, Buddha-bhūmivyākhyāna, p. 58). The Chinese has omitted the sentence on saśrava-pāramitā. I have thus followed the Tibetan in the above translation.

All the major and minor marks [of a Buddha] in their many aspects are supported by duty fulfillment wisdom. All other Buddha dharmas or their associated marks are also so supported.

And so these four wisdoms completely support all Buddha lands, all uncontaminated consciousness and conscious states, whether they be taken together, or whether the varieties of their manifestations are distinguished. The pure dharmadhātu supports the merit above all marks, which is tathatā. (302a) Thus these five dharmas together support the merits of all Buddha lands.²⁸⁶

4) What is the meaning of these five dharmas?

Name refers to pure dharmadhātu down to duty fulfillment wisdom.

Pure dharmadhātu means: 1) that it is separated from the adventitious defilements of [the obstacles of] passion (kleśa) and knowledge (jñeya),²⁸⁷ 2) the

²⁸⁶ Bandhuprabha's intent in this added passage is to emphasize the point that all the previous doctrines on wisdom are summarized and subsumed in this teaching on the five dharmas. The five dharmas are then an attempt to synthesize all the prior thinking on the nature and functioning of wisdom.

²⁸⁷ 客塵障垢, āgantuka-mala, adventitious or incidental defilement. Silabhadra's text reads: ses-bya dañ ñon-moñs-paḥi sgrib-pa thams-cad las dben-pa chos-kyi-dbyiñs rnam-par-dag-pa ni. . ., "pure dharmadhātu, which is separated from all the obstacles of passion and knowledge. . ." (Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 60; Buchikyōron, p. 211). The phrase āgantuka-mala does not

indefectible, true nature of all conditioned and unconditioned dharmas,²⁸⁸ 3) that it is the cause from which all sacred dharmas arise,²⁸⁹ 4) that it is the

287cont. occur in the Tibetan. The original source for this sentence appears to be the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter IX, verse 56: sarvadharmadvyāvāra-tathatāśuddhi-lakṣaṇa, "All dharmas are tathatā, marked by purity from the two obstacles." Vasubandhu's commentary reads: kleśa-jñeya-avarāṇa-dvyāt-sarvadharmatathatāviśuddhi-lakṣaṇa, which simply spells out more clearly the above meaning. Here also the phrase āgantuka-mala does not occur. However, that section of the Viññaptimātratāsiddhi, which described originally pure nirvāṇa (anadikalika-prakṛtiśuddha-nirvāṇa) does have the term 雖有客染 (Wei Tat, p. 758). As this section probably is the source for the latter part of Bandhuprabha's commentary, it is also most likely the source for the phrase āgantuka-mala here.

288 一切有為無為等法無倒實性. Śīlabhadra has: chos thams-cad kyi de-bshin-ñid phyin-ci-ma-log-pahi rañ-bshin, "tathatā of all dharmas and the indefectible nature." (Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 60). Nishio also points out, Buchikyōron, p. 134, that in Sthiramati's Madhyāntavibhāgatika, pariniṣpanna-svabhāva (i.e., dharmadhātupariśuddhi) is also described as being the support of the conditioned path (samskrta-mārga). Although the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa has the words samskrta-asamskrta in place of the Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna's tathatā, the underlying meaning of both is that dharmadhātu is the ground and support for all dharmas. On this point then, the differences do not seem to be of doctrinal import.

289 一切聖法生長依因. Śīlabhadra reads: hphags-pahi chos thams-cad ñe-bar-bskyed pahi rogyu ste, "It is the cause of the production of all sacred dharmas." It is the cause for the manifestation of teaching, because, as Asaṅga explained, teaching (ālambana-vyavādāna) is an outflow from pure dharmadhātu. It is the cause for the purified consciousness that understands that teaching, inasmuch as it is the dominant enabling condition (adhipatipratyaya) that brings it about that sentient beings can cultivate their own seeds, which are the direct cause (hetupratyaya) of enlightenment.

true essence of all Tathāgatas,²⁹⁰ 5) that it is essential purity from the beginningless beginning,²⁹¹ 6) that it is endowed with all kinds of essential merits, which surpass the number of atomic particles in all the ten directions,²⁹² 7) that it is neither born nor destroyed, just like empty space,²⁹³ 8) that it is universally present to and common to all dharmas and all all sentient beings,²⁹⁴ 9) that it is neither identical

²⁹⁰ 一切如來真實自體 . Sīlabhadra has: de-bshin-gsēgs-pa thams-cad kyi bdag-ñid yin no, "It is the essence of all Tathāgatas." (Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 60). Compare the Madhyāntavibhāga: tathatā bhūta-kotiś cañimit-tam paramārthatā/ dharma-dhātus ca paryayaś śūnyatayaś samasatah// ananyathā'viparyayaś-tan-nirodharya-gocaraiḥ/ hetuvac carya-dharmanam paryayartho yathā-kramam. "Synonyms for expressing emptiness are tathatā, the reality limit, the unmarked, the highest truth, and dharmadhātu, which respectively mean unchanging [tathatā], indefectible, the cessation of marks, the sphere of saints (i.e., the highest truth), and the cause of sacred dharmas (i.e., dharmadhātu)." (Madhyāntavibhāga, chapter I, verses 14-15; Yeh A-yüeh, Yuishiki-shisō no kenkyū, pp. 47-50).

²⁹¹ From this point the commentary on dharmadhātu finds no parallel in the Tibetan text, but it does correspond with the Viññaptimātratāsiddhi's treatment of originally pure nirvāṇa, which "is pure in its essence (prakṛtiśuddha)," (Wei Tat, p. 758; Poussin, p. 670).

²⁹² The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi has: "It is endowed with excellent qualities without number or measure." (Wei Tat, p. 758; Poussin, p. 670-671).

²⁹³ 無生無滅猶如虛空 . The same phrase occurs in the Viññaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra. (Wei Tat, p. 758; Poussin, p. 671).

²⁹⁴ 遍一切法一切有情 . The Viññaptimātratā reads: 一切有情平等共有, i.e., "[It] is equal and common for all sentient beings." (Wei Tat, p. 758; Poussin, p. 671).

with nor different from all dharmas and it is neither existent nor non-existent,²⁹⁵ and 10) that, being separated from all marks, from all discrimination, from all naming, it is entirely unattainable [by means of these], and is realized only by the wisdom of pure saints.²⁹⁶ Tathatā, which is revealed by the anātman of the two emptinesses [of self and of dharmas] is the essence [of dharmadhātu]. In part all saints realize it, and in full all Buddhas realize it. Therefore it is called pure dharmadhātu.

Mirror wisdom means: 1) that it is separated from the clinging to I and mine (ātamgrāha-ātmiyagraha), from all subject-object dichotomies (grāhyagrāha-grāhakagrāha). 2) that its object (ālambana) and mode of activity (ākāra) are difficult to know, 3) that it is not confused nor forgetful in regard to all objects of knowledge,²⁹⁷

²⁹⁵ The first clause 與一切法不一不異 is identical with the Viññaptimātratāsiddhi. (Wei Tat, p. 758; Poussin, p. 671).

²⁹⁶ The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi reads: "Being separated from all marks and all discrimination, the path of reasoning is severed and the path of names is cut off. It is only realized internally by true saints." (Wei Tat, p. 758; Poussin, p. 671).

²⁹⁷ 不愚不忘一切境界 . Śīlabhadra has: dmigs-pa ma-lus-pa bsñel-ba-mi-mñah-ba, [the wisdom], which does not forget any object. (Buddhabhūmivyākhyana, p. 60). No equivalent is found for the words 不愚. The entire phrase, however, does occur in the Siddhi. In his Shu-chi, K'uei-chi explains: "The phrase 不愚 means that it is not bewildered or obscured, and thus sarvākārajñāna and sarvajñāna are attributed to the Tathāgata."

4) that it does not discriminate the differences in the marks of knowable objects,²⁹⁸ 5) that at all times and in all places it is without interruption and without cessation, 6) that it is absolutely separated from the contaminated seeds of the obstacle of passion, 7) that it is replete with the seeds of all pure, uncontaminated merit, 8) that it is able to manifest and give birth to all wisdom images in all realms, 9) that it is the basic support (āśraya) for the images of all bodies and lands, 10) that it upholds the merits of all Buddha lands, and 11) that it will never come to an end and has no point of termination.²⁹⁹ Therefore it is named mirror

²⁹⁷cont. (Wei Tat, p. 766; Poussin, p. 682). The original source of the phrase is probably the Mahāyāna-sūtrālamkāra, chapter IX, verse 68: adarśa-jñāna-mamama-aparicchinnaṃ sadā-anugaṃ/ sarva-jñeye-svasammudham na ca teṣv-amukhaṃ sadā, "Mirror wisdom has no I and mine, is not delimited, but is always continuing. It is not fooled about all objects of knowledge, but is always present to them."

²⁹⁸Śīlabhadra has: śes-bya dan rnam-pa tha-dad-par-shugs-pa, "it does not enter into discrimination in regard to the knowable." (Buddhabhūmividyākhyāna, p. 60). Thus the Chinese should be punctuated as: 不分別知境相差別.

²⁹⁹The corresponding passage from the Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi reads: "The mind associated with mirror wisdom is separated from all discrimination. Its objects and modes of activity are subtle and difficult to know. In regard to all objects it is neither forgetful nor confused. In its essential nature it is pure and apart from all confusion and defilement. It is the basic support for seeds that manifest pure, full merits. It is able to manifest and give birth to images of lands and bodies. Without interruption or cessation, it never comes to an end. Like a great mirror, it manifests a multitude of images." (Wei Tat, p. 766; Poussin, pp. 681-682).

wisdom.

Equality wisdom means that [this wisdom] has deep insight into the universal equality of self and others, and is constantly associated with great mercy and compassion. Constantly and without interruption it establishes non-abiding (apratisthita) nirvāṇa of Buddha land, and at will confers happiness upon all sentient beings. It manifests all kinds of images of sambhogakāya and nirmāṇakāya. It is the specific support for the wisdom of intellectual mastery. Therefore it is named equality wisdom.³⁰⁰

The wisdom of intellectual mastery means that [this wisdom] has deep insight without hindrance in regard to the differentiations of all objects.³⁰¹ It supports and remembers all dhāraṇī and samādhi practices, and all wondrous samādhis. In the great assembly it is able to manifest all masterful activity, cut off all doubts, and pour down the great dharma rain. Therefore it is named the wisdom of intellectual mastery.³⁰²

³⁰⁰This paragraph does find a parallel in Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, except that the last item is omitted. But it completely parallels the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Wei Tat, p. 769; Poussin, p. 683.

³⁰¹The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "It discerns the common and individual marks of all dharmas." (Wei Tat, p. 769; Poussin, p. 683).

³⁰²Compare Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Wei Tat, p. 769; Poussin, p. 683.

The wisdom of duty fulfillment is [the wisdom] that is able to manifest various, immeasurable, innumerable, inconceivable Buddha transformations in all world realms whatsoever, as they are appropriate to the sentient beings to be converted and matured. Its upāya constantly and without interruption brings benefit and happiness to all sentient beings. Therefore it is named the wisdom of duty fulfillment. (302b)

5) The five dharmas as cause and result

Next we will treat the five dharmas from the standpoint of cause, result, and the distinctions of those results. The cause is pure dharmadhātu, because it is the cause that is able to give birth to and increase sacred dharmas. The result is those sacred wisdoms, which arise with it (i.e., dharmadhātu) as object (ālambanapratyaya), because they depend upon it. There are four kinds of these sacred wisdom results, which are distinguished according to their arising. This means that, having dharmadhātu as object, they support all dharma teachings as heard, they realize the equality of self and others among all sentient beings, they manifest the pre-eminent upāya of the true dharma, and they cause benefit to others.³⁰³

³⁰³ This section has been relocated by Bandhuprabha. It corresponds to section 5.1.1. on p. 58 of Nishio, Buddhabhūmividyākhyāna.

Next we will treat these five dharmas from the standpoint of Buddha essence, cause, and result. The Buddha essence has pure tathatā as its essential mark (i.e., dharmadhātupariśuddhi), and that non-discriminative wisdom (nirvikalpañāna) which takes that [tathatā] as its object is its essential mark (i.e., mirror wisdom). Again the cause is that which, being constant and continuous, is the wisdom of equality among all sentient beings (i.e., equality wisdom), and the result refers to the benefit [bestowed upon] all sentient beings. The two [last] wisdoms discern (intellectual mastery) who can be converted and who cannot, and, as appropriate, complete the task (duty fulfillment).³⁰⁴

Next, we will treat these five dharmas from the standpoint of their differences as the results in Buddha land. The result of wisdom and severance is the substance of Buddha land. This result of severance is pure dharmadhātu, because there it is absolutely severed from all obstacles. Wisdom is the four wisdoms of mirror wisdom, etc. They are the manifestations of consciousness and conscious states in that land of Buddha results.

Among all merits, wisdom is the most pre-eminent, and it is named wisdom, because in general

³⁰⁴This paragraph corresponds to Buddhabhūmivākyāna, 5.1.2 on p. 58.

it supports all conditioned merits.³⁰⁵

Next, we will treat these five dharmas by summarizing what has been explained above. In general they support all Buddha dharmas of Buddha land (i.e., pure dharmadhātu). The hearing of dharma teaching (śrutavāsanā) nurtures and supports all the merits, which comprise all Buddha lands (i.e., mirror wisdom). They constantly give rise to equality in bringing about benefit and happiness for all sentient beings (i.e., equality wisdom). They are accompanied by the adornments of dhāraṇī and samādhi practices, by unlimited, immeasurable, rich wisdoms (i.e., intellectual mastery wisdom), and they are able to bring benefit and happiness to all sentient beings (i.e., duty fulfillment

³⁰⁵This paragraph corresponds to Buddhabhūmivyaṅkyāna, 5.1.4 on p. 59, which reads: "In regard to the different kinds of results of Buddha land, the result is wisdom and the essence of severance. Severance is pure dharmadhātu, because it is severed from all obstacles whatsoever. Wisdom, as the four kinds, is mirror wisdom, etc." (Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyaṅkyāna, p. 59). This parallels to the first section of Bandhuprabha's commentary. From this point for the next seven Taisho columns of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa there is no Tibetan parallel. However, these added sections do parallel and rework the thought of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. One passage from the Siddhi reads: "Thus these four [wisdoms] generally and entirely support all the conditioned merits of Buddha land." (Wei Tat, p. 770; Poussin, p. 684). By so rearranging the text, Bandhuprabha has destroyed whatever rhetorical unity was present in the original, and this part of the commentary remains a rather disjointed discussion without clear emphasis or logical coherence. Again Bandhuprabha's intent is to adhere to the Dharmapāla line.

wisdom).

6) Which consciousnesses are con-verted by which wisdoms?

Next we will treat the question of which consciousnesses are con-verted by these four wisdoms. The Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra says: "They con-vert the aggregate of consciousness (vi jñānaskandha)."³⁰⁶

But [it might be objected], since [these wisdoms] are states of consciousness, how can they con-vert consciousness?

Because these four [wisdoms] are associated with the wisdom of the uncontaminated mind (anāśravacitta), we conventionally term them wisdom.

But [the objection continues], the words of that Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra treat true wisdom (samyak-prajñā). Should we say that [true wisdom] is ultimately existent (paramārtha-sat), or that it is conventionally existent (saṃvṛti-sat)?

We answer that we should say both. If we are

³⁰⁶ In treating the realization of dharmakāya, the Mahāyānasamgraha enumerates five parivṛtti (con-versions), the last of which is described as: "By the con-version of the aggregate of consciousness, one attains the mastery of mirror wisdom, equality wisdom, intellectual mastery wisdom, and duty fulfillment wisdom." (Lamotte, La Somme, p. 279).

talking about wisdom itself, then it does ultimately exist (paramārtha-sat). But if you call wisdom the consciousness and conscious states that accompany wisdom, then we say that it is conventional (samvṛti-sat). Therefore, there are these two kinds. Since wisdom is the principal factor in these uncontaminated consciousnesses and conscious states, they are called wisdom.³⁰⁷

By the con-version of the aggregate of consciousness, one attains the mind associated with the four uncontaminated wisdoms. (302c) This refers to the mind of mirror wisdom, etc. By the con-version of the ālaya consciousness, one attains the mind associated with mirror wisdom, because it is able to support the seeds of all merits and to give rise to the images of all bodies

³⁰⁷The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi reads: "Wisdom, although it is not consciousness (citta), yet is a con-version [of conscious states (caitta)], which has consciousness as its principal factor." (Wei Tat, p. 770; Poussin, p. 684). Wisdom is conventional (samvṛti-sat), because all consciousness is paratantric, and thus samvṛti. Paramārtha-sat is unchanging and not subject to the progressive realization of wisdom. It is the originally pure mind, which exists in an ultimate sense, whether or not anyone is aware of it. Thus the con-version of the basis of consciousness refers to the samvṛti realization of insight into the unchanging originally pure mind. See the treatment on the seventh simile of dharmadhātupariśuddhi on p. 627.

and lands. By the con-version of the manas consciousness, one attains the mind associated with equality wisdom, because it is far apart from the distinctions that are clung to as self or others, and has realized universal equality. By the con-version of the mano consciousness, one attains the mind associated with the wisdom of intellectual mastery, because it is able to discern all things without obstacle. By the con-version of the five sense consciousnesses, one attains the mind associated with the wisdom of duty fulfillment, because it is able to manifest and bring to completion external tasks.

But another opinion holds that it is by the con-version of the mano consciousness that one attains the wisdom of duty fulfillment, and by the con-version of the five sense consciousnesses that one attains the wisdom of intellectual mastery. But this opinion is not correct, because it inverts the order [of the four wisdoms], and the wisdom of intellectual mastery, which enunciates the dharma teaching and dispels doubts, is not the function of the five sense consciousnesses.

Therefore in the stages of the con-version of samsaric consciousness, the consciousnesses

and conscious states associated with these four [wisdoms] by their [respective] con-versions attain the consciousness and conscious states associated with these four results of enlightenment.³⁰⁸

7) What are the objects of the four wisdom minds?

Next, we will treat the objects of the consciousnesses and the conscious states associated with these four wisdoms.

According to the "one mark" theory, the consciousness and the conscious states associated with mirror wisdom is non-discriminative (nirvikalpa) and has as its object only tathatā. It is not subsequently attained [phenomenal wisdom], because its object (ālambana) and mode of activity (ākāra) are unknowable.

According to the "ensemble of marks" theory, mirror wisdom has as its object all dharmas. As the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra teaches: "Mirror wisdom is not fooled in regard to all knowable objects."³⁰⁹

³⁰⁸This passage expands upon the Viññaptimātratāsiddhi description: "The four wisdoms are attained by the respective con-versions of the eighth, seventh, sixth, and the five sense consciousnesses, while they are yet contaminated." (Wei Tat, p. 770; Poussin, p. 684). The above passage is also translated by Poussin, p. 684. The earliest explanation of which consciousnesses are converted by which wisdoms is probably found in Asvabhāva's Mahāyānasamgrahopaniṣandhāna, T. 31, p. 438a.

And as this Buddhabhūmisūtra teaches: "Just as a multitude of images appear in a great mirror, just so a multitude of images of all the [six] internal organs (āyatanas), all the [six] external objects of those organs (viśaya), and all the six consciousnesses (vi jñāna) [resultant upon that sense perception] appear in the wisdom mirror of the Tathāgata."³¹⁰ The phrase all the organs refer to the six sense organs, all the objects refer to the six sense objects, and all the consciousnesses refer to the six consciousnesses [of the five senses and mano consciousness]. Thus the multitude of images of the eighteen dhātus (i.e., all knowable objects) appear in this wisdom. And therefore this wisdom has all dharmas as its object. It is because this mirror wisdom at all times has all dharmas as its object that we say that the Tathāgata is omniscient (sarva jñāna). If this were not so, then, since the other wisdoms certainly do not know all dharmas, the Tathāgata would not be called omniscient.

³⁰⁹ Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter IX, verse 68. Quoted in note 297.

³¹⁰ T. 16, p. 721b.

Therefore, mirror wisdom internally has as its object the meritorious seeds of its own essence, [which is tathatā], and externally has as its object all knowable objects, whether paramārtha or saṃvṛti, and manifests all images of bodies and lands, etc.³¹¹ When it takes the limit of paramārthasatya as its object, it is called non-discriminative wisdom (nirvikalpañāna), and, when it takes the limit of saṃvṛtisatya as its object, it is called subsequently attained wisdom (prṣṭhalabdhañāna).³¹² Although it does have all dharmas as object, yet its mode of activity (ākāra) is subtle and difficult to know (asamvidita), just as ālaya consciousness, although it has as

³¹¹The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi reads: "Furthermore, this wisdom most certainly has as its object the uncontaminated seeds (anāśravabhīja) and the images of bodies and lands, etc." (Wei Tat, p. 774; Poussin, p. 689). The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa expands this sentence by identifying these anāśravabhīja as the seeds of the essence, i.e., of dharmadhātupariśuddhi or tathatā. In distinguishing between the internal and the external, it identifies paramārthasatya with insight into ultimate emptiness and saṃvṛtisatya with insight into dependent co-arising. Thus both are insights into truth, for saṃvṛti is the external functioning of mirror wisdom.

³¹²眞義邊, the limits of paramārthasatya. 俗義界 the limits of saṃvṛtisatya. These parallel the terms yathāvadbhāvikatā, 如所有性, and yāvadbhāvikatā, 盡所有性. See pp. 120-122 of the preceding study. This passage is an important example of the correspondence of these terms with the two truths.

its object the three realms (tridhātu), yet, because it is subtle, it is said that its object (ālambana) [and modality (ākāra)] are difficult to know. It is not the case then, that this wisdom, because it is difficult to know and realize, has as its object only tathatā of non-discriminative wisdom. Although its essence is one, (303a) yet its activities of [manifesting] truth are many, and it is distinguished according to these activities, and divided into the two wisdoms [of non-discriminative wisdom and subsequently attained wisdom], without any logical incompatibility. Moreover, it is only when it reaches paramārthasatya that it can understand saṃvrtisatya.³¹³ Therefore, although it is one mind, its truth is said to have before and after. Or perhaps it is that what appears to be subsequently attained wisdom is designated as prsthālabdha jñāna. The other wisdoms are to also be understood in this manner.

³¹³The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "It is said that its modality of activity and its object are subtle and difficult to know, but it is just as ālaya consciousness, because it takes as object saṃvrti. When it has as its object tathatā, it is non-discriminative, and, when it has other objects, it is called subsequently attained. Its essence is one, but its functions are double. It understands saṃvrti, because it has realized paramārtha, and thus it is said to be subsequently attained." (Wei Tat, p. 778; Poussin, p. 689)

In regard to the consciousness and the conscious states associated with equality wisdom, one opinion holds that it has as its object only mirror wisdom, just as the defiled (kliṣṭa) manas consciousness has only ālaya consciousness as its object.

Another opinion holds that it has as its object only tathatā, the limit of reality (bhūtakoti), because it has as object equality (samatā).

The correct opinion holds that this equality wisdom also has as object all dharmas, because it takes as object the universal equality [of all dharmas]. The Mahāvānasūtrālamkāra teaches that equality wisdom has all sentient beings as its object, because its object is the equality between self and others, and "according to the earnest faith and understanding of sentient beings, manifests images of Buddha."³¹⁴ This Buddhabhūmi-sūtra teaches that, because it realizes the ten marks of equality, this equality wisdom discerns both paramārtha and saṃvṛti.³¹⁵ Therefore it has as object all things without any logical incompatibility. If it did not have saṃvṛtisatya

³¹⁴ Mahāvānasūtrālamkāra, chapter IX, verse 71: "Equality wisdom, by means of great mercy and compassion, is present at all times, and manifests images of Buddha according to the earnest faith and understanding of sentient beings."

³¹⁵ T. 16, p. 721c-722a.

as its object, then it would be unable to manifest images of Buddha according to the earnest faith and understanding of sentient beings. Thus it is not correct to consider equality wisdom as being analogous with the defiled (kliṣṭa) manas and having as object only mirror wisdom, because this is different from the above sacred teaching [of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra], opposes it, and is not [in accord with what is taught] in other [texts].³¹⁶

The consciousness and conscious states associated with the wisdom of intellectual mastery has as its object all common and individual marks without any obstacle. Therefore it has as object the entire range of the knowable.³¹⁷

According to one opinion the consciousness and the conscious states associated with the wisdom of duty fulfillment has as its object the five sense objects, because the Mahayānāsūtrālaṃkāra teaches that the five senses of the Tathāgata are each transformed in regard to their five objects."³¹⁸

³¹⁶ An exact parallel is found in the Siddhi, Wei Tat, p. 776; Poussin, p. 690.

³¹⁷ Again this parallels the Siddhi, Wei Tat, p. 776; Poussin, p. 690.

³¹⁸ Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, chapter IX, verse 41: pañca-indriya-paravṛttau vibhutvaṃ labhyate param/ sarva-artha-vṛttau-sarveṣaṃ guṇa-dvādaśa-śata-udaya, "In the

The correct opinion holds that duty fulfillment wisdom also has as its object all objects without any obstacle. The Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra also teaches that "duty fulfillment wisdom gives rise to various transformations, which are immeasurable and inconceivable, in all object realms, and thus brings benefit to all sentient beings."³¹⁹ Also this Buddhabhūmisūtra teaches that duty fulfillment wisdom gives rise to all the transformations of the three actions of voice, body, and mind, and discerns "the differences of the eighty four-thousand states of mind of sentient beings," and that it "proclaims the discipline," implements the four methods of discourse, and "experiences all the meanings of past, future, and present."³²⁰ If this wisdom did not have as

³¹⁸cont. transformation of the five senses, the highest mastery is attained, and in regard to all their activities in respect to all sense objects, the twelve thousand qualities arise."

³¹⁹ Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra, chapter IX, verse 74: krtyānuṣṭhānātā-jñānam nirmanaiḥ sarva-dhātusu/ citra-aprameya-acintyaisca-sarva-satva-artha-karakam: "Duty fulfillment wisdom acts in all realms by means of immeasurable, inconceivable transformations, and brings benefit to all sentient beings."

³²⁰ T. 16, p. 722b-c.

object all knowable objects, it would not have such abilities.

Futhermore, it is said that the mastery without obstacle of this Buddha mind is able to illumine each and every knowable object. The force of such attention (manasikāra) is sometimes focused upon just one dharma and sometimes upon all dharmas. The above passage from the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra on the transformation of the senses is not conclusive proof [that this wisdom has as object only the five sense objects], because it does not say that it is related only to these [sense objects].

8) Are these states of wisdom aware of themselves?
Or are they only aware of their objects?

[Dignāga's] Pramāṇasamuccayaśāstra says that³²¹ all consciousnesses and conscious states, which are conscious of their essence are called direct perception (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa). If this were not so, then there would be no memory or recollection [of things perceived], just as if they had never been perceived at all.³²² Therefore

³²¹ This explanation is a summary of the teaching of Dignāga. An exact parallel occurs in the original Sanskrit of the Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭippaṇī, Bibliotheca Buddhica. XI., St. Petersburg 1909, pp. 32-35. This passage is partially translated by Poussin, Siddhi, p. 130.

³²² In its discussion of svasamvittibhāga, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi employs this argument: "If this

the consciousness and the conscious states associated with the four wisdoms are able to illumine and know their own essence.³²³

But [it is objected], is this not contrary to the way dharmas function in this world? A knife does not cut itself. The tip of one's finger does not touch itself. [And so how can consciousness know itself?] (303b)

But have you not noticed that lamps are able to illumine themselves?

But, [the objection continues], how do you

322cont. [svasaṃvittibhāga] were lacking, there would be no memory of consciousness or of conscious states, just as objects, which have not been perceived, cannot be remembered." (Wei Tat, p. 141; Poussin, p. 128).

323. In discussing that kind of direct perception, which is self-awareness, Theodore Stcherbatsky, in his Buddhist Logic, I, 163-164 writes: "It is a fundamental thesis of the Sautrantika-Yogācāra school (i.e., Dignāga and Dharmakīrti) that all consciousness is self-consciousness. Every cognition of an external object is at the same time a cognition of that cognition. Every feeling and every volition are, on the one side, connected with some object, but they also are, on the other side, self-conscious. We are thus possessed of "an awareness of our awareness." Knowledge is self-luminous (svayam-prakāśa). Like a lamp which illumines the neighboring objects and its own self at the same time, not being dependent on a foreign source of light for its own illumination, just so is knowledge self-luminous, since it does not depend on any other source of conscious light in order to be known." The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa here attributes such self-awareness to the mind of the four wisdoms, for in being aware of its objects, which are the internal images of consciousness, that mind is also aware of consciousness itself.

know that lamps illumine themselves?

One directly perceives (pratyakṣa) the absence of darkness and [their luminosity] is apparent. If they did not illumine themselves, they would be enveloped in darkness, and would not be directly perceptible. Therefore I know that lamps illumine themselves.

But, since lamps are not darkness, why must they illumine [themselves]?

The essence of a pitcher or a piece of clothing, etc., is not darkness, but when they are not illumined by lamps, they are enveloped in darkness and are not directly perceptible. But when lamps illumine them, those lamps expel their darkness and cause them to be directly perceptible. And so we say that they are illumined. It is just the same with lamps. When their essence [of being luminous] arises, the enveloping darkness is expelled, and they become directly perceptible. Thus we say that they illumine themselves.

All consciousness and conscious states, whether eminent or weak, are able externally to know objects, and internally to realize their own essence. Just like the brightness [of lamps], they are able to both illumine other things and to illumine

themselves. They are not anything like knives and cannot be compared to such things.

9) What is the structure of this luminous mind?

Each and every defiled consciousness and conscious state has the two aspects (bhāga) of image (nimittabhāga) and insight (darśanabhāga). The Pramāṇasamuccayaśāstra further explains that consciousness and conscious states have three aspects. The first is that which is grasped (grāhyabhāga). The second is that which grasps (grāhakabhāga). And the third is the self-awareness (svasamvittibhāga) [of grasping what is grasped]. These three aspects are neither identical nor different. The first is that which is known (prameya). The second is the act of knowing (pramāṇa). And the third is the result of that knowing (pramāṇaphala), [i.e., the self-awareness of knowing that which is known].³²⁴

³²⁴The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "If one closely analyzes consciousness and conscious states as they arise, each has three aspects: that which is known (prameya), the act of knowing (pramāṇa), and the result of knowing (pramāṇaphala). The image-object (nimitta) and the act of insight (darśana) must have an essence on which they depend. As taught in a verse of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, the internal image (nimitta), which appears as an external object, is that which is known (prameya). That which grasps (grāhaka) this image (nimitta) and the [consequent] self-awareness (svasamvitti) are the act of knowing (pramāṇa) and its result (pramāṇaphala). The essence of these three is the same." (Wei Tat, i. 140; Poussin, p. 131). Poussin, Siddhi, p. 133,

If one analyzes very carefully, there must also be a fourth aspect to complete this explanation. The first three are as above, and the fourth is an awareness of the awareness of the very [act of being aware] (svasamvitti-samvitti-bhāga).³²⁵

324cont. notes that the original verse from the Pramāṇasamuccaya has been preserved in the Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanti Bhaṭṭa: yadābhasam prameyamtat pramāṇaphalate punah/ grāhakākārasamvittiyos trayam nātaḥ prthak kṛtam, "That which is known (prameya) is the aspect under which consciousness appears. Consciousness, inasmuch as it has the character of grasping (grāhaka) and self-awareness (samvitti) is [respectively] the act of knowing (pramāṇa) and the result of knowing (pramāṇaphala)."

Thus this three bhāga theory of Dignaga analyzes consciousness into its objective (nimitta) and subjective (darśana) aspects, and grounds these in an awareness of this process of knowing (samvitti). Knowing implies not only a subjective insight into an objective image, but also an awareness that one is actually knowing.

325 The Viṅṇaptimātratāsiddhi has: "Finally, if one subtly analyzes citta-caittas, there must be a fourth aspect. The three aspects are as explained above, and the fourth is that aspect which is aware of [the third] svasamvittibhāga. If there were no fourth aspect, then by what would the self-awareness aspect, in its turn, be known? Since the self-awareness aspect is an aspect of the mind, it must be known, just as insight (darśana) is known by self-awareness (svasamvitti). Moreover, if there were no fourth aspect, what would be the result of self-awareness? All acts of knowing (pramāṇa) must have a result (pramāṇaphala). It will not do to say that the insight aspect is the result of the third aspect, because insight is not always an act of knowing, [i.e., insights can be mistaken, and self-awareness is direct perception, which is prior to the mental verbalization that can be mistaken]. Therefore, the insight aspect is not aware of the self-awareness aspect, and the [fourth] awareness of self-awareness (svasamvitti-samvitti-bhāga) must directly perceive [the self-awareness aspect.]" (Wei Tat, p. 142; Poussin, p. 132). The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa omits the later portion, which gives the rationale for the fourth bhāga, probably because it assumes that this argumentation is of common knowledge.

The first two aspects are external, [inasmuch as insight is into an image that appears as if external], while the last two are internal, [inasmuch as both are awarenesses of consciousness]. The first [image aspect] is simply the object of knowledge (ālambana, prameya), while the other three are both [objects and subjects of knowledge]. This means that the second insight aspect (darśanabhāga) knows only the first image aspect (nimittabhāga), whether it be through an act of true knowing (pramāṇa) or not, whether it be through direct perception (pratyakṣa) or through inference (anumāna).³²⁶

The third self-awareness aspect (svasaṃvittibhāga) is aware of the second insight aspect (darśanabhāga) and the fourth awareness of self-awareness (svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti-bhāga).³²⁷ The fourth aspect of

³²⁶The insights of ālaya and the five sense consciousnesses cannot be mistaken knowing, because they are not conceptualized, but insights of manas and mano can be mistaken and not true, for they respectively mistake the functioning of ālaya as an ātman and as real external dharmas. Thus an insight that is arrested at the image in the mind issues in extroverted consciousness, for it assumes that image to be a real thing. True insight is that understanding which occurs through or into the image, and does not thus assume that images are external units of meaning. See Wei Tat, p. 280; Poussin, p. 252.

³²⁷One is conscious of insight when it occurs, and also is implicitly conscious of being able to transcend the awareness implicit in particular acts of insight, and become conscious of oneself being conscious.

awareness of self-awareness (svasamvitti-samvitti-bhāga) is aware of the third self-awareness aspect. The third and the fourth aspects both are direct perception.³²⁸

From this reasoning, although [consciousness] is of one essence, yet it is a unified composite of many aspects. And, since they are neither identical nor different, since both the internal and external [functioning of consciousness] is explained, this explanation avoids the error of an infinite regress.³²⁹

³²⁸ Both self-awareness and the awareness of that self-awareness are not conceptualizable in their actual functioning. One is then aware of consciousness not by taking an inner "look," but simply by noting conscious operations as they occur. One is directly aware of consciousness, not by conceptualizing its functionings in words or verbalizing it as theories, however well reasoned or correct they might be, but rather by being aware of what occurs when one thinks. Thus these last two awarenesses are directly given in all conscious operations. No one would admit that he is not aware of what he knows (svasamvittibhāga), or that he is unaware of being aware that he knows (svasamvitti-samvitti-bhāga). Implicit in this is the assertion that one cannot come to an awareness of consciousness by studying theory, even the above theory. Thus, even the Yogācāra thinkers, who moved in the context of theoretical interiority, demand that the practices of meditation be implemented. Their theories are meant to be explanations of insights gained in such an inner focusing of consciousness. The above passage exactly follows the Siddhi, Wei Tat, p. 143; Poussin, p. 132.

³²⁹ 無窮過, anavasthā, an endless series. By developing the idea of the fourth aspect, Dharmapāla seems to have intended to respond to the possible objection that self-consciousness itself could be grounded only by an endless series of similar self-consciousnesses. The fourth aspect, being of a different order, avoids this.

As a sūtra says: "The mind of sentient beings is of two natures. Internally and externally all its aspects are entangled in what is grasped (grāhya) and the act of grasping (grāhaka), and their insights are of different varieties."³³⁰

This verse means that the mind of sentient beings is a unified composite of two aspects. Whether internally or externally, all are entangled in [these aspects of] the grasped and the act of grasping. The insights [of such minds] are of different varieties. Some are true acts of knowing (pramāṇa). Some are mistaken acts of knowing (apramāṇa). Some are direct perception. And some are acts of inference.

Although the consciousness and the conscious states of the four wisdoms have all these different aspects, yet they consist in uncontaminated direct perception (anāśrava-pratyakṣa-pramāṇa).³³¹

³³⁰The Ghanavyūha reads: "All internal and external things, all the visible, is nothing other than the mind itself. The mind of sentient beings is of two natures, the act of grasping and the object grasped." (T. 16, p. 735a)

³³¹This commentary agrees word for word with the Siddhi, except that the last sentence has been added by the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa to introduce the following discussion on the aspects (bhāga) of the mind of wisdom. This section is treated by Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, pp. 169-172.

This interpretation is all-inclusive, as has been extensively explained in other texts.³³² In this interpretation, although the functions [of the mind of wisdom] are many, yet its essence is one, just as, in the one dharma teaching, there are many different meanings, such as the [truth of] suffering, of impermanence, etc., and yet the essence [of that dharma teaching] is one.

10) What then are the aspects of the mind of wisdom?

Next we will treat the question of the conditioned image aspect and insight aspect of the consciousness and the conscious states associated with the four wisdoms. (303c) They certainly have the aspect of insight, which illumines the objects those wisdoms illumine. And it is also certain that they have the aspect of self-awareness, which fully illumines both the insights they have and the awareness of their self-awareness. And they certainly have the aspect of the awareness of their self-awareness, which illumines that self-awareness. For if they lacked these aspects, [such consciousness] could

³³² This is probably a direct reference to the Vijnapti-mātratāsiddhiśāstra, for no other Indian text treats the theory of the four bhāgas, which is specific to Dharmapāla.

not be called wisdom, [because it would not be aware of anything].

But there is some uncertainty in regard to the image aspect (nimittabhāga) [of the wisdom mind].³³³ [There are three opinions.]

The first opinion holds that the true uncontaminated consciousness and conscious states [of wisdom], because they lack obstacles, immediately illumine objects presented before them, without [the mediation] of any images that, issuing from the evolutions of consciousness (vi jñānaparināma), might appear [to them].

Therefore this uncontaminated mind is said to be unmarked (animitta), because it is non-discriminative. Furthermore it is also said that the objects [of the wisdom mind] are inconceivable.³³⁴

³³³ This section is one of the earliest explicit discussions on the sākāra-jñāna-vāda - nirākāra-jñāna-vāda debate. See pp. 289-293 of the preceding study. Note that all Yogācārins agreed that samsaric consciousness functioned in images, but, as above, did not agree on whether the mind of wisdom needed an image to function.

³³⁴ The Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "One opinion holds that this non-discriminative wisdom has neither the insight aspect nor the image aspect, because it lacks the marks of both grāhya and grāhaka." (Wei Tat, p. 686; Poussin, p. 586). Kuei-ch'i identifies this as the opinion of Sthiramati. In his Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, Sthiramati does appear to adopt this position. See Stcherbatsky, Madhyāntavibhāga, p. 33. But the accuracy of the Siddhi in reporting Sthiramati's opinions is much in doubt. See Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, pp. 191-193.

The second opinion holds that this true uncontaminated consciousness and conscious states [of wisdom] do have the image aspect. The objects which appear (pratibhāsa-ārtha) to all consciousnesses and conscious states are indeed objects of understanding (ālambana). [The difference between samsaric consciousness and wisdom is that wisdom] does not come to grasp at these objects, as if the mind were a set of pincers. Nor does [wisdom] project its light upon those objects, as do lamps. Rather it reflects the images of things, as do bright mirrors, and because its insight aspect illumines these objects which appear [in consciousness], [wisdom] is said to be without obstacle. It is because [wisdom] does not grasp nor imagine [these objects in a parikalpita fashion] that it is said to be markless (animitta). It is because this wondrous non-discriminative function is difficult to fathom that it is said to be inconceivable, and not because [wisdom] does not manifest images. If one were to claim that it has no images, then it would have no image aspect. And if being non-discriminative means that it has no insight aspect, then, entirely lacking both image aspect and insight

aspect, it would be like empty space or the horns on a hare, and not be termed wisdom, [i.e., it would be entirely non-existent]. It is rather because it does not cling to imaginings (parikalpita) that it is said to lack the marks of the object grasped (grāhya) and the act of grasping (grāhaka), and not because wisdom lacks the function of illumining the objects that appear to it.³³⁵ If the uncontaminated mind entirely lacked this image aspect, then all Buddhas would not manifest the various images of bodies and lands, etc. But this contradicts the sūtras and śāstras in many places. If the con-version of the basis

³³⁵The Madhyāntavibhāga reads: abhūtaparikalpa'sti dvyam tatra na vidyate/ sunyata vidyate tv atra tasyam api sa vidyate (Verse I. 1; Nagao, Madhyantavibhagabhāṣya, p. 17). Unreal imagining (abhūtaparikalpa) is understood to be consciousness. And the two that do not exist in it (dvyam tatra na vidyate) are identified in Vasubandhu's commentary as the object grasped and the act of grasping (grāhya-grāhaka). It is in commenting upon this verse that Sthiramati in his Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā writes: tathā hi vijñaptir api vijñaptiyantaraparikalpitenatmanā śumyeti siddhantāḥ, "However, it is our conclusion that consciousness is empty of any essence that might be imagined to be another consciousness." (Yamaguchi Susumu, Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, p. 19, l. 18). Thus for Sthiramati consciousness is of one bhāga only, for the two bhāgas of grāhya-grāhaka are illusory. But for Dharma-pāla, these bhāgas are the paratantric nature of consciousness. See pp. 313-318 of the preceding study. The paratantric nature of consciousness means that it functions through insight into image, but parikalpita occurs when these images are assumed to be real units of meaning (grāhya) that can be grasped (grāhaka) by a real subjective consciousness. Thus the above sentence seems to refute Sthiramati's opinion.

of the aggregate of form (rūpa-skandha-āśraya-parivṛtti), [i.e., the con-version to wisdom of the internal form, which is the nimittabhāga], were unrelated to form [and completely transcended form], then likewise the con-version of the other four skandhas would be unrelated to sensation (vedanā), conceptualization (saṃjñā), volition (saṃskāra), and consciousness (viññāna). [But to hold that the con-version of the basis results in such a completely transcendent state] is a serious error, [because it negates the phenomenal, paratantric nature of consciousness]³³⁶.

³³⁶This section parallels the third, correct opinion of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra: "Furthermore, this wisdom (i.e., prsthālabdhajñāna) distinguishes the individual and common marks of all dharmas, and, discerning the differences in the basic natures of all sentient beings, it addresses itself to them. And this wisdom manifests lands and bodies in order to enunciate the true dharma for sentient beings. If it did not manifest appearances of form, sound, etc., then how could such manifestations of bodies and enunciations of the dharma occur? If in the con-version of the basis of the aggregate of form, it did not manifest form, then in the con-version of the other four aggregates, there would be no sensation, etc." (Wei Tat, p. 686; Poussin, pp. 599-600). Although the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa has re-arranged the order of these opinions, yet it is in doctrinal agreement with the Siddhi, for the Siddhi passage treats only prsthālabdhajñāna, while holding that nirvikalpajñāna is without image, just as the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa will do in the third opinion. Poussin mistakenly identifies the source of the Siddhi passage as the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa. The original source for the last part is probably the Mahāyānasamgraha: "By the con-version of the aggregate of form, it attains mastery over Buddha lands, bodies, marks, etc." (Lamotte, La Somme, pp. 276-277.)

The third correct opinion holds that the consciousness and the conscious states associated with uncontaminated non-discriminative wisdom (anāśrava-nirvikalpa-jñāna), because it is non-discriminative, and because its object, tathatā, is not separated from the essence, illumines [only] its own essence, and therefore has no distinct image aspect (nimittabhāga).³³⁷ But in the case of the consciousness and the conscious states associated with subsequently attained wisdom (prastahlabdha-jñāna), because it is discriminative, and because its objects are separated from the essence, in a manner similar to the contaminated mind, images of objects do appear and are directly perceived and illumined.

³³⁷This corresponds to the third opinion of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: "This wisdom (i.e., nirvikalpa-jñāna) has insight (darśana), but no image (nimitta), because it is said that it has no image to grasp, even although such is not entirely lacking. Although it has no nimittabhāga, yet one can say that it arises in adhering to tathatā, because it is not apart from tathatā. Just as the self-awareness aspect (svasamvittibhāga), when it has as object the insight aspect, does not develop [an image] of that insight aspect which it then takes as its object, [but is rather aware of the occurrences of insight as they occur], just so non-discriminative wisdom [develops no image]. If it did, then it would not directly realize [tathatā], but would be discriminative, and just like subsequently attained wisdom, [would know tathatā only through images]. Therefore, we must conclude that it has insight, but not image." (Wei Tat, p. 688; Poussin, pp. 587-588).

If the uncontaminated mind understands objects that are separated from the essence, then is it not the case that, even although it lacks any images that appear as those objects, yet it does take them as object? The Ālambanaparīkṣā does not say that, because there are no images that appear as atoms in the five sense consciousnesses, there are no objects at all.³³⁸

³³⁸The Ālambanaparīkṣā is a short work of eight verses and commentary by Dignāga. It is important for Dharmapāla thinking, and he composed a commentary on it, the Ālambanaparīkṣāṭīkā. The Siddhi quotes a passage from this text: "The Ālambanaparīkṣā also says that the potentialities of form (rupasamarthya, i.e., rupabīja), which reside in the [ālaya] consciousness are correctly called the five sense faculties. These potentialities [of the sense faculties] and their form objects have, since the beginningless beginning, been reciprocal causes one of the other." (Wei Tat, p. 256; Poussin, pp. 231-232). Thus the arising of sense consciousness is due to potentialities inherent in ālaya, i.e., bījas, and not to the force from any externally real objects, such as the atoms, etc. The introductory section of the Siddhi's discussion of the āśraya and ālambana of the five sense consciousnesses contains a passage that has been identified as from the Ālambanaparīkṣā (Katsumata, Shinishikisetsu, pp. 158-161): "Do not the five sense consciousnesses have as their support (āśraya) material organs (rūpa-indriya), and as their object (ālambana) material objects (rūpa-artha)? It would be incorrect to say that [their āśraya and ālambana] are not material (rūpa), but that rūpa is nothing other than an evolution of consciousness. That is to say, when the eight consciousnesses are born, by the force of internal causes (bījas) they develop and manifest themselves in images, which are like the sense organs and their objects. It is these images which the five sense consciousnesses have as their support and object." (Wei Tat, p. 48; Poussin, p. 41). The point of the above Buddhabhūmyupadeśa passage is that, just as the senses have a material object that is derived from consciousness, so the uncontaminated

Therefore the uncontaminated seeds (anāśravabīja), which in their [potentiality to take] objects are identical with the uncontaminated mind, arise, and, although these object marks [that they take] appear to be contaminated dharmas, yet they are not contaminated, just as the contaminated mind may perhaps seem to be uncontaminated, and yet still be contaminated. This concludes our discussion [on the aspects of the mind of wisdom].

Note that all this discriminative discussion is reasoning according to saṃvrtisatya, and is not paramārthasatya. For paramārthasatya is beyond words and transcends thinking, and thus lacks both the image aspect and the insight aspect, is unable to speak about consciousness and conscious states, is beyond prapañca, and is inconceivable.

338cont. mind, inasmuch as it is subsequently attained wisdom, does have an inner image that is derived from consciousness. For in the Ālambanaparīkṣa the object of consciousness (ālambana) is identified as this inner image, or this inner form (内色). It is not then correct to say, as above in the text, that the uncontaminated mind, lacking any image, yet has an object. It lacks the images that are clung to as if they were external, but, since the paratantric nature of consciousness is the structure of insight into image, in the subsequently attained insight into saṃvrti-paratantra, an image must be present. Such an uncontaminated mind can appear to be contaminated, because an image is present. But it is not contaminated, because that image is not clung to in false imaginings, i.e., wisdom realizes the truth of consciousness only.

11) How many conscious states are associated with wisdom?

Next we will treat the question of how many conscious states (caittas) are associated with the consciousnesses and the conscious states of the four wisdoms. (304a) There are twenty-one: the five universal mental states (sarvatraga) [of mental contact, attention, sensation, conception, and volition]; the five special mental states (vinīyata) [of desire, resolve, memory, contemplation, and wisdom]; and the eleven good mental states [of faith, the sense of shame, the sense of integrity, non-covetousness, and non-anger, non-delusion, zeal, composure, vigilance, equanimity, and nonviolence]. In all places the Tathāgata has these five universal mental states. With constant joy he understands all knowable objects, and his desire is without decrease. His pre-eminent understanding, which is signed with objects, is constantly without decrease. He understands objects already experienced and recalls them without increase. His mind is not dispersed, and he constantly discerns. He is constantly associated with pure faith and the other good mental states. He has no defilement

and is never drowsy. He has done no evil [that could cause remorse]. He has realized the state of no intellectualization (vitarka) and no rationalizing (vicāra).

The shallowness of the contaminated mind is unsettled and to some degree is associated with mental states in which objects are clung to and become obstacles. But the uncontaminated consciousness and conscious states are characterized by mastery and lack of obstacles, and all its mental states are equally without obstacles.

12) What is the sequence in which these four wisdoms are attained?

Next we will treat the question of the sequence in which these four wisdoms are attained. At what point does the uncontaminated lineage (anāśravagotra), which from the beginningless beginning has been dependent upon the samsaric continuity of the consciousness of karmic maturations (vipākavi jñāna, i.e., ālayavi jñāna), become actually manifest? Once the aspiration for the mind [of bodhi] has occurred, then one gradually progresses because of external permeations (vāsanā), [such as the dharma teaching,

etc.].³³⁹ The consciousness and the conscious states associated with mirror wisdom are converted at the moment of diamond-like (vajropama) samādhi, when all contaminated seeds and karmically maturing consciousness are destroyed. At this moment one attains the first actual manifestation of the uncontaminated seeds of Buddha result. Supported with such plenitude, [such consciousness] will not come to an end, but will be constantly and uninterruptedly associated with equality wisdom. When the bodhisattva at the first pramuditābhūmi first attains insight, then this [equality] wisdom is first actually manifested. Hereafter in the successive bhūmis, practice causes it to grow unto its full plenitude. When uncontaminated insight, etc., are present, this wisdom is constantly manifested, but if the contaminated mind is present, then it is at times interrupted.

³³⁹The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi reads: "The seeds of the four wisdoms have always been present, but, in order that these wisdoms may actually become manifest, they must receive permeations (vāsanā). In the course of the period [of implementing] the causes (hetu-avasthā) [that bring about wisdom], these seeds gradually increase, and in the state of Buddhahood, they remain constant without increase or decrease. . ." (Wei Tat, p. 774; Poussin, p. 688).

In this manner it will develop up to the tenth dharmameghabhūmi. After this last state of [wisdom] consciousness, it will continue without coming to an end, and be constant and uninterrupted. Just as the ālaya consciousness in the contaminated state constantly arises in synergy with manas consciousness, so in the uncontaminated state, mirror wisdom arises in synergy at the same time as equality wisdom. And so equality wisdom is also uninterrupted.³⁴⁰

The consciousness and conscious states associated with the wisdom of intellectual mastery are also present in the first pramuditābhūmi. When insight is first attained, this wisdom is first actually manifested. Due to subsequent cultivation, it gradually increases. When the contaminated mind is present, or when the mind is absorbed [in contemplation or is asleep or unconscious], then it is interrupted. In this manner it develops

³⁴⁰The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi gives a similar argument: ". . . in the course of the daśabhūmi, because the two clinging [to self and dharmas], which pertain to the manas consciousness, have not yet been cut off, this [equality] wisdom is occasionally interrupted, when the mano consciousness is contaminated. But after the tenth dharmameghabhūmi, when the manas consciousness and the pure ālaya consciousness support and depend on one another, this equality wisdom will continue uninterrupted forever." (Wei Tat, p. 772; Poussin, p. 686).

up to the state of Buddha result. But if one enters nirodhasamādhi (the samādhi of complete cessation) then it will not be actually manifested.

The consciousness and conscious states associated with the wisdom of duty fulfillment, according to one opinion, are actually manifested in all the bhūmis above the first pramuditābhūmi, because they are involved in disseminating dharma teaching. But the correct opinion holds that it arises only at the stage of Buddha result, because in the ten bhūmis the five senses, which are evolutions of the karmically maturing consciousness (vipākavi jñāna), are not uncontaminated. And therefore, what relies on these five consciousnesses, [i.e., the performance of the tasks of compassion], is also not uncontaminated. It is not possible that these five contaminated sense organs produce (304b) uncontaminated consciousness. Even in the state of Buddha result, this wisdom is not always present, for it arises by the turning of attention [to the tasks that are to be fulfilled], and is frequently interrupted.³⁴¹

³⁴¹The Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi gives both of these opinions, but does not identify either as the correct opinion. (Wei Tat, pp. 772-774; Poussin, pp. 687-688).

13) What is the nature of the seeds of these four wisdoms?

Next we will treat the question of the seeds (bīja) of the consciousnesses and the conscious states associated with these four wisdoms. The original beginningless nature of things (dharmatā) does not arise from permeation (vāsanā). This original nature is innate in the five lineages (gotras). But immediately upon the arising of the aspiration [for bodhi], these seeds do develop and increase by means of the permeations of external objects. Thus the lineages [of sentient beings] are brought to completion by permeation. From the first bhūmi on it follows its course and becomes manifest. By repeated permeations it increases and becomes eminent, until the realization of vajropamasamādhī. From this point, although [these wisdoms] are frequently manifested, yet they are not again influenced by permeation, nor are they again caused to increase, because their plenitude of merit cannot be increased, because, being supported by such pure consciousness, they are neither undetermined nor capable of being influenced by permeation, and because in this manner we avoid attributing gradations to the merits of

earlier and later Buddhas.³⁴²

The consciousnesses and conscious states associated with these four wisdoms is entirely good, and is fully supported by the truth of the uncontaminated path (anāśravamārgasatya), because all Buddhas lack any contaminated seeds (sāśrava-bīja). Although they frequently manifest transformed samsaric bodies, which [teach] the truth of the origin of suffering (duhkhe-samudaya-satya), and seem to be characterized by kleśa, yet in truth they are supported by the truth of the uncontaminated path (anāśravamārgasatya).

According to saṃvrtisatya, their marks are said to be the five skandhas, the twelve āyatanas, and the eighteen dhātus (i.e., phenomenal realities), but in paramārthasatya they are not supported by these skandhas, āyatanas, or dhātus, because they are separated from all prapañca and from all marks. In this manner these five dharmas [of the four wisdoms and dharmadhātu] are both saṃvrti and paramārtha. Inasmuch as they do not rely upon names and words, the objects of their [spiritual]

³⁴² Confer the Siddhi passage quoted in note 339.

faculties all ultimately exist (paramārtha-sat). But, inasmuch as they do rely upon names and words, then these objects all conventionally exist (samvrti-sat). Furthermore, dharmadhātu-pariśuddhi-tathatā is their essence, because this is ultimate existence (paramārtha-sat). Because of tathatā we establish the marks of the annihilation of discrimination (pratisamkhyā-nirodha), because [all teaching only] has conventional existence. All these wisdoms of the mind [of bodhi] and all direct perceptions (pratyakṣa) of colors, such as blue, yellow, etc. do ultimately exist (paramārtha-sat), but mental states, such as idleness, etc., and [discriminated] forms, such as longness or shortness, conventionally exist (samvrti-sat).³⁴³ Now we rest our explanations, and must return to commenting on the sūtra text.

³⁴³This passage reflects the influence of Dignāga, who held that direct perception, being prior to all conceptualizations, was a direct and immediate means of knowing (pramāṇa). Thus not only is wisdom an insight into paramārtha-sat, but direct perception is also such an insight. In Dignāga's works, the phrase nīla-rūpa, the form of blue, or nīla-pitādi-rūpa, the form of blue and yellow, is frequently used as example of direct perception. And dirgha-hrasva-vat, short, long, and such, is used to refer to inference (anumāna).

14) How are these five dharmas to be discerned?³⁴⁴

The fourth mark of discernment is divided into three parts. The first is the discernment of the differences between the five dharmas.³⁴⁵ The second is the discernment of phenomenal wisdom, which is experienced as being all of one unified taste.³⁴⁶ The third is the discernment of all the merits, which characterize pure dharmadhātu in the concluding verses [of the sūtra], and the relationships between the three bodies and the five dharmas.³⁴⁷

³⁴⁴Bandhuprabha here returns to the original structure of the commentary. On p. 543 it was stated that there were four marks by which Buddha land is established. The first three were treated on 543-557, where Bandhuprabha then added an extensive commentary of his own. He now treats the fourth mark, discernment, but, even here he reworks it, so as to introduce the following chapters of the commentary.

³⁴⁵This constitutes the following body of the commentary, which explains each of the five dharmas at length.

³⁴⁶This indicates the discussion between Buddha and the bodhisattvas on the experience of phenomenal wisdom, which begins in chapter six of the Chinese text, on p. 321a.

³⁴⁷This is the body of Chapter Seven of the Chinese, which is added by Bandhuprabha and is devoted to a commentary on the concluding verses of the sūtra and contains a lengthy discussion of trikāya. It begins on p. 322c.

PART TWO

CHAPTER TWO

Pure Dharmadhātu

The First Simile: The Mark of Discrimination

The sūtra says: You wondrously born ones should realize that pure dharmadhātu is like empty space, which, although all kinds of marks of every color are present in it, yet cannot be said to have any color marks at all, because its essence is of one taste only. Just so the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu, although it too pervades all kinds of knowable objects of all kinds of marks, yet it cannot be said to have any kind of mark at all, because its essence is of one taste only.

The commentary explains: Next we will explain the marks of pure dharmadhātu. We must be careful in analyzing pure dharmadhātu, (304c) for there are objections.

It may be objected that dharmadhātu of all Tathāgatas is the essence, that dharmadhātu implies that tathatā is the essence, and that tathatā is the common mark of all dharmas. But, since all dharmas do have various distinctions, so should dharmadhātu. But if it has these various distinctions, then how can it be pure?

We answer that it is like crystals, which support various kinds of common marks, and yet they themselves have no marks at all. In order to respond

to this objection, [the sūtra] gives the first simile of empty space. It says that it is like empty space, in which are present all kinds of marks of every color. The words all kinds refer to all the different kinds, for worldly space pervades all similar and dissimilar marks by which forms, which are limited by having a body,³⁴⁸ are differentiated. The word mark (lakṣaṇa) means that their essence (svabhāva) is apprehended³⁴⁹ in acts of understanding and clearly appears (pratibhāsa) [to the mind]. The phrase yet [empty space] cannot be said to have any color marks at all means that no perceptible marks of any kind of material limitation can be attributed to empty space. The words cannot be said means that the nature of empty space does not correspond to words and is ineffable, i.e., the nature of empty space is such that one cannot attribute to it any manifesting marks or any manifested marks.³⁵⁰

³⁴⁸ 形礙色, forms (rūpa) which are limited because they have a material body, inasmuch as, occupying a particular space, they limit or obstruct (石礙) other forms from entering that space. Śīlabhadra has: lus-can, that which has a body.

³⁴⁹ 集在, hgod-par-byed-pa, to be gathered up in, to be formed. Apprehend means to be taken up by the mind.

³⁵⁰ 能表相, rgyu-mtshan, nimitta, marks that cause a thing to be manifested.

所表相, mtshan-pa, lakṣaṇa, the marks thus caused.

But, [it may be objected], if one looks up into empty space, there are various marks, and one can indeed say that there are these various marks.

This looking at the various perceptible marks in space is not a looking at space, and therefore only by convention does one say that [space] has these various perceptible marks, just as [the verbal expression of] blue and yellow, etc., or of longness and shortness, do not ultimately exist (paramārtha-sat). If they did not conventionally exist (saṃvṛti-sat), then they would be ultimately existing phenomena, [which is patently absurd].³⁵¹

Why then is it that [space], which universally pervades all forms without having any marks, is said to have an essence of one taste only?

Because empty space is not associated with these various perceptible marks, it does not become [identified] with them, but rather, not departing from its essence, it is of one unobstructed taste and has no differentiating marks.

³⁵¹ 如青黃等或長短等非實是有。 This sentence seems to directly contradict the above passage on p. 592, which describes the direct perception of blue and yellow as paramārtha-sat. Thus I take it to refer to the verbalization of that direct perception, i.e., to anumāna-pramāṇa. The direct perception of something blue or yellow is prior to the inner verbalization that there is a blue wall or a yellow bird. It is prior to discriminative conceptualization, and thus, paramārtha-sat.

The sentence just so the Tathāgata's pure dharma-dhatu, although it too pervades all kinds of knowable objects of all kinds of marks, yet it cannot be said to have any kind of mark at all, because its essence is of one taste only means that dharmadhātu is just like worldly space, which both has an essence and does not have an essence. For, although it universally pervades all material, limited forms, it cannot be said to have any perceptible forms at all. Even although we say that empty space exists, this is only said by convention and does not mean that it ultimately exists (paramārtha-sat), because empty space does not depart from its own mark (svalakṣaṇa) and take on the other marks [of verbal conceptualization]. Although by conventional naming, we speak of empty space as this and that, yet the true nature of empty space is ineffable. Pure dharmadhātu is just like this, for although by conventional naming we say this and that about emptiness (śūnyatā), yet the true nature of emptiness is ineffable. As noted above, dharmadhātu³⁵² is like a crystal, because it is the cause which supports various common marks. Therefore the objection that dharmadhātu is associated

³⁵²The Chinese text mistakenly reads 虛空. Śīlabhadra has: chos-kyi-dbyiṅs, i.e., dharmadhātu, which is clearly called for by the context.

with various distinctions commits the fallacy of uncertainty.³⁵³

Rather it is the case that, although when one looks into empty space, it [appears] to be associated with various perceptible forms, yet it does not have any kind of perceptible form at all. (305a) Just as space, at times, is associated with smoke, mists, clouds,³⁵⁴ etc., and, due to our own power of unreal imagining, its forms are seen, [so it is with dharmadhātu]. When we are looking at these various marks of smoke, mists, and clouds, etc., we are not looking at empty space, because empty space cannot be seen. We see these forms and marks because of the dominating power (adhipati-bala) of our unreal imagining, and such is not dharma-dhātu.

Although pure dharmadhātu has no real perceptible marks nor enunciative dharma teaching (dharmadeśana), yet

³⁵³ 不定過, mañes pa, anaikāntika-hetu-ābhāsa, the fallacy of an uncertain reason, i.e., an erroneous major premise, which does not express the required necessary dependence of the reason upon its consequence, and is therefore logically inconsistent. Thus there is no necessary dependence between dharmadhātupariśuddhi and the having of distinctions. Such a fallacy is detected by giving counter-instances, as the above text has just done. See Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, I, 321 et sq., and his translation of Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindhu, II, 180 et sq.

³⁵⁴ 烟霧, smoke and mists. Śīlabhadra adds spring, clouds.

it does issue (pravṛtti) in the different marks of the dharma teaching, which do have perceptible characteristics. But it does not on that account itself have these various marks. They do not cause dharmadhātu to be identified with these marks, because pure dharma-dhātu is apart from naming. All names are objects of understanding that arise from discrimination. However, the dharma teaching is not in vain (vyartha), because it is the continual cause (kāraṇa-parampara) for the realization of dharmadhātu. It is just like one would understand the meaning of a letter only by looking at the words. Since the dharma teaching flows out (nisyanda) from the great compassion of all Tathāgatas, it is able to continually express meaning that is beyond speech. It would be a wondrous sight if one were to see the empty sky painted with a multitude of colors, and even if many words were used to describe its ineffable beauty, it would still surpass those words. As it is said: "Oh, Sāgaramati, if one [were to see] all kinds of colors painted upon the imperceptible, invisible, un-hindered, unmanifested empty sky, he would stand still as a statue,³⁵⁵ because he would be rapt in wonder."³⁵⁶

³⁵⁵ 如牆壁等, literally: like walls, fences, etc. This is an idiom for immobility.

³⁵⁶ The Mahāsamnipattisūtra reports a discussion between Sāgaramati Bodhisattva and Brahma on the nature of the Buddha's teaching: "That which is not so marked is

All Buddha-Bhagavans have realized this profound, ineffable dharma, and by the use of words they are able to proclaim and explain its profundities for the sake of all sentient beings, for this is the way they expound [dharma teaching]. Because they have the crystal

356cont. called buddhadharma. It has no marks, no words, no written expression. It is pure and quiescent. It is the meaning of emptiness . . . It cannot be proclaimed nor inspected . . . How then does the Tathāgata enunciate buddhadharma? Oh Brahma, just as one speaks about empty space [does he enunciate dharma], for the nature of empty space has no specific mark."

The Bhagavan then enters the discussion and praises Sāgaramati: "The nature of bodhi is ineffable and imperceptible, and so is termed the ultimate truth. Therefore the Tathāgata understands, knows, and perceives that which cannot be proclaimed, and yet, because he has compassion for sentient beings, he comes to proclaim bodhi . . . [That bodhi] has no vocal nor written enunciation and cannot be proclaimed, and yet, because of sentient beings, he enunciates it in the sequences of words and sounds. Good sons, it is like empty space, which has no perceptible dharmas, and cannot be inspected, having no impact nor movement [toward one who sees it]. Good sons, were a man to paint images in the empty sky, whether of a man, a woman, an elephant, or a horse, would such a one be conceivable or not? He would not be conceivable, Oh Bhagavan. Just so you can believe that the Tathāgata Bhagavan knows [buddhadharma] is ineffable, and yet is able to explain it in detail." (T. 13, p. 57c-58b).

The Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra has a similar verse, chapter IX, verse 36: gambhīryamale-dhātu-laksanasthānakarmasu buddhānāmetadudītam raṅgairvakaśacitrāṇa, "The profundity of mark, of place, and of action of Buddhas in the pure realm is expressed by means of the different colors in space."

These are poetic images to express the nature of dharma teaching as an outflow from pure dharmadhātu (dharmadhātu-nisyaṇḍa). This theme is treated by Asaṅga in explaining ālambana-vyavahāra. See pp. 215-216 of the preceding study.

dharmadhātu as their nature and are pure, the objection [that clouds obstruct the pure sky] is logically inconsistent,³⁵⁷ and such reasoning violates either the first rule or both of the other rules of logic.³⁵⁸

The Second Simile: The Mark of Purity

The sūtra says: And, just as empty space, although it pervades all forms and is not apart from them, yet is not defiled by their imperfections, so the Tathāgata's

³⁵⁷ 同法喻, sādharmya. In the epistemological logical system of Dignaga and Dharmakīrti, each major premise of a syllogism is accompanied by an example, which must be consistent with that major premise. Thus the major 法 and the example 喻 must be the same 同. Here Bandhuprabha argues that the major premise that dharmadhātu has no perceptible forms is inconsistent with the example of the objection that clouds, mists, etc., obstruct it, for dharmadhātu pervades all forms as a crystal does, without those forms ever limiting or obstructing it.

³⁵⁸ The three rules of a syllogism are: 1) the presence of the reason which is given in the major premise throughout the entire syllogism, 2) its necessary presence in all similar instances, and 3) its absence in dissimilar instances. The last two are both related to the particular case envisaged by the reason given in the major premise. Thus the phrase 隨一不成, anyatara-asiddha is the logical fallacy that violates the first rule. In the above case, the major premise is not explicitly stated, but clearly implied to be that whatever is extrinsically associated with perceptible form itself lacks form. Bandhuprabha argues that this reason does not apply to the case in point, because space is not merely extrinsically related to form, nor dharmadhātu to dharmadeśana, and thus the objection violates the first rule. The phrase 兩俱不成, ubhaga-asiddha, is the logical fallacy that violates the last two rules, for the above reason is not applicable to the case in point. See Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, I, 320 et sq.

pure dharmadhātu, although it pervades the minds of all sentient beings, since it is their reality, and is not apart from them, yet it is not defiled by their imperfections.

The commentary explains: Again there is an objection. For if pure dharmadhātu pervades all knowable objects, then it must also be associated with the defiled common marks of all the kleśas, such as covetousness, etc. But then how can it itself not become defiled, as the other contaminated consciousnesses and conscious states are [defiled]?

In order to respond to this objection, [the sūtra] gives the second simile of empty space. The phrase just as empty space pervades all forms and is not apart from them means that there is no other place [for those forms to be]. It is thus that it says that [empty space] is not apart from them. Because [these forms] all function within space,³⁵⁹ and cannot be seen apart from space, they cannot be said to be either identical with it nor different from it. Only if there was no distinction between space and these forms would that empty space have material form (305b) and therefore, [like them] not be constant. The phrase yet it is not defiled by their imperfections means that, although empty space

³⁵⁹The Chinese adds 既在內行不見出外, which is redundant.

contains within it all material forms, yet it is not defiled by the imperfections of these forms. Imperfections of form mean all the different kinds of marks of blue, yellow, etc, [i.e., all that is perceptible],³⁶⁰ which represent the causes that give birth to and increase covetousness, anger, etc. They are called imperfections, because such dark rainclouds, fog, etc., can cause empty space to lose its pure appearance, and can hinder the vision of that purity. Or the marks of such objects increase in the mind, and thus are called imperfections of form, which also is consistent with the meaning [of the sutra sentence]. It is not the case that empty space is defiled by any of these imperfections of form.

The phrase just so the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu pervades the minds of all sentient beings, since it is their reality, and is not apart from them means that, just as the Buddha's own mind is ultimately pure (pari-nispanna-pariśuddhi), because its original nature is luminous (prakṛti-prabhāsvara) and pure (prakṛti-viśuddhi), so are the minds of sentient beings.³⁶¹ The original

³⁶⁰ 非青黃等, not blue, yellow, etc. This would mean that imperfections come not from direct perception, whose objects are svalakṣaṇa, i.e., the pure perception of color, but from conceptualization. Śīlabhadra has: ñhon-pa la-sogs-pa sna-tshogs yin-no, "All kinds, such as blue, etc." Here there is no negative, and the meaning is simply all concepts that are clung to in illusion. I here follow Śīlabhadra's reading.

³⁶¹ 一切衆生心平等性, the minds of all

nature is ultimate, the original nature is pure.

The original nature of the mind is tathatā. The mind of all sentient beings is equal (samatā).

How can it be said that their minds are equal? It is said to be equal, because of the nature of emptiness. This means that the original nature of the mind, i.e., its dharma nature (dharmatā), pervades the minds of all sentient beings. Therefore we use the term equality (samatā) of mind, in order to express this dharmatā of the mind.

361cont. sentient beings is equal (samatā) [to the mind of Buddha]. Śīlabhadra has: sems-can thams-cad dañ sems mñam-pa-ñid kyi yoñs-su-grub-pas tha-mi-dad-par-shugs-pa shes-bya-ba/ ni rañ gi sems kyi yoñs-su-grub-pa rnam-par-dag-pa rtaq-tu rañ-bshin qyis hod-gsal-shin rañ-bshin yoñs-su-dag-pa ci-hdra-ba sems-can thams-cad kyi sems qyur-pa rañ-bshin qyis yoñs-su-dag-pa yañ de dañ hdra-ba ste, "The sentence that he enters non-discrimination because of the full perfection of (pariniṣpanna) his mind and its equality with sentient beings means that his own mind is perfected, and, being constantly pure, is in its original nature luminous and pure. All kinds of minds of sentient beings whatsoever are also in the same manner pure in their original nature."

Thus both Bandhuprabha in the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa and Śīlabhadra in the Buddhabhūmiṣaṅkhyā affirm the original purity of the mind, as they will both shortly admit the doctrine of tathāgatagarbha. Whereas it could be argued from the preceding passage on pp. 550-553, in which Bandhuprabha adds the notion of original purity from the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra, that only Bandhuprabha holds for this notion of original purity, the above passage excludes any such interpretation. Indeed, it seems that Śīlabhadra emphasizes it even more than Bandhuprabha, because the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa will later restrict its application to those of the Buddha lineage (gotra).

The phrase since it is their reality, and is not apart from them means that the originally pure minds of sentient beings, although truly originally pure, are firmly established as the Tathāgata's purity of mind only when those [beings] are far apart from adventitious obstacles and defilements. The equality of the minds of all sentient beings consists in paramārtha-pariniṣpanna-svabhāva, because the mind of equality of all sentient beings is the mark of that ultimate (paramārtha), and manifests non-differentiation from that [ultimate]. And, because the mind of all sentient beings is the ultimate mark of mind (citta-paramārtha-lakṣaṇa), it manifests and moves in non-differentiation. Because of this equal movement, [the minds of sentient beings] are not differentiated.

The phrase and yet it is not defiled by their imperfections means that it is originally pure. Imperfections mean covetousness, etc., all of which are able to lead the mind to commit faults and become defiled. Although such imperfections move by adventitious discrimination,³⁶² they are not the essence of the mind.

³⁶² 客塵分別所轉, āgantuka-vikalpa-pravṛtti. Śīlabhadra has: de-dag kyañ rtog-paḥi dbaṅ gis byuñ-bas/ deḥi rañ-bshin ma yin paḥi phyir glo-bur-pa dag yin no, "These [imperfections] issue from discrimination, but because they are not original, they come about adventitiously." (Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 66). Thus vikalpa is not the basic nature of the mind.

That essence cannot be completely lost, and it is able to bring about purity. We are here dealing with a mystery. The pure luminous dharmatā of the original mind is what is meant by mind. It is not the case that, apart from this nature of mind, there is any other nature of a pure mind.

How then can it be that the minds of sentient beings have covetousness, etc.? Such [imperfections] are supported by the power of their own discrimination. For while the faults (viparyāsa) of the mind have not yet been finally severed, these [imperfections] do arise from the power of ignorance (avidyā). This means that, just as the original nature of empty space is pure, but illusory marks make it appear to be impure, because cataracts (timira) (305c) damage the pupils of the eyes, just so the original nature of dharmadhātu is pure, but illusory marks make it appear to be impure, because of all the causal force of covetousness, etc., which arise from one's own discrimination, because the cataracts of ignorance damage the wisdom eye. But that universally pure wisdom eye (sarvākāra-pariśuddhi-prajñā-cakṣus) is never defiled. Furthermore, inasmuch as pure dharmadhātu is non-discriminative, such universal purity is termed dharmakāya of all Tathāgatas, or their true essence, because it is constantly without change.

Therefore, the minds of sentient beings are equal, because dharmadhātu is present in the continuity of these minds. Thus it is said: "All sentient beings are the embryo of Tathāgata (tathāgatagarbha),"³⁶³ and "All sentient beings have Buddha nature."³⁶⁴

[This doctrine is taught] in order to cause the minds [of sentient beings] to decide to enter the Mahāyāna. In fact it includes only those sentient beings of the Tathāgata lineage (gotra). To say that all sentient beings will become Buddhas is like saying that everything is inconstant, [when we know that the ultimate is constant], or like saying that everything is suffering, [when we know that the dharma brings joy]. If the word all here did not really mean just a small part of all sentient beings and not the complete entirety, then it would contradict what has been explained above concerning the five gotras. [Such an opinion] implies that the merits of all Buddhas will finally come to an end, because

³⁶³The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter IX, verse 37 has: sarvesāmaṇiṣṭhāpi-tathatā-suddhimāgatā tathāgatatvam tasmacca-tadgarbhah sarvadehinah, "Not being discriminated in any regard, tathatā has reached purity and the [realized] state of the Tathāgata. Therefore all embodied beings are the embryo (garbha) of that [tathāgata]."

³⁶⁴This is the principal theme of the Nirvāṇasūtra.

there will be nobody left to save. And this contradicts what has been explained concerning the Tathāgata's merits, for they will never come to an end, they are never of no benefit, and they abide [forever] in the world with the purpose of saving beings and [causing them] to seek wisdom.³⁶⁵

Although all sentient beings equally have pure dharmadhātu, yet, [they do not realize it], just as a man born blind does not see the sun or the moon, because they are held within the power of their own obstacles. As the verse says: "It is due to the defilement of sentient beings that pure dharmadhātu does not appear, just as the moon [does not appear] in a broken pot. But it pervades the entire world, for its dharma teaching shines like the sun."³⁶⁶

³⁶⁵This section has been inserted into the text by Bandhuprabha in order to harmonize this discussion on the original purity of the mind of sentient beings with his former treatment of the five gotras. But, while it does do this, he greatly weakens the explanation of the original commentary, for the sūtra's statement that dharmadhātu pervades all minds is thus restricted to only a few minds, and the idea of the equality of all minds falls into ruin. Again the main intent does not seem to be merely elitism, but rather to solve the problem of how Mahāyāna bodhi can be better than Hīnayāna nirvāṇa, if Buddha-bodhi will come to an end.

³⁶⁶From the Mahāyānasamgraha, Lamotte, La Somme, p. 310. The Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra has: yathodabhājanabhinne candrabimbam na drśyate/ tathā duṣṭeṣu sattveṣu buddhabimbam na drśyate, "Just as the moon's image does not appear in a broken pot, so the Buddha image does not appear in defiled beings." (Chapter IX, verse 16).

From this reasoning, the above objection that dharmadhātu itself becomes impure, because it is associated with the defiled marks of all kleśa, such as covetousness, etc., and is just like the other contaminated consciousnesses and conscious states, commits the fallacy of an uncertain reason (anaikantika-hetu-ābhāsa). Although empty space is associated with the defilements of form, it is not itself impure. And although consciousness and conscious states are associated with the kleśas of covetousness, etc., yet they still have dharmadhātu as their nature and are still pure. The example [of the objection regarding consciousness and conscious states] is thus inconsistent [with the premise]. It is rather the case that those whose dispositions (āśaya) are impure see their own minds as impure, and consequently say that dharmadhātu is impure. But those whose dispositions are pure see that dharmadhātu is constantly pure, because, although associated with the defilements of covetousness, etc., it is originally pure and not defiled. Therefore the above objection is a fallacy as just explained. Because dharmadhātu pervades everything, it is like empty space, and is not defiled by the imperfections of any sentient being. Those who say that dharmadhātu pervades everything [and is thus impure], because emptiness, is a dharma that

can be clung to (grāhya-dharma),³⁶⁷ have not demonstrated their thesis.

The Third Simile: The Mark of Non-Activity

The sūtra says: Again just as empty space encompasses all the actions of body, speech, and thought, and yet has no arising activity itself, just so the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu encompasses all transformations of wisdom and all phenomenal activities that universally benefit sentient beings, and yet pure dharmadhātu has no arising activity.

The commentary explains: Again there is an objection. If the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu has tathatā as its nature, then it has no mental fabrication (prapañca) and no arising activity. How then could it come to encompass the arising of wisdom, which is the cause for those phenomenal activities that benefit sentient beings? For if it did encompass the arising of wisdom, then it would have arising activity, and how then could the Tathāgata's tathatā be its mark?

In order to respond to this objection, [the sūtra] gives the third simile of empty space. The phrase just as empty space encompasses all the actions of body, speech,

³⁶⁷ 所執法, grāhya-dharma, btags-pahi chos, a dharma to which one is bound. The commentary thus considers that the above objection is based upon a misunderstanding of emptiness as an extroverted dharma.

and thought (kāya-vāc-mano-karma) means that, although empty space does not have any purposeful activity, yet it is able to encompass these three actions of sentient beings.

Because the two acts of the body and speech have resistancy of form,³⁶⁸ they are properly included [in empty space]. But, [it might be objected], how can the act of thought (mano-karma) be so included? It can not be encompassed in something else, because it has no material form, no resistant form.³⁶⁹ It is precisely because of this [resistant, material form] that things are said to be encompassed [in space]. But when the act of thought arises, it is not resistant at all.

We respond that resistant things also are not

³⁶⁸有形礙, rūpa-sapratigha, i.e., a material form that is resistant to other forms, inasmuch as it occupies place and prevents other forms from occupying the same place. See Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Wei Tat, p. 47; Poussin, p. 38, where such rūpa-sapratigha is explained by various Hīnayānist theories, as being composed of atoms. The present objection seems to be based upon this view of the real, extroverted existence of rūpa, and the equally mistaken view that empty space itself is a real entity. Also confer the Siddhi, Wei Tat, pp. 83-87; Poussin, pp. 73-78.

³⁶⁹The sentence 非無形質有對礙故須他容受 seems to be an error. Śīlabhadra reads: lus-can ma yin-pa la ni gañ-qis na go-hbyed-par-hgyur-ba thogs-pa med do she na, "Having no material form, how can it be encompassed [in empty space]. For it has no resistant form." Thus 非 negatizes the entire sentence, and 有 is an error for 無 (med).

resistant when they arise,³⁷⁰ and are therefore said to be encompassed in empty space. In like manner the act of thought is not resistant when it arises, and also may be said to be encompassed within empty space. If it were otherwise, then a real space would pervade all places, and then how could it encompass [anything]?

Futhermore, because, when resistant things are not resistant, [i.e., when they are coming to be], then they can encompass other things and are subject to movement, [for they have no fixed, determined place]. On this ground we conventionally designate space [as their encompassing milieu]. It is similar with the act of thought. Even when it comes to be destroyed, it passes into other things and causes [other thoughts] to arise. Why can such acts of thought not be [encompassed in space]? It is on this ground that that we conventionally

³⁷⁰The Sarvāstivādins hold that these three acts of body, speech, and thought are not resistant, i.e. that they are rūpa-apratigha. They further divide non-resistant form into indicative form (viññapti-rūpa), which indicates something either by actions of the body (kāyaviññaptirūpa) or by actions of speech (vāgviññaptirūpa), and non-indicative form (aviññapti-rūpa), which, as the act of thought, is not itself indicative. See Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Poussin, p. 47, note.

For the Yogacarins there are no actually real resistant forms at all, for everything arises in mutual dependency (pratītyasamutpāda). Thus space encompasses all things, not because it is a material container of these material things, but because it is the locus of their conditioned arising.

designate empty space. If it were otherwise, then a really existent empty space would pervade all places, and then how could it encompass anything?³⁷¹

If one were to hold that the substance of space was really existent, but not resistant, and that when other [resistant] dharmas arise, they can thus be said to be included in [empty space], then [with equal logical consistency] it could be said that the substance of all dharmas that have no form (i.e., the dharmas of arūpadhātu), which have no resistancy, really exist and are able to include [all things], and therefore they could also be called empty space.³⁷²

Other sūtras do say that that which is without matter is called empty space, but this is said from the defiled marks of common worldly knowledge.

³⁷¹The crux of the objection is a misunderstanding of the meaning of empty space and encompassing. The objector holds that space, as a large empty room, has the ability to contain many things that have resistant form, i.e., that can be bumped into. But, according to Yogācāra, space is a conventional designation for what is but an evolution of consciousness. Thus it does not contain things in any literal fashion. It is rather the locus in which things dependently co-arise.

³⁷²All the dharmas of arūpadhātu have no resistant form that might prevent them from encompassing other things. Therefore, if one argues that space is a real container, because it has no resistant form, the same argument would apply to the dharmas of arūpadhātu, and then all these higher states of mind could encompass phenomenal things, which is patently absurd, so says Bandhuprabha.

Therefore empty space includes the three acts of body, speech, and thought without any incompatibility.³⁷³

The phrase and yet empty space has no arising activity means that empty space does not discriminate, as if it were to include this, but not that. Although it has no purposeful activity, yet it is able to include [all things]. It is just like the brightness of the sun, the moon, or of lamps, which, although they do not discriminate this from that, yet, when they arise, they are able to illumine all forms.³⁷⁴ Or it is like the wish-fulfilling jewel, which, although without purposeful activity, is yet able to fulfill the desires of sentient beings.³⁷⁵ Other examples could be brought

³⁷³ According to the Siddhi space is an evolution of the mind, formed by an image in the mind, and is used as a designation of tathatā, because that image appears in the mind to be all encompassing. (Wei Tat, p. 84; Poussin, p. 75). Thus its nature is not the absence of material form. The only reality of space is that of pratītyasamutpāda.

³⁷⁴ The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter IX, verse 29 has: ameyā-rāsmayo yadvadvyamīśrā bhanumanadale/ sadaikakāryā vartante lokanalokayanti ca, "Just as the rays [of light] are all blended into the disc of the sun, and with one action, make the world visible. . . "

³⁷⁵ The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter IX, verse 19 has: yatha manervina yatnam svaprabhavanidarśanam/ buddheṣvapi vinabhoḡa tatha kṛtyanidarśanam, "Just as a gem shows forth its brightness without purposeful activity, so the Buddha's effortless activity is manifested." The Chinese version has 意珠, the manī jewel, or wish-fulfilling jewel.

forth to the point that empty space is manifested in everything.

The phrase just so the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu encompasses all transformations of wisdom and all phenomenal activities that benefit sentient beings (306b) means that the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu maintains and abides in its own essence, and without purposeful activity, establishes those phenomenal activities that universally benefit sentient beings.

The term wisdom means mirror wisdom and the other three wisdoms.

The words all transformations means the transformations of body, speech, and thought.

The phrase all phenomenal activities that benefit sentient beings means that these activities are able to bring supreme happiness and benefit to sentient beings. The pure dharmadhātu is able to encompass all of these, for when such arise, it is their assisting cause.

The phrase and yet pure dharmadhātu has no arising activity is interpreted as follows. Arising means purposeful activity, which is able to cause the mind to reject some objects and to choose others. Activity means the movement of the mind, for the agitation (spandana) that characterizes the mind's thinking has such activity. Therefore, the above passage means that pure dharmadhātu

is able to encompass all wisdoms, all transformations, and all phenomenal activities that benefit sentient beings, although it lacks any purposeful activity or mental agitation.

Or the phrase reads it encompasses the transformations of all wisdoms and the phenomenal activities that benefit sentient beings. This would mean that it encompasses all sambhogakāya and nirmāṇakāya, because as the cause that benefits sentient beings, it is inexhaustible, and because it is extremely great and extensive, and because it has no obstacles. Although it is non-discriminative, yet the dominating power [of dharmadhātu] can give rise to these bodies. This is to be understood to mean that, just as empty space issues (pravṛtti) forth in the activities of the arising forms that it encompasses, because the nature of dharmas (dharmatā) has the power to produce all kinds of different activities, and yet empty space has no constructed or fabricated discrimination of I and Mine, just so the Tathāgata, dwelling in the uncontaminated realm (anāśravadhātu), although lacking any purposeful or fabricated discrimination of I and Mine, yet, because of the power of his great vow that has been previously cultivated, is able to give rise to the phenomenal activities that benefit sentient beings by means of the transformations of all

wisdoms. Thus the Tathāgata in a most inconceivable manner abides in dharmakāya, and, because he is supported by the force of his previous vow, he is adorned ³⁷⁶ with the merits of all major and minor marks, and continues throughout the kalpas without end. Although he is non-discriminative, yet he produces phenomenal activities that benefit sentient beings by the transformations of all wisdoms. Although the Tathāgata lacks any deliberations as to his proper course of action, yet by the force of his original vow he is able to produce everything. It is because of [the power of]³⁷⁷ that previously elicited vow that, even when he has fallen asleep or entered nirodha-samādhi, at the appropriate moment he awakens and leaves that samādhi, although he has no purposeful activity. The Sāgaramatisūtra says: "It is just like a monk, who would resolve [to awaken] at the sound of the bell, and, [having so resolved], would then enter nirodha-samādhi. Although in that samādhi he would not hear the sound of the bell, since he would have no discrimination, yet, due to the force of his resolve, at the appropriate time, he would awaken from

³⁷⁶ 莊嚴, adornment. Śīlabhadra reads yo-byad, i.e., pariṣkāra, necessary equipment. But the Chinese corresponds rather to pariṣkāra, ornament, decoration, adornment.

³⁷⁷ 先發願. Śīlabhadra has: śnon hphañs-pahi dban-gis bsams-nas, because of the power of the previously elicited [vow].

that samādhi."³⁷⁸

The Fourth Simile: The Mark of Being Non-Conditioned

The sūtra says: Again it is like empty space,
in which all kinds of forms and marks appear to be born
and perish, and yet this empty space is not born and
does not perish. Just like this is the Tathāgata's
pure dharmadhātu, in which all wisdoms, transformations,
and phenomenal activities, that benefit sentient beings,
appear to be born and perish, and yet pure dharmadhātu
is not born and does not perish.

The commentary explains: Again there is an objection. If pure dharmadhātu pervades all knowable objects and is not free from following upon them all,³⁷⁹ then dharmadhātu must have birth and destruction. If it does not have birth and destruction, then it cannot pervade all knowable objects and be not free from following upon them all.

In order to respond to this objection, [the sūtra] gives the fourth simile of empty space. The phrase again

³⁷⁸ The Sāgaramati chapter of the Mahāsaṃnipātasūtra reads: "Good sons, just as if, before a monk were to enter nirodha-samādhi, he were to vow: 'I will now enter samādhi, but, if the bell sounds, then I will awaken.' And although there is no sound of the bell in samādhi, yet, because of the force of that vow, when they sound the bell, he does awaken from samādhi." (T. 13, p. 67c).

³⁷⁹ 不相捨離一向隨轉, thams-cad kyi rjes-su soṅ-shin tha-mi-dad-pa hdug-pa, is not free from (不相捨離, tha-mi-dad-pa hdug-pa) following upon (隨轉, rjes-su soṅ-shin) everything (一向, thams-cad).

it is like empty space, in which all kinds of forms and marks appear to be born and perish means that, just as empty space pervades all forms [as stated above], so it also includes these forms and marks and is not free from following upon them all. Although all these forms appear to be born and to perish, yet the nature of empty space is not itself born and does not perish.

Thus the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu pervades all objects, and encompasses all wisdoms, all transformations, and phenomenal activities that benefit sentient beings, and is not free from following upon them all. But, although such wisdoms, etc. are successively born and destroyed, yet pure dharmadhātu is neither born nor does it perish. This profound meaning is expressed in a sūtra: "Because Mañjuśrī is neither born nor perishes, he is called a Tathāgata."³⁸⁰ In paramārthasatya all the dharmas of form, etc. are neither born nor do they perish, but in saṃvrtisatya we do establish birth and perishing, and thus we say that things appear [to be born and perish]. This means that their saṃvrti marks appear to be born and to perish, but it is not the case that in paramārthasatya

³⁸⁰ The 大乘入諸佛境界智光明莊嚴經 has: "The Tathāgata then said: According to this teaching, i.e., non-birth and non-perishing, Mañjuśrī is he who is not born and does not perish, and this description is the appellation of a Tathāgata." (T. 12, p. 255a).

any real things are born or perish. In pure dharmadhātu all wisdoms, transformations, and phenomenal activities that benefit sentient beings are also like this, [i.e., are the operations of saṃvṛtisatya].

5) The Fifth Simile: Mark of No Increase or Decrease

The sūtra says: Again just as in empty space all kinds of forms and marks appear to increase and decrease, and yet empty space has no increase or decrease, just so in the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu, the sweet dew of the Tathāgata's sacred teachings, which have both increase and decrease, are manifested, and yet pure dharmadhātu has no increase or decrease.

The commentary explains: Again there is an objection. If pure dharmadhātu pervades everything and is not apart from the appearances of the Tathāgata's sacred teachings, which do have both increase and then subsequent decrease and destruction,³⁸¹ then pure dharmadhātu must likewise have increase and decrease. And if this is so, then dharmadhātu cannot be pure.

In order to respond to this objection, [the sūtra] gives the fifth simile of empty space. (307a) The phrase just as in empty space all kinds of forms appear to increase and decrease means that the Tathāgata's sacred

³⁸¹ 滅, destruction. There is no Tibetan parallel.

teachings are the most truly pre-eminent and pure teachings, when they are compared to the heterodox teachings of the pagans (tīrthika), because they are like rich liquor or sweet dew.

And they can lead to nirvāṇa and the eternal absence of death. Thus the sanctity realized by the devout practice of these sacred teachings attains the result of no-training (aśaikṣa). Because the many divisions [of these teachings] have already been present for a thousand years, it is said that the Buddha's true dharma has lasted a thousand years. But this does not mean that the Buddha's teachings are only a thousand years old. The Śrāvaka canon was divided into many sections only a hundred years after the Buddha's death, and the Bodhisattva canon is more than a thousand years old, for the one taste of purity does not engage in crafty debates.³⁸² But after a thousand years there arose two different interpretations, i.e., the Sarvāstivāda and the

³⁸²The claim that Mahāyāna is prior to Hīnayāna is frequently made by Mahāyānists. The Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra notes that the disciples of the Hīnayānists, Kātyāyanīputra, have "taken their origin from Mahāyāna." (Lamotte, Le Traité de la Grande Sagesse de Nāgārjuna, [Louvain, 1944] I, p. 293). And Chi-tsang in his San-lun hsüan-i argues that the eighteen Hīnayānist schools, the Mahāsaṃghika and Sthavira schools have come from the Mahāyāna (從大乘出). (Saigusa Mitsuyoshi, Sanron Genji, Batten Kōza, [Tokyo 1971], No. 27, p. 75)

Śūnyavāda.³⁸³ Thus it is said that the Tathāgata's teachings have lasted a thousand years.

The phrase and yet pure dharmadhātu has no increase or decrease means it is only by saṃvrtisatya that the Tathāgata's teachings have³⁸⁴ increase and decrease,³⁸⁵ but in paramārthasatya, dharmadhātu is their nature and they have no increase and no decrease, just as forms (rūpa) [in paramārtha have no increase and no decrease]. Having dharmadhātu as their nature and lacking increase and decrease, in paramārthasatya they are like empty space, in that they have the mark of no increase and no decrease. When it is said that they appear, this means that the transformations of conventional consciousness (saṃvrti-vijñāna) appear as having increase and decrease, but such is not their true nature in pure dharmadhātu, for they are separated from the marks of prapañca and discrimination.³⁸⁶

³⁸³From the Yogācāra teaching of paratantra the Sarvāstivāda errs by attributing an extroverted reality to what is dependently co-arisen, and the Śūnyavāda errs by overlooking the paratantric existence of dharmas, in favor of a completely transcendent emptiness.

³⁸⁴The character 非 is not found in Śīlabhadra, does not fit the context, and should be omitted.

³⁸⁵The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter IX, verse 21 has: "Just as actions constantly increase and decrease in space, just so the actions of Buddha rise and fall in anāśravadhātu."

³⁸⁶The phrase 色等諸法, all dharmas of form, etc., seems to have been transposed from 色等亦爾 above. Śīlabhadra has: yan-dag-par na chos-kyi-dbyiṅs spros-pa

The Sixth Simile: The Mark of No Movement

The sūtra says: Just as in space forms and marks of the ten directions are limitless and inexhaustible, because the realm of empty space is limitless and inexhaustible, and yet empty space itself has no going or coming, no moving or changing, just so is the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu, in that, although it establishes benefit and happiness for all sentient beings in the ten directions, and its various kinds of activities are limitless and inexhaustible, because pure dharmadhātu is limitless and inexhaustible, yet pure dharmadhātu has no going or coming, no moving or changing.

The commentary explains: Again there is an objection. If the Tathāgata has dharmadhātu as his essence, and also bestows benefit and happiness upon all sentient beings, whether they are going or coming, then dharmadhātu is not separated from this [going and coming], and, just as other dharmas, it must have such going and coming, such birth, etc. If this is so, then dharmadhātu cannot be pure. On the other hand, if dharmadhātu has no activity of going, coming, etc., then it cannot bestow benefit and happiness upon sentient beings in the ten directions.

386cont. med-pahi ño-bo la ni ma yin no, "In paramārtha, having an essence of dharmadhātu without prapañca, they have [no increase or decrease]." I follow Śīlabhadra in the above translation. Or perhaps it means: "All the dharmas of form etc., which are the appearances of the Tathāgata's teachings. . . ."

In order to respond to this objection, [the sūtra] gives the sixth simile of empty space. The phrase just as in space the forms and marks of the ten directions are limitless and inexhaustible, because the realm of empty space is limitless and inexhaustible means that the world realms in all the ten directions are limitless and inexhaustible, and therefore all the various forms and marks in them are also limitless and inexhaustible. Lacking limits in any one direction, they are inexhaustible in all directions, and are fully complete as to time and place. Thus they are said to be limitless and inexhaustible. (307b)

The phrase and yet empty space itself has no going or coming, no moving or changing means that empty space encompasses everything, pervades everything, and yet has no activity.

The phrase just so is the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu, in that, although it establishes benefit and happiness for all sentient beings in the ten directions, and its various kinds of activities are limitless and inexhaustible means that those activities of bringing benefit and happiness are limitless and inexhaustible, as explained above.

The phrase because pure dharmadhātu is limitless and and inexhaustible means that pure dharmadhātu is limitless and inexhaustible, because, although it has no movement,

its dominating force can issue in activities (karman-pravṛtti) that bring benefit and happiness to limitless sentient beings in the limitless world realms in the ten directions.

The phrase and yet pure dharmadhātu has no going or coming, no moving or changing is to be understood as follows. Going means to leave here and arrive there. Coming means to leave there and arrive here. In the phrase no moving and no changing, the first is an illustration (uddeśa) and the second is an explanation (nirdeśa) [for going and coming]. The words dharmadhātu has no going or coming, etc. mean that it has no limits nor any restrictions of form (rūpa-sapratigha). If it had limits or restrictions of form, then, like all dharmas, it could be said to go and come, to move and change from place to place, but then it would not be without limits and restrictions of form. Dharmadhātu is like empty space, but it can be said to have the activities of going and coming, of moving and changing.³⁸⁷ This means that in paramārthasatya

³⁸⁷ Śīlabhadra has: gañ-shiq lus yod-pa de ni yul gshan-dag tu hbyuñ-bahi phyir hgroho shes-bya-ba la-sogs-pahi tha-sñad hthob kyi lus med-pa ni ma yin te/nam-mkhah la-sogs-pa bshin no, "Although all that has form limitations (bodies) can be said to have going, etc., because they progress from one place to another, that which has no such form limitations does not have [such going, etc.], and is comparable to empty space." Bandhuprabha has altered the text and does attribute movement to dharmadhātu, inasmuch as sambhogakāya and nirmāṇakāya are characterized by movement, as will be explained below.

pure dharmadhātu is the essence of all Tathāgatas, and is pervasively present in the [conscious] continuity of all sentient beings. Due to the maturing force of their own good seeds (bīja) and the dominant enabling condition (adhipatipratyaya) of pure dharmadhātu, when consciousness [of dharmadhātu] arises, then the activities [of the Tathāgata's wisdom] become clearly manifested (pratibhāsa) and come to be expressed in words (vyavahāra-labdha) as the benefit and happiness which the Tathāgata brings to all sentient beings. Were it not for such activity, such dominant enabling conditions, then it would not happen that the Tathāgata's dharmakāya would be able to have any activity of bringing benefit and happiness to sentient beings. As a sūtra says: "Good sons, the Tathāgata entirely lacks any going or coming or so forth." ³⁸⁸ We did say above that the Tathāgata does go and come, etc., but, as this refers to his sambhogakāya and nirmānakāya,³⁸⁹ there is no inconsistency.

³⁸⁸ The Vajracchedikaprajñāpāramitāsūtra says: "Because the Tathāgata has no place to come from nor any place to go to, he is called the Thus-Come-One (Tatha-agata)."³⁸⁸ (T. 8, p. 752b).

³⁸⁹ Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna mentions only nirmānakāya, while the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa adds sambhogakāya.

The Seventh Simile: The Mark of Being Eternal

The sūtra says: Again just as in empty space the three thousand world realms appear to be destroyed and created, and yet the realm of empty space is neither destroyed nor created, just so in the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu, there appears the realization of samyak-sambodhi which has unlimited marks, or there is manifested the entrance into parinirvāṇa, and yet pure dharmadhātu does not perfect samyak-sambodhi, nor does it enter nirvāṇa.

The commentary explains: Again there is an objection. For if pure dharmadhātu is apart from going and coming, etc., how can it reach to samyak-sambodhi (perfect wisdom) and parinirvāṇa (full nirvāṇa), since it has no spacial going or coming? On the other hand, if it does have going and coming, then this would contradict what is taught above [in the last section].

This objection is not valid, because of the above sūtra passage. Just as world realms appear to be destroyed and created, and yet empty space is neither destroyed nor created, just so in pure dharmadhātu, although all Buddhas appear to realize samyak-sambodhi and parinirvāṇa, yet in paramārthasatya pure dharmadhātu (307c) does not realize samyak-sambodhi nor parinirvāṇa.³⁹⁰

³⁹⁰ Bandhuprabha here presents the entire sūtra passage, rather than commenting on each phrase singly.

Only if it did realize such could it be said to have going and coming, etc. For just as in empty space the appearances of the destructions and creations of all world realms is saṃvrtisatya and not paramārthasatya, because in great emptiness such things have emptiness as their nature, just so the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu manifests the realization of samyak-sambodhi, which has unlimited marks, and nirvāṇa, but this is said by saṃvrtisatya and not by paramārthasatya, because the realization of samyak-sambodhi and the entrance into nirvāṇa do not really exist, because all dependently co-arisen skandhas have no self-nature. If pure dharmadhātu be considered from paramārthasatya, then the existence of these two, [i.e., samyak-sambodhi and nirvāṇa] is not ultimate existence (paramārtha-sat), because that which ultimately exists does not cast off its own marks (svalakṣaṇa) and take on other marks. If one allows that dharmadhātu casts off what is not samyak-sambodhi to realize samyak-sambodhi, and casts off what is not nirvāṇa to attain parinirvāṇa, then such is not paramārthasatya.

One might think that precisely because of this explanation these two should be said to ultimately exist. For samyak-sambodhi has never had a time when it was not samyak-sambodhi, and nirvāṇa has never had a

time when it was not nirvāṇa. Therefore they should ultimately exist.

But, if this is so, then other things would also likewise [ultimately exist]. The destructions of world ages would be constant destructions, and at no time would they not be being destroyed. The creations of world ages would be constant creations, and at no time would they not be being created. Pots, pans, etc., at no time would not be pots, pans, etc. And so all these things would also ultimately exist.

And if this is so, then ascetics (yogins) would not have to cross over a world realm filled everywhere with flaming fire (i.e., kleśa) and go to that other world realm, but would suffer the flames of that fire in this [world]. Those who have attained the powers of pre-eminent faith (adhimukti) in the various bhūmis would not experience the con-version that attains mastery (īśvara-parivṛtti). And those who have not attained any pre-eminent samādhi or powers of mastery would both realize samyak-sambodhi and negate samyak-sambodhi, would both realize parinirvāṇa and negate parinirvāṇa. Thus, although one first [realizes] the state of samyak-sambodhi, and then that of parinirvāṇa, yet, because pure tathatā does not lose its own mark (svalaksana), so pure dharma-dhātu neither realizes samyak-sambodhi nor enters

nirvāṇa.³⁹¹

Because these two have increase as their svalakṣaṇa, they do not ultimately exist (paramārtha-sat). Both the practitioner and his practice, because they are marked by clinging to what is entirely imagined (parikalpita-lakṣaṇa), do not really exist (abhāva), and yet, because practitioners do come to understand all dharmas, they are said to be enlightened. This is transcendental non-discriminative wisdom, the realization of samyak-sambodhi. In this state, because it takes tathatā as object and does not manifest any discrimination in regard to these two³⁹² [states of samyak-sambodhi and parinirvāṇa], there is no samyak-sambodhi nor parinirvāṇa. This profound meaning is expressed as follows: "Your majesty³⁹³ should know that, because all dharmas are not born, all Buddhas manifest non-attainment and non-realization of birth." Because clinging to what is entirely imagined (parikalpita) does not really exist (abhāva), the discrimination of birth, etc., does not exist. It is by saṃvṛtisatya that

³⁹¹ The above mistaken opinion is based on a confusion of the two truths. In paramārthasatya, all dharmas are empty and lack any temporal sequence. From this the objector concludes that even in saṃvṛtisatya they have no temporal sequence, which negates validity to saṃvṛtisatya and to the entire mārga system.

³⁹² Punctuate after 不現行故, rather than after 分別.

³⁹³ Sūtras were often presented to kings and rulers. If we knew the source of this quotation, then perhaps we would know whose majesty is meant.

these two are established, for nirmāṇakāya manifests them as appropriate to the level of understanding of those sentient beings to be converted. Therefore the Tathāgata manifests these two, (308a) and in establishing these two kinds of phenomena, he manifests everything.³⁹⁴

The Eighth Simile: The Mark of No Suffering or Affliction

The sūtra says: Again just as in regard to the various forms that depend upon space, changes, such as destructions and conflagrations, can occur, and, yet the realm of empty space is not changed by that and suffers no affliction, just so in the realm of sentient beings, which depends upon the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu, sins of the acts of body, speech, and thought against the various [rules of] training (śikṣa) can occur, and yet pure dharmadhātu is not changed by that, nor does it suffer any affliction.

The commentary explains: Again there is an objection. For if pure dharmadhātu pervades all kinds of sentient beings, then how can those sentient beings have any sin?³⁹⁵ In dharmadhātu there is no sin, because its nature is pure. The establishment of the [rules of] training would then be useless, because no sentient beings

³⁹⁴ This last sentence is absent from Śīlabhadra's text. It emphasizes the nature of saṃvṛti as manifesting paramārtha, i.e., udbhāvanā-saṃvṛti.

³⁹⁵ 毀犯, āpad, to fall into misfortune. Alternatively, kṣobha, emotional agitation. The Tibetan

would have any sin. On the other hand, if they had sin, then they would be afflicted (parikhinna) and, just as the Hīnayānists, would not attain purity.

In order to respond to this objection, [the sūtra] gives the eighth simile of empty space. The phrase just as in regard to the various forms that depend upon space, etc. shows that this objection is not valid, for just as in regard to the various forms (rūpa) of grasses, trees, etc., which depend upon space, various changes, such as being destroyed, can occur, and yet pure empty space is not changed along with them, because, although it encompasses them, it is not afflicted, nor oppressed by any of their sufferings, such as being destroyed, etc., just so in the realm of sentient beings, which depends upon the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu, sins of all kinds can occur, and yet pure dharmadhātu is not changed by that, nor does it suffer any affliction. Although sentient beings are within pure dharmadhātu, it is apparent that by their own discrimination they do give rise to the two kinds of sins in the acts of their bodies, speech, and thought, i.e., householders can commit all kinds of bad sins, such as injuring their parents, etc., and monks can commit all kinds of sins, as appropriate to their condition. It is in order to

395 cont. log-par-sgrub-pa means mistakes. As the intent is not to mean physical disasters, I translate sins.

subdue and regulate [such sins] that the various rules of training are set up. But all these sins have only a conventional existence (saṃvṛti-sat), and pure dharmadhātu is not changed by such transgressions, because its nature has no change, no affliction, no oppression. If, due to such suffering, it were not to remain constant, then it would have sin, and be like [the ultimate as understood] by śrāvakas, etc. But such is not pure dharmadhātu. Since it is able³⁹⁶ to remain constant in the face of all sufferings, it has no sin, and is like empty space.

Furthermore, it is only in their conventional existence (saṃvṛti-sat) that all the dharmas of form, etc. are destroyed in space, and not in their ultimate existence (paramārtha-sat). Likewise, although there are sins and there is the establishment of the rules of training in the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu, these are conventionally established and do not ultimately exist. They are so established by conventional naming. The three acts of body, speech, and thought become bad only because of the way in which they arise, and not because

³⁹⁶Delete 不. Śīlabhadra reads: thams-cad bzod-pahi phyir ro, because it constantly bears everything, i.e., it remains constant and does not loose or change its essence, despite the presence of suffering and sin.

they have any [bad] essence. It is not the case that anything³⁹⁷ is established as really existing because of the power of its own arising. Likewise the bad acts of the body [do not really exist], because [the body] is composed of an aggregate of the elements of earth, etc.³⁹⁸ (308b) The acts of speech, like the sound of a drum, are not bad.³⁹⁹ All non-indicative acts,⁴⁰⁰

³⁹⁷ 塊石等, boñ-ba la-sogs-pa, loṣṭa, i.e., lumps of earth and so forth.

³⁹⁸ The Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi refutes the opinion that kāyavi jñaptirūpa really exists as follows: "With the mind as its cause, the material marks of the hand, etc., which are evolutions of consciousness, are born and perish in a continual series, which occupies a particular space, as if they moved themselves, but such manifestations indicate the mind, and only by convention are they called indications of the body (kāyavi jñapti)." (Wei Tat, p. 56; Poussin, pp. 49-50).

³⁹⁹ The meaning of the sound of a drum depends upon the situation in which it is sounded, for it has no moral essence at all. The Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi refutes the real existence of speech rūpa as follows: "With the mind as its cause, the apparent sounds, which are evolutions of consciousness, are born and perish in a continual series, as if they actually indicated something, but it is only by conventional naming that they are called indications of speech (vāgvi jñapti). Such [conventional naming] does not contradict logical reasoning." (Wei Tat, p. 58; Poussin, p. 50).

⁴⁰⁰ 無表業, avi jñapti-karma. The classification of rūpa of the Sarvāstivāda, shorn of its supposed "reality," is employed by Yogācāra. That classification divides all phenomenal form into rūpa-pratigha, the resistant forms of material bodies encountered in the world, and rūpa-apratigha, non-resistant, non-material forms. These non-resistant forms are further divided into the two categories of form which indicates or outwardly manifests something either by an act of the body (kāyavi jñaptirūpa) or by an act of speech (vāgvi jñaptirūpa), and form which does not indicate or outwardly manifest anything (avi jñaptirūpa), i.e., non-indicative acts of body or speech, and acts of thought (manō). It is the

because they have non-action as their nature, do not really exist. Also the acts of thought, because they are established as being bad only by being associated with the power [of bad permeations] also do not ultimately exist.⁴⁰¹ Since their [karmic] causes [are illusory] and do not exist, so these results do not exist. Therefore in pure dharmadhātu neither karmic acts nor results ultimately exist, because all these arise from discrimination, are born from the evolutions of conventional consciousness (samvrtivijñāna), and as the marks of such

400cont. nature of avijñapti acts to be non-active, for they do not indicate or manifest anything in action. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "One conventionally gives the name of avijñapti to volitions (cetanā) or resolve (pranidhi) to practice good or bad acts for a period of time. In other words, this designation may be applied to either the increasing and developing state of good seeds or to bad volitions, which produce acts of the body and speech. . ." (Wei Tat, p. 58; Poussin, pp. 50-51). Therefore avijñapti-karma is the not yet manifested act of the mind, which has been produced by previous manifested (vijñapti) acts, and will itself become manifested in future acts of vijñapti-karma, when carried into bodily or vocal action.

401 意業, mano-karma is defined by the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi as: "The two volitions (cetanā) of deliberation and judgments, because they are associated with the manas consciousness, and because they stir manas consciousness into activity." (Wei Tat, p. 58; Poussin, p. 52). These acts of thought (mano-karma) move the body and speech into visible, manifested actions, but themselves are neither visible nor manifested. They are therefore classified under the category of avijñapti-karma. See Poussin, p. 51, note 2.

evolutions are established.⁴⁰²

The Ninth Simile: The Mark of Not Being an Aggregate

The sūtra says: Again just as, dependent upon space, great earths, great mountains, bright lights, water, fires, Indra's retinue of stars, and suns and moons of all kinds can occur, and yet the realm of empty space is not marked by these, just so, dependent upon the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu, the skandhas śīla, samādhi, and prajñā, the skandhas of liberation (vimukti-skandha)⁴⁰³ and liberation wisdom (vimukti-jñāna-skandha) can occur, yet pure dharmadhātu is not marked by these.

The commentary explains: Again there is an objection. For if pure dharmadhātu pervades all dharmas, then it must have the marks⁴⁰⁴ of the uncontaminated skandhas

⁴⁰²Yogācāra emphasizes the role of karma, because it tended to be neglected in the negative dialectic of Madhyamika. But this does not mean that karma is to be understood as any kind of a fixed essence, or a fixed destiny or fate. Rather, it is the saṃvṛti functioning of paratantra-svabhāva. One of the focal points of the difference between Yogācāra and Madhyamika is their relative emphasis upon conventional consciousness, upon saṃvṛtisatya.

⁴⁰³After the words 解脫 add 蘊, as the context demands it.

⁴⁰⁴Śīlabhadra reads: gal-te chos-kyi-dbyiñs rnam-par-dag-pa thams-cad ldan-pa yin na/ tshul-khrims kyi phum-po la-sogs-paḥi mtshan-ñid du thal-bar-hgyur-ba ham/ de dan tha-mi-dad-paḥi phyir de-dag kyañ de-kho-na bshin du phyin-paḥi bdaq-ñid ma yin-pa ñid du hgyur ro, "If dharmadhātupariśuddhi is associated with everything, it adheres to the marks of the skandhas of śīla, etc. But if they are not different from it, then they do not have the nature of skandhas at all." Thus the first negative in 應無戒等無漏蘊相 should be omitted.

(anāśravaskandha),⁴⁰⁵ such as śīla, samādhi, prajñā, vimukti, and vimukti-jñāna. Because they are not separated from that [dharmadhātu], then, like empty space, they would not have the nature of being aggregates (skandhas).

In order to respond to this objection, [the sūtra] gives the ninth simile of empty space. The above sūtra passage shows that this objection is not valid, because [these uncontaminated skandhas are present in pure dharmadhātu] just as [the great earth, mountains, etc.] are present in empty space. Just as, dependent upon space, the earth, etc. can occur, and yet it is not the case that, because empty space is associated with the common marks of these earths, mountains, etc., it itself has the nature of an aggregate, just so, although the skandhas of śīla, etc. can occur dependent upon the Tathāgata's dharmadhātu, yet that pure dharmadhātu is not the skandha of śīla, etc.

You should understand that uncontaminated, pure śīla (morality) is here called śīla-skandha. Uncontaminated samādhi is called samādhi-skandha. And uncontaminated prajñā is called prajñā-skandha. The pre-eminent understanding of no-training

⁴⁰⁵ 無漏蘊, the above five qualities, although uncontaminated (anāśrava), are yet composites or aggregates (skandha), which are accumulated by practice.

(aśikṣa) is called vimukti-skandha. And the correct insight of no-training is called vimukti-jñāna-skandha. The first three are the causes of the last two.⁴⁰⁶

One opinion holds that the wisdom that takes deliverance (vimukti) as its object at the stage of no-training (aśaikṣa) is called deliverance wisdom (vimukti-jñāna), and the other wisdoms are simply called wisdom.

But another opinion holds that all five of these uncontaminated skandhas are present both in the stage of training (śikṣa) and in the stage of no-training (aśaikṣa), but, whereas they are only partially realized in the stage of training, they are fully realized in that of no-training, because all bodhisattvas and Buddhas are endowed with these five [uncontaminated skandhas]. And so, although these five skandhas depend upon dharma-dhātu, yet dharmadhātu is not to be identified

⁴⁰⁶ The three branches of training (śikṣa) are morality (śīla), samādhi, and prajñā. (Siddhi, Wei Tat, p. 720; Poussin, p. 631). Due to the practices of śikṣa, vimukti-skandha (deliverance) and vimukti-jñāna-skandha (insight into deliverance) are attained at the stage of no-training. The Āmitāyurdhyānasūtra explains that śīla leads to samādhi, which leads to prajñā, which leads to vimukti, which leads to vimukti-jñāna. (T. 12, p. 346a). All five are referred to as 五分法身, because all Buddhas are endowed with them.

with their marks, and they do not loose their svalakṣaṇa as the five [uncontaminated] skandhas. Note that the five clinging skandhas (pañca-upādāna-skandha) of form, sensation, conceptualization, volition, and consciousness, and these five uncontaminated [skandhas] are the same in regard to dharmadhātu, [i.e., they all are aggregates and not to be identified with that dharmadhātu].⁴⁰⁷

In sum we do affirm that there are no phenomenal merits, such as śīla, etc. in pure dharmadhātu, and yet there are true merit doors therein, and their dominating, enabling causality (adhipati-pratyaya) gives rise to and increases all conditioned (samskrta) merits, which merits are not identical with the true merit doors of empty dharmadhātu, because [those true merit doors] are unconditioned (asamskrta). The conditioned (samskrta) merits, being dependent on this dharmadhātu,

⁴⁰⁷ Śīlabhadra reads: de bshin du ñe-bar-len-pahi phuñ-po lñahi rañ-bshin dag kyañ ma yin no shes brjod-par-bya ste/ tshul-khrims-kyi-phuñ-po la-sogs-pa smos-pa ni zag-pa med-pahi chos mthum-pas so, "Thus it must be said that [dharmadhātu] is not of the essence of the pañca-upādāna-skandha, and the explanation of the skandhas of śīla, etc., is the same, [except that] they are anaśrava-dharmas." (Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p.79). Thus I read 五取蘊戒等無漏同法界故 in accord with this passage from Śīlabhadra.

give rise to and increase all merits. (308c)
 These merits are comprised in conditioned,
 samsaric skandhas, but, because they are not
 interrupted or exhausted, they are said to be
 constant. But it is not true that they will
 never be destroyed for all eternity, for having
 been born, they will inevitably come to destruc-
 tion, because they are comprised in skandhas.
 They are not unconditioned (asamskrta) dharmas,
 because they have as their objects the meanings
 produced by reflection, etc., and thus [in this
 fashion] they are pre-eminent. Therefore we
 can conclude in regard to these five skandhas
 that dharmadhātu truly is the basic support (āśraya)
 for the merits of all the Three Vehicles.

The Tenth Simile: The Mark of No I or Mine

The sūtra says: Again in empty space causes and
conditions develop and arise, and the spheres of the
three thousand immeasurable world realms can occur,
and yet the realm of empty space has no arising activity.
Just so in the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu, immeasurable
marks and the spheres of all Buddha assemblies are
encompassed, and yet pure dharmadhātu has no arising
activity.

The commentary explains: Again there is an objection. For if the pure dharmadhātu of all Buddhas is its essence, then there is no experience of discriminating this from that. How then could [dharmadhātu] have differences of assemblies? On the other hand, if it does discriminate that which is experienced, then how can it be the pure dharmadhātu of all Buddhas?

In order to respond to this objection, [the sūtra] gives the tenth simile of empty space. The above passage shows that this objection is not valid, for it is just like empty space. In empty space causes and conditions arise, and the encircling of the enveloping wind sphere, which [supports] the three thousand realms, can occur. Even although empty space has no discriminative thought that might differentiate between I and Mine, yet it is able to encompass all these spheres of the different world realms. Just so in the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu, the one unified assembly sphere of all initiated (abhiṣeka) bodhisattvas, who in the plenitude of all their marks have attained all wisdoms (sarvajñāna), which arise from the dominant power of their own good actions, can occur. And since this [assembly] arises from a variety of different causes and conditions, those causes and conditions do not result in just one Buddha assembly, but in a number of such

assemblies. Another sūtra expresses this same idea:
 "There can be various Buddhas and Buddha lands and
 various Buddha assemblies." And yet pure dharmadhātu
 does not experience the differentiation of I and Mine,
 nor does it have the potentiality for creating discrim-
 ination between subject and object (grāhya-grāhaka).

Although the Tathāgata's dharmakāya has no images
 of differentiation or mental fabrication (prapañca), yet,
 due to the power of original vows and pre-eminent
 practice, sambhogakāya and nirmānakāya do give rise to
 all the Buddha lands replete with all their various
 marks. Therefore all the differentiations in Buddha
 assemblies can occur, all of which are but evolutions
 of pure consciousness. But all these differentiations
 are not ultimately existent (paramārtha-sat). Just as
 some universal monarch (cakravartin), by the power of
 his previous vow to benefit all sentient beings, might
 perform pre-eminent acts and give rise to wondrous and
 varied differentiations, such as excellent women, etc.,⁴⁰⁸
 just so all Buddhas, because they desire to benefit (309a)
 all sentient beings create pre-eminent actions, and the

⁴⁰⁸ 女寶, or 寶女, strī-ratna, a jewel of a woman,
 an excellent woman. Cakravartins are said to have seven
 jewels: golden wheels, elephants, swift horses, a queen,
 good ministers, jewels of women, and fine generals. The
 mention of excellent women is meant to include all these
 items, which would be of benefit to the people of the
 realm, so it is supposed.

dominant power of these actions gives rise to various pure lands, and thus sentient beings experience differentiations in the joy of the dharma. But there is no discrimination in regard to these differentiations.

From this we can understand that all the marks of dharmadhātu are profound, that its places are profound, and that its actions are profound.⁴⁰⁹ The profundities of its marks mean that it is separated from the ten kinds of impure defects and thus has the ten marks of purity. The ten kinds of impure defects are: discrimination, defilement, [arising] activity, being conditioned, increase and decrease, movement, being transitory, suffering affliction, being an aggregate, having movement, and being attached to assemblies.⁴¹⁰ The ten marks of purity are non-discrimination, non-defilement, no [arising] activity, no increase nor decrease, no movement, being eternal, having no affliction, not being an aggregate, and not distinguishing I and Mine.

⁴⁰⁹The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter IX, verse 36 has: gambhīryamamale dhatu lakṣaṇasthānakarmasu/ bud-dhānametaduditaṁ raṅgairvakaśavitraṇa, "We speak of the profundities of the Buddha's marks, place, and action in the uncontaminated realm by means of [the analogy] of the different colors in space." In the following prose commentary Vasubandhu enumerates these profundities. For a consideration of the relationship between this section of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra and the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra see pp. 342-350 of the preceding study.

⁴¹⁰These ten correspond to the above ten similes of empty space.

The profundities of actions refer to the actions of transformations. The profundities of places mean that [these Buddha places] have no movement and are in fact the fully replete assemblies in the Tathāgata's pure land. All these places are metaphorically expressed by use of the analogy of empty space, because that [analogy] of empty space is used to express all the marks⁴¹¹ of dharmadhātu. As a sūtra says: "All the metaphors we rely upon (pratisthā) express the merits of the Tathāgata's śīla, etc. analogically, but they all slander all Tathāgatas, except the metaphor that employs the analogy of empty space, because the immeasurable merits of the Tathāgata's śīla, etc. are analogous to empty space."⁴¹²

⁴¹¹Delete 塵 from the phrase 一切塵相, for Śīlabhadra reads, rnam-pa thams-cad nam-mkhah: all the marks.

⁴¹²The 如來不思議秘密大乘經 has: "Good sons, conventional usage exhausts all metaphors without being able to analogically express the various merits of śīla, samādhi, prajñā, vimukti, and vimukti-jñāna of all Buddhas and Tathāgatas. All these metaphors, whether of body, speech, or thought, are unable to analogically express them, because those Tathāgatas transcend them. The sole exception is [the metaphor of] empty space, which is able to express them analogically, because the Tathāgata's śīla, samādhi, prajñā, vimukti, and vimukti-jñāna are all just like empty space." (T. 11, p. 718a).

PART TWO: CHAPTER THREE

Mirror Wisdom

The First Simile: The Mark of Enunciation

The sūtra says: Next, wondrously born ones, is mirror wisdom, which reflects all kinds of images as in a great mirror. Thus, dependent on the Tathāgata's wisdom mirror, images of all senses, objects, and consciousnesses are reflected. But you should consider this mirror to be only a simile, and should recognize that the Tathāgata's wisdom mirror is entirely universal. It is thus that this mirror of wisdom is called mirror wisdom.

The commentary explains: We have already explained the transcendence (tyajana) [of pure dharmadhātu], and now we will explain wisdom. One should understand that here we explain mirror wisdom by analogy [with a mirror], which is an impartial cause for the arising and manifesting of images of all dharmas. This means that pure ālaya consciousness⁴¹³ of all Tathāgatas is able to manifest and give rise to all images of all wisdoms, just as a great mirror is able to manifest all images in this world, because [that ālaya consciousness] is associated

⁴¹³ 諸如來第八淨識. Śīlabhadra has simply: de-bshin-qsegs-pāhi śes, the wisdom of Tathāgatas. Bandhuprabha has added the reference to ālaya to emphasize Dharmapāla's teaching on the continuity of paratantric consciousness into wisdom.

with wisdom. By conventional naming we term [such manifestations of pure ālaya consciousness] wisdom. The phrase all senses refers to the six internal sense organs (indriya) of the eye, ear, etc. Objects refers to the six external objects of those sense organs (viṣaya), i.e., form, etc. These six internal sense organs and their six external objects are the twelve (309b) supports (āyatana) [of sensation]. The consciousnesses and the conscious states which characterize the last three wisdoms arise through the functioning of these twelve [supports], and, because consciousness is their principal factor, they are referred to as consciousnesses [in the sūtra]. The sūtra says that all kinds of images are reflected, because various kinds of differences in the mode of functioning (ākāra) of these consciousnesses are manifested.

Later on the sūtra says that at all times mirror wisdom relies on all objects, and various images and appearances arise. Other passages are to be interpreted in accord with this, for, because it is the cause that is able to give rise to wisdom images, it is called mirror wisdom.

Equality wisdom, having mirror wisdom as its object, understands all dependently co-arisen (pratītyasamutpāda) things, [i.e., it understands all things as reflected in

mirror wisdom]. The wisdom of intellectual mastery takes all common and individual marks as its objects, and the wisdom of duty fulfillment similarly [has all dharmas as object]. The consciousnesses and conscious states of these three wisdoms, in all the objects they apprehend, both internally and externally, appear (pratibhāsa) as the individual and common marks of all dharmas, and their images clearly appear [in this mirror wisdom]. Therefore all these images arise with the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom as their cause.

They are said to appear (pratibhāsa) because they are clearly manifested and shine forth (prabhāvita). They are appearances in the mind of the Tathāgata's wisdom, and nothing more, because in the Tathāgata result stage their essence is equality wisdom and the other two wisdoms, [and thus, being wisdom, they are free from parikalpita]. When these wisdoms arise, each according to its proper mode of activity (ākāra) is able to thoroughly understand. Although they are nothing other than the Tathāgata's wisdom, yet upon analysis we say that they each manifest their proper marks. The other three wisdoms do not have the ability [to give rise to images of all dharmas], but this mirror wisdom is said to be able to manifest these appearances, because it conditionally gives rise to such images, just as a

bright mirror manifests all images.

An alternate interpretation is that, in regard to the phrase all senses, objects, and consciousnesses, the senses are the six sense organs, the objects are their six object spheres (viṣaya), and the consciousnesses are the first six consciousnesses. These include all the multitudinous images of the eighteen dhātus, [i.e., all the knowable phenomenal world]. All these images do appear as is appropriate to the specific nature of the other three wisdoms, [which depend upon mirror wisdom]. Because the wisdom of intellectual mastery and the other wisdoms are all able to manifest the universal nature of all just as it is (yāthāvadbhāvikatā) and to the limits of its existence (yāvadbhāvikatā), they have as object the [images in] the pure consciousness associated with the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom. Because these three wisdoms give rise to their respective wisdom images, they are said to manifest (pratibhāsa) [wisdom meaning], but that which is manifested is nothing other than the Tathāgata's wisdom, for in the final analysis they are simply the Tathāgata's wisdom. Only by analysis do we say that they manifest [specific] marks. The rest of this interpretation is as above.

Furthermore, the eighteen dhātus are all present to the consciousness and the conscious states associated

with the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom and thus their images appear there, since, when the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom arises, it is able to entirely illumine all objects. All senses, their objects, and the [resultant] consciousnesses clearly appear as images in this wisdom, because it apprehends their marks and causes them to arise.⁴¹⁴ Although mirror wisdom has no discrimination of subject and object, yet all knowable images do appear in it, just as in a mirror, since this is the mode of functioning of this wisdom. Although the Tathāgata has no discrimination between subject and object, between unity and difference, yet he is able to be aware of dharma images of all individual and common marks,⁴¹⁵ which appear in his mind, (309c) and since he is thus aware, he can explain these individual and common

⁴¹⁴ 諸處境識, all sense organs, sense objects, and sense consciousnesses. Thus all images of all knowable things are present in the mind of wisdom, and Bandhuprabha affirms the theory of sākāra-jñāna-vāda, i.e., that knowledge is always, even in wisdom, accompanied with an inner image (ākāra). Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna reads somewhat differently: skye-mched rnams dañ dehi yul rnams dañ rnam-par-śes-pa rsams so, "all senses and their objects and consciousnesses." (Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 83). This might suggest that images only of the senses, which are internal to consciousness, appear, and not that all knowable object images are present, which would be less emphatic about the perdurance of the structure of samsaric knowing into wisdom than the above Chinese.

⁴¹⁵ Awareness of common marks is knowledge of truths common to all, such as the four truths. Awareness of individual marks is direct, immediate knowing of particular instances, from which those truths are generated by logical thinking.

marks of all dharmas without failure. Because of these images the Tathāgata is perfected in his never failing memory of dharmas (anuṣitasmr̥ti), and because of this all knowable objects at all times clearly appear in his mirror wisdom and the other three wisdoms. If this were not so, then how could the Tathāgata be called omniscient? If there were no mirror wisdom or if there were not the other three wisdoms, then he would not be able to constantly be aware of the individual and common marks of all dharmas.

One might perhaps offer the opinion that, because of his [temporal] continuity, he has such a profound ability [to know all individual and common marks], and thus he is said to be omniscient. For the verse says: "because of his continuity, he has such a profound ability, and, just as fire consumes everything, so he is omniscient. It is not the case that he knows everything simultaneously."⁴¹⁶

But these are untrue words (anṛta-vacana), for when the minds of non-Buddhas apprehend one thing, they do not apprehend other things or know other things, and therefore are not omniscient. A temporally sequential continuity is unable to apprehend and know [all things in

⁴¹⁶In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya the opinion is given that "with a temporally successive mind he knows all dharmas," and then refuted. (T. 29, p. 155. See Nishio, Buchikyōron, p. 231, n. 3).

one] moment. In such an opinion at one moment he would know only one aspect of the common marks of all dharmas. If this were so then the Tathāgata would be termed omniscient only by conventional naming. But this is not so, for then he would not be omniscient, because to be omniscient means to be omniscient in the ultimate meaning (paramārthasatya).

Furthermore, because the Tathāgatas' mirror wisdom is the object (ālambana), [which structures their minds], in the continuity⁴¹⁷ of other beings, all the images of senses, their objects, and [the resultant] consciousnesses of world transcendent and good worldly dharmas (lokattara laukikakuśaladharmas) appear, because, if there were no mirror wisdom, then all these dharmas would not so appear. They arise and are realized because of the force of this [mirror wisdom]. This means that the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom is their dominant, enabling cause (adhipatipratyaya), and because of this all the senses, sense objects, and their consciousnesses of all world transcendent and good worldly dharmas arise,⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁷ 相續, santāna, continuity, i.e., the series of karmically engendered skandhas that constitute the sense of duration falsely believed to be a self, ātman. This passage is translated by Poussin, Siddhi, p. 682. He translates: ". . . tous les bons Dharmas mondains et supramondains, les āyatanas, viśayas, et vijñānas peuvent naitre surgir." (p. 68). I rather take 一切世間世出世善 to modify 諸處境識, since defiled consciousness is not dependent upon mirror wisdom.

just as a multitude of images appear in a bright mirror. Although each sentient being has his own causal force (i.e., hetupratyaya), yet only because mirror wisdom is their dominant enabling cause (adhipatipratyaya) do these [images] come to arise. It is just like seeds, which would not produce sprouts without the earth, etc., or the images of things, which would not be reflected without a mirror.

But, [it might be objected], if this is so, then the Bhagavan would be just like Maheśvara, who in the false view [of the heretics] is thought to be the cause of the world. Can it really be held that [the Bhagavan] is the universal cause of all the results in the world?

We do not commit this error, because, when [mirror wisdom] arises, it is able to be only the dominant enabling cause [for results in this world]. It is not an eternally creative agent. Rather [mirror wisdom] arises because of the joint accumulation of merit and wisdom, which have been cultivated for immeasurable kalpas [by sentient beings, who are thus the direct cause for these results]. Thus, although [mirror wisdom] is a cause whereby all kinds of good arises for sentient beings, it is not to be understood as the heretics understand Maheśvara, who is falsely thought to be the creative agent of the world, and whose nature is

held to be eternal.⁴¹⁹

If there were not any images in that mirror [of wisdom], then how could there be metaphorical [understanding of the ultimate (paramārtha)]? It is from the union of the thing [to be reflected] and the mirror that there is an object of understanding (ālambana), and because images appear in this manner, we are able to have metaphorical [understanding of the ultimate]. Because of the permeating (vāsanā) and maturing (vipāka) power of the images that all sentient beings erroneously cling to, (310a) the mirror surface [of their consciousnesses] is variously transformed and surface images appear. Thus in this world, [because sentient beings cling to the images as if they were real things], arrogant pride arises, and they think that they see such images in the mirror of self (ātman), because there is no other mirror in which those images arise. But the Buddhabhūmisūtra says only that those images appear, and not that they are produced [by any self].

You should understand that the marks of all objects are appearances of the evolutions of consciousness and do not ultimately exist (paramārtha-sat) apart from consciousness, for this [consciousness] is their ultimate meaning (para-

⁴¹⁹For a refutation of Maheśvara, see Siddhi, Wei Tat, p. 38; Poussin, p. 30.

māthasatya).

However, the doctrine of consciousness only (vi jñaptimātrata) does not mean that there are no conscious states⁴²⁰ and does not teach that there is only one consciousness.⁴²¹ Each sentient being has the eight consciousnesses and their conscious states. Although all form, etc., have their specific classifications, they all arise from consciousness due to permeation (vāsanā), whereby consciousness is variously transformed, because it is the nature [of consciousness] to be able to be so differentiated.⁴²² But even when these transformations appear, they are still not apart

⁴²⁰The Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi reads: "The word 'only' is used in order to deny that there are real things apart from consciousness, but it does not deny that conscious states, inasmuch as they are inseparable from consciousness, do exist." (Wei Tat, p. 504; Poussin, p. 416).

⁴²¹In refuting the objection that there is only one mind, the Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra has: "By the word 'consciousness' it should be understood that each sentient being has the eight consciousnesses, the six kinds of conscious states, the image and insight aspects, the differentiations of those aspects, and tathatā, which is manifested by the truth of emptiness." (Wei Tat, p. 522; Poussin, p. 431).

⁴²²These various transformations here seem to refer principally to the karmically defiled states of consciousness, but they also do include the conversions of consciousness to wisdom. It is the nature of consciousness to be so differentiated and transformed because consciousness is basically paratantra, and can exist either as parikalpita or as pariniṣpanna.

from consciousness. By conventional speech we differentiate these conscious states, but such is not ultimate truth, because in paramārthasatya all dharmas lack any definite essence.⁴²³

Even tathatā, although it is not an evolution of consciousness (vi jñānaparināma), yet is not apart from consciousness, because it is the real nature of consciousness, and because it is revealed by the common marks of the non-self (anātman) of the two emptinesses [of self and of dharmas]. However, we do refute the form, etc., which is imagined as external to consciousness and conscious states by the ignorant, [i.e., parikalpita-svabhāva]. But we do not reject the dharmas of form, etc. of paratantra and pariniṣpanna, which are not apart from consciousness and conscious states, because these do not lack existence and are not distinct [from consciousness]. Because these two, paratantra and pariniṣpanna, are not distinct, the sūtra refers to them as equal (samatā, samatā).

⁴²³The Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "If there were no vi jñaptimatratā, there would be no saṃvrtisatya. And if there were no saṃvrtisatya, there would be no paramārthasatya, because saṃvrtisatya and paramārthasatya are established in synergy." (Wei Tat, p. 518; Poussin, p. 427). Thus by the nature of vi jñaptimātratā as paratantra we conventionally establish relative truth.

Both worldly mirrors and the Tathāgata's wisdom mirror are non-discriminative, and both are able to present images without discrimination. Because [the wisdom mirror] is the cause of [such images], it is called mirror wisdom.

The Second Simile: Non-Discrimination

The sūtra says: Just as a great round mirror would be suspended in some high place by a fortunate, rich man, where it would not be shaken, and in it the limitless sentient beings who pass by could see their virtues and their imperfections, and thus would come to desire to hold onto their virtues and discard all their imperfections, just so the Tathāgata has suspended his round mirror wisdom in pure dharmadhātu, which, being uninterrupted, cannot be shaken, because he desires to lead immeasurable, innumerable sentient beings to gaze upon purity and to come to desire to hold onto that purity and discard all defilements.

The commentary explains: The phrase in some high place means the pinnacle or the acme. Dharmadhātu is undefiled tathatā, and its place is called the place of peace, because, whether as support (āśraya) or as object (ālambana) it is uninterrupted. The phrase cannot be shaken means that, since mirror wisdom depends on and takes dharmadhātu as object, it exhausts samsaric limits.

and follows along in a constant continuity without interruption. This means that mirror wisdom is eternally separated from the oscillations of discrimination. This first [mirror] wisdom has always been and will never come to an end, and so its continuity is uninterrupted.⁴²⁴ The other three wisdoms, although they have no imaginings, yet do have a kind of non-clinging and non-purposeful discrimination. They are realized in a temporal sequence. They may be active or not. For these reasons they are not unshakeable.(310b)

[This would seem to imply that the consciousnesses of these other wisdoms can be lacking in the state of enlightenment].⁴²⁵ Thus according to one opinion at nirodhasamādhī equality wisdom is not

⁴²⁴ 一得已後盡未來際相續無斷. Śīlabhadra has: rtag-tu rgyun gyis rjes-su-hgro ba, "[mirror wisdom] follows along by means of its constant continuity." (Nishio, Buddhabhūmividyākhyāna, p. 85). It would appear that Bandhuprabha has altered the text in accord with his teaching on the phenomenal eternity of the Buddha's merits.

⁴²⁵ The following section is dependent upon the explanation in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra on the cessation of manas consciousness. The basic text of the commentary, here represented by Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmividyākhyāna seems to imply that the other three wisdoms, being temporal and not unshakeable could perhaps be severed in the mind of full, complete wisdom. Such a thought would trigger the question of whether or not manas consciousness, which in its converted state, is equality wisdom, ceases to exist upon the realization of enlightenment. Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā verse reads: arhato na tat/ na nirodhasamāpattau marge lokottare na ca, "Manas ceases to exist at the stage of arhatship, in the meditation of cessation, and on the transcendent path."

manifested,⁴²⁶ because the śāstras say that at nirodhasamādhi there is no manas consciousness.⁴²⁷ It is further stated that [nirodhisamādhi] in one aspect destroys the constantly active consciousness and conscious states.

But, if this were so, then the śāstra would say that in these three states [of arhatship, nirodhasamādhi and the transcendent path]⁴²⁸ there is no manas at all. And if this were so,

^{425cont.} This would clearly seem to imply that in these three states manas no longer exists, and consequently equality wisdom, which is the con-version of manas, would also not exist. Dharmapāla's response is to distinguish the defiled state of manas, which ceases to exist in these states, from the antecedent manas, which, as the consciousness of verbalized meaning, must perdure into the state of enunciable wisdom.

⁴²⁶ This commentary has above explained on page 589 that at nirodhasamādhi intellectual mastery ceases.

⁴²⁷ The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra teaches that at the state of nirodhasamādhi consciousness no longer arises. T. 30, p. 652b-c.

⁴²⁸ It would seem that the primary textual reference here is Vasubandhu's Triṃśikāviññaptimātratāsiddhi, given in note 425. See Poussin, p. 267. The Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa's phrase 於三位中 is unintelligible unless one has in mind the above passage from the Triṃśikāviññaptimātratāsiddhi. Again it appears clear that Bandhuprabha assumes that the reader is already quite familiar with the Viññaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra, which is Dharmapāla's commentary on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikāviññaptimātratāsiddhi verses.

The argumentation seems somewhat strained, for the Triṃśikā verse does say that in these three states manas ceases to exist. Bandhuprabha however distinguishes this from the statement that there is no manas at all (皆無第七), and argues that the manas, which ceases to exist, is only kliṣṭamanas.

then from the first pramuditābhūmi, when uncontaminated insight occurs, to the tenth dharma-meghabhūmi, [even although insight into the equality of all dharmas occurs, yet] this [equality] wisdom would be lacking. And this is a serious mistake, because it contradicts the sūtras and śāstras.

When the śāstras say that the manas is lacking [in these states], they mean that the defiled manas is lacking, and not that manas consciousness is entirely lacking.⁴²⁹

As long as one has not yet attained the anātman wisdom that realizes the emptiness of dharmas, this [defiled manas] is the support for the constant manifestation of clinging to dharma discrimination.⁴³⁰ As long as one has not attained the anātman wisdom that realizes the emptiness of self, this clinging is constantly active, because it has support in this [defiled

⁴²⁹The Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "The texts which say [manas] is non-existent refer only to the defiled manas." (Wei Tat, p. 314; Poussin, p. 270).

⁴³⁰The second mode of manifestation of manas, according to the Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi, is that associated with the belief in the substantial existence of dharmas (法我見相應.), i.e., the manas of those in whom "dharmasūnyatājñāna has not yet manifested itself." (Wei Tat, p. 270; Poussin, p. 271).

manas consciousness].⁴³¹

If we examine the matter thoroughly, we would say that ālaya consciousness functions in synergy with a consciousness that is the manas. If the mano consciousness arises, then at the same time ālaya functions in synergy with these two consciousnesses. When one of the five sense consciousnesses arises, then it functions in synergy with three consciousnesses, and so forth, until, when all five sense consciousnesses arise at the same time, then ālaya simultaneously functions in synergy with seven consciousnesses.⁴³² Know then that in [the three states of the holy [transcendent] path, in nirodha-samādhi, and in the state of no-training (aśaikṣa), [this manas] also exists, because its mode of activity (ākāra), which is joined together with equality wisdom, and which has no discriminative clinging to defiled dharmas, is subtle, and is not opposed to nirodhasamādhi. Nirodhasamādhi is the natural

⁴³¹The first mode of the manifestation of defiled manas in the Siddhi is that associated with the belief in the substantial existence of pudgala, self: "This manas takes ālayavijñāna to be its own atman." (Wei Tat, p. 314; Poussin, p. 271). And again: "Clinging to self constantly exists in those who have not yet realized pudgalaśūnyatā." (Wei Tat, p. 312; Poussin, p. 270).

⁴³²This section is quoted almost verbatim from the Siddhi's third argument for non-defiled manas, Wei Tat, p. 308; Poussin, p. 268.

development from the uncontaminated path (anāśravamārga), because its essence is uncontaminated. The self-clinging of defiled manas is in opposition to it.⁴³³ The above statement that [nirodhasamādhi] in one aspect destroys [consciousness] does not mean that it destroys all consciousness. Therefore equality wisdom, [which is the con-version of the basis of manas], is present in the state of Buddha result, and, although it is constantly manifested, yet in the ten bhūmis it is realized in a temporal sequence. And when the contaminated mind arises, then this wisdom does not arise, because it is interrupted.⁴³⁴ Therefore it is not unshakeable. Because the other two wisdoms are also not constantly active in the state of Buddha result, they are not unshakable.

⁴³³The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "Nirodhasamādhi is the natural outflow of the holy path. It is perfectly calm and, in reality, resembles nirvāṇa. Defiled manas is incompatible with it." (Wei Tat, p. 308; Poussin, p. 268).

⁴³⁴In its treatment of samatājñāna the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "However, in the course of the ten bhūmis, because the two clings [to self and to dharmas], which belong to the seventh [manas] consciousness, have not yet been cut off, this [equality] wisdom is occasionally interrupted when the sixth [mano] consciousness is impure." (Wei Tat, p. 772; Poussin, p. 686).

Why has the Tathāgata securely placed this mirror wisdom in pure dharmadhātu? In order to lead immeasurable, innumerable sentient beings to gaze upon purity. But why should they gaze upon purity? So that they may come to desire to hold onto that purity and discard all defilements. Defilements here mean the marks of kleśa and karmic rebirth.⁴³⁵ To discard means to suppress and sever, because, whether on the mundane or the transcendent path⁴³⁶ one suppresses and severs them either for a time or finally. Purity means all good which can cause the minds of sentient beings to become purified. To hold onto means to support, because [that purity] firmly establishes, nurtures, and matures the seeds [of wisdom] and seeks to realize deliverance, according to that vow [to seek purity]. This means that all Tathāgatas, when they were bodhisattvas, came to desire to perfect all kinds of benefit for sentient beings, entertained the joyous thought of benefiting and gladdening

⁴³⁵ 煩惱及業生相 . Śīlabhadra divides these marks into three: ñon-moñs-pa dañ las dañ skye-baḥi kun-nas-ñon-moñs paḥi mtshan ñid no, the defiled marks of kleśa, karma, and birth. (Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 86).

⁴³⁶ 出世道, the transcendent path, i.e., darśana-mārga. 世間道, the mundane path, refers to the previous stages of sambhārāvasthā and prayogāvasthā. In darśanamārga one first enters upon the daśabhūmi and gains insight into truth. See Poussin, p. 563.

all sentient beings. Relying upon pure dharmadhātu, they consequently amassed the spiritual equipment of happiness and wisdom by their practice and turned around [from nirvāṇa] to seek a continued presence [in samsāra]. All this is due to the fact that the upāya skills of mirror wisdom were earnestly cultivated [by them]. Having realized this wisdom, which has as its object dharmadhātu, their continued presence was without movement, and, although they had no purposeful, discriminative (310c) mental fabrication (prapañca), yet that continued presence [in samsāra] is the dominant, enabling condition that leads sentient beings, according to their dispositions, to establish, nurture, and mature the seeds of immeasurable good roots, to attain worldly joy and transcendent deliverance.

Therefore [these bodhisattvas] arose from the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom, and their transformed existence⁴³⁷ functions to proclaim the dharma essence for all sentient beings, in order that they might know [the difference between]

⁴³⁷ 化生, i.e., 不思議變易生死, acintya-pararīṇāmikī, existence by incomprehensible transformation. The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi has: "Because of the force of compassion and vow, the body and life of fragmented existence are transformed. . . And this transformed existence functions in a wondrous manner. . ." (Wei Tat, p. 610; Poussin, p. 503).

defilement and purity, hold onto purity and discard defilement. Such is their basis for bringing benefit and happiness to sentient beings.

The Third Simile: Purity from Obstacles

The sūtra says: Again just as when a mirror is shined to a lustre, its mirror surface is pure and free from dust, shines and clearly illuminates everywhere, just so is the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom, because, being Buddha wisdom, it is eternally separated from the obstacles of passion and knowledge, and its well polished lustre is the support on which samādhi depends. Its mirror surface is pure and without dust, and brings happiness and benefit to all sentient beings, for its light illumines everywhere.⁴³⁸

The commentary explains: The surface of a mirror is extremely pure by essence. Its purity means that it is free from adventitious dust (āgantuka-dosa). The phrase it is free from dust means that these two, [i.e., the mirror surface and its purity] are free from dust and extremely pure. The word shines is said because of the [luminous] surface of the mirror. The word clearly

⁴³⁸The Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, chapter IX, verse 19, has: yathā maṇervina yatnaṃ svaprabhāvanidarśanam/ buddheṣvapi vinabhoga tatha kṛtyanidarśanam, "Just as gems show their lustre without effort, just so effortlessly are the Buddha's actions manifested."

is used because of that purity. The phrase it illumines everywhere means that it is free from dust. It is said that mirror wisdom is Buddha wisdom, that is, it is forever apart from the obstacles of passion and knowledge, which are here termed dust, and thus it says that it is eternally separated [from these]. Because such Buddha wisdom is eternally transcendent to the dust of all obstacles, it says that mirror wisdom is polished to a lustre. Passion refers to the bonds of all the kleśas of craving, anger, etc., which in the state of bondage (pariyavasthāna) and guilt (anuśaya) keep men drowsy, for, whether outwardly manifested (viññapti) or not, they all have the power to obstruct the arising of the holy path, and the attainment of nirvāṇa. Because they scatter the body and the mind, they are called the obstacle of passion (kleśāvarāṇa). The obstacle of knowledge (jñeyāvarāṇa), while not being defilement, is ignorance (akliṣṭa ajñāna) in regard to all knowable objects, which obstructs the universal wisdom (sarvajñāna) [of the bodhisattva]. But it does not obstruct nirvāṇa, because we see that śrāvakas and so forth, although they have this obstacle, yet do attain nirvāṇa. These two obstacles are also called defiled hindrances, and pure wisdom renders them quiescent, since they would defile that pure wisdom. Thus [wisdom] comes to control

these adventitious dusts, these obstructing obstacles. Because they do not ever arise again, it says that [wisdom] is eternally separated from them. Because it is eternally separated from these obstacles, mirror wisdom is constantly pure, and thus it says that it has a well polished lustre. The phrase it is the support (adhiṣṭhāna) on which samādhi depends means that [samādhi] is that which is supported and [mirror wisdom] is the support, because this [samādhi] arises in dependency on mirror wisdom. But the term support is also applicable to samādhi itself. If samādhi be termed support, it is because on the path of uninterrupted deliverance, it gives rise to utmost purity. Thus either samādhi or wisdom may be termed support.⁴³⁹ The most basic samādhi is the pre-eminent vajropamasamādhi, because by its power obstacles are eternally severed. In this case wisdom is that which is supported, because it is upheld in the power of samādhi. The text uses the word depends, because, since this samādhi is uninterrupted, this wisdom arises. From samādhi (311a) power, the utmost purity is

⁴³⁹ 定或智依. Śīlabhadra reads: hdi ni der brten-pa yañ yin la tin-ñe-hdsin yañ yin-pas śes tshiq rnam-par-sbyar ro, "While this [samādhi] is supported by that [mirror wisdom], we can also take it to mean [that which is supported] by samādhi." (Buddhabhūmivākyāna, p. 87) The question involves the grammar of the original phrase. In the Chinese 為依止定所攝持故, the words 依止 can be either the predicate of the copulative 為, or a noun in apposition to 攝持.

separated from all discrimination and has no discrimination, because mirror wisdom arises. This wisdom is then that which is supported, because it is upheld by samādhi.

Because its mirror surface is pure and without dust and is originally pure (prakṛti-vyavadāna), the text uses the term mirror surface. Because it is apart from the obstacle of passion, it is pure. Because it is apart from the obstacle of knowledge, it is said to be without dust. The passage it brings happiness and benefit to all sentient beings, for its light illumines everywhere means that, because this wisdom is upheld by samādhi, it is also able to bring all benefit and happiness to all sentient beings. Because of this activity, its light illumines everywhere. Because its essence is the pure mirror, the text employs the word light. Since it is free from the obstacles of passion and knowledge, the text says that it clearly illumines everywhere.⁴⁴⁰ Therefore mirror wisdom is original purity (prakṛti-viśuddha), far apart from the two obstacles, and its mirror surface is pure and without dust. Although it cannot be seen,

⁴⁴⁰The commentary equates purity with the freedom from passion, and the consequent ability to realize nirvāṇa, while the ability to illumine everywhere is its freedom from obstacles to universal wisdom, and the consequent insight into all samsāra, needed for the carrying out of the bodhisattva course.

yet it gives rise to sambhogakāya and nirmānakāya, is able to produce all wisdoms, and to perfect all benefits for sentient beings. Therefore it is said that its light illuminates everything.

The Fourth Simile: The Cause for the Arising of Images

The sūtra says: Again just as the basic nature of a round mirror is to depend upon conditions, by which various images and appearances arise in it, just so the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom, because it always depends upon all conditions, gives rise to various wisdom images and appearances.

The commentary explains: If mirror wisdom is the cause whereby images of all wisdoms arise for all sentient beings, then how can these images not be differentiated? [And if they are differentiated], then how can the essence of this wisdom not also be differentiated? Moreover, if at all times it constantly is able to be the cause [for these images], then how can it at some particular time all at once give rise to the images of all sentient beings and of the other wisdoms?

In order to respond to this objection, [the sūtra] says that just as the basic nature of a round mirror is to depend upon conditions, by which various images and appearances arise in it, just so the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom, because it always depends upon all conditions,

gives rise to various wisdom images and appearances.

It is not true that, because these images are different, the essence of the mirror is differentiated. And it is not true that it gives rise to these images either constantly or all at once, because it must wait upon a multitude of conditions. Therefore, because mirror wisdom at all times waits upon a multitude of conditions, it gives rise to various different kinds of images, but this wisdom does not become differentiated because those images are different, just as the colors of blue, etc. are not differentiated.⁴⁴¹ It is also not true that it gives rise to images of all sentient beings and the other wisdoms either constantly or all at once, because it must wait upon the proper occasion and condition to be able to give rise [to any images].

This means that the pure consciousness associated with mirror wisdom has two functions. The first is the

⁴⁴¹ 青等種種體別 : The various [colors of] blue, etc. are in their essence differentiated. This appears to be a mistaken reading. Śīlabhadra has: ñhon-pa la-sogs-pa bshin du tha-dad-par mi hgvur-bahi phvir, "Just as the colors of blue, etc. do not become differentiated." (Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 89). According to Dignāga the image of something blue, etc., is pre-verbal and pre-conceptual, and is thus the object of pratyakṣa-pramāṇa, and not differentiated. The consequent identification of a blue flower or car is the conceptualizing function of anumāna-pramāṇa. Thus emend 體 to 差 according to the alternate Taisho reading, and supply a negative to arrive at 青等種種非差別, translated as above.

function of being the direct, immediate cause (hetu-pratyaya), which means that innate in that pure consciousness are all the pure dharma seeds of wisdom that are able to manifest and give rise to the objects of bodies and lands, if they encounter the [proper] conditions. Only then will [these seeds] manifest (pratibhāsa) the various bodies and lands that are the objects [of wisdom understanding]. Only then will they be able to give rise to the different modes of activity that characterize the consciousness and the conscious states associated (311b) with equality wisdom and the other wisdoms.⁴⁴²

The second function is being the dominant, enabling cause (adhipatipratyaya), which means that, because of the arising of the vow power of the good roots in the pure consciousness of Buddha, if sentient beings are equipped with their own direct, immediate cause (hetu-pratyaya), then that pure consciousness [of Buddha] lends them assistance in order to cause them to attain the perfection (pariniṣpanna) that has no obstacle to

⁴⁴²In discussing innate seeds (sahajābīja) Dharma-pāla in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi deals with the theme of śrutavāsanā, the permeations that come from hearing the dharma teaching. Such hearing is to be understood as the external condition (外緣) of wisdom. He writes: ". . . when [the ascetic] hears the true dharma teaching, the innate pure seeds are permeated in such a way that they increase and develop progressively until they engender the transcendent mind." (Wei Tat, p. 122; Poussin, p. 115).

its arising or increase. Thus, although the essence of mirror wisdom is one, yet it is able to manifest and give rise to all these dharma images, but, because it must wait upon external conditions, it is not true that it arises all at once.

The Fifth Simile: The Mark of Not Clinging to Mine

The sūtra says: As in a round mirror not just one, but a multitude of images arise, and yet there are no images at all in that mirror and it has no movement and no activity, just so in the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom not just one, but a multitude of wisdom images arises, and yet there are no images at all in that mirror wisdom and mirror wisdom has no movement and no activity.

The commentary explains: If all these wisdom images are already essentially present in mirror wisdom, how then can mirror wisdom arise conditionally? On the other hand, if they are not essentially present, how is [mirror wisdom] able to produce all these wisdom images, since it has no movement or activity? One never sees a potter who without movement or activity is yet able to make a new pot.

In order to respond to this objection, [the sūtra] says that it is just as in a round mirror not just one image but a multitude of images arises, etc. This means that mirror wisdom is able to give rise to images just like a mirror. Because there are many such images, it says

not just one. Because these different kinds [of images] are innumerable, it says a multitude. If a mirror were to depend upon just one kind [of image], it would distinguish only that one kind, and thus the text says not just one. Because it depends upon different varieties [of images], it manifests an innumerable variety, and thus the text says a multitude. In this manner, although at first there are no images in the mirror, yet it gives rise to many images, and yet it has no movement or activity of deliberation or discrimination. Just so is mirror wisdom, for, although at first it has no images of any wisdom, yet it is able to give rise to various dharma images of wisdom. Since it depends on a variety [of images], they are not just one, and are said to be a multitude. Although it gives rise to wisdom images, yet it has no movement or activity of deliberation or discrimination. This means that just as a mirror, although non-discriminative, yet is able to give rise to many images, just so mirror wisdom, although it does not cling to I and Mine, nor purposefully discriminate object from subject, yet it is able to give rise to the dharma images of various wisdoms.

The Sixth Simile: Not Forgetting all Objects

The sūtra says: Again just as a round mirror is neither united to nor separated from all its images.

because it does not accumulate them and because it is the cause which manifests them, just so the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom is neither united to nor separated from all its wisdom images, because it does not accumulate them and because it does not lose them.

The commentary explains: If mirror wisdom is united to all its wisdom images, how can it not itself become differentiated, since they are differentiated? On the other hand, if it is not united to them, then how can it be their cause? (311c) We never have seen seeds, which were not united with their results, the sprouts, be able to be the cause [of those sprouts]. If the rays of the sun were not united with luminous stones,⁴⁴³ etc., its marks would not shine forth.

In order to respond to this objection, [the sūtra] gives the above passage. For a worldly mirror, although it is able to be the cause that gives rise to a multitude of images, yet is not united to those images, because before they arise they have nothing that can be accumulated. It is neither directly joined to them nor not directly joined to them, and cannot be said to be united with them. Also a mirror is not separated from these [images], because

⁴⁴³ 石灰等 , rdo-thal la-soga-pa, sudhā-ādi, white plaster, limestone, cement, etc., i.e., any bright stone material that shines in the sun.

it is the cause that manifests them. But it is not united to them, for it is only because of the mirror that they exist at all. Although it is the cause whereby images appear, yet the mirror does not become differentiated because those images are discriminated. Mirror wisdom is also like this, for, although it is able to be the cause that produces wisdom images, yet it is neither united to nor separated from those wisdom images, because it does not accumulate them and because it does not disperse them. The phrase it is not united means that before they have arisen, they have nothing that can be accumulated. The phrase it is not separated means that there must be that mirror wisdom for these wisdom images to arise, for if it were lacking, they would not arise. The phrase because it does not lose them is to be understood as follows. The meaning of the word lose is to be separated from, to fall away from, to be non-existent, and its opposite is not to lose. Because [mirror wisdom] supports and does not forget the marks of the objects of the images it gives rise to, the text says that it does not lose them.⁴⁴⁴ Thus in mirror wisdom are manifested all knowable marks, the wisdoms of the triple world, and all sentient beings. If there were no such universal

⁴⁴⁴Delete the punctuation after 失.

knowledge, mirror wisdom would not arise, for it is only by knowing everything that this wisdom arises. Therefore, because this wisdom does not forget any object-mark, it says that it does not lose them. And, because it does not lose them, it is not apart from them. Although it can be the cause that gives rise to wisdom images, yet it does not become differentiated because those [images] are differentiated, for they issue non-discriminately, as if in a mirror. Although a worldly mirror is able to be the cause that gives rise to all images, yet it is not joined to the differentiations of being either united to or separated from [those images]. Just so mirror wisdom is not joined to the differentiations of being either united to or separated from wisdom images, although it is able to be the cause of their arising.

Although seeds are able to be the causes of sprouts, yet they cannot be said to be either united to or separated from them. And even the finest parts of the rays [of the sun] are not the material bodies [they illumine], but because their common marks are united and joined together, a unified mark that seems to be those material bodies appears in consciousness, [and the eye perceives them as luminous]. Thus all the causes of results that we see in the world are causes without being either united to

or separated from [the results]. Only if they were not related as cause and result would their marks be definitely united. (312a)

The Seventh Simile: Omnipresence

The sūtra says: Again just as the lustrous surface of a round mirror could be the basic condition for the arising of all images in all places, just so the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom does not cut off the lustre of all the innumerable practices, and it is the basic condition for the arising of all wisdom images, i.e., the wisdom images of the śrāvaka vehicle, the pratyekabuddha vehicle, and the great vehicle (mahāyāna), because he desires to lead all those of the śrāvaka vehicle to attain deliverance by means of that śrāvaka vehicle, those of the pratyekabuddha vehicle to attain deliverance by means of that pratyekabuddha vehicle, and those of the great vehicle to attain deliverance by means of that great vehicle.

The commentary explains: How is it possible that this wisdom can be able at all times to give rise to all the dharma images in the Three Vehicles?

In order to respond to this objection, [the sūtra] gives the above passage. In order that a worldly mirror might universally reflect on its surface all images, various efforts are undertaken to polish both sides of its

surface, so that it be universally capable of being the cause that manifests all images in all places. Just so is mirror wisdom. For all Tathāgatas, when they were⁴⁴⁵

bodhisattvas, because their lineage (gotra) [of being Tathāgatas] was yet covered by obstacles, were yet unable to give rise to all the dharma images of all the wisdoms of the Three Vehicles in [their mirror wisdom]. But by means of intense cultivation of uninterrupted, immeasurable practices [their minds] became lustrous, and at the moment of vajropamasamādhi⁴⁴⁶ they severed all obstacles and were perfected in purity (pari-nispanna-pariśuddhi). Then they were able to give rise to the wisdoms of the Three Vehicles and such images were not severed, for their range is without any limitations and the time period of their unlimited [practices] is unlimited.⁴⁴⁷

⁴⁴⁵The following commentary has been rather thoroughly reworked by Bandhuprabha in light of the Viññaptimātratā-siddhiśāstra's teaching on mahāparinirvāṇa, and bears minimal resemblance to Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmi vyākhyāna in this section.

⁴⁴⁶Thus for the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa ādarśanājñāna begins at vajropamasamādhi. This is rejected by the Viññaptimātratā-siddhiśāstra, which places its commencement only at vimuktimarga, when the bodhisattva first becomes a Buddha. (Wei Tat, p. 770; Poussin, 685).

⁴⁴⁷In describing how jñeyāvarana obstructs markless meditation, the Siddhi has: ". . . nevertheless, since preparatory efforts are still needed in this markless meditation, the bodhisattva is yet unable to spontaneously manifest forms and lands." (Wei Tat, p. 738; Poussin, p. 650)

This explains the aspect of the cause, whereby [mirror wisdom] pervades all places. Due to the intense cultivation of many practices for an immeasurable time, mirror wisdom is able to give rise to the wisdom images of the Three Vehicles.

Furthermore, this mirror wisdom is free from all defilement in all places and at all times, and its various practices and merits are fully perfected, because its adornments are most fully pure. Therefore at all times and in all places it is able to give rise to all images, for, as already explained, that pre-eminent vajropamasamādhī severs all obstacles and realizes the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom, and thus its various merit-filled adornments at all places and times are able to give rise to all the images of the Three Vehicles.⁴⁴⁸

This is to be understood as follows. There are differentiations in the maturation of the good roots of individuals.⁴⁴⁹ (312b) Individuals of determined lineage realize deliverance by means of their respective vehicles. Those of undetermined

⁴⁴⁸This paragraph is an enlargement upon Śīlabhadra's text, Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 92, 1, 21-22.

⁴⁴⁹This passage is in part translated by Poussin in his Siddhi, p. 673 and p. 703.

lineage attain deliverance either by means of the Mahāyāna or by means of one of the other vehicles. The word deliverance here means nirvāṇa. All individuals of the Three Vehicles use their own seed nature (bīja-gotra) as immediate, direct cause (hetupratyaya) and the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom as dominant enabling cause (adhipati-pratyaya), and by their own intense efforts and the Buddha's upāya, they cultivate and amass good spiritual stores, elicit the holy path, and sever the obstacles of passion and knowledge, and, as appropriate to each, they realize nirvāṇa.⁴⁵⁰

In the case of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas of determined lineage who dwell in the state of no-training (aśaikṣa), because they delight in tranquility and cessation and have eternally severed all passion obstacles, which might elicit karma and engender rebirth, their bodies and thoughts, which have been influenced by previous acts of passion, are spontaneously destroyed, and

⁴⁵⁰ Thus in agreement with the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa admits that the saints of the Two Vehicles can attain nirvāṇa. The Śrīmālādevī rejects this position: "Thus śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas . . . are far from nirvāṇa, because only fully awakened Tathāgatas realize nirvāṇa." (T. 11, p. 675a). The Siddhi explains that this refers only to apratisthitānirvāṇa, and not to nirupadhiśeṣānirvāṇa. See Poussin, p. 505.

they will never again be reborn, because they lack any supporting basis⁴⁵¹ [for such rebirth]. Thus all their conditioned dharmas, whether contaminated or uncontaminated, whether developed or yet undeveloped, are accordingly severed and destroyed. There remains only the con-version of the basis, unfabricated (nihprapañcalakṣaṇa) and undefiled tathatā, pure dharmadhātu, the body of liberation.⁴⁵² Such is called nirvāṇa without remaining support,⁴⁵³ eternal, beatific, ultimate, quiescent, unfathomable,⁴⁵⁴ inconceivable. They

⁴⁵¹ 所依, upadhi, remaining support, whereby, by maintaining a phenomenal body, one remains in the world.

⁴⁵² 解脱身, vimuktikāya, the Buddha body proper to the saints of the Two Vehicles, who, not being characterized by compassion (karuṇā), cannot realize trikāya. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "The fruit of the two con-versions of the basis obtained by the saints of the Two Vehicles, inasmuch as it is eternally separated from the bonds of the obstacle of passion, and inasmuch as it does not have the pre-eminent dharmas, [i.e., the ten Buddha powers, etc, whereby Buddhas benefit sentient beings], is called only the body of liberation." (Wei Tat, p. 790; Poussin, p. 702).

⁴⁵³ 無餘依般涅槃, nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa, i.e., nirvāṇa, which, because it has no remaining bodily support, cannot abide in samsāra any longer. Thus such śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are unable to confer benefit and happiness upon all sentient beings, because they are unable to abide in the phenomenal world.

⁴⁵⁴ 不隨眾數, na samkhyāṃ gacchati, that which does not fall within any of [the powers of] human calculation.

are identical with all Tathāgatas. But, because they lack the adornments of conditioned pure merits and do not give rise to benefit and happiness for sentient beings, they are not like Tathāgatas.⁴⁵⁵

Those śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas of undetermined lineage, who abide in the state of no-training, although they have no passion [and might thus delight in cessation], yet do delight in bodhi. By the power of their vows they maintain their bodies in continuity⁴⁵⁶ and cultivate Mahāyāna practice until they attain vajropamasamādhi, wherein all obstacles are destroyed and they realize the three bodies of Buddha. Although they do have conditioned uncontaminated

⁴⁵⁵The Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi reads: "From the point of view of tathata, the saints of the Two Vehicles are not different from Buddhas, but, since they do not have bodhi and the activities that benefit others, it is said that they are different from Buddhas." (Wei Tat, p. 762; Poussin, p. 675).

⁴⁵⁶The Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "These saints of undetermined lineage, at the moment of their attainment of sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa (nirvāṇa with remaining support, i.e., a body), turn their minds to the search for supreme bodhi. By the power of their samādhi vows, they conserve their bodies and abide for long periods of time, and do not enter nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa, as do the first kind [of the saints of determined lineage of the Two Vehicles]." (Wei Tat, p. 762; Poussin, p. 674).

merits, yet they do not have an uncontaminated body or mind, and therefore they do realize nirvāṇa without any remaining support (nirupashi-śeṣanirvāṇa). Support (upadhi) means the contaminated (sāśrava) body and mind of the triple world. If bodhisattvas severed the two obstacles entirely when they reached the Buddha result, then we would have to say that they also realize the realm of nirvāṇa without any remaining support (nirupadhi-śeṣaparinirvāṇa).

Thus those of the Two Vehicles first enter sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa and then afterwards enter nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa. But when bodhisattvas first realize Tathāgatabhūmi, they immediately realize these two nirvāṇas. Because their contaminated body and mind is completely exhausted, they are said to have no remaining support (nirupadhiśeṣa). Yet because they create the appearances of contaminated bodies and minds, they are said to have some remaining support (sopadhiśeṣa). And because they have realized compassion and wisdom without interruption, they are also said to have entered non-abiding nirvāṇa.⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁵⁷ According to the Viññaptimātratāsiddhi, bodhisattvas dwell in apratisthitanirvāṇa, the nirvāṇa in which one does not abide. See Wei Tat, p. 764; Poussin, p. 678.

Nirvāṇa means the eternal destruction of obstacles in the essence of tathatā. Inasmuch as, when uncontaminated wisdom has penetrated (pratisamkhyā) its truth, one severs all impurity and realizes [nirvāṇa], it is called the cessation of penetrating discernment (pratisamkhyā-nirodha).⁴⁵⁸ This cessation of penetrating discernment exists only as a designation for tathatā.

The ultimate stage of not discriminating things as if they were real is termed nirvāṇa. Because it has no goal to achieve,⁴⁵⁹ because it has no fetid impurity, (312c) because it is free from bondage and confusion,⁴⁶⁰ it is termed nirvāṇa.

How then can śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, since they have not yet destroyed the permeations of the obstacle of knowledge (jñeyāvarana), attain

⁴⁵⁸ The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "Inasmuch as it is realized and penetrated, when one has completely destroyed all impurities by the power of penetration, it is called the cessation of penetrating discernment." (Wei Tat, p. 84; Poussin, p. 76).

⁴⁵⁹ 無所趣, i.e., 無所得, aprāptitva, the state of no clinging to or discriminating anything, not having any goal or objective to attain.

⁴⁶⁰ 稠林, gahana, an inaccessible thicket, impenetrable darkness.

this ultimate nirvāṇa?

Because the obstacle of knowledge is a lack of knowledge rather than a defilement, it obstructs bodhi results, but not nirvāṇa.⁴⁶¹ Because it is not passion, it is not able to engender rebirth. And since they have no vow power, they turn their minds toward the ultimate state of no-training, and, having exhausted the measure of their long lives, they then must become eternally extinct.⁴⁶²

The Eighth Simile: The Source of Sarvajñāna

The sūtra says: Just as in a round mirror great images, such as the great earth, high mountains, large trees, and broad palaces and lodges can occur, and yet that mirror is not measured by them, just so in the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom, wisdom images from pramuditābhūmi to Buddhābhūmi can occur and wisdom images of all worldly and transcendent dharmas can occur, and yet that mirror wisdom is not differentiated by these.

⁴⁶¹ Compare the prior section on the third simile of mirror wisdom on p. 665.

⁴⁶² The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has: Jñeyāvarāṇa is not the cause of samsāra, for it does not bind sentient beings as do the kleśas. (Wei Tat, p. 764; Poussin, p. 679).

The commentary explains: If mirror wisdom is able to give rise to wisdom images, then in the same measure that they are differentiated, so would it be differentiated.

In order to respond to this objection, [the sūtra] gives the above passage. Although a worldly mirror is able to be the cause that gives rise to images of earth, etc., yet that mirror is not measured by those [images]. Even in a small mirror such great images of many mountains, etc., can occur, and in a large mirror small images of many pebbles, etc., can occur. Although all these images have material form, yet the mirror is not measured by the largeness or the smallness of the images in it. Similarly mirror wisdom, although it gives rise to the immaterial forms of all the wisdom images of the ten bhūmis, of worldly and transcendent dharmas, yet is not measured by the largeness or the smallness of these wisdom images. For this reason the mirror wisdom of all Buddhas is termed the womb of great wisdom (mahājñānākara), because it is the foundation of transcendent and worldly wisdom. As explained, the Bhagavan completes this mirror wisdom of the womb of great wisdom and is able to give rise to omniscience (sarvajñāna). You should understand that by the term wisdom this sūtra denotes all merits, since the pure

consciousness associated with mirror wisdom is replete with all the meritorious seeds whereby self-benefit benefits others. This wisdom is able to be the direct, immediate cause (hetu-pratyaya) that gives rise to wisdom images in one's own body, and the dominant, enabling cause (adhipatipratyaya) that gives rise to wisdom images in the bodies of others. This is so because mirror wisdom is able to manifest bodies by transformation (nirmāṇa), give rise to the dharma teaching enunciated by wisdom, and, by its evolutions, give rise to the images of the other wisdoms.⁴⁶³

Alternately it can be interpreted to mean that, perfected by the permeation of the power of the compassionate vow, [mirror wisdom] becomes the dominant, enabling cause for the good dharmas of the other wisdoms, and thus it brings it about that in the bodies of others the good dharmas of wisdom, etc. are easily attained, born, and increased. As the sūtra says: "All the good

⁴⁶³ The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "[Mirror wisdom] is the supporting basis for the seeds that manifest pure and perfect merit, and is able to manifest [the images of the other wisdoms], and to give rise to images of bodies and lands." [Wei Tat, p. 766; Poussin, p. 682).

dharmas of sentient beings arise from the dominance (adhipati) of the power of the Tathāgata's compassionate vow."⁴⁶⁴

The Ninth Simile: Non-Arisal in Unfit Vessels

The sūtra says: Just as a round mirror is not a cause that gives rise to images when there are obstacles placed in front of it, just so the Tathāgata's (313a) mirror wisdom is not a cause that gives rise to wisdom images for sentient beings, who have the obstacle of hearing untrue dharma teachings under the influence of bad teachers, because they are unfit vessels.

The commentary explains: Since mirror wisdom is the cause whereby those of the Three Vehicles attain deliverance, it gives rise to all wisdom images. Moreover, [mirror wisdom], perfected by the permeation of the compassionate vow, is the dominant, enabling cause that gives rise to all worldly and transcendent wisdom images. Why then does not true wisdom arise among the pagans, for, if it is constantly present to them as the immediate, direct cause that gives rise to [wisdom images], then it would never fail, even in the case of these pagans.

⁴⁶⁴This quotation appears to be from a Pure Land source, and represents a Yogācāra attempt to incorporate Pure Land thinking within the Yogācāra doctrinal synthesis.

In order to respond to this objection, [the sūtra] gives the above passage. Although a worldly mirror is able to be the cause that manifests all images, yet, when obstacles, such as walls, etc., are placed in front of it, it does not cause images to arise. Just so is the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom, for, although it is able to be the cause that gives rise to wisdom images, yet it does not cause wisdom images to arise for those who have the obstacle of delighting in the hearing of perverted teachings under the influence of bad teachers (pāpa-mitra), for such persons are not fit vessels⁴⁶⁵ to receive the hearing of true dharma teaching.

Therefore among the pagans [wisdom] does not arise, but rather is constantly rejected and brought to naught, because their good seeds are suppressed, and their evil seeds find opportunity to arise. From the beginningless beginning, the times when sentient beings have cultivated good have been few, but the times they have wrought evil have been many. Therefore good dharmas, even although they meet favorable conditions, are yet difficult to nurture, and evil dharmas, even although they meet only the weakest external conditions, still prosper.

⁴⁶⁵ 非器, snod-ma-yin-pa, ābhajanabhūta, an unfit vessel, an undeserving person.

The Tenth Simile: Unfit Vessels who Delight in Evil

The sūtra says: Just as a round mirror cannot give rise to images in darkened places, just so the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom cannot give rise to wisdom images among those sentient beings who foolishly delight in the experience of evil.

The commentary explains: Just as wisdom images do not arise because of the obstacles of external conditions, [such as bad teachers], so also they do not arise because of the obstacles of internal conditions, whereby, because of previous actions (karma), one delights in the darkness of evil and ignorance.

Although those who delight in evil are aflame with all the passions of covetousness, anger, etc., yet even more so are they heavily inclined toward delusion, because they do not understand the relationships between the causes and results of good and evil. All the Buddha dharmas, which have appeared in the world, bring benefit and happiness to all sentient beings. The good field of the Three Jewels nurtures the immeasurable accumulation of bliss for all in the world and transcendent to the world. But, rather than desiring to hear, receive, delight in, and base themselves on that dharma teaching, they turn away their ears

and accept the perverted teachings of infidels, which bring neither benefit nor happiness. They turn toward and base themselves on [such teachings], and thus nurture and bring about a multitude of sufferings, immeasurable evil actions, and various kinds of evil powers. Is this not the obstructing force of ignorant, deluded darkness? The pull of ignorance in obstructing good is quite heavy. We must then earnestly cultivate the light of wisdom, for one weighed down by ignorance is not a fit vessel for good. (313b)

The Eleventh Simile: Perpetual Unfit Vessels

The sūtra says: Again just as a round mirror cannot give rise to images that are far distant, just so the Tathāgata's mirror wisdom cannot give rise to wisdom images in those sentient beings, who, because of their actions, are defective in regard to the dharma, or who do not believe, for they are unfit vessels.

The commentary explains: Wisdom images do not arise because of the obstacle force of both internal and external conditions. The first refers to those who, because of actions in previous births, are defective in regard to the dharma teaching,⁴⁶⁶ and are thus unable to hear

⁴⁶⁶ 感圓法業, chos kyis phoṅs-par-hgyur-ba, dharma-vyasana-saṃvartaniyam-karma, actions leading to defectiveness in regard to dharma.

the true dharma teaching for a long time. This means that they will pass through immeasurable kalpas without hearing the Buddha dharma of any Buddha, because they have slandered the true dharma in a previous birth. This obstacle is a result of their own actions (karman), and so wisdom images do not arise for them and they do not hear the true dharma.

...If they are essentially [incapable of hearing the dharma], then how can they still be said to be slandering the true dharma? What is the result [of their previous actions]?

The ability to obstruct wisdom images that might arise does not imply that their not hearing of the true dharma is the result or the obstacle. Rather the result [of their actions] and the obstacle [they engender] are their defectiveness in regard to the dharma, whereby they are unable to hear and accept that true dharma, because of the natural outcome of their actions, and their unsound sense organs and obtuse bodies and minds.⁴⁶⁷

⁴⁶⁷The point of this discussion is that the result of slandering the dharma in a previous birth is not simply the not hearing of the true dharma teaching, as if that were some extrinsic punishment unrelated to the pattern of karmic retribution. Rather they are incapable of hearing and accepting dharma teaching because, due to that previous action, their physical and mental capabilities are defective, and are the natural karmic result of those slandering actions.

The second is unbelief. This refers to those who do not have any lineage (gotra), nor any nirvāṇa dharmas, who do not delight in nirvāṇa, and who have no seeds (bīja) of the transcendent path. They have a perpetual obstacle against the realization of tathatā. Upon hearing the transcendent dharma teaching, they do not believe or accept it, and will never attain nirvāṇa in any of the Three Vehicles. Because the continuity of their bodies and minds is impure, they are unfit vessels for sacred dharmas. Both for a time and for all time they do not give rise to any transcendental, meritorious images. Just as stagnate water is unable to reflect the image of the moon, so it is in regard to mirror wisdom, for these sentient beings are unable to give rise to wisdom images.⁴⁶⁸

⁴⁶⁸The Mahāvāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter IX, verse 16, has: yathōdabhājane bhinne candrabimbam na drśyate/ tathā duṣṭeṣu satveṣu buddhabimbam na drśyate, "Just as the image of the moon is not seen in a broken pot, so the image of Buddha is not seen in sinful beings." Vasubandhu explains: anena pañcamena sarvagatatve'pyabhājanabhūteṣu satveṣu abuddhabimbadarśanam drṣṭantena sadhyati, "It is shown by simile in this fifth verse that the Buddha image is not seen in those beings, who are unfit vessels (abhājanabhūteṣu satveṣu)."

The 如來興顯經 has a similar passage: "Those sentient beings, who have lost their original purity, when they see the Buddha, do not believe and do not have that light of the highest path. Thus they are said to be born blind, and they continue in covering up the sunlight of wisdom. For such beings, even although wondrous light and blazing spiritual powers illumine their bodies, because they have set an obstacle to that light for future time, they cling to defiled actions." (T. 10, p. 599b).

Thus [in summary] mirror wisdom has nine kinds of pre-eminent marks: 1) the mark of sure enunciation (nirukti), 2) the mark of non-discrimination, 3) the mark of purity from obstacles, 4) the mark of being the cause for the arising of wisdom images, 5) the mark of not clinging to Mine, 6) the mark of not forgetting any knowable object, 7) the mark of giving rise to wisdom images at all times and places, 8) the mark of being the source that is able to give rise to all wisdom, and 9) the mark of being unable to give rise to wisdom images in unfit vessels. There are three kinds of vessels unfit for the dharma: 1) those who are vessels unfit for the sacred dharma because they have the temporary obstacle of hearing untrue teaching, due to the influence of bad teachers, 2) those who are vessels unfit for the sacred dharma because they have the obstacle of being hindered by passion and delusion, and 3) those who are vessels unfit for the sacred dharma because of the perpetual obstacle of being hindered by extremely heavy karma or lacking any seeds for the transcendent path. These three are included in the ninth mark, for they all are unfit vessels, in whom [wisdom] images cannot arise.

PART TWO

CHAPTER FOUR

Equality Wisdom

The sūtra says: Next, wondrously born ones, is equality wisdom, which is replete and perfected with ten kinds of marks. (313c)

The commentary says: Equality wisdom is replete and perfected in ten kinds of marks. You should understand that these are the results of the practices of the ten bhūmis. We will consider them one by one. Each is realized in equality wisdom, cultivated to fullness, and perfected in the equality wisdom of Buddhabhūmi. This is why it is said that equality wisdom is replete and perfected with ten kinds of marks. In general terms in each of the bhūmis, one realizes the immeasurable dharma nature of equality (samatādharmatā), cultivates fullness, and perfects the equality wisdom of the Buddhabhūmi.

The First Mark: Highest Delight in its Marks

The sūtra says: It realizes the supreme delight in all its marks, because the dharma nature of equality is fully perfected.

The commentary explains: The phrase all its marks refer to all the major marks and the minor marks of a great person. Because all these marks are far apart from

the nature of clinging to what is entirely imagined (parikalpitasvabhāva), it is said that they are equal (samatā). A sūtra says: "Because the Tathāgata is said to have the marks of a great person, he has no marks, and thus it is that he is said to have the marks of a great person."⁴⁶⁹ The term supreme means regal mastery (īśvara). Because all the skandhas of form, etc., are each differentiated, none of them are regally masterful. Even taken as a whole, they are not regally masterful, because their nature is to be differentiated, and all dharmas, even taken as a whole, do not lose this essence [of being differentiated].⁴⁷⁰ But because [equality wisdom] is apart from these skandhas and lacks any real pudgala,⁴⁷¹ in all respects it is regally masterful and apart from parikalpitasvabhāva. Therefore it is said to be equal. Another sūtra says: "Bhagavan, I now understand that, because everything lacks any self-nature (svabhāva), there is no poverty or riches."

⁴⁶⁹The Vajracchedikaprajñāpāramitāsūtra has: "The Tathāgata's having the thirty-three marks is a not having the thirty-three marks, and this is called his having the thirty-three marks." (T. 8, p. 750a).

⁴⁷⁰Regal mastery (īśvara) implies the ability to be unmoved by samsaric influence, because one does not differentiate good from bad, etc. Thus, the continuity of samsaric living, i.e., the skandhas, cannot be so masterful, because they are constantly influenced by permeations (vāsanā) of all sorts.

⁴⁷¹補特伽羅, pudgala, personality, i.e., the belief in an really existent atman as the basis for personality.

The term delight [usually] refers to that delight which comes from the force of imagining (parikalpa), whereby one elicits delight in regard to agreeable things and sorrow in regard to disagreeable things. But because [in equality wisdom] there are no dharmas which are clung to as imagined and no delight in that clinging, it is called the understanding of equality. The phrase it takes supreme delight in all its marks, because of the dharma nature of equality refers to the realization of pramuditābhūmi, [the land of joy]. Bodhisattvas first realize this, and then, by the progressive cultivation of upāya in the subsequent bhūmis, they cause it to grow, until, in the final Buddhabhūmi, [dharmamegahbhūmi], they bring it to full perfection. After this last bhūmi [the understanding of equality wisdom] no longer increases, because they have realized this full perfection. It should be understood that this is the full perfection (pariniṣpanna) of equality wisdom.

The phrase because it is fully perfected [in the original Sanskrit] is in the ablative case, but it expresses an instrumental meaning, i.e., because of its full perfection. The [original Sanskrit] text here uses the ablative with an instrumental meaning.⁴⁷²

⁴⁷² 於第三處說第五轉。The 八轉聲, asta-vibhakti are the eight cases of nouns in Sanskrit grammar. The third case (三處) is the instrumental, a grammatical form, which, in Buddhist Sanskrit, is often replaced by

The Second Mark: The Experience of Conditioned Arising

The sūtra says: It realizes the conditioned arising of all experience, because the dharma nature of equality is fully perfected. (314a)

The commentary explains: There are two kinds of dependent co-arising (pratītyasamutpāda): internal and external. Internal dependent co-arising refers to the twelve branches of ignorance, etc.⁴⁷³ External dependent co-arising refers to [the arising of] all things, such as seeds, sprouts, etc. The internal is examined by the harmony (anuloma) or disharmony (pratiloma) of the two modalities (ākāra) of defilement and purity. The

472cont. the ablative. The commentary says that the sūtra phrase 圓滿成就 was in the ablative case, i.e., pariniṣpannāt, but that its meaning is not "from full perfection," but rather "because of full perfection," i.e., instrumental. The point hardly comes through in the Chinese text, because Chinese does not have case endings. The Tibetan expresses the point more clearly, as it does have the same case endings as Sanskrit: yoṅs-su-grub-pa las (ablative, i.e., las) ni yoṅs-su-grub-pas (instrumental, i.e., pas) te thams-cad du gsum-paḥi qnas su lña-par byas-pa yin no, "From full perfection (ablative) means by means of (instrumental) full perfection, for all instrumental cases (gsum-paḥi qnas) are put into the ablative case (lña-par)." (Nishio, Buddhabhūmivivākyāna, p. p. 96) .

473 十二緣生, dvādaśa-pratītyasamutpāda, the twelve links in the chain of existence, each of which engenders the next: ignorance (avidyā), karmic action (saṃskāra), consciousness (viññāna), name and form (nāmarūpa), the six sense organs (ṣaḍāyatana), contact (sparsa), sensation (vedanā), desire (trṣṇā), appropriation (upādāna), the existence [thus appropriated] (bhāva), birth (jāti), and old age, death (jaramarāṇa). For a clear explanation see Lamotte, Historie du bouddhisme indien, pp. 38-43.

The external is examined by means of the modality that because this exists, that exists, that because this is born, that is born.⁴⁷⁴ This means that, because there are seeds, sprouts come to be; because seeds are born, so sprouts come to be born. In these two kinds of dependent co-arising, all things exist as results, because their causes exist, for results are born only because their causes are born. The meaning of dependent arising is the meaning of no purposeful activity. The meaning of dependent co-arising is the meaning of the no self-nature of emptiness. The meaning of dependent co-arising is the meaning of no pudgala. These meanings are the specific marks (svalakṣaṇa) of dependent co-arising. And because [equality wisdom] experiences⁴⁷⁵ these, the sūtra uses the term experience. Or perhaps, because sentient beings are able to experience, it uses the term

⁴⁷⁴ Nishio, Buchikyōron, p. 32, points out that the Cūlasakuludāyisuttaṃ of the Majjhima-nikāya, 79, has: imsamiṃ sati, idaṃ hoti; imass'uppada idaṃ upapajjati; imasmiṃ asati, idaṃ no hoti; imassa nirodha imaṃ nirujjhatīti, "If this does exist, then that exists. If this has been born, then that is born. If this does not exist, then that does not exist. If this has been destroyed, then that is destroyed."

On the two kinds of pratītyasamutpāda, confer the Mahāvānasamgraha, Lamotte, p. 37.

⁴⁷⁵ 領受, ñams-su-myoṇ-ba, anubhava, to enjoy, to experience. Thus the doctrine of dependent co-arising is not just a theoretical postulate, but is a datum of human experience, for, once clinging to the imagined is seen as delusory, all the elements of experience are understood as dependently co-arisen.

experience. All dependently co-arisen dharmas are that which is experienced, and therefore all experience arises conditionally. Because it has no purposeful activity, is empty, has no self-nature, and has no pudgala, it is far removed from parikalpitasvabhāva, and is called the understanding of equality. Because all things are experienced as dependently co-arising, as the dharma nature of equality, the text uses the term it realizes. Because, as explained above, this realization is cultivated unto full perfection, equality wisdom is fully perfected. Therefore the dharma nature of the equality of dependent co-arising (pratītyasamutpāda-samatā-dharmatā) is identical with the dharma nature of the equality of all dharmas (sarvadharmasamatādharmatā). As it is said: "Oh, Brahmācārin,⁴⁷⁶ the entire dharma-dhātu is the conditionally produced, conditionally arising dharma nature. This understanding is called bodhi. As seen by the Tathāgata, the entire dharma-dhātu is the dependently co-arising dharmadhātu." Again another sūtra says: "One cannot see even the least of dharmas that does not have the nature of dependently co-arising."⁴⁷⁷

⁴⁷⁶ 梵志. , Brahmācārin, the celibate monk who practices the path of Brahma, i.e., celibacy.

⁴⁷⁷ The Prajñāpāramitāsūtra has: "If bodhisattvas do not revert, they will attain the upāya power, which is called the bodhisattva practice of prajñāpāramitā, whereby

In this sūtra the dharma nature of the equality of dependent co-arising is called the nature of dependent co-arising. According to this profound meaning, it is said: "If one gains insight into dependent co-arising, he sees into the dharma nature. If one gains insight into the dharma nature, he sees all Buddhas."⁴⁷⁸

Because the actual nature of dependent co-arising is the ultimate dharma (paramāṛthadharmā), the Buddha of ultimate truth (paramāṛthasatyabuddha), and because the equality [of dependently co-arisen dharmas] in all places has no discrimination, the sūtra enunciated the above passage.

The Third Mark: Unmarked

The sūtra says: It realizes being far removed from all differentiating marks, because the unmarked dharma nature of equality is fully perfected.

The commentary explains: The non-similarity of the transformations, destructions, etc., of all dharmas

⁴⁷⁷cont. they see the twelve nīdānas (dvādaśapratītya-samutpāda) to include all dharmas. When bodhisattvas gain this insight, they do not see any dharma that does not arise conditionally." (T. 8, p. 579a).

⁴⁷⁸The 大乘入諸佛境界智光明莊嚴經 has: "If one sees into dependent co-arising, then he is able to see the dharma, and if he is able to see the dharma, then he sees the Tathāgata." (T. 16, p. 261c).

of form, etc., are termed differentiating marks.

But, [it might be objected], to be far removed from individual differentiating marks means that it is a common mark (samānyalakṣaṇa). How can such a common mark be a mark [of equality wisdom] at all?

Because this mark is no mark, [it is the mark of equality wisdom]. As the sūtra says: "The dharma nature (314b) has only one mark, and that is no mark."⁴⁷⁹ This no-mark is precisely the equality of the dharma nature (dharmatā-samātā). Because [equality wisdom] understands this dharma nature of equality, whereby all the dharmas of parikalpita [are seen] to be absolutely and eternally non-existent, the text uses the term realizes. As explained above, because this realization is cultivated unto its full perfection, equality wisdom is fully perfected.

An alternate opinion holds that its being far removed from differentiating marks means that it does not have any marks. And its being far removed from no-mark means that it lacks having no mark. And because it lacks having no-mark, the sūtra terms it equality. The rest is as above.⁴⁸⁰

⁴⁷⁹The Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra has: "All dharmas are unmarked, and this is what is called their one mark." (T. 8, p. 390b).

⁴⁸⁰This interpretation sees both 異相 and 非相 as the direct object of 遠離, rather than taking 非相 as a modifier of 平等法性.

The Fourth Mark: Compassion

The sūtra says: A broad refuge is great compassion, because the dharma nature of equality is fully perfected.

The commentary says: There are three kinds of compassion: 1) that which has sentient beings as its object; 2) that which has the dharma as its object; and 3) that which has no object.⁴⁸¹ When bodhisattvas first elicit the aspiration for bodhi, in many ways they cultivate the compassion that has sentient beings as its object. In many ways this compassion is contaminated (sāśrava), because of its saṃvṛti, conditioned object. But, when they are cultivating true practice [in bhāvanāmārga], in many ways they cultivate the compassion that has dharma as its object. This compassion is also contaminated, because it has the Mahāyāna dharma teaching as its object. And, when they have attained the patience of no birth, in many ways they cultivate the compassion that has no object, because, although dharmadhātu is their object, they lack discrimination, just as the [direct perception] of the variously maturing (vipāka) dharmas of eye, etc., [has no discrimination,

⁴⁸¹The Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra has: "There are three kinds of compassion: sattvalambana, dharmāmbana, and anāmbana." (T. 25, p. 257c). The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra describes the first as compassion for suffering sentient beings, the second as total focus on the joyful dharma teaching, and the third as the abandonment of all discrimination. (T. 30, p. 535c).

because it is pre-conceptual], and because [this compassion] arises spontaneously without prior intention (abhisamkāra). Therefore their compassion is said to be objectless, to be the great compassion (mahākaruṇā) associated with mirror wisdom.

Another opinion holds that its only object is dharmadhātu, because any discrimination of external objects is non-existent. Therefore, because it does not take as its object sentient beings or the dharma, it is called objectless compassion.⁴⁸²

But the correct opinion holds that it also has as object sentient beings, but yet is non-discriminative. Its universally equal activity (ākāra) understands all samvṛti,⁴⁸³ because the nature of sentient beings is universally equal, because the dependently co-arising, universal dharmatā is universally equal, because anātman-tathatā is universally equal. Therefore it is called equality wisdom. Thus the objects associated with this wisdom include all three compassions. However, because its action is

⁴⁸²The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi has: "Its object is only tathatā, because it perceives the equality of all dharmas." (Wei Tat, p. 776; Poussin, pp. 689-690).

⁴⁸³The Siddhi's correct opinion is: "It has as object both tathatā and samvṛti, . . . because the Buddhabhūmisūtra says that equality wisdom attains the ten kinds of equality." (Wei Tat, p. 776; Poussin, p. 690).

non-discriminative and equal, it is said to be objectless.⁴⁸⁴

The great compassion associated with equality wisdom in the tathāgatabhūmi is perfected in a multitude of marks and constantly appears. The Tathāgata certainly has objectless compassion, and even if the other two are not explicitly mentioned, they are also perfected by him. Because of these three kinds of compassion, with universal equality the Tathāgata saves all sentient beings. It is not only that he confers some small happiness upon them, but rather, because, moving in that equality whereby all sentient beings and all dharma teachings are tathatā of no-self, he constantly brings about the salvation of all. For this reason the text says great compassion. This is not like śrāvakas or other such beings, who can bring about some small benefit for a time, but are unable to save all sentient beings. Because he is superior to all (314c) śrāvakas, etc., because he does deliver all sentient beings, because for a long time he has amassed the perfected fullness of blessed wisdom and spiritual stores, the text uses the term a broad refuge.⁴⁸⁵ This broad refuge and great

⁴⁸⁴The point of this discussion is to avoid the objection that, having no object, the Buddha's compassion is aloof from and transcendent to sentient beings.

⁴⁸⁵弘濟, yoñs-su-skyob-pa, paritrāna, i.e., protection, assistance, refuge. The Mahāyanasūtrālamkāra,

pervades everywhere and, because they are non-discriminative, they are said to be equal, i.e. the dharma nature of equality. Or perhaps because this broad refuge and great compassion have the dharma nature of equality as object, that object is termed the dharma nature of equality. As explained above, because this great compassion is cultivated unto full perfection, equality wisdom is fully perfected.

The Fifth Mark: Unrejecting Compassion

The sūtra says: Unrejecting is its compassion, because the dharma nature of equality is fully perfected.

The commentary explains: The compassion of śrāvakas, etc., is unable to save all sentient beings, for its activity, which takes as its object only a limited number of the sentient beings in this realm of desire (kāmadhātu), arises only temporarily. But the great compassion of Tathāgatas is universally able to save all

485cont. chapter IX, verse ten, has: baudhair-dharmairyacca susampurnasariram yatsaddharma veti ca satvanpravinetum/ yatam param yathrpaya sarvajagatsu tad buddhatvam streṣṭhamihatyam śaranānam, "Because his body is replete with wonderful buddhadharmas and because of his compassion, he knows how to lead beings in all worlds to that other shore. Therefore here [in this world] Buddha is the best of all refuges." See verses seven to eleven for the full description of śaranatva-anuttara, the supreme refuge.

sentient beings, for its universal activity, which takes as its object sentient beings in all three realms (tridhātu), arises constantly. The term non-rejecting (anupekṣā) means that, without rejecting, he constantly saves and does not abandon, i.e., without rejecting, his compassion constantly arises to save suffering sentient beings as appropriate to each from the three sufferings⁴⁸⁶ without abandoning them. Just as an adult would take pity on a child, [this compassion] arises equally for all sentient beings. Because the realm of sentient beings is limitless, the time when it matures sentient beings does not fall away even for a moment. In fact it never passes away. The Tathāgata is always associated with great compassion, and one cannot say that that compassion arises or appears only at certain times. As the sūtra says: "Good sons, you must not say that the great compassion of Buddha Bhagavans arises or appears for all sentient beings only at certain times. The reason why it constantly and always appears is that, if that great compassion of all Buddha Bhagavans were without foundation or had not yet been established (mūla-abhūta-maula-abhūta), then they would not have realized

⁴⁸⁶ 三苦, triduhkhata, i.e., the suffering that comes from the presence of disagreeable objects, the suffering that comes from transitoriness, and the suffering that comes from the absence of agreeable objects.

anuttara-samyak-sambodhi. But the Tathāgatas have already realized that mahābodhi and constantly entertain this thought: I must establish all the good roots for sentient beings. For those who do not yet understand all the dharma teachings, I must open up their understanding. And so in this manner the Tathāgatas always give rise to great compassion for sentient beings." Again another sūtra says: "Night and day at the six times the Tathāgata beholds the world."⁴⁸⁷

But how then can it be said that his compassion arises always, [if it arises at the six times]?

Since the phrase the six times means a constant continuity without interruption, there is no inconsistency.

Great mercy and compassion have benevolence (adveṣa), non-violence (ahimṣā), and non-delusion (amoha) as their essence. In their conferral of happiness and deliverance from suffering, their mode of activity is different, but both [mercy and compassion] have the three kinds of sentient beings, [who suffer the three kinds of sufferings], as their objects. Mercy is benevolent, while

⁴⁸⁷The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra has: "Thus the Tathāgata at the six times, the three [divisions] of day and the three [divisions] of night, constantly by means of his Buddha eye, perceives the world." (T. 30, p. 499b). The six times are the six divisions of the day.

compassion is non-violent. Mercy has as its object the absence of happiness (sukha-vedanā-abhūta) and desires to confer that happiness. Compassion has as its object the presence of suffering (duhkha-vedanā) and desires to deliver from that suffering. Since this non-rejecting, great compassion arises in non-differentiation, it is called equal. And this is the dharma nature, or it (315a) takes as its object the dharma nature of equality. As explained above, because this compassion is cultivated unto full perfection, equality wisdom is fully perfected.

The Sixth Mark: Rūpakāya

The sūtra says: It manifests itself according to the dispositions of all sentient beings, because the dharma nature of equality is fully perfected.

The commentary explains: According to the earnest desires (kautūkala) of sentient beings, they see differences in the Tathāgata's rūpakāya (form-body). In such a manner the Tathāgata manifests rūpakāya. Although the Tathāgata abides in a state of no mental fabrication (prapañca), yet, because of the dominant power (adhipati-bala) of equality wisdom, the pure consciousness associated with mirror wisdom manifests gem-like, wondrous rūpakāyas.

Because he causes the good roots of all sentient beings to mature, and because the marks⁴⁸⁸ of these [form] bodies appear (pratibhāsa) in their own minds, it is said that they see the body of the Tathāgata external from their minds. As the sūtra says: "Because of the compassionate good roots of all Tathāgatas there are such manifestations, i.e., he causes the minds of gods, men, etc., to be transformed in various ways and to see the body of the Tathāgata, as if it were colored golden, etc."⁴⁸⁹ Again another sūtra says: "If, as appropriate to the immeasurable sentient beings to be converted, they see the colors of the vaidūrya or mani gem [on the Tathāgata's body], this is because the Tathāgata is able to manifest these various vaidūrya or mani gem colors, and thus cause their own minds to be so transformed." He manifests the universal equality of the appearances of all Tathāgatas. Because in this manner

⁴⁸⁸Read the Taisho alternate 相 for 根.

⁴⁸⁹The 佛說如來不思議秘密大乘經 has: "Both gods and men delight in seeing the golden colors of the Buddha. This is because he causes them to see his golden-colored body." (T. 22, p. 716c).

universal equality (samatā) is identical with the dharma nature (dharmatā), the text uses the term the dharma nature of equality. This means that, according to the earnest desires of the sentient beings to be converted [by many Buddhas] in common, all Tathāgatas make visible the appearances of rūpakāya, i.e., they each manifest the same kind of appearances at the same place and at the same time, and causing the minds of sentient beings to be transformed, they bring benefit and happiness to them.⁴⁹⁰ It is just like the marks of ālaya-vijñāna which are common to all sentient beings. When they mature, then each sentient being individually perceives the marks of the [same] world, etc., and there is no mutual inconsistency because these marks occur at the same place and the same time, and are all similar. In like manner, the marks of rūpakāya are similar. Because, as explained above, this manifestation of

⁴⁹⁰ Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "What happens when those sentient beings [to be converted] depend upon several Buddhas in common? In the same time and at the same place each Buddha transforms a nirmānakāya and its land, and all these appearances are similar and do not hinder one another. They combine to be the dominant, enabling cause, (adhipatipratyaya), which causes the consciousnesses of these beings, who are to be converted, to transform themselves." (Wei Tat, p. 802; Poussin, p. 714).

rūpakāya is cultivated unto full perfection,
equality wisdom is fully perfected.

The Seventh Mark: The Tathāgata's Words

The sūtra says: His words are to be respectfully received by all sentient beings, because the dharma nature of equality is fully perfected.

The commentary explains: When sentient beings hear the various words that are able to cause their good roots to mature, they will be delighted and realize the happiness of pure faith. The Tathāgata manifests such words, for, although he has no mental fabrication (prapañca) nor discrimination, yet, because of the power of his compassionate vow, he does manifest such words. And those sentient beings to be converted, because of their own pre-eminent powers of understanding, are variously transformed in this manner.

This means that they hear the Buddha's voice coming from outside their own minds, because all the words uttered by the Tathāgata are in accord with the operations [of their minds].

Because all men, gods, etc. do not oppose them, the text says that they are respectfully received. Because, if these words were (315b) not addressed to their mental operations, they would not be manifested, it is said that the words of Buddha are not in vain.

Although there are sentient beings who do not follow the Buddha's words, yet, because [those words] do transform and bring benefit, in the future they will certainly come to believe in and accept them. Because his universal intention (arthasamanta) is embodied in these words, the sūtra says that his words are to be respectfully received by all sentient beings. Because, by the above explanation, such spoken words are manifested by all Buddhas in common, they are equal. Thus this equality is the nature of the dharma. And, as explained above, because this manifestation [of words] is cultivated unto full perfection, equality wisdom is fully perfected.

The Eighth Mark: The One Taste of Tranquility

The sūtra says: Tranquility from the world is all of one taste, because the dharma nature of equality is fully perfected.

The commentary explains: The five contaminated skandhas are here termed world. Because [equality wisdom] from moment to moment controls [these worldly skandhas] by means of two destructions, ⁴⁹¹ i.e., they are rendered quiescent (śānta) and brought to cessation (nirodha),

⁴⁹¹ = 種壞, dvesamvaittanyau. There is an etymological connection between loka, the world, and ruj, to destroy, at least in the mind of some Buddhist commentators. However, it is unclear just what these two destructions refer to in this instance. The above equation of them with quiescence and cessation (息滅) is an interpretative translation.

the text uses the term tranquility. The cause of tranquility is the holy path, which is grounded in the paratantric nature of nirvāṇa.⁴⁹² Tranquility from the world is the same as returning to tathatā, and since this is pariniṣpannasvabhāva, the sūtra text says that it is of one taste.

Furthermore, the word world means that, since parikalpitasvabhāva is absent from this original nature, it is called tranquility. Because tathatā manifested in this tranquility is not differentiated, it is said to be of one taste. And this is the dharma nature of equality. As explained above, because this one taste is cultivated unto perfection, equality wisdom is fully perfected.

⁴⁹²由此於此而寂靜故，即是聖道及以涅槃
依他起性： "Tranquility is because of this [cause] and in this [ground], i.e., because of the holy path and by means of the paratantric nature of nirvāṇa". Śīlabhadra reads simply: de ñe-bar-shi-ba (upasama) nī gañ qis gañ du ste lam dan mya-nan-las-hdas-paḥo, "The cause (gañ qis) and place (gañ du) of this tranquility is the path and nirvāṇa." (Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 101). It would thus appear that Bandhuprabha has added the reference to paratantra in order to emphasize that tranquility from the world is not a complete separation from phenomenal existence in nirupadhiśeṣenirvāṇa, but rather the complete cessation of parikalpita, which retains the non-discriminative activity of phenomenal tasks in apratisthita-nirvāṇa, the non-abiding state of the bodhisattva. Bandhuprabha's subsequent equation of original purity with this tranquility implies that tranquility is the realization of the originally pure paratantrasvabhāva.

The Ninth Mark: The One Taste of Suffering and Happiness

This sūtra says: The suffering and happiness of all worldly dharmas is of one taste, because the dharma nature of equality is fully perfected.

The commentary explains: All worldly dharmas are of eight kinds: gain, loss, defamation, eulogy, flattery, ridicule, sorrow, and pleasure.

The thought of acquiring things is called gain.
 The thought of losing things is called loss.
 Insulting somebody behind his back is called defamation. Praising somebody behind his back is called eulogy. Praising somebody to his face is called flattery. Insulting somebody to his face is called ridicule. That which oppresses body or mind is called suffering. That which delights body or mind is called pleasure. In general these eight are of two kinds: the four disagreeable ones are called suffering, and the four agreeable ones are called pleasure, because these ones produce delight. They are also explained as being involved in the antagonism between suffering and happiness. The saint dwells constantly in one taste. When he attains gain, he is not delighted. When he encounters loss, he is not downcast. When he finds happiness, he is not covetous.

When he is suffering, he is not cantankerous.

As a sūtra says: "The world of the saint is of the one taste of equality, just as if it were empty space."⁴⁹³

The fool imagines that there are distinctions in the world, but because [saints] are far removed from such parikalpita, the eight worldly dharmas are everywhere the same [for them]. And this is the dharma nature of equality. As explained above, because this one taste is cultivated unto perfection, equality wisdom is (315c) fully perfected.

The Tenth Mark: The Nature of Merits

The sūtra says: It cultivates the final stage of immeasurable merits, because the dharma nature of equality is fully perfected.

The commentary explains: Merits here mean all the meritorious dharmas of the virtues favorable to enlightenment (sarvabodhipāksikadharma). Because equality wisdom permeates, nourishes, matures deliverance, the sūtra

⁴⁹³ 聖處世間平等一味猶如虛空 . Śīlabhadra has: hphags-pa rnams la ni ste-hu dan tsan-dan du mtsuñs so, "For the saints, an axe handle and sandal wood are all the same." (Nishio, Buddhabhūmividyākhyāna, p. 102). Tsan-dan, candana, i.e., sandal wood is used as a metaphor for anything excellent. Ste-hu, paraśu means an axe. I take it as the equivalent for ste-yu, an axe handle, i.e., ordinary wood. Thus the saint does not discriminate the ordinary from the superior. Such imagery was probably commonly understood both in India and in Tibet. But perhaps Hsüan-tsang has altered the passage, because such images were unfamiliar to the Chinese. There seems to be no reason why Bandhuprabha would have omitted these images.

uses the word cultivates. Although equality wisdom is non-discriminative, because of the dominant power of the wisdom of Buddhas and bodhisattvas, it is like the maṇi gem and causes the merits of different individuals to increase and mature unto deliverance. The phrase the final stage means that it causes deliverance, because it is able to attain parinirvāṇa in the Three Vehicles, but one cannot say that it causes worldly happiness.

Such august wisdom is called the dharma nature of equality because it is far removed from parikalpita-svabhāva. Or perhaps, because all bodhisattvas cultivate the pre-eminent merits of the virtues favorable to enlightenment and come to that final place, this sūtra uses the phrase the dharma nature of equality. As explained above, because these merits are cultivated unto full perfection, equality wisdom is fully perfected.

PART TWO

CHAPTER FIVE

The Wisdom of Intellectual Mastery

The sūtra says: Next, wondrously born ones, is the wisdom of intellectual mastery.

The commentary explains: This wisdom has ten kinds of causal activity. You should understand that we distinguish these ten causes of the wisdom of intellectual mastery: 1) the cause of being a support, 2) the cause of arising, 3) the cause of being joyful, 4) the cause of discerning, 5) the cause of experiencing, 6) the cause of differentiating destinies, 7) the cause of discerning [world] realms, 8) the cause of pouring down the great dharma rain, 9) the cause of suppressing māra, and 10) the cause of severing all doubts.

The First Cause: Supporting dhāraṇī and samādhi

The sūtra says: Just as the realm of the physical world supports the realm of sentient beings, just so the Tathāgata's intellectual mastery wisdom supports the entry doors of all dhāraṇī and samādhi, and without obstacle expounds the Buddha's wondrous dharma.

The commentary explains: This passage explains its mark of being a supporting cause.⁴⁹⁴ The phrase

⁴⁹⁴ 建立因相, gnas-paḥi rgyu, pratiṣṭhā-hetu, the supporting cause.

just as the physical world supports the realm of sentient beings means that the physical world, which consists in the lower wind wheel, etc., and which is an evolution from the minds of sentient beings, is able to support the realm of sentient beings, i.e., the world of sensation, which is also an evolution from the minds of sentient beings. In like fashion the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery is able to support all the entry doors of dhāraṇī, and, more broadly, all the wondrous dharma teachings of Buddha, because it is associated with them and is able to elicit them [from consciousness]. Dhāraṇī refers to superior recollective wisdom (smṛti-prajñā), which is able to support immeasurable buddhadharmas and hold them without failure. In one dharma it can support all dharmas. In one expression (vyañjana), it can support all expressions. In one meaning (artha), it can support all meanings.

Because it supports and stores up immeasurable merits, it is called an inexhaustible treasury.⁴⁹⁵ There are

⁴⁹⁵ 無盡藏, mi-zad-pahi za-ma-toq, aksaya-karandā, an inexhaustible basket or treasury.

four kinds of dhāraṇī: the dhāraṇī that supports dharma teaching [without forgetfulness], the dhāraṇī that supports [dharma] meanings [without forgetfulness], (316a) the dhāraṇī that supports mantra, [i.e., mystic, magical formulae], and the dhāraṇī that is able to attain bōshisattva patience (ksānti). These are described in the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra.⁴⁹⁶

But how is it possible that in but one dharma, [this recollective wisdom of dhāraṇī] can support all dharmas?

This means that the inconceivable power of superior recollective wisdom of Buddhas and bodhisattvas manifests all dharmas, all expressions, and all meanings in the one dharma mark of the image aspect (nimittabhāga) of their own minds. Furthermore, it is able to manifest the entry doors of inconceivable, inexhaustible merits, because their insight aspect (darśanabhāga) and self-awareness aspect (svasaṃvittibhāga) both have the capacity for such unlimited, pre-eminent merits, and both support everything and cause such not to be forgotten. Such inconceivable power is called dhāraṇī.

⁴⁹⁶ Yogācārabhūmiśāstra discusses this theme at some length. See T. 30, p. 542c-543a.

Samādhi refers to that superior contemplation, which includes all samādhis, such as śuraṃgana-samādhi⁴⁹⁷ and which is able to bring to victory all world transcendent and worldly samādhis.⁴⁹⁸ Since other [wisdoms] are unable to bring [samādhis] to victory, this samādhi [of intellectual mastery wisdom] is called śuraṃgana.

⁴⁹⁷ 健行等, dpah-bar-hgro-ba la-sogs-pa, śuraṃganādi. Śuraṃgana means the samādhi of heroic action, i.e., that which is characterized by bravery in destroying the obstacles of impurity. Note that the above term means śuraṃgana and others.

⁴⁹⁸ 能勝一切世出世間諸三摩地. The Tibetan text reads: hjiq-rten-pa dan hjiq-rten-las-bdas pahi tin-ñe-hdsin thams-cad thibs-kyis-qnon la. Nishio, Buddhabhumivyākhyāna, p. 103, emends the phrase thibs-kyi-qnon to zil-gyis-qnon (abhibhava) in order to make it agree with Hsüan-tsang's 勝, understood as: "to be superior, to excell." Nishio thus translates: 世と出世との一切定勝...: "it is superior to all worldly and world transcendent samādhis." (Buchi-kyōron, p. 246). He further understands the subject of this sentence to be śuraṃgana-samādhi, but this appears to be problematic, for such a pre-eminent position is not, it would seem, accorded to śuraṃgana-samādhi in Yogācāra thinking. Furthermore both the Chinese 健行等 and the Tibetan dpah-bar-hgro-ba la-sogs-pa imply that śuraṃgana-samādhi is one of many samādhis supported by intellectual mastery wisdom. Also the Chinese sentence is introduced by 能, which would lead one to expect a transitive verb to follow. If 勝 meant "to be superior," then the word 能 would be superfluous. Thus I take 勝 to be transitive, meaning: "to bring [something] to victory."

The phrase thibs-kyis-qnon la of the original Tibetan still remains obscure. The word qnon is the perfect of qnan-pa, which means "to give or grant." Thus Nishio's emendation of zil-gyis-qnon would mean: "the granting of lustre," i.e., the attaining of the highest position, and could be a possible translation of abhibhava, to suppress or overcome. But the perfect of qnon-pa can also mean "to suppress or subdue." The original term thibs means gahana, a dark thicket, used metaphorically for any state of dark confusion. Thus thibs-khyi-qnon would mean gahana-abhibhava, the suppression of confusion.

Or perhaps because such is the action of that heroic land of Buddhas and bodhisattvas, [all its samādhis] are called śuraṃgana, since only Buddhas and bodhisattvas in dharmameghabhūmi attain these samādhis.

Therefore all other samādhis are to be interpreted in accord with the explanation of this sūtra, i.e., both dhāraṇī and samādhi are to be explained as entry doors,

because, just as the three entry doors of emptiness, the desireless, and the unmarked, they are able to give rise to all kinds of merits.

The sentence without obstacle it expounds refers to the four absences of obstacles in regard to dharma teaching, its meaning, its explanation (nirukti), and its proper exposition (pratibhāna). Due to these four, it is able to expound, and thus the sūtra uses the word expounds. All the words of the wondrous dharma of all Buddhas, i.e., the unlimited buddhadharmas of the Tathāgata's powers and fearlessnesses, must be similarly explained.

498cont. Hsüan-tsang's 勝, understood as "to bring to victory," expresses this meaning in positive form. Thus, without emending the original Tibetan, both texts affirm that all the samādhis supported by the wisdom of intellectual mastery, are heroic, i.e., śuraṃgana, and that this wisdom leads them all to victory.

Because the wisdom of intellectual mastery con-verts the mano consciousness and attains a dynamic energy (audārya), it is able to support all merit. Because the pure mano consciousness associated with this wisdom is also associated with all merit,

and is able to evolve all merit, the sūtra says that it is able to support.

The Second Cause: The Cause of Generation

The sūtra says: Again just as the world is the cause for the spontaneous arising of all kinds of immeasurable phenomenal consciousness for sentient beings, just so the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery is the cause that can simultaneously give rise to all knowable objects without obstacle and to all kinds of immeasurable marked consciousness of wondrous wisdom.

The commentary explains: This passage explains the mark [of intellectual mastery wisdom] as being the cause of arising. The wisdom of intellectual mastery is able to simultaneously (yugapad) know all knowable objects, because it is the cause that gives rise (janaka-hetu) to marked consciousness.⁴⁹⁹ The word world here

⁴⁹⁹ Śīlabhadra reads: thams-cad la cig-car rig-pa rnam-par-rig-pa sna-tshogs-can skye-baḥi rgyu-mtshan yin-paḥi phyir te, "[Intellectual mastery wisdom] simultaneously knows all knowable objects, because it is the cause that gives rise to various kinds of

means all physical worlds. Just as the physical world is able to be the cause for the arising of phenomenal consciousness for sentient beings in all the various realms and in unlimited space, just so the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery is able to understand at one time and simultaneously all knowable objects and realms, which are limitless as empty space, because it is the cause that gives rise to the marked consciousness that can understand the objects of all the various worlds and the unlimited objects above the world.⁵⁰⁰

This means that the wisdom of intellectual mastery of all Tathāgatas is able to understand all objects, and (316b) has a multitude of images, which appear as these knowable objects, just as a colored painting has a multitude of visible marks. In its insight aspect (darśanabhāga) this wisdom is able to be the cause for the arising of such consciousness in such images, and, because

⁴⁹⁹cont. "consciousness." (Buddhabhūmivyaṅkyāna, p. 103). I have divided the Chinese sentence according to this Tibetan reading. The Chinese... 能作頓走一切所知相識因故 would mean: "... because it is the cause of marked consciousness, it is able to simultaneously act and give rise to all knowable objects."

⁵⁰⁰相識, marked consciousness. The term means lakṣaṇa or nimitta. Consciousness becomes marked, because it functions through images (nimittabhāga). Thus the background for Bandhuprabha's addition of the phrase 相識 into the original text is the theory of sākāra-jñāna. According to this theory all phenomenal consciousness must be accompanied with an image (相, nimitta, ākāra) in order to function. Without being so

it can manifest (pratibhāsa) them, it is said to be the cause that gives rise to them. It is not the immediate, direct cause (hetupratyaya), for [consciousness] arises from seeds (bīja).⁵⁰¹

When the sūtra uses the term direct, immediate cause (hetupratyaya), [it does not intend to denote the technical meaning of that term, for the direct, immediate cause is the bīja]. Rather it intends to say a conditional cause (pratyayahetu), for [with the bīja as the direct, immediate cause], the insight aspect of consciousness gives rise to the image aspect, or the essence [of consciousness, i.e., svasaṃvittibhāga], gives rise to the functioning [of both these aspects]. Although there is no difference in the essence [of consciousness], yet because it functions differently, the insight aspect (darśanabhāga) can be termed

500cont. marked by an image consciousness cannot know any of the objects of phenomenal existence. Thus wisdom must also function through the basic structure of consciousness in order to know saṃvṛti truth, and this wisdom is called intellectual, for it operates by means of the structure of intellectual knowing.

501 親因, sākṣāt. . . pratyaya, immediate . . . cause, i.e., hetupratyaya. If the wisdom of intellectual mastery were the direct, immediate cause for the arising of marked consciousness, then there would be no function for bīja, which is impossible. See Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Wei Tat, p. 534; Poussin, p. 436. All consciousness arises from bījavāsanā, and not from any other direct, immediate cause.

a cause. For just as [in samsaric consciousness] the image aspect gives rise to the insight aspect, so [in wisdom consciousness the basic structure of inter-dependency] is the same, [but, rather than image giving rise to insight, insight gives rise to image].⁵⁰²

The Third Cause: Delight

The sūtra says: Just as in the world there are various kinds of things to play with, and the adornments of parks, groves, pools, etc. can be deeply enjoyed, just so in the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery there are various things to play with, and the adornments of the pāramitās, the virtues favorable to enlightenment, the ten powers, the fearlessnesses, and the uncommon buddhadharmas can be deeply enjoyed.

The commentary explains: This passage explains the wisdom of intellectual mastery as the cause of joy.

⁵⁰²The usual explanation of the relationship between nimittabhāga and darśanabhāga is that insight arises from image, for insight occurs into the image within consciousness. Thus samsaric consciousness is brought about by the presence of the image in consciousness. But, as explained in the above passage, in wisdom consciousness the direction of dependency is reversed, for wisdom makes use of images by upāya to embody and express its meanings. Thus insight gives rise to images. But it is not limited or determined by that image, but rather elicits that image as appropriate in order to understand phenomena, and, having understood, to give rise to wisdom images. This reversal is one phase of the con-version of the basis, for, while the paratantric structure of consciousness remains intact, its functioning is turned around, i.e., con-verted.

Just as in the physical world there are many things to play with, and the beautifully adorned, brilliant splendor of parks, groves, pools, etc., cause sentient beings to be joyful and delighted, just so the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery in many ways is able to play with the pāramitās, the virtues favorable to enlightenment, etc., and their beautifully adorned, brilliant splendor causes all bodhisattvas to be joyful and delighted.

The pāramitās refer to the six pāramitās. When developed by analysis, they become ten, because the last four are stages of skillful upāya.⁵⁰³ Or, when analyzed, they number eighty-four thousand, for as the sūtra says: "If one analyze their distinctions, their number is immeasurable."

The virtues favorable to enlightenment (bodhi-pāṅśikadharma) number thirty-seven, but by extension they also are immeasurable.

The ten powers are the wisdom powers of distinguishing place, etc., which are all comprised in the wisdom faculties of the Tathāgata, and are

⁵⁰³The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "In fact, there are ten pāramitās. If one speak of six, that is because the last four are included in the sixth, prajñāpāramitā (the perfection of wisdom). When analyzed, they are ten, in that the sixth prajñāpāramitā is comprised in non-discriminative wisdom (nirvikalpa jñāna), while the last four are comprised in subsequently attained wisdom (prṣṭhalabdhajñāna), because their object is saṃvṛti." (Wei Tat, p. 720; Poussin, p. 630).

the faculties of his knowledge.⁵⁰⁴

The fearlessnesses refer to the four absences of dread, which are comprised in his five spiritual faculties and are the faculties of his knowledge, i.e., faith, zeal, recollection, samādhi, and wisdom.

There are eighteen uncommon buddhadharmas.⁵⁰⁵

As a sūtra says: "The many aspects of these merits are comprised in this wisdom, and, being associated with them, it can bring them to development.

Therefore this wisdom has all adornments."

The Fourth Cause: Discerning

The sūtra says: Just as the world is completely arrayed with the wondrous adornments of islands, islets, the sun and the moon, the Heaven of the Four Celestial emperors, the Thirty-threefold Heaven, the (Su)yāma Heaven, the Tuṣita Heaven, the Nirmānarati Heaven, the Paramirmitta-vasā-vartin Heaven, the Brahmakāya Heaven, and so forth, just so the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery

⁵⁰⁴The ten powers (daśabalāni) are: the wisdom power to know the proper place, the wisdom power to know karmic maturation, the wisdom power to know the differences of organs, the wisdom power to know the various kinds of enlightenment, the wisdom power to know the different realms, the wisdom power to know all destinies, the wisdom power to know and remember former lives, the wisdom power to know birth and death, and the wisdom power to know the exhaustion of contamination.

⁵⁰⁵不共佛法, āvenikā-buddhadharma: the ten powers (daśabalāni), the four absences of dread (catvāri vaiśarādhyaṇi), the three recollections (trīṇi smṛty-upasthānani), and great compassion (mahākaruṇā).

examines the complete arrayment of the wondrous adornments of the causes and results of degeneration and prospering both in the world and transcendent to the world, and all the full realizations of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas without exception.

The commentary explains:

This passage explains the mark of the wisdom of intellectual mastery as the cause of discerning. It is just as in the physical world, immeasurable islands are wondrously adorned and arrayed without being confused with one another. The term islands (dvīpa, i.e., the divisions of the world) refers to the four great islands of Jambūdvīpa, etc.⁵⁰⁶ (316c) The term islets refers to the eight small islets of Cāmara, etc.,⁵⁰⁷ The mention (grahana) of the sun and the moon includes all the heavenly constellations (nakṣatra). The

⁵⁰⁶ 瞻部洲, Jambūdvīpa, i.e., the continent of India. The other three great island continents are Pūrvavideha, Aparagōdanīya, and Uttarakuru.

⁵⁰⁷ 遮末囉, Cāmara. Each of the above four island continents have two smaller continents attached. Jambūdvīpa has Cāmara and Varacāmara attached.

These descriptions form the cosmological view of ancient India, which was then expanded to include various heavens. However, all these heavens still belong to the same physical world of kāmadhātu.

Heaven of the Four Celestial Emperors⁵⁰⁸ refers to those gods who dwell on each of the four sides of the fourth level of Mt. Sumeru. The Thirty Threefold Heaven⁵⁰⁹ means that, because each of these four sides of that mountain peak has eight emperor gods with Indra at their center, we arrive at this number [of thirty-three].⁵¹⁰ The (Su)yāma Heaven⁵¹¹ means that, because these gods, having come of age (yāma), experience pleasure, it is called the coming of age (yāma).⁵¹² The Tuṣita

⁵⁰⁸ 四天王天, catur-mahā-rāja-kāyikā-devah, the four divine emperors from pre-Buddhist times, who were transformed into protectors of the Buddha-dharma, and today grace the entrance to many a temple. In the east is Dhṛtarāṣṭra, in the south Virāḍhaka, in the west Virūpākṣa, and in the north Vaiśravaṇa. Their heaven is the sixth of kāmadhātu.

⁵⁰⁹ 三十三天, trāyastriṃśā-devah, the second heaven of kāmadhātu.

⁵¹⁰ The eight emperor gods times the four sides gives thirty-two, to which we add Indra in the center.

⁵¹¹ 夜摩天, (Su)yāma-devah, the third of the kāmadhātu heavens.

⁵¹² 謂此天中隨時受樂故名時分. This sentence is somewhat problematic, because it apparently intends to give an etymological interpretation of the word (su)yāma, deriving it from 隨時 and 時分. In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya Hsüan-tsang uses 時分 to translate avasthā, i.e., the circumstances of time or age. Avasthā also refers to the penis, and thus its meaning would connote the onset of puberty. This possibility accords with the Kośa's description of these gods: "Above [the thirty-three] there are other gods, who are in the heavenly palace. There are six kinds of gods who enjoy sexual desires, and who do lewd actions by copulating, embracing, holding hands, laughing, and looking." (Loka chapter, verse 69). Thus it seems that 隨時-時分 mean yāma, i.e., the coming to the age [of pubescence].

Heaven⁵¹³ is where those bodhisattvas who will afterwards become embodied [as Buddhas on this earth] are transformed by the teaching. Because they cultivate the fulness of joy (tuṣṭi), it is called Tuṣita. The Nirmāṇarati Heaven⁵¹⁴ is where [gods] take pleasure in all the pleasures, which they themselves bring about (nirmāṇa), because these gods are narcissistic.⁵¹⁵ The paranirmita-vaśa-vartin Heaven⁵¹⁶ is where [the gods] take pleasure in pleasures, which they cause others to bring about (paranirmita), and, when these pleasures are present, they control them.⁵¹⁷ The Brahmakāya Heaven⁵¹⁸ is called brahma, because it is apart from desire (kāma) and tranquil. Kāya here means [not Brahma's

⁵¹³ 觀史多天, Tuṣita-devaḥ, the fourth of the heavens of kāmadhātu, i.e., this realm of desire.

⁵¹⁴ 樂變化天, nirmāṇaratayaḥ devaḥ, the fifth of the heavens of kāmadhātu, where gods sexually take pleasure in themselves.

⁵¹⁵ 自娛樂, sva-sevate-rata, the pleasure of sexually enjoying oneself. Thus narcissism. Later interpretations take 娛樂 to refer to any kind of frivolous amusements, perhaps to somewhat soften the strong sexual connotations.

⁵¹⁶ 他化自在, paranirmita-vaśa-vartināḥ devaḥ, the sixth heaven of kāmadhātu, where, instead of enjoying themselves, gods have power to cause others to bring about pleasures for them.

⁵¹⁷ 自在, vaśa-varta, to control or regulate.

⁵¹⁸ 梵身天, brahmakāyikāḥ, the first of the rūpa-dhātu heavens.

body, but] his multitude. The phrase and so forth refers to all the heavens above these ones mentioned here.⁵¹⁹

[Just as these heavens are discerned and examined], so the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery examines the causes and results of all that degenerates or prospers both in the world and transcendent to the world and all the complete arrangement of the wondrous adornments of the Three Vehicles without confusing one with another. Worldly degeneration refers to the causes and results of evil destinies (gati). Worldly prospering refers to the causes and results of good destinies. Inasmuch as they are devolution or evolution in this world, they are respectively called degeneration and prospering. Also loss and destruction are called degeneration, while increase and growth is called prospering. The causes and results of the Two Vehicles are termed world transcendent degeneration. The causes

⁵¹⁹ There are seventeen rūpadhātu heavens, which are characterized by various degrees of purity from desire (kāma). Above these seventeen rūpadhātu heavens is the realm of no form, i.e., arūpadhātu, with its four stages of consciousness. Thus the six kāmadhātu, the eighteen rūpadhātu, and the four arūpadhātu abodes results in twenty-eight different heavens, which in Mahāyana are used as an upāya to encourage sentient beings to practice virtue.

and results of Mahāyāna is termed world transcendent prospering. Or again falling back is termed degeneration, while forging ahead is called prospering. The term full realizations refers to the result stage [of enlightenment], which occurs only after the Three Vehicles have manifested their causal stage. Only at full realization is one said to have attained the result of Buddhahood.

Because the wisdom of intellectual mastery examines the differences in all these dharmas and dharma marks, its wisdom resembles these objects, and yet in its clear manifestation [of them], its mode of activity (ākāra) is unconfused. Therefore the sūtra uses the phrase the complete arrayment of wondrous adornments.

The Fifth Cause: Experiencing

The sūtra says: Just as the world is extensively experienced by sentient beings, just so the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery manifests itself to all Buddha assemblies and pours down the dharma rain to cause sentient beings to experience the joy of the great dharma. (317a)

The commentary explains:

This passage explains the mark of the wisdom of intellectual mastery as being the cause of

experiencing (anubhava). Due to the dominant power (adhipatibala) of the karmic actions of sentient beings, the seeds (bīja) which are common in their ālaya consciousnesses, evolve and give rise to the various necessary [images] that enable them to extensively experience the physical world. In like fashion, the pure consciousness of the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery, assisted by equality wisdom as dominant, enabling cause (adhipatipratyaya) and evolving in synergy with mirror wisdom, manifests sambhogakāya to various [Buddha] assemblies, with flaming ardor warms them,⁵²⁰ and pours down the great dharma rain, in order to lead all world transcendent bodhisattvas to experience the joy of the great dharma. Furthermore, with the assistance of the Tathāgata's wisdom of duty fulfillment as dominant, enabling cause and in synergy with mirror wisdom, this pure consciousness also manifests nirmāṇakāya to various

⁵²⁰ 威德熾盛, tejas-uttapati. Tejas means the rays of fire, light, fiery energy. Uttapati means to glow, to shine forth, or to heat. This seems to be a reference to tapas, warmth, i.e., the ascetic practices of austerity and meditation, which allow the power of wisdom to warm one.

assemblies, with its flaming ardor warms them,
and pours down the rain of the true dharma in order
to lead those sentient beings who are to be converted to experience the joy of the dharma here
on this earth.⁵²¹

The Sixth Cause: Discerning Destinies

The sūtra says: Just as in the world the five destinies of the hells, hungry ghosts, animals, men, and gods are all possible, just so in the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery, the discernment of the unlimited causes and results associated with these five destinies come to be fully manifested.

The commentary explains: This passage explains the mark of the wisdom of intellectual mastery as the cause for the discerning (pariccheda) of destinies.

Due to the dominant power of the karmic actions of sentient beings, the specific marks⁵²² of the ālaya consciousness evolve and give rise to the possibilities of differences in the causes and results of the various five destinies.

⁵²¹ Śīlabhadra reads: "The cause of full enjoyment is the door that manifests various masteries by means of sambhogakāya. All bodhisattvas enjoy the dharma, because they comprehend those bodies." (Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 104). This is the entire entry for this sixth cause. The Chinese has so rearranged the text as to render exact parallels difficult.

⁵²² 不共相, āvenika-lakṣaṇa, i.e., the marks that individualize one sentient being from another.

In like fashion the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery, because it has as object the causes and results of these five destinies, manifests clearly the causes and results of the five destinies. But, because it does not itself give rise to any of the various undetermined states of asuras,⁵²³ gods, hungry ghosts, or animals, it does not speak discriminately.

The cause of the five destinies means that those in the intermediate state⁵²⁴ between death and rebirth have these five destinies as the means [of being reborn]. Destiny (gati) means that to which one goes. Because those in the intermediate state are able to go, they are not already included in the destinies. Therefore, due to the differences in the kinds of their rebirth, because they are established in the four

⁵²³ 阿素洛, asura. Originally the term asura was the same as ahura, which means a good spirit. But later commentators derived it from a-sura, i.e., not a god, which comes to mean an evil spirit, such as were seen as constantly waging war on Indra. In Buddhist lore, they became fighting spirits, whose abode was the bottom of the sea under Mt. Sumeru. They were added to the list of the five gatis to form a sixth category. It is probably for this reason that they are included in the commentary here, for the sūtra has the listing of five gatis only.

⁵²⁴ 中有, antarā-bhava, beings in the middle between death and rebirth. Because they have a spiritual body, the phrase 中有身, bodies in the middle, is used.

kinds of birth,⁵²⁵ they are then included in the destinies.

An alternate opinion holds that, because those in the intermediate state have the means [of rebirth] that are the destinies, they are included in the destinies. Therefore the causes referred to in the sūtra are the karmic actions of passion, etc., and their results are the five destinies.

The Seventh Cause: Discerning Realms

The sūtra says: Just as in the world all the realms of desire, form, and formlessness are all possible, just so in the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery the differences associated with the unlimited causes and results of the three realms come to be manifested.

The commentary explains: This passage explains the mark of the wisdom of intellectual mastery as the cause of discerning realms.

Due to the dominant power of their karmic actions in this world, the common and specific marks in the ālaya consciousnesses of sentient

⁵²⁵ 四生, catur yoni, the four kinds of birth: viviparous (jarāyuja), oviparous (andaja), birth from moisture (samsvedaja), such as with fish, and metamorphosis (upapaduja).

beings evolve and give rise to the possibilities of the differences in the causes and results of the three realms (tridhātu).

In this world there are both the sentient realm and the non-sentient realm, i.e., the realm of sentient beings and the physical world. If this were not so, then [the world] would not include those in the intermediate state, [who have no material body], nor those in the formless state (arūpadhātu), who only have a form born of samādhi, and not any forms produced by karmic actions, (317b) and thus no physical location.⁵²⁶ The three realms are established in the world according to their respective [meanings]. This means that in the physical, [material] world there are only the realms of desire (kāma) and form (rūpa), i.e., the sentient and the non-sentient realms. But in the realm of sentient beings there are all three realms, [including the formless (arūpadhātu)]. These three only exist in the world realm of sentient beings, because the physical, [material] world only supports the realm of sentient beings and the non-sentient realm, but the world realm of sentient

⁵²⁶ The realm of formlessness (arūpadhātu) is constituted by four samādhis: ākāśānantyāyatana, i.e., insight into the unlimited; viññānanantyaayatana, i.e., the insight that consciousness is unlimited; akimcanyāyatana, the insight that nothing truly exists, and naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana, the insight of no thought and no non-thought. See Poussin, Kośa, III, p. 3.

is able to support the [entire three] realms of sentient beings. 527

In like fashion, the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery has as object the causes and results of all the three realms, and [in it] are manifested the differences of the two marks [of the causes and results]. It is not that this wisdom gives rise to the causes and results of the three realms, but, as explained above, these two are discerned [by it].

This means that, because the wisdom of intellectual mastery is universally able to examine all objects, the marks of all realms (dhātus), destinies (gatis), and births (yonis), or the causes and results of consciousness and conscious states, which are supported by the maturation of all karmic actions and influenced by the actions of passion, do appear [in this wisdom consciousness].

This means that the wisdom of intellectual mastery, which arises from the dominance of mirror wisdom of all

527 The problem here under discussion is that, if world realm means only the physical, material world, then arūpadhātu, the realm of pure samādhi, being immaterial, would not be included. Therefore the commentary says that world realm includes both the physical world, which encompasses both the physical world and the realm of sentient beings, and the realm of sentient beings, which encompasses all the three realms of kāmadhātu, rūpadhātu, and arūpadhātu.

Tathāgatas, although it does not cling to subject or object and is far apart from all the obstacles of passion or knowledge, yet, because it examines the elements of all causes and results and is able to enunciate them, all marks of objects appear in it, just as a pure mirror reflects a multitude of images. However, it does not issue in the non-discrimination of mirror wisdom.⁵²⁸ For, although mirror wisdom is unconfused about all things and is able to manifest all images without exerting any effort (ayatna-vāhitva), yet it is non-discriminative. But this wisdom is able to discriminately manifest all the marks of objects. If it were non-discriminative, it would be unable to examine the elements of causes and results, or to enunciate the dharma teaching without doubt for the various assemblies.

This passage definitely establishes that the uncontaminated consciousness and conscious states (anāśrava-citta-caitta) do have the image aspect (nimittabhāga), because the unlimited

⁵²⁸ 然無鏡智無差別過： it lacks non-discriminative issuance (過) of mirror wisdom. Śīlabhadra has: de me-lon lta-buhi ye-śes dan khyad-par med-pa yan thal-bar mi hgyur te, "It does not issue in mirror wisdom or non-discrimination." (Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 105). The word 過 parallels thal-bar hgyur te, i.e., anusañj, to follow upon, be consequent to. 過 does have the meaning of to pass through.

causes and results of the five destinies and the three realms do come to be manifested in the Tathāgata's wisdom.⁵²⁹

It is said that, because the Tathāgata's wisdom is bright and pure, although the marks [i.e., the images], of all objects do appear in it, yet these images of the objects are not in any way changed (vikāra) by this wisdom, because they are not pure.⁵³⁰

However, such an opinion is not reasonable, because the images of all dharmas are evolutions of the consciousness and the conscious states of sentient beings, [and thus there is no dichotomy between pure consciousness and impure images].

⁵²⁹ According to the discussion in the Vijñapti-mātratāsiddhi on prsthalaabdhañāna, the correct opinion of Dharmapala is that such wisdom has both darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga. The Siddhi writes: "Furthermore, it has been said that this wisdom discriminates the individual and common marks of all dharmas, examines the differences in the sense natures of all sentient beings, and enunciates [dharma for them]." (Wei Tat, p. 696; Poussin, pp. 599-600). Both Wei Tat and Poussin identify the source for this passage as the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, but, because of the constant borrowing from the Vijñapti-mātratāsiddhi by the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, the opposite seems to be the case.

⁵³⁰ The import of this objection is that, although the Tathāgata is aware of these impure marks, because of that impurity, he does not actively manifest them. Such amounts to a rather deist position, in that Buddha wisdom, although aware of suffering, etc., would not become defiled by manifesting images, would not become involved in defiled phenomenal living.

But, [it might be further objected], if these images are evolutions of the consciousness and the conscious states of sentient beings, then how can they be manifested in Buddha wisdom at all? For it is not possible that one kind of cause can give rise to another kind of consciousness. Such contradicts correct reasoning. These images should be the same as images of other minds, [and thus Buddha images would also be defiled].

However, these images of objects are manifested by the Tathāgata's uncontaminated mind just as the image of manure might appear in a bright mirror. Although [that image] might appear to be impure, yet it is not impure. This [uncontaminated] consciousness and conscious states [of wisdom] have as its object dharmatā, and, if it takes other things as object, it does not do so as a pair of pincers, [which grasps things], or a lamp, [which projects its light upon things], because it has no movement. Rather, just as the nature of a bright mirror is originally pure, wisdom [is originally pure, and yet] manifests images which appear like objects, and is thus able to consider [such objects]. If the images of these did not appear in this consciousness, then,

they would have the power to elicit consciousness and conscious states, and yet would not be called the object causes (ālambanapratyaya) [of consciousness], just as the five sense organs, etc. [are not called objects of consciousness, although they have the power, in the presence of the images of objects, to give rise to consciousness]. (317c)

As said elsewhere: "Is non-discriminative wisdom limited (niyama) in any way? Since its object is tathatā and it is not separated from the essence of wisdom, it cannot be limited in any way."⁵³¹ But the conventional wisdom that is subsequently attained (prṣṭahlabdha-samvrti-jñāna), although it is not apart from tathatā, because it is discriminative, does not realize the essence of tathatā, for it takes as its object the image of tathatā, which it brings about by its own evolutions.⁵³² One cannot object that

⁵³¹The Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "Although non-discriminative wisdom has no nimittabhāga, it can be said that it arises in adhering to tathatā, because it is not separated from tathatā." (Wei Tat, p. 688; Poussin, p. 587).

⁵³²The Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "This subsequently attained wisdom reflects upon the seeming image of tathatā, but does not see the true nature of tathatā." (Wei Tat, p. 696; Poussin, p. 599). Poussin adds: "donc il comporte nimitta, ne voyant qu'une image mentale de la Tathatā." It seems clear that the Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa has here brought these two separate passages of the Siddhi together.

the uncontaminated images of objects in the uncontaminated [Buddha] mind are similar to the objects in the minds of fools (prthagjana), or that, although they appear to be uncontaminated, in reality they are contaminated.

The basic principle of consciousness only (vi jñaptimātratā) is established to mean that, although the images evolved by consciousness seem to imply [real, external] existence, yet in reality there is no [corresponding] essence (svabhāva). If this were not so, then form, etc., would exist just the same as consciousness and conscious states. And this would invalidate the principle of consciousness only. This principle means that their real existence is not apart from consciousness. If consciousness and conscious states were not separated from form, etc., but associated with form etc., then that would be [the theory of] objects only (arthamātra). And that would be a grave error.

The Eighth Cause: Dharma Rain

The sūtra says: Just as in the world Mt. Sumeru and other great jeweled, lofty peaks can appear, just so in the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery the broad, deep dharma teaching, which draws upon the power of all Buddhas and bodhisattvas can appear.

The commentary explains:

This passage explains the mark of the wisdom of intellectual mastery as being the cause for the pouring down of the dharma rain. In the world there arise all the jeweled mountains, because of the dominant power of the karmic actions of sentient beings. In like fashion, because of the dominant power of the action of the true dharma, which influences all sentient beings, the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery gives rise to the deep dharma teaching, which draws upon the might (prabhāva) of all Buddhas and bodhisattvas. Because this teaching reveals the power of the self-mastery of all Buddhas and bodhisattvas, and is also able to draw upon these august powers, the sūtra says that it draws upon the power of all Buddhas and bodhisattvas.

This means that the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery is able to elicit the images of dharma teaching in the consciousness associated with mirror wisdom, or that it itself is able to manifest these images of the dharma teaching. Because this [wisdom] has as its object the maturation of good roots, the sentient beings to be converted manifest [these images] in their

own minds.

The Ninth Cause: Suppressing Māra

The sūtra says: Just as in the world, the broad, deep, unperturbed sea can appear, just so in the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery, the teaching of the deep dharmadhātu, which is unperturbed by māra, infidels, or false teachers, can appear.

The commentary explains: This passage explains the mark of the wisdom of intellectual mastery as the cause for the suppressing of māra enmity. In the world there arises [in consciousness] the great sea, which is unperturbed (akṣobhyatva), because of the dominant power of the karmic actions of sentient beings. In like fashion the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery gives rise to the teaching of dharmadhātu [in consciousness], which teachings are unperturbed, because of the dominant power of the action of the true dharma, which influences sentient beings. Dharmadhātu is the unmarked truth of emptiness. The sūtra refers to this dharmadhātu as the teaching of dharmadhātu. All the infidels depend upon their [own] opinions, but the truth of dharmadhātu-sūnyatā controls such opinions and is apart from all such opinions.⁵³³ Therefore the teaching of emptiness

⁵³³ 見趣, lta-bar-gyur-pa, drṣṭa, i.e., what is seen in the mind, imagined, and thus opinion. Place punctuation after 諸見 and not after 空理.

cannot be fathomed by them, (318a) and they cannot disturb such a powerful teaching, as described in the last item. Because its power is high and vast, [this teaching] is compared to the jeweled mountains. Because it is as deep as dharmadhātu, it is compared to the great sea. Because the wisdom of intellectual mastery is able to illumine the causes of all objects, it can give rise to the enunciation of all dharma teachings. Thus the term in the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery is expressed in the locative case [in the original Sanskrit].⁵³⁴ As a sūtra says: "The Buddha Bhagavan is called the sun of great wisdom, because he is universally able to illumine and understand all dharmas."⁵³⁵

⁵³⁴ 略說勝者 is difficult to understand without reference to the Tibetan text, which reads: śes-byaḥi rnam-pa thams-cad yañ-dag-par rab-tu-ston-paḥi rgyu-mtshan yin paḥi phyir so-sor-rtoq-paḥi ye-śes la shes rgyuḥi bdun-pa bstan te, "Because it is the cause that correctly manifests all the knowable, it uses the seventh case (i.e., the Sanskrit locative) to express a causal relationship, i.e., in (1a) the wisdom of intellectual mastery." Here la is the locative marker. The original Sanskrit then would appear to have read: pratyavekṣana-jñānāsi. The commentary explains that here this locative has a causative meaning, i.e., this wisdom can cause the suppression of false teachings. The Chinese expresses this locative by means of the word 上 in the phrase: 如是如來觀察智上, which, by itself, is not clearly locative in meaning, but must be so, because of the parallel from Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna (Nishio, p. 106). Therefore 勝者 means uttama, the last [case of Sanskrit grammar], i.e., the locative.

⁵³⁵ Similar passages occur in the Avatamsakasūtra, T. 10, p. 266a, and T. 10, p. 596b.

The Tenth Cause: Severing Doubt

The sūtra says: Just as the world is surrounded by the large and small mountain ranges, so the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery is surrounded by all individual and common marks, in regard to which it is not confused.

The commentary explains:

This passage explains the mark of the wisdom of intellectual mastery as the cause for the severing of doubt. This world of Mt. Sumeru, its seven surrounding mountain ranges, the eight great seas, and the four continents is encircled and surrounded by an outer small range of mountains, whose total number reaches a thousand. And again these are all encircled and surrounded by the next mountain range. Such is called a small chiliocosm (sāhara cuḍiko-loka-dhātu), [i.e., one thousand such worlds all surrounded by their respective mountain ranges], because its number reaches a thousand. Furthermore, all these [small chiliocosms] are again encircled and surrounded by the next mountain range, and such is called a medium chiliocosm (dvi-sāhasra-loka-dhātu), [i.e., a thousand small chiliocosms all together], for their number reaches yet another thousand.

And all these are yet again encircled and surrounded by a great range of mountains, which is supported below by the great wheel of the wind.⁵³⁶ Such is called a great chiliocosm (tri-sāhasra-mahāsāhasro loka-dhātu), [i.e., one thousand of the medium chiliocosms, which contain one thousand of the small chiliocosms, which contain one thousand of worlds.] This is what the sūtra refers to in the phrase it is surrounded by the large and small mountain ranges.

In like fashion the Tathāgata's wisdom of intellectual mastery universally knows all individual and common marks and is able to sever all worldly doubts. The cause of doubt is confusion in regard to individual or common marks, but, because this wisdom lacks any such confusion, it understands these marks. And, because it itself has no doubts, it is able to sever the doubts of others.

Being separated from the obstacles of passion and knowledge, mirror wisdom is unconfused in regard to all individual and common marks, and is able to give rise to this wisdom [of intellectual mastery]. Because [mirror wisdom] supports and preserves this wisdom, this wisdom

⁵³⁶ 大風輪, mahā-vāyu-maṇḍala. The various world realms are all supported by the water wheel (jala-maṇḍala), which in turn is supported by the wheel of metal (kañcana-maṇḍala), and this upon the wind wheel, which rests on space.

of intellectual mastery is said to be surrounded.⁵³⁷

But, although mirror wisdom is able to know all individual and common marks, because it is non-discriminative, it is unable to enunciate the dharma teaching for others or to sever their doubts. But this wisdom of intellectual mastery is able to know [all these marks], and, because it is discriminative, it can enunciate the dharma teaching for all and sever their doubts. Furthermore, it is the very essence of this wisdom to know the individual and common marks of all dharmas, and it is surrounded by these two kinds of conditioned marks. The individual marks (svalakṣaṇa) are like the mountains of the small range, while the common marks (samānyalakṣaṇa) are like the mountains of the large range. Mirror wisdom is able to support this [knowing of the wisdom of intellectual mastery], just as from below the wind supports [the earth].

But, since [the wisdom of intellectual mastery] is supported by the direct insight (pratyakṣa) of the Tathāgata's pure wisdom, how is it able to

⁵³⁷ Following Śīlabhadra's text, punctuate the Chinese as follows: 大圓鏡智永離二障, 不覺一切自共相, 能生此智。

know the common marks of all dharmas? And, if these objects that are the common marks are known by direct insight, how then can the two means of cognition (pramāṇa) be held to be based upon the two kinds of marks?⁵³⁸

[There are three opinions.] The first holds that the two sources of true knowledge (pramāṇa) are established upon these two marks only in the fragmented mind, but that this does not refer to the state of samādhi. Even if the samādhi mind has all marks as object, [including the common marks], all are supported by direct insight (pratyakṣa).

The second opinion holds that the samādhi mind has as object only the individual marks. However, because it draws upon upāya from common marks, (318b) it also takes as object common marks.⁵³⁹

The truths thus manifested are then spoken by

⁵³⁸ According to Dignāga, direct perception (pratyakṣa) is the means of cognition which knows the individual marks of dharmas prior to any conceptualization or verbalization, whereas inference (anumāna) is that means of cognition that does verbally conceptualize direct insights to arrive at general judgments. Each means of cognition is defined by its respective object, for the svalakṣaṇa is object only of direct perception, while the samānya-lakṣaṇa is object only of inference.

⁵³⁹ There is little problem in admitting that wisdom knows individual marks, because such is prior to the conceptualization that can lead to parikalpita. But how can it know conceptualized common marks?

upāya, and are termed the knowledge of common marks. Otherwise, they would be termed knowledge of individual marks. It is from this reasoning that we say tathatā is the common mark of all dharmas, which are empty and without self, and that tathatā, as the manifestation of the two emptinesses [of dharmas and of self], is not their common mark.

The correct opinion differs only slightly from [the above second opinion of] that Treatise on Logic⁵⁴⁰ in regard to the establishment of individual and common marks. That work says that in paramārthasatya all dharmas are termed individual marks, because individual and common marks are each contained in their own essence and are not jointly shared with one another.⁵⁴¹ If the discriminative mind establishes a general category and is able to express its significance, it penetrates through all dharmas, just as one might string flowers together. Such [an object of understanding] is called the common mark,

⁵⁴⁰ 因明論, hetu-vidyā-śāstra, a general term used to refer to treatises on logic (因明). It perhaps is to be identified with Dignāga's Nyāyamukha, 因明正理門論 (T. 32, n. 1629), but I have been unable to find any exact parallel passages.

⁵⁴¹ Only the pre-conceptual svalakṣaṇa is actually real, paramārtha-sat, and not the samānyalakṣaṇa.

[because the truth it expresses is common to many individuals]. Thus it is that the discrimination of the fragmented mind conventionally establishes the objects of inferential thinking (anumāna-pramāṇa). But all samādhi minds are far apart from such discrimination, and [their understanding] is called direct perception (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa). Although [such samādhi minds] have as object the suffering⁵⁴² and impermanence, etc., of all dharmas, yet, because each one of these dharmas singly exists, they are said to be the individual marks [which are the objects of direct perception]. Therefore, tathatā, although it is expressed as a common mark, is the individual essence of all dharmas, is their individual, existing mark. It is not a common mark, [nor a general category], because one cannot say that it is either identical with or separated from all dharmas, i.e., with their common marks, and that is why it is called both a common mark and an individual mark. Thus, when that śāstra says that the paramārthasatya of all dharmas is termed their individual mark,

⁵⁴²Reading 苦 in place of 若 .

although it expresses itself differently than this Buddhabhūmisūtra, yet there is no contradiction.

PART TWO

CHAPTER SIX

The Wisdom of Duty Fulfillment

The sūtra says: Next, wondrously born ones, is the wisdom of duty fulfillment.

The commentary explains: Understand that the wisdom of duty fulfillment realizes the nirmāṇakāya of the Tathāgata, which is of three kinds: the transformation of the body (kāyanirmāṇa), the transformation of speech (vāgnirmāṇa), and the transformation of thought (manonirmāṇa).⁵⁴³ The first transformation of the body is again of three kinds: the transformation which manifests spiritual (ṛddhi) powers, the transformation which manifests the receiving of birth, and the transformation which manifests the results of karma. The transformation of speech also has three kinds: the transformation of encouraging (sampraharṣana) speech, the transformation of upāya speech, and the transformation of explanatory speech. The transformation of thought includes four kinds: the transformation of certain thought, the transformation of constructive

⁵⁴³The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter IX, verse 58, has: kāyavākciṭtanirmanaprayogopāyakarmakah, "Its action is the upāya that employs the transformations of body, speech, and thought." This verse is quoted in the Buddha-bhūmisūtra and commented upon in chapter seven of this commentary.

thought, the transformation of emergent thought,
and the transformation of the thought of experiencing.⁵⁴⁴

The wisdom of duty fulfillment is able to give rise to transforming activities in regard to these three actions [of body, speech, and thought], for the transformations of these three is nirmāṇa-kāya. You should understand that in these three transformations and by means of their activity, the essence [of wisdom] is manifested. It is not that these three transformations are themselves the essence of wisdom. Rather they are the images (nimittabhāga) which appear in wisdom. The pure consciousness associated with mirror wisdom, which develops in synergy with the dominant power of the wisdom of duty fulfillment, brings about this manifestation of the transforming activity of these three actions, and thus [the wisdom of duty fulfillment] is able to be manifested.

You should understand that each of the four wisdoms is able to give rise to all these activities. But, in their principal aspects, we say that equality wisdom gives rise to sambhogakāya, the

⁵⁴⁴ Each of these transformations identifies a following section of this chapter on the wisdom of duty fulfillment, and will be further explained there.

wisdom of duty fulfillment gives rise to nirmāṇa-kāya, the wisdom of intellectual mastery examines all individual and common (318c) marks, all dhāraṇī and samādhi practices, etc., and mirror wisdom is able to manifest all dharma images.⁵⁴⁵ Just as each of the senses grasps all objects, and yet none lack a principal activity, so it is [with the four wisdoms].

The words of this sūtra definitely demonstrate that the consciousness and the conscious states of the three actions all have a transformed state. All the characteristics of the gross consciousness and conscious states, which appear in the Tathāgata's wisdom, lead all those in inferior positions to be able to understand. Otherwise, how could Hīnayānists and worldlings (prthag-jana) be able to ever understand?

But, [it might be objected], if the characteristics of this consciousness and these conscious states, which are present to the Tathāgata, are differentiated, then how can the Tathāgata long since have realized Buddhahood? And how could he be able to manifest various nirmāṇakāya, which are characterized by covetousness, anger, etc.?

⁵⁴⁵The Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "Equality wisdom manifests parasambhoga-kāya, and the wisdom of duty fulfillment manifests the nirmāṇakāya of the three actions." (Wei Tat, p. 798; Poussin, p. 709).

But another sūtra does say: "He transforms immeasurable kinds [of nirmāṇakāya] in such a way that they are conscious." And it is further said: "Nirmāṇakāya is said to be conscious and not to be conscious. This is because it has a consciousness dependent upon another (paratantra-citta), but does not have a consciousness that depends upon itself." This means that his transformation of consciousness (cittanirmāṇa) is manifested in dependency on his ultimate consciousness (paramārtha-citta). However, the image aspect (nimittabhāga) of his real mind appears as having the activities of thought. It is just as in a mirror fire does not have a separate substance, but arises in dependency upon a multitude of causes.

Although we say that the consciousnesses and the conscious states of others have no direct relationship with his transformed mind, because it has no real function [in their regard], in truth his transformed consciousness and transformed form (rūpa) do have a real function in their regard, because that [consciousness functions] like actual form (rūpa), and thus we say that it has [such a real function]. Because the manifestations of the gross marks of such a transformation of consciousness is easy to understand, even apes and monkeys know the Tathāgata's mind. If it were

the real mind of Buddha [that was manifested], then even the great bodhisattvas would be unable to understand it.⁵⁴⁶

The First Transformation: Spiritual Powers

The sūtra says: Just as, because of the efficacious, physical actions of sentient beings, they seek various profitable endeavours, take up farming, or enter the king's⁵⁴⁷ service, and so forth, just so, because of the actions of the efficacious transformations of physical action of the Tathāgata's wisdom of duty fulfillment, he manifests various skillful endeavours to suppress all cleverness and conceit in sentient beings, and thus, because of his very skillful upāya power, he leads all sentient beings and causes them to enter the sacred teachings and mature unto liberation.

⁵⁴⁶This argument alludes to the objection that, since Buddha knows the minds of others, he knows an external object, and thus all is not consciousness only. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi explains that the mind of another is not the immediate object of consciousness, for when the mind of another arises in one's own consciousness, it has no real function therein. One understands that mind, inasmuch as consciousness develops an image that is similar to it, just as the images of external things appear in a mirror. (Wei Tat, p. 522; Poussin, p. 430). Thus, just as one's own consciousness perceives the consciousnesses of others through the mediation of a inner engendered image, so sentient beings perceive the mind of Buddha through the mediation of the nirmāṇa-kāya he brings about.

⁵⁴⁷The commentary has 王, but the Chinese text of the Buddhabhūmisūtra has 王. The Tibetan text of the sūtra has rgyal, king, but Śīlabhadra has bzo, silpa, 王.

The commentary explains: This passage explains the action of the transformation of the body, which consists in the transformation that manifests spiritual powers. Because they cause the mind to venture forth (abhyutsāha), they are called efficacious (vyāvāma). Because of this developing, efficacious action, zeal (vīrya) is attained by those of good lineage, while diligent practice is attained by others. This is why such action is called efficacious. Because of this action of [Buddha's] bodies, sentient beings in the world practice the three correct actions [of body, speech, and thought]. The phrase and so forth indicates any kind of such endeavours. The wisdom of duty fulfillment, in association with zeal (vīrya), gives rise to the action of the transformation body. Because of this transformation of action, when one becomes a bodhisattva, he manifests various kinds of skillful endeavours,⁵⁴⁸ just as a craftsman might. In this wisdom the marks of physical actions are manifested, because he desires to suppress cleverness and conceit. He manifests such very skillful upāya, because in the path where one becomes aware of the equality between compassion and wisdom, he first

⁵⁴⁸ 工巧等處, bzohi-qnas, śilpa-sthāna, the works of skillful craft. It would thus seem that both commentarial texts consider the original sūtra to have referred to crafts, and not to service for the king, even although the Tibetan sūtra mentions the king (rgyal).

manifests spiritual powers (rddhi). Because he first causes beings to give rise to faith, the sūtra says that he leads beings and causes them to enter the sacred teachings, just as by manifesting his spiritual powers, he saved Kāśyapa, and (319a) so forth.⁵⁴⁹ And, because he has the profound ability (karmanya) to lead them to become docile, the text says that he matures them. Because he leads both those of lineage and those of no lineage to be liberated from the triple world and from evil destinies, the text says they are liberated.⁵⁵⁰ Because of the transforming power (avavāḍabala) of his teachings, those [of lineage] are caused to give rise to the holy path and to be liberated from the triple world, while those of no lineage are caused to cultivate worldly good and to be constantly reborn in good destinies. Being attentive to their good roots in order to speak the true dharma teaching to them, he causes [those of lineage] to be liberated from the triple world. Assuaging suffering

⁵⁴⁹ 迦葉等, Nadi Kāśyapa, one of the early disciples of the Buddha.

⁵⁵⁰ Śīlabhadra reads: rnam-par-grol-bar mdsad-pa ni khams gsum-pa dan nan-son las te, "Liberation means [liberation] from the triple world and from evil destinies." The distinction between those of lineage and those of no lineage is introduced by Bandhuprabha in accord with his opinion of the reality of the dharmatā as being composed of the five lineages (pañca-gotra). Those of no lineage (agotra) will never attain liberation, and the best they can hope for is constant birth in good destinies.

by emitting his brilliant light, he establishes [those of no lineage] in good destinies.

By another interpretation the three actions of causing them to enter the sacred teachings, to mature, and to be liberated mean that he causes them to give rise to the hearing of the dharma teaching (śrutavāsanā), the reflecting upon that teaching, and the cultivation of wisdom.

Another interpretation holds that these three actions mean that he causes them to give rise to the elements conducive to liberation,⁵⁵¹ the elements conducive to insight,⁵⁵² and then to give rise to the holy path.

By yet another interpretation, these three mean that he causes them to enter the path of insight, the path of

⁵⁵¹ 順解脫分, mokṣa-bhāgīya, the elements conducive to liberation, i.e., stages preparatory to liberation. In Yogācāra this is equated with saṃbhāravasthā-mārga, the first stage of the fivefold holy path, in which spiritual equipment (saṃbhāra) conducive to bodhi is cultivated. See Viññaptimatratāsiddhi, Wei Tat, p. 668; Poussin, p. 565.

⁵⁵² 順決擇分, nirvedha-bhāgīya, elements conducive to insight, i.e., the stage of practicing the four penetrations (nirvedha), which lead to bodhi. This is equated with prayogavasthā-mārga. See the Viññaptimatratāsiddhi, Wei Tat, p. 678; Poussin, p. 576. The first two stages of the Yogācāra path system are preparatory, for it is only at the third stage of darśana-mārga that insight into emptiness occurs.

practice, and the path of no-training.⁵⁵³

These three interpretations explain the marks of these three actions in these various manners.

The Second Transformation: Receiving of Birth

The sūtra says: Just as, because sentient beings experience bodily actions, they experience the objects of various forms, etc., just so, because the Tathāgata's wisdom of duty fulfillment experiences transformed bodily actions, the Tathāgata goes to all the various places where sentient beings are born, adopts their life form, and dwells in an honored position among them. Because he thus adopts their life style, he supports all kinds of sentient beings. Thus, because of his very skillful upāya power, he leads all sentient beings and causes them to enter the sacred teachings and mature unto liberation.

The commentary explains: This passage explains the action of the transformation of the body, which consists in the transformation that manifests the receiving of birth.

Because, wherever they are born in the world, sentient beings experience the objects of form,

⁵⁵³The path of insight (darśana-mārga) and the path of practice (bhāvanā-mārga) are respectively the third and fourth stages of the path. Aśaikṣa is the stage where no training remains to be performed, i.e., the fifth and final stage (niṣṭhāvasthā-mārga).

by means of their senses, the sūtra uses the term experience. Because their bodies are constantly active, the sūtra refers to bodily action.⁵⁵⁴

In all places of birth and at all times the wisdom of duty fulfillment manifests births and experiences objects. This means that it manifests nirmāṇakāya in all places among gods and men. It manifests a birth of the same kind as those among whom it dwells, whether they be kṣatriya or brahman class. [In all these births, Buddha] supports all lower classes, and brings benefit and happiness to them. The manifestations of the bodily actions of this wisdom, whether in synergy with mirror wisdom, or manifested by its own [power], are all to be understood in this manner in the following passages.

The Third Transformation: Manifesting the Results of Karma

The sūtra says: Just as, because sentient beings experience bodily actions, they experience the good and evil results of what they do, just so, because the Tathāgata's wisdom of duty fulfillment experiences transformed bodily actions, the Tathāgata manifests

⁵⁵⁴Punctuate after 受用, and before 身. The Taishō punctuation after 受用身 would attribute sambhogakāya to sentient beings.

and experiences all the practices that were difficult to cultivate in former times and in former births. Thus, because of his very skillful upāya power, he leads all sentient beings and causes them to enter the sacred teachings, and mature unto liberation.

The commentary explains: This passage explains the action of the transformation of the body, which consists in the transformation that manifests the results of karma. Because it is the body that acts, the text uses the term bodily actions. Because these are the results of previous actions, the word results implies the presence of a cause. Or perhaps, when the body experiences (319b) the results of previous actions, because it has constant activity, the text employs the term bodily actions (kāyakaṛman). Because of these bodily actions, we experience the results of love and hatred that flow from those previous actions.

The wisdom of duty fulfillment, in manifesting nirmāṇakāya, experiences bodily action, and because of this action, it manifests and experiences everything. In the phrase all the practices that were difficult to cultivate in prior times and in prior births, prior times (purva-yoga) refer to all the affairs associated with former ages, while prior births refer to the different births in these former ages. As the

Vessantara-jātaka and the other Jātakas explain, all former times depend upon those former births. The various practices of asceticism (tapas) that were formerly cultivated are here termed the practices that were difficult to cultivate. Or perhaps these practices difficult to cultivate refer to the practices whereby the nirmāṇakāya of this present age, [i.e., the historical Buddha], attained bodhi by first practicing asceticism and then abandoning such practices.⁵⁵⁵ This means that, because all sentient beings imagine that the practice of asceticism will put a stop to evil and give rise to good, and that this is the method to attain bodhi, in transforming them, [Buddha] at first manifests and cultivates practices of asceticism. Then in order to show that it is not just by practices of morality (śīla) that one attains purity, he manifests the method of attaining bodhi by the abandonment of asceticism, because purity is attained by the method of samādhi and wisdom. As a sūtra says: "At the time of the Buddha Kāśyapa, the Tathāgata Maitreya uttered this admonishment: Oh, monks, where is mahābodhi in the reception of the tonsure? Supreme bodhi is indeed

⁵⁵⁵For an account of the historical career of Śākyamuni in first attempting harsh, ascetical practices, and then abandoning them, see Richard Robinson, The Buddhist Religion, pp. 16-17.

difficult to attain." Because of this criticism [of asceticism], we now perceive what the result of asceticism (tapas) is. These words are meant to put a stop to asceticism and to manifest his transforming activity. If this were not so, then how could Maitreya,⁵⁵⁶ who had already showed reverence (pariyupās) to immeasurable Tathāgatas and nurtured all good roots, in remembering the former births of his original nature,⁵⁵⁷ have uttered such a weighty and disagreeable criticism (aprasādikā). You should understand that these words are intended to transform and save, because those who, by listening to these words will attain salvation, are led by these words to abstain [from asceticism].

The Fourth Transformation: Encouraging Speech

The sūtra says: Just as, because of the action of encouraging speech, sentient beings draw out their discussions and encourage one another, just so, because of the transformed action of the encouraging speech of the Tathāgata's wisdom of duty fulfillment, the Tathāgata pleasingly declares various kinds of dharma teaching, which accord joy, and the skillful wonders of his scriptures and meanings. When those of little wisdom first

⁵⁵⁶ 繫屬一生菩薩, eka-jāti-pratibaddha, i.e., Maitreya, who has one birth remaining, that of his coming as the next Buddha.

⁵⁵⁷ 性憶宿命, raṇ-bshin-gyis tshe-rabs dran-pa, i.e., prakṛti-jāti-smara. The Chinese has omitted 本 of 本性, because it is included in the above phrase 善本.

hear, they respectfully believe. Thus, because of his very skillful upāya power, he leads all sentient beings to enter the sacred teachings and mature unto liberation.

The commentary explains: This passage explains the action of the transformation of speech, which consists in the transformation of encouraging speech. The term encouraging means that this speech, which is selected to bring joy, is able to bring about [such joy], because, upon hearing such words, one develops and elicits great joy.

This means that, because of the dominant power of the minds of sentient beings, which develop speech, the marks of speech appear in each of their individual consciousnesses as the dominant, enabling cause (adhipatipratyaya), and cause the minds of others to develop the appearing marks of speech. [They encourage one another], because when each one hears the words of another, he gives rise to joy.

The transforming speech of the wisdom of duty fulfillment (319c) must be understood in the same fashion, for it itself manifests wondrous sounds and causes the minds of others to be transformed. This means that, upon hearing the Buddha's speech, they give rise to joy. The phrase the dharma

teaching, which accords joy means that, men, gods, and all in the Three Vehicles, hearing in joy according to the power of that cause, discern the dharma teaching.

The phrase the skillful wonders of his scriptures means that his writings manifest beauty and bring about joyful hearing.

The phrase the skillful wonders of his meaning means that those meanings, being truly reasoned and clear, are easy to understand.

The phrase when sentient beings of little wisdom first hear, they respectfully believe means that the Buddha's utterances are endowed with the sixty merits.⁵⁵⁸ Since when even those of foolish wisdom come to hear it, they give rise to faith and understanding, how much more so would those of intelligence do so? This wisdom of duty fulfillment is said to be encouraging, because it is able to manifest transformed speech and proclaim all skillful, wondrous scriptures and meanings, and give rise to a joyful mind in sentient beings. It is able to confer good and manifest all varieties, because the Buddha's voice proclaims the deep dharma teaching that is

⁵⁵⁸ 六十德, i.e., 六十種聲, ṣaṣṭyākāra-vāg, the sixty kinds of inconceivable speech treated in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, chapter VI, verse 63.

difficult to fathom. Thus this wisdom is able to confer these other things also. In all treatises, in all kinds of forms, and even in empty space, it is able to elicit and give rise to the enunciation of dharma teaching by the transformation of speech. Know then that this wisdom is inconceivable.⁵⁵⁹

The Fifth Transformation: Upāya Speech

The sūtra says: Just as, because of the upāya speech of sentient beings, they indicate and attend to the task of summoning one another to destroy evil and praise good, just so, because of the transformed action of the upāya speech that arises from the Tathāgata's wisdom of duty fulfillment, the Tathāgata establishes the correct rules of learning to destroy all madness and praise all sanity. Furthermore, he establishes some according to the practice of faith, and others according to the practice of dharma. Thus, because of his very skillful upāya, he leads all sentient beings to enter the sacred teachings and mature unto liberation.

The commentary explains: This passage explains the action of the transformation of speech, which consists in the transformation of upāya speech. It is just like

⁵⁵⁹The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter XII, verse 4, has: āgamato adhiḡgamato vibhutvato deśanāgrasatvānam/ mukhato rupatsarvakaśāduccaranata'pi, "The teaching of superior beings comes from scripture, understanding, and mastery. It issues forth from the mouth, from all things, and from space."

the teachings associated with upāya speech in the world, which manifest all that must be done and all that must be left undone in order to benefit dear friends. It is because its efforts arise in regard to sentient beings who are crazy with passion (pramāda) that it is called upāya. In like fashion, because of his great compassion, the Tathāgata establishes the rules of learning for sentient beings in order to cause them to suppress all evil and cultivate all worldly good. By establishing such differences in the stages of the holy path, he causes them to enter that correct path and transcend the triple world. The wisdom of duty fulfillment is able to develop such transformed speech and carry through to completion its tasks. This means that the stopping of evil and the development of all good is the function of this kind of speech.

The Sixth Transformation: Explanatory Speech

The sūtra says: Just as, because of the explanatory speech of sentient beings, they develop explanations for meanings that are not understood, and clarify all treatises, just so, because of the transformed explanatory speech of the Tathāgata's wisdom of duty fulfillment, he severs the immeasurable doubts of all sentient beings. Thus because of his very skillful upāya, he leads all sentient beings and causes them to enter the sacred

teachings and mature unto liberation. (320a)

The commentary explains: This passage explains the action of the transformation of speech, which consists in the transformation of explanatory speech. According to the differences in the thinking and dispositions of sentient beings, the wisdom of duty fulfillment manifests the action of such transformed speech. [The Buddha] enunciates various meanings and severs all doubt. This means that, in uttering one sound, he expresses all meanings, and all sentient beings obtain benefit as appropriate to each. As a sūtra says: "Buddha by means of one sound, explains all meanings, and sentient beings attain understanding, as appropriate to each, whether they be fearful or joyous, whether they are troubled (samvijante) or have severed their doubts."⁵⁶⁰ This transformed speech, which is evolved from the inconceivable power of the Tathāgata's original vow, in one sound is able to sever all doubt. The creating of nirmāṇakāya is also able to enable sentient beings to see in the same image different [meanings that] complete benefit and happiness.

⁵⁶⁰The Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra has: "Buddha by means of one sound explains the dharma teaching, and sentient beings, according to their level of understanding, all receive that action and obtain benefit. This is the uncommon power of his spiritual powers." (T. 14, p. 538a).

The Seventh Transformation: The Thought of Certitude

The sūtra says: Again, just as, because of the truly certain thoughts of sentient beings, they are certain as to what can be done and what cannot be done, just so, because of the transformed certain thought of the Tathāgata's wisdom of duty fulfillment, he has certain knowledge of the eighty-four thousand different mental activities of sentient beings. Because of his very skillful upāya power, he leads all sentient beings and causes them to enter the sacred teachings and mature unto liberation.

The commentary explains: This passage explains the transformation of thought, which consists in the transformation of the thought of certitude. Because the thought associated with the wisdom of duty fulfillment is able to give rise to this transformation, the sūtra says it is the action of transformed thought. This wisdom is able to have certain knowledge of the differences in the eighty four-thousand mental activities of the sentient beings to be converted.

Or perhaps it is that the images of transformed thought, which appear in the image aspect (nimittabhāga) of this wisdom, are able to have the certain knowledge of the eighty-four thousand mental activities, and [these images] cause it

to understand and attain the benefit of para-mārthasatya.

What are these eighty-four thousand mental activities? They are the differences in the seething mind (cittaśrānta) of the eighty-four thousand defiled objects of the wearisome mental activities of sentient beings, which are able to hinder the eighty-four thousand pāramitās, dhāraṇīs, samādhis, etc. The Hsien-chüeh-ching⁵⁶¹ elucidates their marks from the first cultivation of the pāramitās until the last pāramitā, which manifests Buddha body,⁵⁶² and thus three hundred and fifty [samādhis and dhāraṇīs] are each endowed with the six pāramitās. Thus we arrive at two thousand and one hundred, which regulate the eighty-four hundred mental activities of craving, anger, delusion, etc. of sentient beings. But these exclude the four great elements [of earth, water, fire, and wind], and the six faults that arise from inadvertence. Therefore by multiplying by ten, we arrive at eighty-four thousand. By cultivating these one attains

⁵⁶¹ 賢劫經, Hsien-chüeh-ching. (T. 14, pp. 1-66). No Sanskrit original exists, but Chinese and Tibetan translations are extant. As stated, it treats the varieties of samādhi, etc.

⁵⁶² Reading the alternate 身 for 體.

perfection in the eighty four thousand dhāraṇīs and samādhis. But all this is simply a summary for what is immeasurable. (320b)

The Eighth Transformation: Constructive Thought

The sūtra says: Just as, because of the constructive thought of sentient beings, they bring forth all kinds of emergent actions, just so, because of the transformed action of the transformed constructive thought of the Tathāgata's wisdom of duty fulfillment, he examines all the actions which sentient beings might do and what they should do and should leave undone. And he constructs rules to cause them to choose that which they should do and abandon what they should omit. Thus, because of his very skillful upāya power, he leads all sentient beings and causes them to enter the sacred teachings and mature unto liberation.

The commentary explains: This passage explains the transformation of thought, which consists in the transformation of constructive thought. In examining all the actions of sentient beings, if evil actions are not done, then there will be benefit.⁵⁶³ But, if they are done, there will be loss. And, if good actions are done, there will be benefit.⁵⁶³ But, if they are not done,

⁵⁶³ Reading the alternate 德 for 得, as attested by the Tibetan yon-tan, benefit.

there will be loss. He thus examines, because he desires to lead them to choose the benefit and abandon the loss. In regard to their benefit, he constructs and supports the rules of morality (pratimokṣa). In regard to their loss, he constructs the rules of abstaining. Because the thought associated with the wisdom of duty fulfillment is able to give rise to such transformations, it is called the action of transformed thought. Although all Tathāgatas in all things lack effort, yet they cause the minds of sentient beings to develop transformed images that construct [such good morality]. Therefore their thought is called constructive.

Or perhaps the transformed thought images, which appear in the image aspect (nimittabhāga) of this wisdom, enable them to examine the benefit or loss of all the actions of all sentient beings, and cause them to understand how to attain the benefit of paramāṛthasatya.

The Ninth Transformation: Emergent Thought

The sūtra says: Again, because of the emergent thought of sentient beings, they bring about all their actions, just so, because of the action of the transformed thought of the Tathāgata's wisdom of duty fulfillment, because he desires to proclaim the rules of discipline to them, he manifests to them that corpus

of names, phrases, and words that bring about joy.
Thus, because of his very skillful upāya power,
he leads all sentient beings and causes them to enter
the sacred teachings and mature unto liberation.

The commentary explains: This passage explains the action of the transformation of thought, which consists in the transformation of emergent thought. The thought associated with the wisdom of duty fulfillment is able to give rise to the two actions of the body and speech. Inasmuch as it employs speech, the sūtra terms it emergent thought. Or perhaps, because this thought emerges from wisdom, it is called emergent thought, because it is able to give rise to such a transformation, or because the images, which appear in the image aspect (nimittabhāga) of this wisdom take the appearance of speech. This wisdom transforms thought, because it desires to proclaim the rules of discipline for sentient beings, because it enunciates these rules for all their actions. Since the essence of this enunciated dharma teaching is the corpus of names, phrases, and words, it manifests such a corpus of names, phrases, and words. In speaking of this corpus according to the dispositions of sentient beings, the Tathāgata causes them to desire to elicit the rules of discipline. Thus this transformed thought, which appears in the image aspect of the Tathāgata's

wisdom of duty fulfillment, develops the corpus of names, etc., and proclaims to sentient beings the rules of (320c) discipline for all actions. Because of this power, he causes the minds of all sentient beings to themselves transform in these images, and the profundity of that dharma spoken by Buddha gives rise to the desire to elicit the rules of discipline. Thus it is called emergent thought.

The Tenth Transformation: The Thought of Experience

The sūtra says: Just as, because of the thought of the experiences of sentient beings, they give rise to the experiences of suffering and happiness, just so, because of the transformed action of the experiential thought of the Tathāgata's wisdom of duty fulfillment, because he declares things by means of fixed words, words that are not fixed, returning the question, and the silent answer, he makes known the meanings of the past, the future, and the present, as appropriate at each instant. Thus, because of his very skillful upāya power, he leads all sentient beings and causes them to enter the sacred teachings and mature unto liberation.

The commentary explains: This passage explains the action of the transformation of thought, which consists in the transformation of experiential thought.

Because the thought associated with experience can move the mind to experience suffering or happiness, the sūtra calls it experiential thought. Because the thought associated with the wisdom of duty fulfillment can give rise to its transformation, it is called the action of transformed thought. Also, because this transformed thought is realized in the image aspect (nimittabhāga), it is called the action of transformed thought. Because it declares (ādis) and answers according to the four kinds of responses (catvāraḥ praśna - vyākaraṇā), it truly understands all questions as appropriate to each questioner. It makes known the meaning of immeasurable dharma teachings in the three times and understands them as they really are. Already knowing the essence of each thing as it really is, its declarations in regard to each thing are unfailing.

The four kinds of responses are: the direct answer (akāṁśa-vyākaraṇā), the distinguishing answer (vibhajya-vyākaraṇā), the returning of the question (pariprccha-vyākaraṇā), and the silent answer (sthāpanīya-vyākaraṇā). The direct answer is aimed at questions such as: Is it certain that all beings will be destroyed? or: Why are the Jewels of Buddha, Dharma, and Saṃgha a rich field? Such questions [Buddha] answers

directly and their meaning is fixed. The distinguishing answer is directed to questions such as: Will not all that is destroyed certainly arise again? or: Is it not true that there is only one jewel of Buddha, Dharma, and Saṃgha? Such questions [Buddha] answers by distinguishing, and their meaning is not fixed. The returning of the question is directed to questions such as: Are the bodhisattvas in the ten bhūmis ranked in degree? or: Are the Jewels of Buddha, Dharma, and Saṃgha pre-eminent or inferior? Such questions [Buddha] answers by returning the question: What is it that you expect from such a question? The silent answer is directed to questions such as: Is the real substance of the self good or evil? or: Is the color of the child of a sterile woman (vandhyā-putra) black or white? Questions such as these receive a silent answer, because they deserve no answer and are the utmost of foolishness (prapañca).

You should understand that among these three kinds of transformations [of body, speech, and thought], the actions of the transformations of body and speech are either associated with one's own body or with the bodies of others, or they are not associated with the one or the other. But the actions of the transformation of

thought are always associated with either one's own self or others.⁵⁶⁴

Thus there are three kinds of spiritual transformation (rddhinirmāṇa): the transformation of spiritual powers (rddhi), the transformation of instructions (ādeśanā), and the transformation of precepts.⁵⁶⁵

These transformed actions of Buddha in all their varieties are constantly and consistently inconceivable. Because these activities, their numbers, and their lands are inconceivable, his actions that benefit sentient beings are ceaseless and their emergence (pravṛtti) is inconceivable. (321a) These three kinds of transformed action of all Tathāgātās [come about] because they place first their desire to mature sentient beings.

And therefore they are called the utmost upāya skill.

⁵⁶⁴For a fuller discussion of this theme, see p. 838-840.

⁵⁶⁵The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra has: "All Buddhas and bodhisattvas in sum have the august power of three kinds of spiritual transformations. The first is comprised in the spiritual transformation of spiritual objects. The second is comprised in the spiritual transformation of precepts. And the third is comprised in the spiritual transformation of instructions. Understand that [Buddha] supports and enters into the august power of these three spiritual transformations, as appropriate to each. These refer to his august power of wisely penetrating spiritual objects, his august power of wisely penetrating the differences of mind [of sentient beings], and of the august power of wisely penetrating the exhaustion of contamination." (T. 30, p. 496b).

It is thus that a sūtra says: "The Buddha Bhagavan is called the joy of great wisdom, because he is able to uproot all the ills of passion."⁵⁶⁶

⁵⁶⁶ Similar passages occur in the Avatamsakasūtra, T. 9, p. 623a, and T. 10, p. 272a, as well as in the 如來興顯經, T. 10, p. 600a.

PART THREE

THE PRACTICE BASED ON THE TEACHING

CHAPTER ONE: The Experience of Wisdom

The sūtra says: Then, those wondrously born bodhisattvas spoke to Buddha, and said: Bhagavan, is it only the Tathāgata in pure dharmadhātu who experiences this phenomenal wisdom all of one taste? Or can bodhisattvas also be able to experience it? The Buddha addressed those wondrously born bodhisattvas: You can also experience this phenomenal wisdom all of one taste.

The commentary explains: This is a question about the experience of that phenomenal wisdom all of one taste. When the Buddha realm (Buddhabhūmi) was discussed earlier, it was only said that the essence of the Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu was all of one taste. But, because the Buddha's mirror wisdom and the other wisdoms in that realm all experience that one unified taste and are without movement or activity, those wondrously born bodhisattvas doubt that it is only Tathāgatas [who experience that one taste of wisdom], and thus penetratingly they ask this question.

Or perhaps, as explained above, these five dharmas

comprise the realm of great wisdom (mahābodhibhūmi). The essence of pure dharmadhātu is of one taste only. Because mirror wisdom depends upon this and takes this [dharmadhātu] as its object and thus gives rise to non-discrimination, it is also of one mark only. Equality wisdom, also having tathatā as its object and being apart from the discrimination of subject and object, is also of one mark only. Since the other two wisdoms, in order to benefit others, also rely on tathatā and lack any differentiation or discrimination, they also are of one mark only. Therefore, if only Buddha experienced this phenomenal wisdom all of one unified taste, then [such wisdom] would have no relationship (yoga) with others. Because they want to settle this question, they ask: Since it is in pure dharmadhātu that this phenomenal wisdom all of one unified taste is realized, [as stated in the sūtra], does this imply that others lack the experience of this wisdom all of one unified taste?

Because they are able to experience that which is to be experienced, i.e., the object realm of tathatā of one unified taste, the text uses the term experience. It is unified, because all its common [marks] come together into one. Although that unity may become differentiated so as to become manifested, yet in [the pure

[realm] it is constantly undifferentiated.⁵⁶⁷ Again it is said that, because, being equal in regard to subject and object, it unites both, it is ultimately unified and not differentiated. Taste means the inner essence,⁵⁶⁸ i.e., the one taste that takes dharmadhātu-tathatā as the object of its experience. Phenomenal means phenonemal activity. Wisdom means that wisdom which, being able to experience, correctly holds to mirror wisdom, equality wisdom, and the other two, because in various manners it has tathatā as object.

Or perhaps one taste means the ability to experience

⁵⁶⁷ Śīlabhadra reads: gcig-du gyur kyañ res-hgañ tha-dad du bya-ba yod na de ni nams kyañ tha-dad du bya-ba med-pas ñe-bar-hdres-pa ste, "Even although it is one, yet it may become differentiated for a time, and yet certainly, because it is not differentiated, it is unified (upamiśra)." (Nishio, Buddhabhūmi-vyākhyāna, p. 113). Bandhuprabha has apparently added the phrase 為顯 to give the reason for its differentiation and 於中 to emphasize that its essence is undifferentiated. Thus I punctuate the Chinese as follows: 雖同一事或復離別為顯。於中常不離別故。

⁵⁶⁸ 堅實, sñiñ-pa, sāra, the inner core or pith of anything, and thus firmness, strength, power, energy, the essential part of anything. Rasa 味, taste, also means the best part of anything, the essence or marrow, as the sap or juice of plants or fruit. It seems that its meaning of taste is derived from this meaning. Therefore it would appear that the above passage is, in fact, giving the basic meaning of taste (rasa) as the inner essence (sāra), i.e., the best part. The inner essence or the best part of wisdom is that it is structured by having dharmadhātupariśuddhi as its object.

the non-discrimination of wisdom. And phenomenal refers to its result, because it arises by having pure dharmadhātu as object.⁵⁶⁹

Or perhaps, because this ability to experience is indifferent to all sensations (vedanā-upekṣa) and remains equally the same in the face of either suffering or happiness, the sūtra uses the term one taste. And phenomenal then refers to its result, i.e., this state of indifference, which is associated with mirror wisdom and the other wisdoms. Because that [phenomenal nature of wisdom] arises from this power [of indifference], we call it the result.

Or perhaps, because it is indifferent to all karmic actions (saṃskāra-upekṣa), it lacks the marks of purposeful activity, and in all (321b) places emerges as one taste. Because [such a consciousness] is able to experience this wisdom, the sūtra uses the term phenomenal wisdom.

⁵⁶⁹In the Tibetan translation of the Buddhabhūmisūtra there is no parallel for the term 事, and thus the Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna has no commentary relating to it. In this section that commentary reads: yañ na ye-śes de ñid ro gcig-pa yin te/ rnam-par-mi-rtoq-paḥi phyir ro// chos-kyi-dbyiñs kyi hbras-bu yañ yin te/ de la dmigs-nas skye-baḥi phyir ro, "Further, because this wisdom is non-discriminative, it is truly of one taste. It is the result of dharmadhātu, because it arises with that as its object." (Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 113). Bandhuprabha has re-arranged the text and made the phenomenal nature of wisdom the result of non-discrimination, i.e., the non-discrimination of nirvāṇa and saṃsāra is the phenomenal nature of wisdom.

Or perhaps, because wisdom is itself able to experience its own essence, the term experience is used. And because it lacks the two discriminations of self and others, it is said to be of one taste. Its phenomenal nature is the result, because it constantly emerges apart from these two [discriminating] thoughts.

This sūtra explains that bodhisattvas also are able to experience this wisdom. But if bodhisattvas are also able to experience it, then why does the sūtra say that these five dharmas comprise the realm of great wisdom (mahābodhibhūmi), [which is the ultimate realm of Tathāgatas]?

The sūtra does say that the Buddha realm is comprised solely of these five dharmas, but it does not say that they comprise only that Buddha realm, for they are able to comprise also all the realms of bodhisattvas.

The sutra says: Then those wondrously born bodhisattvas addressed Buddha, and said: Which bodhisattvas experience this phenomenal wisdom all of one unified taste? The Buddha addressed those wondrously born ones: Those bodhisattvas who have realized the patience that dharmas do not arise (anupattika-dharma-kṣānti), because they dwell in this dharma teaching of no birth, when they attain the understanding of this patience, will gain mastery over the two [discriminative] thoughts.

And because they have banished these two thoughts of self and others, they will attain the mind of equality (samatācitta). From this point the differentiating thoughts of self and others will never again occur to those bodhisattvas, and they will experience the phenomenal wisdom all of one unified taste.

The commentary explains:

In order to show the difference between those bodhisattvas who have attained the Mahāyāna patience that dharmas are not born ⁵⁷⁰ and those bodhisattvas who, dwelling in the stage of intensified effort (prayogāvasthā), have not yet experienced the phenomenal wisdom all of one unified taste, the wondrously born bodhisattvas again ask: Which bodhisattvas experience this phenomenal wisdom all of one unified taste?

The phrase those bodhisattvas who have attained the patience that dharmas are not born refers to those bodhisattvas from the first pramuditābhūmi, who have realized tathatā, which is manifested by the two emptinesses [of dharmas and of self]. They have seen that the imagined (parikalpita) nature of all dharmas is

⁵⁷⁰ 無生法忍, anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti, i.e., the realization that no dharmas are ever born, that both dharmas and self are empty, and the consequent patience to abide in the world with such awareness.

neither born nor destroyed. [They have seen] the purity of the original nature and the nirvāṇa that is the essence.⁵⁷¹ Thus they experience this phenomenal wisdom all of one unified taste.

This [insight] is different from that of the path of insight (darśanamārga) of the Two Vehicles, which does realize the tathatā manifested by the emptiness of birth (jāta-sūnyatā) [i.e., the emptiness of self], but does not realize tathatā, manifested by the emptiness of dharmas (dharmasūnyatā), and is not yet able to see the equality of all dharmas nor to experience the phenomenal wisdom all of one unified taste. Bodhisattvas, who have not entered the ten bhūmis, are also unable to realize this wisdom, because they have not yet seen tathatā, and that equality wisdom of one unified taste has not yet appeared to them.

⁵⁷¹ Bandhuprabha has reworked this passage in accord with the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: "It is in relation to the three natures that the three anutpattikakṣānti arise: the patience of the non-arising of the original nature (prakṛtyanutpattikakṣānti). [i.e., that parikalpita is originally non-arising], the patience of the non-arising of spontaneity (svayamanutpattikakṣānti), [i.e., that paratantra does not arise], and the patience of the non-arising of passion and suffering (kleśaduhkhānutpattikakṣānti), [i.e., the final non-arising of all samsaric suffering that is pariniṣpanna]." (Wei Tat, p. 648; Poussin, p. 546).

According to one opinion, there are three kinds of bodhisattvas in the ten bhūmis. The first are those who have begun to elicit the aspiration for bodhi. These are those, who in the first pramuditābhūmi, have already entered the path of insight (darśanamārga) and see that their true nature is unborn, because their true uncontaminated minds are engaged in practice. The second are those who have already cultivated practice. These are those who, in the first six bhūmis, have already attained the path of practice (bhāvanāmārga), because they have progressed in the practice [of meditation]. The third are those who have attained the stage of no returning (avaivartika). These are those who, above the first three bhūmis, have already perfected the path of practice (bhāvanāmārga), who are apart from all effort (ayatna-vāhitva) and beyond the path of intensified effort (prayogāvasthāmārga), for, dwelling effortlessly in the sixth abhimukhībhūmi, all passion will never again arise [for them], (321c) because from moment to moment their progress is irreversible. Among these, only those who have attained the eighth acalābhūmi realize that all dharmas originally are not born and do not arise. Only these attain the universal purity of this superior wisdom of patience. They constantly give rise to uncontaminated [purity] and effortlessly

appear. Because they have attained this state, the sūtra says that they have realized the patience that dharmas do not arise.⁵⁷² As a sūtra says: "In the eighth bhūmi, all bodhisattvas are apart from thoughts of dharmas." Lacking [thoughts of] I and Mine, they see that all dharmas are neither eternal nor impermanent, are not born, and do not arise. They see the equality of self and others. This means that they attain the effortless control of the two thoughts and realize the mind of equality in regard to everything, because from this [bhūmi] they are free from these two thoughts, because they are free from effort and intense practice, and because they are entirely uncontaminated and extremely pure. Such

⁵⁷²This opinion that anutpattikadharmakṣānti is realized at the eighth acalābhūmi is shared by a number of texts. See Rahder, Daśabhūmika, p. 47; Mahāyānasūtra-ālaṅkāra, chapter XIX, verse 36; Vikhyāpana, T. 31, p. 508c. Thus the opinion on p. 787 that bodhisattvas from the first pramuditābhūmi can realize anutpattika-dharmakṣānti is not the traditional one. Poussin summarizes this traditional opinion: "At first the bodhisattva accepts the idea of non-birth (sarve dharmā anutpattikā ity adhimuñcanti, in Aṣṭasāhasrikā, p. 451); but this is only adhimukti, adherence or approbation; and the bodhisattva has not yet anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti-pratilabdha (realized the patience that dharmas do not arise). In the sixth bhūmi, although he possesses an intense ānulomikī kṣānti (suitable patience), he has not yet attained anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti-mukha. It is at the eighth [acalā] bhūmi that he attains this kṣānti." See Poussin, La Siddhi, p. 547, for this quotation and a comparison of the opinion it expresses with that of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa.

non-discriminative wisdom has already attained mastery (īśvara), because it emerges effortlessly (ayatna-vāhitva-pravṛtti). Therefore they are said to experience the phenomenal wisdom all of one unified taste. Bodhisattvas in the first bhūmi, although they have already realized the equality of self and others, yet do have effort, intense practice, and purposeful activity, and because they are not yet pure, they are not yet established [in this patience of no-birth].

The sūtra says: Those wondrously born bodhisattvas again spoke to Buddha, and said: We request the Tathāgata to give some clear examples, so that all we bodhisattvas might understand this profound meaning, and might broadly proclaim and disseminate it in accord with such a transformed object of understanding, so that, when sentient beings hear, they will quickly understand this patience that dharmas are not born.

The commentary explains: Those wondrously born bodhisattvas again request [Buddha] to express this sublime meaning clearly in examples, so that it can be easily understood. Thus all those bodhisattvas and others also, upon hearing this dharma teaching, will understand its profound meaning and will understand the patience that dharmas are not born.

The sūtra says: The Buddha addressed those wondrously born ones: The gods of the Thirty-Threefold Heaven, before they have entered the luxuriant grove, are entirely unable to have that unified experience, which lacks I and Mine in both the range it encompasses and the experience it has. But upon entering that luxuriant grove, then non-discriminately they experience just as they desire. Because this luxuriant grove has such good qualities, it can cause these gods to enter it, and all their karmic actions, in both the range they encompass and the experience they have, will be a unified experience without reflection. In like fashion, bodhisattvas, before they have realized the patience that dharmas are not born, are entirely unable to attain the mind of equality, which [embodies] the indifference of equality (samatopekṣa), and are non-discriminative in the manner of all śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, because they have the two thoughts [of self and others]. Thus they are unable to abide in the experience of the phenomenal wisdom all of one unified taste. But after they have realized the patience that dharmas are not born, because they have banished these two thoughts, they attain the mind of equality, and they are different from śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, because of this mind of equality. Thus they are able to abide in

indifference and experience this phenomenal wisdom all of one unified taste.

The commentary says: These gods of the Thirty - Threefold Heaven (trayastrimśa) have a luxurious grove,⁵⁷³ which has been formed by the unified, blissful power of all the gods. (322a) All the gods, who are not in this grove, in the ranges of their palaces and the experience of their joys, are differentiated as superior and inferior, and they have the discriminative experience of I and Mine. But, upon entering that grove, they all lack the discrimination of superior and inferior in both the range they encompass (vastu) and the experience (anubhava) they have. Being all equal, they lack I and Mine, and their unified experience is able to elicit equality. It is because of this unified (miśra) experience that [that grove] is called a luxuriant (i.e., miśra, variegated, mixed) grove.

Thus, because all these gods each have the dominant power of the unified, blissful action of equality, it comes about that the ālaya consciousnesses of these gods transform and appear as this grove at the same place, at the same time, and with the same characteristic of being one [unified] mark. Because of the dominant power of

⁵⁷³ 樂林, ḥdres-paḥi tshal, miśrakāvana, i.e., one of Indra's pleasure groves, which causes joy to all.

this luxuriant grove, it comes about that their evolving consciousnesses are similarly transformed, and, although each individually experiences, yet it is said that there is no differentiation. In the same manner those bodhisattvas of the Two Vehicles, who have not yet entered the ten bhūmis, have not yet realized tathatā, the patience that dharmas are not born, which is manifested by the two emptinesses [of self and dharmas], because the path of insight (darśanamārga) must yet sever their attachment to differentiation. They are not free from the two discriminative thoughts of self and others. Because they have not yet attained the equality or indifference, which is associated with uncontaminated equality wisdom, they are unable to abide in the experience of the phenomenal wisdom all of one unified taste.

Another opinion holds that bodhisattvas below the eighth bhūmi still must make efforts (abhi-saṃkāra) and are yet in the path of intensified effort (prayogāvasthāmārga). They yet have the emergence of subtle passion. Because they are not yet pure, they have not attained the effortless patience that dharmas are not born. Because they have not yet attained the equality associated with

the wisdom of intellectual mastery, whether it be a case of the equality of the mind or of indifference, they are unable to abide in the experience of phenomenal wisdom all of one unified taste.⁵⁷⁴

The sūtra says: Again, wondrously born ones:
The many large rivers and small streams, before they
enter the great sea, each have a different river bed,
and their waters are different. Their amount of water
is small, and their water level has increase and decrease.
They each differ in the action of their flow. In small
part they support the life of water creatures. But,
when they enter the great sea, they have no differences
in their bed, and their waters are not different. The
amount of their waters is unlimited, and their water level
has no increase or decrease, and the action of their
flow is one. They are an extensive and great support for
water creatures. In the same manner, bodhisattvas, who
have not yet realized the great sea of the Tathāgata's

⁵⁷⁴ A parallel to this passage is found in the Mahāratnakūṭa collection, Samantaprabhāsa Bodhisattva Assembly, Kāśyapa Paripṛccha: "Kāśyapa, just as the Thirty-Threefold gods, when they enter that garden of equality, are all equal in the things they employ, just so, bodhisattvas, because of the purity of their minds, teach and transform with equality among sentient beings." (T. 11, p. 633b).

dharmadhātu, each have a different course, and their
wisdoms are different. They have but little wisdom,
and that wisdom has increase and decrease. They are
each different according to the action of the course of
their wisdom. In small part they are the support for
the maturation of the good roots of sentient beings.
But, when they have realized the great sea of the
Tathāgata's dharmadhātu, they have no difference in
their course. Their wisdoms are not differentiated,
and are unlimited. That wisdom has neither increase nor
decrease. They experience the phenomenal wisdom all
of one, unified taste, and are the support for the matura-
tion of the good roots of immeasurable sentient beings.⁵⁷⁵

⁵⁷⁵This passage appears to be dependent upon the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter IX, verses 82-85: Bhinnāśrayā
bhinnaśālaśca nadyaḥ alpodaḥ kṛtyapṛthak-kāryaḥ/ śālaścita-
prāṇitanupabhogya bhavanti pātalamasampravīṣṭaḥ//82//
Samudravīṣṭaśca bhavanti sarva ekaśraya ekamahāśālaśca/
miśraikakāryaśca mahopabhogya śālaśritapraṇiṣṭaśca nityaṃ
//83// Bhinnāśraya bhinnanāśca dhīraḥ svalpavabodhaḥ
pṛtagatmakṛtyaḥ/ parittasatvarthasādhopabhogya bhavanti
buddhatvasampravīṣṭaḥ//84// Buddhatvavīṣṭaśca bhavanti
sarve ekaśraya ekamahāvabodhaḥ/ miśraikakāryaśca
mahopabhogyaḥ sādā mahāsattvaśca te hi//85//: "Before
they have entered the great sea (pātala, the abode of
nāgas), rivers have different river beds (āśrayā), and
different waters. The amount of their water is small,
and they differ in the action of their waters. They are
useful only in a small manner to creatures who live in the
water. But, when they have entered the sea, they have the
same sea bed (āśrayā) and are one great body of water.
They combine their actions, and are constantly of great use
to all kinds of creatures who live in the water. All the
saints, who have not entered Buddhahood, each have a dif-
ferent support, and each have different thoughts. Their
wisdom is small, and they differ in the actions they perform.

The commentary explains: The large rivers refer to the Ganges and the other four great rivers. The small streams refer to all the other small rivers. Before they have entered the great sea (pātāla ma sampravistāḥ), each has a different river bed (bhinnāśrayā), because various terrains determine their course. Their waters are different (bhinnajalāśca), because, until they reach the sea, some are pure, some turbid, some muddy, and some beautiful. (322b) The amount of their water is small (alpodakāḥ), because they have not yet reached the sea. Their water level has increase and decrease, because there are variations in the amount of rainfall. They each differ in the action of their flow (kṛtyapṛtakkāryaḥ), because there are differences in its velocity, its power, and its development. In small measure they support the life of water creatures (jala-śrita-prāṇi-tanūpabhogyā), because they are the support only for a small number and a small measure of aquatic sentient beings. The sentence when they enter the great sea (samudraviṣṭāśca), they have no differences in their bed (ekāśrayā) etc. is to be interpreted as the opposite of what has been above

575cont. They are of constant use for the benefit of beings only in a limited manner. But, when they have entered Buddhahood, they all have but one support and one great wisdom. They combine their actions and are constantly of use to all kinds of great beings in a great manner."

described. Understand that its mark of being an extensive and great support (makopabhogyā) means that it supports a large number of creatures and creatures that are themselves vast.

The sentence in the same manner bodhisattvas, who have not yet realized the great sea of the Tathāgata's dharmadhātu means that they have not yet realized the Buddha's pure dharmadhātu. That they each have a different support means that they take different Tathāgatas as their support. Their wisdoms are different, because each differs in meditational practices⁵⁷⁶ to which they devote themselves. They have but little wisdom, because they await the realization of Buddha wisdom. Their wisdom has increase and decrease, because the marks of all their lands are not yet pre-eminent, and because the marks of their samādhis are also not pre-eminent. They are each different according to the action of the course of their wisdoms, because all these bodhisattvas differ in the number and extent of their samādhis. They differ in their actions, and each, according to the dominant cause of their endeavours (adhimukti), is able to perform actions in the realm of sentient beings. But, beyond this they

⁵⁷⁶ 修成, i.e., 修所成, bhāvanā-māya, that which is produced by the practice [of meditation].

do not progress. Thus each is different. The sentence in small part they are the support for the maturation of the good roots of sentient beings (satvārtha-sadepa-bhogyā) means that, for a small part of sentient beings and in a small measure, they are the support for the maturation of good roots. Because of the dominant, enabling power of all these bodhisattvas, according to their ability, they cause the good roots of others to mature. But, as the samādhi of these bodhisattvas is not yet the samādhi of the Tathāgata, because its numbers and extent are small, the benefit and happiness which they bring to sentient beings they convert is itself small. The sentence when they have realized the great sea of the Tathāgata's dharmadhātu means that they have already realized the Buddha's pure dharmadhātu. That they do not have any different support (ekāśrayā) means that pure tathatā is their support. In the uncontaminated realm there are no differences between Buddhas.⁵⁷⁷

⁵⁷⁷ 無漏界中不可建立諸佛有異. This sentence appears to be based on a passage from the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter IX, verse 77: gotrabhe-dāḍavaiyarthatsakalyadapvanāditaḥ abhedannaikabuddhatvam bahutvam camalaśraye; "Because of the divisions of the lineage [of Buddhas], because they are not without use, because they are without beginning, because they have no divisions, in the uncontaminated ground there is neither one Buddha, nor many Buddhas." Vasubandhu's commentary explains: "One should not say that there is only one Buddha. Why? Because of the divisions of the lineage [of Buddhas]. The lineage of the lineage of Buddhas is infinite. How could it be that just one of

Why then would we do so in the case of bodhisattvas?

Their wisdoms are not differentiated (akamahāva-
bhodaḥ), because in their marks they are similar to
mirror wisdom and the other wisdoms, since they neither
discriminate nor differentiate between self and others.
That their wisdom is unlimited means that they understand
unlimited objects of knowledge. Their wisdom has neither
increase nor decrease, because it is universally pure,
and because the objects of such universal knowledge
are neither few nor many. They experience the phenom-
enal wisdom all of one, unified taste, because their
marks are all similar to the actions of equality wisdom
and the other wisdoms. They are the support for the
maturation of the good roots of immeasurable sentient
beings (mahopabhogyāḥ-sadāmahā-satva-gaṇasya), because
the inexhaustible stores of their blissful wisdom is

577cont. them would arrive at full enlightenment,
while the others would not? In that case the provisions
of merit and wisdom would be useless. . . . Since they are
not useless, there is not just one Buddha. If there were
only one Buddha established in enlightenment, then his
actions of benefiting others would not be complete, and
this is not correct. And there is no original Buddha
(adibuddha), because it is impossible to become a Buddha
without provisions, and because such provisions are impos-
sible without another Buddha. Thus from the beginning there
has never been only one Buddha. But one cannot say that
there are many Buddhas, because dharmakāya is not dif-
ferentiated in the uncontaminated realm."

It would seem that both Bandhuprabha and Śīlabhadra
have interpreted the Buddhabhūmisūtra passage in the
light of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, and seem to have
regarded that Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra as the source for the
Buddhabhūmisūtra.

universal (samata). Because they attain dharmakāya and exhaust the limits of samsāra, they are the support for the maturation of the good roots of all sentient beings whatsoever.

One opinion holds that the difference between these two examples is that the first explains the difference between those bodhisattvas, who have not yet entered the first pramuditābhūmi or the eighth acalābhūmi, [where, dependent on one's opinion they attain anūtpattikadharmakṣānti], and those who have already entered. And the second example of the great sea explains the difference between those bodhisattvas who have not yet entered the eighth acalābhūmi or the tenth tathāgatabhūmi, and those who have already entered.

But another opinion holds that both of these examples explain ((322c) the differences between bodhisattvas who have not yet realized the patience that dharmas are not born, and those who have already attained it. The first example explains that the merits of these bodhisattvas are difficult to understand (gahana), just like that luxuriant grove (gahana). The second example explains that the merits of these bodhisattvas are inexhaustible, just like the great sea.

PART THREE

CHAPTER TWO: The Concluding Verses⁵⁷⁸

The sūtra says: Then the Bhagavan recited these verses.

The commentary explains: We should explain that the overall meaning of the following four verses is to explain the marks of pure dharmadhātu of the Buddha realm. In that realm of the Tathāgata, all conditioned and unconditioned qualities are supported by pure dharmadhātu, and all are marks of that dharmadhātu, since both that which is marked [by dharmadhātu] and that which [dharmadhātu] marks are included in the term mark. Of these four verses, the first three and a half explain these marks, and the last half of the fourth verse presents a conclusion.

[There are two opinions as to how these verses are to be interpreted]. The first holds that, in regard to the specific explanation of these marks, the first half of the first verse manifests pure dharmadhātu, while the second half manifests mirror wisdom. The first half of the second verse manifests equality wisdom, while the second half manifests the wisdom of intellectual mastery.

⁵⁷⁸These concluding verses, although they follow the description of the bodhisattvas' response to the Buddha's teachings, and thus belong to the third part, i.e., the description of the practice based upon the teaching, in fact constitute a lengthy doctrinal disquisition, which is unencumbered by the need to constantly refer back to the sūtra text.

The first half of the third verse manifests the wisdom of duty fulfillment, while the second half manifests the accompanying merits supported by these four wisdoms. The first half of the fourth verse manifests the differences of the three bodies, which are the completion of the five dharmas.

The second opinion holds that these verses manifest that pure dharmadhātu has six kinds of marks, which in general support all the merits of the Buddha realm: 1) the mark of essence (svabhāva), 2) the mark of cause (hetu), 3) the mark of result (phala), 4) the mark of action (karman), 5) the mark of associated qualities (yoga), and 6) the mark differentiation (viśeṣa).⁵⁷⁹ The first verse corresponds to the first mark, and then each half verse corresponds to the next five marks.

The sūtra says: Tathatā of all dharmas is marked by purity from the two obstacles. (Verse 1a)⁵⁸⁰

⁵⁷⁹For a treatment of these six categories, see Takasaki Jikido, Study, Appendix III, pp. 400-408.

⁵⁸⁰These four verses are identical with verses fifty-six to fifty-nine of the Bodhi chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra. They are thus also commented upon by Sthiramati in his commentary, the Sūtrālaṅkāravṛtti-bhāṣya and by Asvabhāva in his Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāratīkā, both of which are preserved in Tibetan translations only. The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra reads: sarva-dharma-dvayāvāra tathatā-suddhi-lakṣaṇa. Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmi-vyakhyana has: chos-rnams kun gyi de-bshin-ñid/ sgrib gnis ldan dag mtshan-ñid-can.

The commentary explains: According to the first opinion, this manifests pure dharmadhātu. This means that tathatā, manifested by the emptiness and no-self (śūnyatā-nairātmya) of all dharmas, is original purity,⁵⁸¹ which is free from the two obstacles [of passion and knowledge]. Being free from all defilement, it is able to be the support (āśraya) of all good dharmas. Therefore it is called pure dharmadhātu. The phrase all dharmas means all transcendental and worldly, all contaminated and uncontaminated skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, etc. Tathatā is the true nature of all dharmas, the indefectible nature, which is neither identical with nor different from them.⁵⁸²

⁵⁸¹ 本性清淨, prakṛti-prabhāsvara. This term is absent from the other three commentaries of Śīlabhadra, Sthiramati, and Asvabhāva. But the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter IX, verse 19, has: matam ca cittam prakṛti-prabhāsvaram sadā tad āgantuka-doṣa-duṣitam/ na dharmatā-cittam rte'nya cetasaḥ prabhāsvarartvam prakṛtau vidhiyate, "It can be said that the originally pure mind is always defiled by adventitious faults, but it must not be thought that apart from this original mind, in the essence of another mind, one becomes purified."

⁵⁸² There are close relationships between the four commentaries on these verses. As an example of this, the commentary on this first half of the first verse from the commentaries of Śīlabhadra, Sthiramati, and Asvabhāva follows.

Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna reads: don ni chos thams-cad kyi de-bshin du yod-pa ni de-bshin-ñid de/ chos thams-cad kyi phyin-ci-ma-log-paḥi ho-bo de-kho-na-ñid dan/ ston-pa ñid yin la chos thams-cad kyi de-bshin-ñid de/ non-moṅs-pa dan śes-byaḥi sgrib-pa gñis las rnam-par-dag-ciṅ de las dben-pa ste/ chos-kyi-dbyiṅs ni deḥi mtshan-ñid-can yin no shes-bya-ba yin no, "One opinion holds that all dharmas, just as they are, are tathatā. Since this

Although its essence is of one taste only,
yet it is many, because of [the images] of its

582cont. is tattva and śūnyatā, which is the inde-
fectible nature of all dharmas, it is tathatā of all
dharmas, and, being free from kleśajñeyavarāṇa, such is
called the mark of dharmadhātu." (Nishio, Buddhabhūmi-
vyākhyāna, p. 119).

Sthiramati's Sūtrālaṅkāravṛttibhāṣya reads: chos
thams-cad ni ḥdus-bya dañ ḥdus-ma-bya sam zag-pa dañ
bcas-pa ham/ zag-pa-med-pa-sde/ chos-te-rnams kyi de-
bshin-ñid ni stoñ-pa-ñid la-byaho/ sañs-rqyas kyi sañi
stoñ-pa-ñid dus kyi stoñ-pa-ñid de-bshin-ñid dehi mtshan-
ñid dañ rañ-bshin ci-ḥdra-śen-sqrib-pa qñis dag-paḥi
mtshan-ñid de shes-bya mos-de/ sañs-rqyas kyi dus kyi
de-bshin-ñid ni ñon-moñs-paḥi sqrib-pa dañ shes-byaḥi
sqrib qñis dañ bral-paḥi mtshan-ñid dañ rañ-bshin yin no
shes-bya-paḥi don no, "All things include both the condi-
tioned and the unconditioned, both the contaminated and
the uncontaminated. Tathatā of all dharmas is called
śūnyatā. What is the mark and the essence of that
śūnyatā-tathatā, which characterize the śūnyatā of the
Buddha realm? It is marked by purity from both obstacles.
Tathatā of the Buddha state is said to have the mark
and essence of being free from both the obstacle of
passion and the obstacle of knowledge." (Peking ed.,
No. 5531, Mi, 150a, 5-7)

Asvabhāva's Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāraṭīkā has: chos thams-
cad kyi de-bshin-ñid ñon-moñs-pa dañ shes-byaḥi sqrib-pa
qñis rnam-par-dag-paḥi mtshan-ñid shes-bya-ba ni ñon-
moñs-pa dañ shes-byaḥi sqrib-pa dag las rnam-par-dag-pas,
"It is said that tathatā of all dharmas has the mark of
being purified from the obstacles of passion and know-
ledge, because, being purified from these two obstacles,
it is completely pure." (Peking ed., No. 5530, Bi, 81a,
5-7).

The earliest of these commentaries appears to be
that of Asvabhāva (ca 450-550), from which the commen-
taries of Sthiramati (510-570) and Śīlabhadra (529-?)
probably drew. Sthiramati's Sūtrālaṅkāravṛttibhāṣya
is more than twice the size of Asvabhāva's Mahāyānasūtra-
alaṅkāraṭīkā.

In "Asvabhāva's Commentary on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra
IX. 56-59," JIBS, XX, (1971), pp. 473-465, N. Hakamaya
argues that Asvabhāva presents a traditional exegesis
without any strong emphasis on Dharmapāla's thought. The
same can be said for Śīlabhadra. Bandhuprabha then
harmonized these commentaries with Dharmapāla's lineage
of Yogācāra in light of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra.

image aspect (nimittabhāga), and thus one may say that there are two tathatā, i.e., the no-self of the emptiness of pudgala and the no-self of the emptiness of dharmas. However, tathatā is not actually emptiness or no-self, because it is free from discrimination and severed from mental fabrication (prapañca). But, because in meditating on the insights of emptiness and no-self one destroys the clinging to I and Mine that obstructs tathatā, it is called emptiness and no-self (śūnyatā-nairātmya).⁵⁸³

Or there are three kinds [of tathatā], i.e., good (kuśala), bad (akuśala), and morally neutral (avyākṛta), because tathatā is the true nature of these three kinds of dharmas.

Or there are four kinds [of tathatā], i.e., those associated with the three realms (tridhātu), and that which is not so associated (aparyāpannā), because tathatā is the true nature of these four kinds of dharmas.

⁵⁸³The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter IX, verse 37, has: sarveṣaṃ aviśiṣṭāpi tathatā śuddhim āgata tathāgatvam tasmāc ca tad grabhāḥ sarvadehināḥ, "Tathatā has no discrimination in regard to anything, for, having arrived at purity, it is Tathāgata. Therefore all those who have a body are the womb of that." Thus, while insights into emptiness and non-self are means to uncover the original purity that is tathatā, they are themselves insights, and not the objects of wisdom.

Or there are five kinds [of tathatā], i.e.,
consciousness (citta), conscious states (caitta),
unassociated dharmas (viprayukta), form (rūpa),
and the unconditioned (asamskrta),⁵⁸⁴ because
tathatā is the true nature of these five dharmas.

Or there are six kinds [of tathatā], i.e.,
the five skandhas of form (rūpa), sensation
(vedanā), conceptualization (saṃjñā), karmic
functioning (saṃskāra), and consciousness (vi jñāna),
together with unconditioned dharmas (asamskrta),
[because tathatā is the true nature of these
six dharmas].

Or there are seven kinds [of tathatā], i.e.,
1) tathatā of the flow of transmigration (pravṛtti-
tathatā), which is the true nature of the flow
of transmigration from the beginningless begin-
ning, 2) tathatā of marks (lakṣanatathatā), which
is the true nature of all dharmas manifested by
emptiness and no-self, 3) tathatā of consciousness
only (vi jñaptimātratathatā), which is the true
nature of all dharmas as consciousness only,

⁵⁸⁴ This is the listing of all the dharmas developed
by the Hīnayāna schools, and treated in the Vi jñaptimā-
tratāsiddhi, where they are denied any extra-mental
reality. See Wei Tat, pp. 46-90 and Poussin, pp. 38-
84 on dharmagrāha, the clinging to dharmas.

4) tathatā of steadfastness (saṃviveśatathatā), which is the true nature of the truth of contaminated suffering (duḥkha), 5) tathatā of wrong conduct (mithya-pratipatti-tathatā), which is the true nature of the truth of the origin (samudaya) of karmic passion, 6) tathatā of purity (viśuddhitathatā), which is the true nature of the truth of the cessation (nirodha) [of suffering], which is good and unconditioned, and 7) tathatā of right conduct (samyak-pratipatti-tathatā), which [is the true nature of] all conditioned and unconditioned good dharmas.⁵⁸⁵

Or there are eight kinds [of tathatā], i.e., 1) tathatā of not being born (anutpāda), 2) tathatā of not being destroyed (anīrodha), 3) tathatā of not being cut off (anuccheda), 4) tathatā of not being eternal (aśasvata), 5) tathatā of not being one (anekārtha), 6) tathatā of not being many (anāmārtha), 7) tathatā of not coming (anāgama),

⁵⁸⁵These seven kinds of tathatā are discussed in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, chapter XIX, verse 44. They are repeated in Paramārtha's translation of the Asaṅga's Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra (T. 31, p. 456c) and in Hsüan-tsang's translation of the same text. (T. 31, p. 470a). The above version, however, is almost identical with that of the Viññaptimātratāsiddhi (Wei Tat, p. 534; Poussin, p. 639). And it would thus appear that this work is the immediate source for Bandhuprabha's discussion.

and 8) tathatā of not going (anirgama), because tathatā is manifested by these eight negations.⁵⁸⁶

Or there are nine, i.e., tathatā manifested by the ninefold path, which removes the ninefold obstacle.⁵⁸⁷

Or there are ten, i.e., tathatā manifested by the severance of the ten ignorances in the course of the ten bhūmis.⁵⁸⁸ These are the ten dharmadhātu as explained in the Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra.⁵⁸⁹

⁵⁸⁶ 八遣, asta-pratiṣedha, i.e., the eight negations of the introductory verse to Nāgārjuna's Madhyamika-kārikās: anīrodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvataṃ anekartham ananartham anāgamam anirgamam yāḥ pratitya-samutpādam; "Neither born, nor destroyed; neither cut off nor eternal; neither one nor many; neither coming nor going; such is dependent co-arising." For a discussion of this passage, see Nagao, Chukan, pp. 11-13.

⁵⁸⁷ 九品障, i.e., the obstacles found in the nine lands of illusion: kāmadhātu with its five destinies, the four meditations of rūpadhātu, and the four samādhis of arūpadhātu. The ninefold path 九品道 would then be the path in each of these lands.

⁵⁸⁸ The ten ignorances (十無明) are the same as the ten obstacles described in the Viññaptimātratāsiddhi: the obstacle of being a prthagjana, of bad conduct, of forgetfulness, of subtle passion, of attachment to parinirvāṇa, of the presence of crude marks, of the presence of subtle marks, of conceptual contemplation, of the absence of desire to benefit others, and of an incompleteness in respect to dharma mastery. See Wei Tat, p. 727sq. and p. 747sq. and Poussin, p. 639sq. and p. 658sq.

⁵⁸⁹ The reference is to the Fifth Chapter, Hetuphalabhāvanāprabheda of the Mahāyānasamgraha, Lamotte, p. 197sq., where insight into dharmadhātu is explained as being progressively realized at each of the ten bhūmis. This passage appears to be the source for the Siddhi's treatment referred to in the above note, for they agree point by point.

In this manner we could increase the number [of the kinds of tathatā] indefinitely, for all dharmas are different marks of tathatā, and yet tathatā is neither one nor many. Discriminative speech is entirely unable to explain this. But, inasmuch as it is free from illusion and mistake (abhūta-viparyāsa), it is conventionally termed tathatā. Inasmuch as it is able to be the support of all good dharmas, it is conventionally termed dharmadhātu. Inasmuch as it has nothing that can be denied, it is conventionally termed paramārtha-sat. Inasmuch as it has nothing that can be affirmed, it is termed emptiness and non-existence (śūnyatā-abhūta). We can analyze and examine all the idle words of all dharmas, and, when we have finished, we still cannot fathom [tathatā]. It is paramārtha only, but by convention (saṃvṛti) we call it the reality limit (bhūtakoti). This is the object realized by the pre-eminent holy path of non-discrimination. By convention we call it paramārthasatya. Such is its explanation.

The phrase the two obstacles refers to the (323b) obstacle of passion (kleśāvaraṇa) and the obstacle of knowledge (jñeyāvaraṇa). The obstacle of passion is so called because it torments and

disperses the body and mind, and causes them to be agitated. The obstacle of knowledge is so called because it covers over the indefectible nature (aviparīta-svabhāva) of the knowable (jñeya), and causes them to not appear (pratibhāsa) in the mind. The obstacle of passion has as its principal element the belief in self (satkāyadr̥ṣṭi) that clings to a real ātman, and also the one hundred and twenty-eight basic passions (mūlakleśa) together with their associated passions (upakleśa). Both the acts they engender and the results they attain are included [in the obstacle of passion], because they have as their root passion.⁵⁹⁰ The obstacle of knowledge has as its principal element the belief in self (satkāyadr̥ṣṭi), which clings to all the dharmas of parikalpita, and to all the consciousnesses and conscious states of ignorance, the love of dharmas (dharma-rāga), together with the affection for malicious thoughts (vyāpādānumaya), etc. Both the acts they engender and the results they attain are included [in the obstacle of knowledge], because they have as their root the

⁵⁹⁰The Siddhi has: "The obstacle of passion has as its principal element the belief in self that admits as real an ātman, which is entirely imagined, and also the one hundred and twenty-eight mūlakleśas and their upakleśas. All perturb and torment the mind." (Wei Tat, p. 670; Poussin, p. 566).

clinging to dharmas (dharmagrāha) and ignorance (avidyā).⁵⁹¹

[There are, however, two opinions as to which consciousnesses have such clinging to dharmas and ignorance]. The first opinion holds that in all contaminated consciousness and conscious states, whether good, bad, or neutral, and in the consciousness and conscious states of Hīnayāna, both dharma clinging and ignorance are present, because in such minds the non-self of dharmas (dharma-nairātmya) cannot be understood, and thus dharma clinging and ignorance arise as the apparent aspects of image (nimittabhāga) and insight (darśanabhāga).

But the second, correct opinion holds that dharma clinging and ignorance are present only in contaminated conscious states that are either bad (akuśala) or neutral (avyākṛta). Furthermore, the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra says: "Ignorance is only of two kinds: bad and neutral, i.e., defiled and

⁵⁹¹The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi reads: "The obstacle of knowledge has as its principal element the belief in self that admits as real imaginary dharmas. Its false views, doubt, ignorance, attachment to malicious thoughts, pride, etc. cover over the indefectible nature of knowable objects, and are able to obstruct bodhi." (Wei Tat, p. 566; Poussin, p. 671).

undefiled."⁵⁹² It does not mention good [states of mind], because it is impossible that what is not good be associated with the good mind, since their natures are incompatible.

Furthermore, good states of mind must of necessity be associated with the good roots of non-delusion. Delusion (moha) is ignorance (avidyā), and it is impossible that both delusion and non-delusion be present in the same mind, for they are incompatible, just as covetousness and non-covetousness, or anger and non-anger [are incompatible].⁵⁹³ It is impossible that dharma clinging not be accompanied by delusion, because in the absence of ignorance, there would be no erroneous clinging. It is just as the clinging to a real ātman must be accompanied by ignorance.

Furthermore, all good mental states have no illusory clinging. The understanding of no-self

⁵⁹²This is the opinion of the Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi: "The obstacle of knowledge is associated only with bad thoughts or neutral thoughts. For the [Yogācārabhūmi] śāstra says: 'Ignorance includes only bad and neutral dharmas. Delusion and non-delusion cannot be mutually associated.'" (Wei Tat, p. 672; Poussin, pp. 570-571).

⁵⁹³The Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "According to one opinion (Dharmapāla's), non-delusion . . . is directly opposed to ignorance, and, like non-covetousness and non-anger, it is included among the good roots." (Wei Tat, p. 396; Poussin, p. 328).

(nairātmya), which accompanies the good conscious states of faith, etc., has the insight into the two emptinesses [of self and dharmas] as its principal method. But it is impossible that dharma clinging leads to the insight of the emptiness of dharmas, because the self clinging (ātma-grāha) would not permit such an insight to arise. Therefore the good mind, whether contaminated or uncontaminated, is definitely not associated with these two clings to self and dharmas, with ignorance, desire (rāga), etc., because this would contradict the principles of this teaching.

All the differently maturing, neutral consciousnesses and conscious states (vipākaja-avyākṛta-citta-caittas), [i.e., ālaya consciousness and the five sense consciousnesses], also have no clinging to dharmas and no ignorance, because their power of discrimination is slight and they are unable to cling. If it had erroneous clinging and brought about belief in dharmas and in self, then ālaya consciousness, having ignorance, would not be associated only with the five [universal] mental states [of mental contact, attention, sensation, conception, and volition], because it would be comprised in both ignorance, etc. and wisdom,

etc.⁵⁹⁴

Furthermore, if ālaya consciousness had dharma clinging, it would from moment to moment be annihilated, because it would not be permeable.⁵⁹⁵ And then this obstacle of knowledge would not be able to be disciplined [by good permeations], and this would be a serious error. There is no question that this is not the case in regard to the obstacle of passion (kleśāvarana), [for it is certainly able to be disciplined by the cultivation of the permeation of good seeds].

⁵⁹⁴The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi reads: "The obstacle of knowledge is certainly not associated with the maturing [ālaya], because that consciousness is weak and is not associated either with ignorance or with wisdom . . ." (Wei Tat, p. 670; Poussin, p. 569). Thus ālaya, in association with the five universal mental states is not the source of ignorance. If it were to be associated with ignorance, then there would be a sixth mental state, i.e., ignorance, with which it is associated, but no text states this. Discrimination and ignorance come then, not from ālaya, but from the manas and mano consciousnesses. The neutral role of ālaya, being associated neither with ignorance nor with wisdom, allows the con-version of the basis to occur.

⁵⁹⁵The Siddhi again has: "This ālaya consciousness is by nature a permeable (vāsanā) dharma. If it were good or defiled [by nature], then, like an object that has an extremely fragrant or offensive smell, it would not be permeable. . . Hence ālaya consciousness is non-defiled and non-defined." (Wei Tat, p. 164; Poussin, p. 152). And again: ". . . This [ālaya]consciousness, from the beginningless beginning, is born and perishes from moment to moment, ever changing." (Wei Tat, p. 170, Poussin, p. 156). But, if it had the nature of clinging to dharmas, not being permeable, it would simply be annihilated at every moment.

Furthermore, [if ālaya had dharma clinging], then when the insight into the emptiness of dharmas first occurs, this consciousness would be severed, because dharma clinging is incompatible with the disciplining of the obstacle [of knowledge], and cannot be active together with it. And, if this were so, then the other contaminated seeds would have no support, and the good qualities that are cultivated [by meditation] would not permeate it, because it would not be permeable.⁵⁹⁶ One cannot say that [these good qualities] permeate the pure mind associated with mirror wisdom, because that mind is not neutral, and because it may not yet have been attained. Therefore ālaya consciousness does not have dharma clinging. (323c)

If this be the case, then would not the results of maturation (vipāka-phala), which are the other evolving consciousnesses (pravṛttiviñāna) also be of the same nature, i.e., without dharma clinging?

⁵⁹⁶The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi has: "Again this consciousness is the support for good and defiled dharmas. If it were good or defiled, it would not be capable of supporting good or defiled dharmas, because this consciousness itself and the supported dharmas would be incompatible." (Wei Tat, p. 164; Poussin, p. 152).

The five sense consciousnesses also have no dharma clinging, since they do not have a strong discriminating function and do not examine. The Mahāyānasamgraha says: "Only thought consciousness is able to imagine."⁵⁹⁷ We should then recognize that these five do not have parikalpita as their object. Since they do not discriminate or gain insight by examining, they cannot imagine a self, and, consequently, they cannot imagine any dharmas. But, desire, hatred, etc., which arise from the imagined self and dharmas of thought consciousness, elicit in the five sense consciousnesses the arising of desire, anger, etc., which do not consist in insight. Although these consciousnesses do have the power of insight, yet they are supported by these dharmas of desire, hatred, ignorance, i.e., by the two obstacles.

Therefore the discriminating examining (paryesanā)

⁵⁹⁷能遍計心唯是意識。The Mahāyānasamgraha has: 當知意識是能遍計, 有分別故, "Understand that thought consciousness is able to imagine, because it has discrimination." (T. 31, p. 139b). But the Vijñapti-mātratāsiddhi has: "It is also said that thought consciousness is the only consciousness that imagines." (Wei Tat, p. 626; Poussin, p. 518). The clear identification of manas and mano as the only discriminating consciousnesses is Dharmapāla's theory. The Mahāyānasamgraha does not use the word "only" in its statement, and Bandhuprabha has here included it in light of the Siddhi's passage.

of the two clingings are present only in the sixth [mano] and the seventh [manas] consciousnesses. If desire, anger, etc. were not supported by the insights [of mano and manas consciousnesses], then it would not be the case that the examining (paryeṣaṇā) [of ignorance and delusion] would be present in the five sense consciousnesses.

Therefore the essence of the obstacle of passion, which [gives rise to] all self clinging and its conscious states, is present only in the two consciousnesses [of mano and manas], when they are bad (akuṣala), defiled (nivṛta), and not defined (avyākṛta).⁵⁹⁸

If, in the case of the stage of no-training (aśaikṣa) of Hīnayāna, the obstacle of knowledge, which [gives rise to] dharma clinging, is present in that non-defiled and non-defined (anivṛta-avyākṛta) consciousness, then in that stage of no-training there are no conscious states that are not good, defiled, or not defined. Thus those of the Two Vehicles consider this mind, [which has

⁵⁹⁸The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi has: "[The moral nature of the mental states of manas consciousness] is exclusively defiled and non-defined. The four passions [of ātmamoha, ātma-drṣṭi, ātmamāna, and ātmāsneha] associated with manas, being defiled dharmas, are an obstacle to the holy path. They impede and obscure the mind, and are thus defiled. But, being neither good nor bad, they are non-defined." (Wei Tat, p. 304; Poussin, p. 265).

this obstacle of knowledge] undefiled. But from the perspective of the bodhisattvas, it is impure, and they consider such a mind defiled. Thus the obstacle of knowledge is considered both undefiled and defiled, for its one essence is viewed differently in these two perspectives.⁵⁹⁹

The obstacle of knowledge is [always] present in the obstacle of passion, because it is the support of that obstacle of passion, because in clinging to some "real" dharma, one necessarily imagines that it has a self. Although the essence [of these two obstacles] is not differentiated, yet they do have separate functions, just as, although the essence of consciousness is one, yet the functions of consciousness of apprehending objects are differentiated. From permeation (vāsanā) there arises a seed, [i.e., consciousness] of one essence, which yet has many functions.⁶⁰⁰

⁵⁹⁹ The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "If the obstacle of knowledge is considered to be undefiled, this must be understood from the point of view of the Two Vehicles. From the point of view of the bodhisattvas, it is defiled." (Wei Tat, p. 672; Poussin, p. 571).

⁶⁰⁰ The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "When there is the obstacle of passion, there is necessarily the obstacle of knowledge, but not vice-versa. For the former necessarily takes the latter as its supporting basis. Although their essence is not differentiated, yet they do have separate functions." (Wei Tat, p. 672; Poussin, p. 571).

Although [these obstacles] arise simultaneously, yet they are severed progressively, because the power of the holy path does have different aspects (pariccheda).

If the obstacle of knowledge is considered by those of the Two Vehicles to be non-defiled and non-defined, to which of the non-defined categories⁶⁰¹ does it belong?

It belongs to the category of non-defined maturation (vipāka-avyākṛta), because it arises from the maturing consciousness (vipākavi jñāna, i.e., ālayavi jñāna).

If this is so, then what are the categories that are not non-defined maturation?

These include all other [non-defined] categories, such as the dominant, enabling cause [of such non-defined dharmas], because the mind of non-defined deportment (airāpathika-avyākṛta) and the other two non-defined categories [of consciousness] do not have tenacious clinging, are not universal, and in essence do not have the

⁶⁰¹The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya lists four categories of morally neutral states of mind: vipāka-avyākṛta: non-defined maturation, i.e., the maturation of karmic results from all previous actions, that have no good or bad results; airāpathika-avyākṛta: non-defined deportment, i.e., the everyday conduct of sitting down, sleeping, etc., that have no moral character; śāilpasthānika-avyākṛta: the arts of poetry, etc., that are morally neutral; and

two obstacles.⁶⁰²

If there is no dharma clinging in the good, non-defiled, non-defined mind [of Hīnayānists], then why are they unable to understand the emptiness of dharmas? If they have no self clinging, why are they unable to understand the emptiness of birth (jātaśūnyatā)?

They are unable to understand the emptiness of birth, because of the presence of innate self clinging in their manas consciousness. They are

⁶⁰¹cont. nirmāṇa-avyākṛta: various rddhi transformations, that are neither good nor bad. (Poussin, Kośa, II, p. 315).

⁶⁰²The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi has: "The obstacle of knowledge is also included in the category of the non-defiled, non-defined (anivṛta-avyākṛta). In this category it belongs to the class of maturation (vipāka), because the activities of the other three non-defined classes is slight, because they do not obscure the knowable, because they do not obstruct bodhi. If the obstacle of knowledge is considered to be non-defiled, this is from the perspective of the Two Vehicles. From the perspective of bodhisattvas, it is defiled." (Wei Tat, p. 672; Poussin, p. 571).

Above Bandhuprabha is attempting to clarify this passage. The obstacle of knowledge is non-defined maturation (vipāka-avyākṛta), because, by clinging tenaciously to dharmas, it matures into an obstacle to bodhi. But it is yet not defined, because it is not an obstacle to nirvāṇa. Bandhuprabha further defines the other morally neutral states of mind of everyday actions, the arts, and magical transformations as non-clinging, i.e., they have no dharmagrāha. They are like the dominant, enabling cause (adhipatipratyaya), for that cause has no immediate or efficacious power to achieve its result, and is therefore weak. Sunlight and rain are dominant, enabling causes for the production of plants, but without a seed (hetupratyaya) no plant results.

unable to understand the emptiness of dharmas, because of the presence of innate dharma clinging in their manas consciousness. These innate (324a) clingings arise as their image aspect (nimitta-bhāga), [which is mistaken for dharmas], and their insight aspect (darśanabhāga), [which is mistaken for a self, and thus from the perspective of bodhi, their minds are indeed defiled].

Why then do we not simply say that these two aspects [of image and insight] are comprised in dharma clinging?

We do not say this, because the uncontaminated wisdom of all Buddhas and bodhisattvas also has these two aspects.

How is it then that they do not cling?

This is because their dependently co-arising image aspect and insight aspect is comprised in paratantrasvabhāva. Only if, because of these aspects [of image and insight], they were to falsely imagine things external to consciousness, or that fixed natures existed, would we say that they cling.⁶⁰³

⁶⁰³The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "Although from the beginningless beginning, consciousness and conscious states in their image and insight aspects have been able to take one another as object, yet, because they are always accompanied by clinging to self and dharmas,

Therefore the obstacle of knowledge, present in the manas consciousness, always accompanies the other six consciousnesses in all the triple world.

We are aware that this lengthy argumentation (kalaha) is not directly related to the sūtra text, so we will end it and return to interpreting the basic sūtra text.

The phrase marked by purity means that the basic nature of tathatā is purity. But it is defiled (nivṛta, i.e., covered over) by the two obstacles, just as pure space seems to be impure, because of the obstacles of mists and clouds. When one attains the transcendent path, where tathatā is realized and the seeds of the two obstacles are gradually eradicated, then, when diamond-like (vajropama) samādhi appears, one destroys all the seeds of all obstacles entirely, just as a strong wind blows away mists and clouds, and attains the ultimate conversion of the basis (āśraya-parivṛtti) of pure dharmadhātu.⁶⁰⁴ This is called the mark of purity, and

⁶⁰³cont. they do not truly know that all their objects of thought are unreal evolutions from their own minds." (Wei Tat, p. 636; Poussin, p. 532).

⁶⁰⁴淨法界究竟轉依. Śīlabhadra has: de-bshin-ñid qnas yons-su-gyur-pa, i.e. tathatā-āśraya-parivṛtti. (Buddhabhūmivakhyāna, p. 119) Sthiramati reads: de-bshin-ñid qnas-qshan-du-gyur-pa: tathatā-āśraya-parivṛtti. (Peking ed., No. 5531, Mi, 150a-6). None of these readings specify what the relationship between

is pure dharmadhātu of the five dharmas explained above [in this sūtra].

According to the second opinion [on the interpretation of these verses], this verse manifests one of the six marks of pure dharmadhātu, i.e., the mark of its essence. But the commentary would be the same as given above.

The sūtra says: Its mastery in dharma wisdom and in its object is marked by inexhaustibility.⁶⁰⁵ (Verse 1b)

The commentary explains: According to the first opinion [on interpretation], this passage manifests the dharma of mirror wisdom. The paratantric, conditioned dharma of mirror wisdom is here called dharma wisdom.⁶⁰⁶ Mirror wisdom has as object saṃvṛti-paratantra, because it manifests [conventional, conditionally arising] images and is not confused about them. And the phrase

⁶⁰⁴con. tathatā or dharmadhātu and āśraya-parivṛtti is. But Asvabhava has: de-bshin-ñid kyi gnas-yoñs-sugyur-pa: āśraya-parivṛtti of tathatā. Thus the above translation. In this śāstra dharmadhātupariśuddhi is not only the all inclusive horizon in which conversion happens, but is the originally pure mind.

⁶⁰⁵The Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra reads: Vastujñāna-tadālabhavaśītakṣaṇalakṣaṇaḥ. Śīlabhadra has: dnos-po śes-pa de dmigs-pa/ dban zad-mi-śes mtshan-ñid-can (Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 119).

⁶⁰⁶法智, dharmajñāna. Note that the Sanskrit reads vastujñāna. Hsüan-tsang apparently understood vastu, phenomena, to be identical with dharmajñāna, thing.

its object (tad-ālamba) refers to tathatā, and is not to be taken as referring to dharma wisdom.⁶⁰⁷ Although tathatā is beyond words, because it is associated with the ability to give meanings, it is [the object of dharma wisdom] without contradiction.⁶⁰⁸ Because dharma wisdom takes that [tathatā] as object, the text uses the phrase its object. This does not mean that dharma wisdom is the object. Mirror wisdom also has as object pariniṣpannasvabhāva that is paramārtha-satya, because it exhausts the limits of samsāra and

⁶⁰⁷ 彼謂真如非彼法智。 The phrase vastu-jñāna-tad-ālamba can easily be read to mean: that object, which is vastu-jñāna. In order to avoid this interpretation, the commentary outlines the grammatical relationship between vastu-jñāna 法智 and tad-ālamba 彼所緣, and describes them as co-ordinate nouns that are not in apposition to one another. Thus we have vastu-jñāna and its object, which is tathatā. Śīlabhadra concurs: de shes-bya-baḥi sgra ni chos-kyi-dbyiṅs daṅ sbyar qyi, dños-pa śes-pa ni ma yin yo, "The word that (tad), although related to dharma-dhātu, is not vastu-jñāna (i.e., dharma wisdom)." (Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 120).

⁶⁰⁸ 雖復隔句,義勢相應故,無有過。 This sentence differs from Śīlabhadra's text: bar-du chod-pa la yaṅ ḥbrel ma mthoṅ-baḥi phyir te/ dper na utpa-la sñon-poḥi ḥdab-ma ḥdra-baḥi spyān mñah-ba/ khyod kyi shal ḥas deḥi ḥad daṅ dri mtshuṅs-ḥdra shes-bya-ba lta buḥo, "Being beyond words, it is not seen to be again associated with them. For example, it is just as if you were to hold a blue lotus flower in front of your eyes. Your face would seem to have its aroma and fragrance." (Nishio, Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, p. 120).

Thus, while Śīlabhadra seems to focus upon the dichotomy between paramārthasatya and samvrtisatya, Bandhuprabha emphasizes their inter-relationship, for paramārtha, although beyond words, can issue in meanings.

internally realizes (pratyātmagati) that [pariniṣpanna-tathatā]. This means that⁶⁰⁹ mirror wisdom has as its object the common and individual marks of all dharmas, because its objects are both paratantrasvabhāva and pariniṣpannasvabhāva. But parikalpita is merely imagined by the illusory thoughts of fools and is not an object of holy wisdom. Therefore it is not said to be an object [of this wisdom]. As a śāstra says: "Parikalpita is the 'object only of common understanding. Pariniṣpanna is the object only of holy wisdom. Paratantra is the object of both common understanding and of holy wisdom."⁶¹⁰ Because parikalpita has no

⁶⁰⁹The following section is translated by Poussin, Siddhi, p. 553.

⁶¹⁰On the basis of K'uei-chi reference, Poussin attributed this passage to the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra. But he gives no reference to that work, and one would suppose that he was unable to identify its source in the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra. Another option is possible, for the śāstra mentioned could be the Viññaptimātratāśāstra, which reads: "Parikalpitasvabhāva is not within the range of any wisdom, because it has no essence (svabhāva), and is not the object (ālambanapratyaya) [of any wisdom]. Fools cling to it as existent, but saints understand that it does not exist, and thus one can say that is the object of both foolish and common understanding. Paratantrasvabhāva is within the range of both these [common and saintly] understandings. Pariniṣpannasvabhāva is the object only of saintly wisdom." (Wei Tat, p. 650; Poussin, p. 553). Bandhuprabha then seems to have reworked this passage. As Poussin thinks that the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa is a source for the Viññaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra, he cannot avail himself of this option. But the opposite understanding would appear to be preferable.

reality, it is not realized by saints.

But, [it might be objected], if this is so, then saintly wisdom would not know everything, because there would be some objects not known to wisdom.

If one knows [parikalpita] as really existing, then such [knowledge] is erroneous. But, if one knows it as non-existent, then such [knowledge] is not merely imagined (parikalpita). The appearance (pratibhāsa) in the mind of really existing essences (svabhāva) is comprised in the essenceless paratantra (paratantra-niḥsvabhāva), and the truth of tathatā is comprised in the essenceless pariniṣpanna (pariniṣpanna-niḥsvabhāva).⁶¹¹ Therefore holy wisdom has parikalpita-

⁶¹¹In regard to paratantra-niḥsvabhāva the Siddhi has: "Paratantrasvabhāva is essenceless in regard to origination (utpattiniḥsvabhāva), because, like a magician's trick, it arises from various causes. These [causes] do not, as falsely supposed, have any independent essence (svayaṃsvabhāva). We may therefore say that they do not exist, although they are not entirely without reality." (Wei Tat, p. 656; Poussin, p. 559).

In regard to pariniṣpanna-niḥsvabhāva the Siddhi has: "Pariniṣpannasvabhāva is paramārtha-niḥsvabhāva (essenceless ultimate truth). Paramārtha is conventionally said to be essenceless (niḥsvabhāva), because it is far removed from the clinging to self and to dharmas of that first parikalpitasvabhāva, but it is not without any essence at all nor is it entirely non-existent. Just as empty space, although it encompasses and pervades all form, is manifested by the absence of essence, so paramārtha is manifested by the emptiness and non-essence of self and dharmas." (Wei Tat, p. 656; Poussin, p. 559).

svabhāva as its object only in the sense that it knows it to be non-existent.

The term (324b) mastery (vaśita) means that, because mirror wisdom is the perfection of the practice of the six pāramitās, it is endowed with the ten masteries,⁶¹² and its wondrous functioning is without obstacle.

The phrase marked by inexhaustibility means that it exhausts the limits of samsāra, because without cessation or interruption it constantly continues. The word mark means that which is marked, or that which can mark, because it manifests the essence.

⁶¹²The Mahāyānasamgrahaśāstra has: "[Dharmakāya] has as its mark to be comprised of pure dharmas, because, by the fullness of the six pāramitās, it attains the ten masteries (vaśita). First, the mastery of long life (āyurvaśita), the mastery of thought (cittavaśita), and the mastery of provisions (pariṣkaravaśita) [are attained] in the fullness of danapāramitā. The mastery of action (karmavaśita) and the mastery of birth (upapattivaśita) [are attained] in the fullness of śīlapāramitā. The mastery of resolve (adhimuktivaśita) [is attained] in the fullness of kṣantipāramitā. The mastery of vows (prapīdhānavaśita) [is attained] in the fullness of virya-pāramitā. The mastery of spiritual powers (ṛddhivaśita), which consists in the five spiritual intuitions (abhi-jñā), [is attained] in the fullness of dhyānapāramitā. The mastery of wisdom (jñānavaśita) and the mastery of dharmas (dharmavaśita) [are attained] in the fullness of prajñāpāramitā." (Lamotte, La Somme, pp. 269-271, and T. 31, p. 149b). They also appear in the Daśabhumikasūtra, T. 10, p. 561a, and in the Mahāyānasūtralaṅkāra, Chapter VII, verse 4, and Chapter XVIII, verse 54.

Therefore this passage explains mirror wisdom of the five dharmas.

According to the second opinion, this passage manifests one aspect of the essence (svabhāva) [of dharmadhātu].⁶¹³ The four wisdoms, which are the result of enlightenment, are one aspect of the essence [mark] of the six marks. The dharma of conditioned merit is precisely mirror wisdom, which, because of its controlling power, con-verts ālaya consciousness away from being the support of heavy dross (daṣṭhulya) [of delifement] and con-verts it into pure paratantra-svabhāva, far removed from the discrimination of all thinking. Both the objects of its understanding and its ability to take those objects are universally equal (samatā-samatā) and ineffable, for the dependently co-arising dharmatā neither increases nor decreases. Its mode of activity (ākāra), which is internally realized, is able to manifest all dharma images, because it is able to illumine all objects non-discriminately. This is what the verse intends by the use of the term

⁶¹³ Śīlabhadra has: rnam-pa gcig tu na dños-po
śes-pa dan/ de dmigs-pa shes-bya-ba zlas-dbye-ba yin te,
"Alternately the words vastu jñāna and tadālamba are com-
pound nouns in apposition." (Buddhabhūmi vyākhyāna, p.
120). Thus since vastu jñāna is that object, which is
tathatā, the verse refers not to mirror wisdom itself,
but to the essence of dharmadhātu. This agrees with the
Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra prose: eṣaṃ svabhāvārthamārabhyaikāḥ
slokaḥ, "This verse refers to the meaning of the essence."

dharma wisdom.

That dharma of conditioned merit [of dharmadhātu] is [also] equality wisdom, which, because of its controlling power, con-verts manas consciousness away from clinging into pure paratantrasvabhāva, and takes as its object mirror wisdom, the other wisdoms, and pure dharmadhātu in universal equality. Because one internally realizes such a mode of activity, it is called wisdom, i.e., [the term dharmawisdom refers to mirror wisdom and equality wisdom].

The phrase that object (tad-ālamba) then refers to the other two wisdoms. Because of their controlling power, they con-vert the other six consciousnesses away from worldly discrimination into pure paratantrasvabhāva. Whether in transcendent [non-discriminative wisdom] or in [the subsequently attained wisdom], which is both worldly and transcendent,⁶¹⁴ the objects subsequently attained (prṣṭālabdhālamāna) are tathatā, dharma wisdom, etc., for paratantrasvabhāva is taken to be their objects. In a non-clinging discrimination these objects appear [in wisdom consciousness], and [that wisdom] by such discrimination internally [knows] what is realized and what realizes, [i.e., it is marked

⁶¹⁴ 或出世間或世出世. The Siddhi interprets 出世間 as nirvikalpa-jñāna, and 世出世 as wisdom that is both worldly and transcendental, i.e., prṣṭālabdhajñāna. (Wei Tat, p. 754; Poussin, p. 664).

by the image and insight aspects of wisdom].

As stated above, because these objects are tathatā and dharma wisdom, the verse says that object. [Thus the full verse is to be understood to mean: Because of dharma wisdom, which includes mirror wisdom and equality wisdom, and [those wisdoms] that have that object [in a non-clinging discriminative fashion, i.e., the wisdoms of intellectual mastery and duty fulfillment, [dharmadhātu] in its mastery is marked by inexhaustibility, for all these wisdoms are the essence of dharmadhātu.]

In this manner the wondrous activity of the four wisdoms is without obstacle, and therefore the verse says that it has mastery. Because their constant activity, which exhausts the limits of samsāra, does not cease, it is marked by inexhaustibility. Inasmuch as mirror wisdom and equality wisdom are constant and without interruption, they are called inexhaustible. Although the wisdoms of intellectual mastery and duty fulfillment are at times interrupted, yet because the occasions in which they temporarily come to awareness are limitless, they are also said to be inexhaustible. The term mark here refers to all the essence marks, which arise conditionally, i.e., they are pure para-tantra. They are said to be pure, because they are indefectible. Because the manifestation of such objects

consists in this activity that illumines objects, which is realized internally in pariniṣpannasvabhāva, it is called wisdom. And because these understandings of objects are able to manifest the essence [of dharma-dhātu], they are said to be its marks.

The sutra says: Because of the cultivation of the wisdom of tathatā in all respects, full perfection is realized.⁶¹⁵ (Verse 2a)

The commentary explains: According to the first opinion, this part of the [second] verse refers to equality wisdom. This means that, with the first (324b) insight at pramuditābhūmi, one attains non-discriminative, equality wisdom, and gains insight into the universal equality of tathatā. In the subsequent bhūmis [this insight] is progressively cultivated and becomes better and purer, until in buddhabhūmi one realizes full perfection (pariniṣpanna).

This ultimate purity is the realization of dharmadhātu, the realization that truth and its embodiment⁶¹⁶ are entirely equal.

⁶¹⁵The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra has: sarvatastathatā-jñānabhāvanā samudagamah. Śīlabhadra has: de-bshin-ñid-śes thams-cad nas bsqoms las yañ-dag grub-pa can.

⁶¹⁶理事. These terms have no consistent Sanskrit parallel. They here appear to mean the ultimate truth and its phenomenal embodiment, i.e., the two truths.

According to the second opinion, this verse refers to the causal mark of the six marks [of dharmadhātu].

This means that in the first pramuditābhūmi non-discriminative wisdom gains the first insight into dharmadhātu,⁶¹⁷ and in the path of insight (darśanamārga) the three consciousnesses [of ālaya, manas, and mano] sever the one hundred and twelve basic passions and their accompanying passions, which have to be severed by insight (darśana-mārga-prahātavya), and destroy part of the non-defiled ignorance (aklistā-avidyā) and the heavy elements (dausthulya) of discriminative dharma clinging (dharmagrāha). The seeds of wisdom, which reveal this first insight into dharmadhātu, increase from this point on in the bhūmis.

In the path of practice (bhāvanāmārga) non-discriminative wisdom gains insight into the other dharmadhātu-tathatās. In all other dharma practices, in hearing, considering, practicing, etc., in the wisdoms of intensified effort,⁶¹⁸ in upāya, it progressively cultivates [these seeds].

⁶¹⁷This is a reference to the ten tathatās of the Viññaptimātratāsiddhi. The first is sarvatraḡatathatā, i.e., universal tathatā, "which is revealed by the two emptinesses. There is not one single dharma which is not empty." (Wei Tat, p. 746; Poussin, p. 658).

⁶¹⁸加行智, prayoga-prajñā. See Poussin's note on prayoga-nirvikalpa-prajñā as adhiprajñam śikṣa, p. 633.

As appropriate at each stage, [this wisdom] gradually suppresses the sixteen passions⁶¹⁹ and their accompanying passions, which are to be severed by practice (bhāvanā-mārga-prahātavya), and, again as appropriate at each stage, gradually destroys the non-defiled ignorance [i.e., jñeya-avarāṇa], and the innate dharma clinging⁶²⁰ in all of their aspects.

The seeds of this wisdom, which manifest the other dharma-dhātus, because of this causal power, increase, until in buddhabhūmi, one realizes the full perfection of dharma-dhātu and the four wisdoms.

The sūtra says: It establishes the two for all sentient beings and brings about inexhaustible results in all respects.⁶²¹ (Verse 2b)

⁶¹⁹ 十六煩惱 . The Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi lists six basic passions: covetousness (raga), anger (pratiṣṭha), delusion (moha), conceit (māma), doubt (vicikitsā), and false views (kudṛṣṭi). Seven kinds of conceit (māma) are added, together with five kinds of false views (kudṛṣṭi), which in total give the sixteen passions mentioned above.

⁶²⁰ The Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi reads: "Passions of discriminative thought are to be abandoned by insight (darśanaheya), because they are coarse and easily abandoned. But innate passion [from innate seeds] is only abandoned by the practice of meditation (bhāvanāheya), because they are subtle and difficult to abandon." (Wei Tat, p. 430; Poussin, p. 359).

⁶²¹ The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra has: sarvasatvadva-yādhānasarvathā'kṣayata phalaṃ. Śīlabhadra has: sems-can kun kyi gn̄is bskyed-pa stan du ni-zad h̄bras-bu-can.

The commentary explains: This passage refers to the wisdom of intellectual mastery.

This means that the wisdom of intellectual mastery is able to enunciate the wondrous dharma teaching for sentient beings.

Because it establishes benefit and happiness for sentient beings, the verse says the two.

Because these two have many aspects, the verse says in all respects.⁶²²

And, because these two exhaust the limits of samsāra and are constantly active without ceasing, the verse says that they are inexhaustible, i.e., such is the result, because it is the result of wisdom. Thus this passage refers to the wisdom of intellectual mastery of the five dharmas.

According to the second opinion, this verse refers to the mark of the result of the six marks.

This means that pure dharmadhātu and the four wisdoms are all able to establish benefit and happiness for sentient beings. Because they cause them to cultivate the causes of goodness, they are said to bring about benefit. Because they

⁶²² Sthiramati reads: rnam-pa-kyan-du-ni dus-thams-cad du ham/ phan-pa dan bde-paḥi rnam-pa-thams-cad-kyis shes-bya-baḥi don te, "All kinds means at all times, or because of all kinds of benefit and happiness." (Sūtrālaṅkāra-vṛttibhāṣya, 150b-8).

cause them to attain the result of happiness, they are said to bring about happiness. Furthermore, because they cause them to avoid evil, they are said to bring about benefit. And because they cause them to support goodness, they are said to bring about happiness. Again, because they cause them to eradicate their suffering, they are said to bring about benefit. And because they cause them to elicit joy, they are said to bring about happiness.

Understand that this is the case in this world or in any other world, in this world or transcendent to this world. Because these two have many aspects, the verse says in all respects. Because such results will never come to an end, the verse says that they are inexhaustible. All the aspects of these two are then inexhaustible, because they arise from pure dharmadhātu and the four wisdoms.

The sūtra says: It has the activity of the very skillful upāya of the transformations of body, speech, and thought.⁶²³ (325a) (Verse 3a)

The commentary explains: According to the first

⁶²³The Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra has: kāyavākācitta-nirmāṇaprayogopāyakarmakāḥ. Śīlabhadra reads: sku dañ gsuñ dañ thugs sprul-pa sbyor-bahi thabs kyi hphrin-las-can.

opinion this verse refers to the wisdom of duty fulfillment.

This means that this wisdom is able to give rise to the transformations of body, speech, and thought. Because it is harmonious and appropriate, it is called skillful. Because the applications of its methods (prayoga) are ceaseless, it is called upāya. These then are what is meant by its activity. Or perhaps activity refers to this wisdom's skillful upāya, which is able to give rise to the three transformed activities of body, speech, and thought.

According to the second opinion, this verse refers to the mark of action of the six marks. This means that pure dharmadhātu and the four wondrous wisdoms are able to give rise to the three transformed activities of body, speech, and thought, and to their accompanying skillful upāya. The wisdom of duty fulfillment gives rise to the three kinds of activity of body, speech, and thought. The wisdom of intellectual mastery gives rise to skillful activity, because it examines what upāya would be most appropriate [in any given case]. The other two wisdoms and pure dharmadhātu give rise to the activity of

upāya, because they are spontaneously able to relate to all actions as upāya.

The transformation of the body (kāyanirmāṇā) has three kinds. The first is that associated with one's own body (svātmabhāvasambaddhanirmāṇā), which is the transformation of one's own body into that of a cakravartin, etc., or the manifestation of various forms (rūpa) from previous births. The second is that associated with the bodies of others (parātmabhāvasambaddhanirmāṇā), which means the transformation of Māra King into a Buddha body, etc., or the transformation of Śāriputra into the daughter of a god, etc., for in these wondrous bodies of others [Buddha] manifests various kinds of transformed appearances.⁶²⁴ The third is that not

⁶²⁴The Devadatta Chapter of the Saddharmapundarika recounts a story of a dragon girl who appeared before the Bodhisattva, Śāriputra: "At that time Śāriputra spoke to the dragon girl, and said: 'You say that in no time you shall attain the unexcelled way. This is hard to believe. What is the reason? A woman's body is filthy, it is not a Dharma-receptacle. How can you attain unexcelled bodhi? . . . Also, a woman's body . . . has five obstacles. It cannot become first a Brahmā god King, second the god Śakra, third King Māra, fourth a sage King turning the Wheel, fifth a Buddha-body. How can the body of a woman speedily attain Buddhahood? . . . At that time the assembled multitude all saw the dragon girl in the space of an instant turn into a man, perfect bodhisattva conduct, straightway go southward to the world realm Spotless, sit on a jeweled lotus seat, and attain undifferentiating, right, enlightened intuition . . .'" (Hurvitz, Scripture of the Lotus Blossom of the Fine Dharma, New York, (1976), pp. 200-201).

associated with a body (nihsambaddhanirmāṇa), which means the manifestation of the great earth as the seven jeweled [palace], etc., or the manifestation of immeasurable Buddha bodies, or the emitting of a light to illumine unlimited realms. All these are not connected with either one's own body or with the bodies of others. They manifest transforming activity in regard to the various kinds of sentient and non-sentient forms, such as shaking the earth, emitting light, raising up a fragrant wind, etc., because such are for the benefit and happiness of sentient beings. All these are termed the action of Buddha's nirmāṇakāya.

In a similar fashion the transformation of speech (vāgnirmāṇa) has three kinds. The first is associated with one's own body, for Buddha, by transforming his own body, manifests the Brahmā voice and universally addresses himself to unlimited world realms, etc., in various kinds of speech action. The second is that associated with the bodies of others, for he causes śrāvakas and his great sons, etc., to proclaim the deep Mahāyāna dharma teaching by means of the Buddha Brahmā voice. It is thus that śrāvakas and all bodhisattvas speak, for they were not previously capable of such deeply wondrous dharma teaching. This ability is brought about by the Tathāgata's transforming activity, and not by their own power.⁶²⁵ The

third is that which is not associated with any body. These are the transformations of various kinds of mountains, seas, grasses, trees, etc., and even empty space, which emit voice sounds and enunciate the great dharma teaching.⁶²⁶ All these are termed the action of the Buddha's transformation of speech.

The transformation of thought (cittanirmāṇa) has only two kinds. The first is that associated with one's own body, which is the transformation of various kinds of different images in the consciousness and the conscious states of one's own mind. The second is that associated with the bodies of others, which means that [Buddha] causes different images to appear in the consciousnesses and the conscious states of the minds of others. These are only images (nimittabhāga), but they appear as if they had arisen from the insight aspect (darśanabhāga) of the minds of those beings.

⁶²⁵ 皆是如來變化所作非彼自力 . Although the context is here nirmāṇakāya, these words do seem to reflect the later Pure Land thought of jiriki 自力 and tariki 他力, and are perhaps a Pure Land theme that predates Chinese formulations.

⁶²⁶ Poussin reports (Siddhi, p. 797) a passage from the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra: "Many people do not believe when they understand a dharma preached by a man. But they would believe the dharma, if an animal taught it. This is why bodhisattvas teach in the form of animals, as is seen in the Jātakas, for the hearers believe, because it is extraordinary, and because, in their judgment, animals are of a true mind and are not crafty. But certain others think that animals, although living, are liars and crafty. This is why Buddha

According to one interpretation, that which is called the transformation of one's own thought is that which, by the force of samādhi, leads to the understanding in one's own mind of dharma teaching beyond one's own ability [to understand]. That which is called the transformation of the thought of others is the exercise of such assisting action (adhiṣṭhāna) upon sentient beings that the ignorant understand the deep, subtle dharma teaching, and the forgetful attain correct recollection. (325b)

But [it can be objected, this is not so], thought cannot be transformed, because it has no material form (sapratigha-rūpa). As a Śāstra says: "Because thought has no form, it cannot be transformed." And again it is said: "Nirmāṇakāya is without consciousness and conscious states." [Thus the above doctrine is incorrect.]

But these texts refer to the samādhi power of Hīnayānists and fools (prtagjana), which is slight and incapable of manifesting dharmas without material form, [and thus they do not refute the above teaching]. The inconceivable

626cont. makes the trees speak, because all the world will believe the trees, which are devoid of thought, [and thus cannot deceive anyone.]"

samādhi of all Buddhas and bodhisattvas is entirely capable of transforming and manifesting [such dharmas without any material form]. Otherwise, how could the Tathāgata manifest desire, hatred, etc.? And how could śrāvakas and animals know the thought of the Tathāgata? How could this sūtra say that he transforms immeasurable kinds [of nirmāṇakāya], and causes them to have conscious thought? How could it say that he transforms the action of thought? How could one say that he has thoughts that depend upon another (paratantracitta)? All these transformed forms have the same action [upon the senses of sentient beings] as do real forms, but, inasmuch as these images appear in the mind by the transformation of the senses, they do not function the same as real forms. Furthermore, it was for the sake of lower kinds [of beings] that [Buddha] made those statements [in the texts cited above in objection to this teaching].

But, [the objection continues], if this is so, then why does he not transform the unconscious gods⁶²⁷ and cause images of thought to appear in

⁶²⁷ 非情, i.e., 非想有性, asamjñisattva, gods described as having consciousness interrupted for one lifetime.

their minds?

These unconscious beings already have the image aspect in the consciousness and conscious states, [although it is dormant]. Why would he again cause such images to arise in their minds and make them conscious? When such thought images do appear, then they are said to be sentient, and are not included among the unconscious. Thus the transformations of thought have only the two kinds as explained above.

The wisdom of intellectual mastery is able to examine and understand the lands of dhāraṇīs and samādhis. It is able to diagnose the basic natures and desires of sentient beings, and enunciate the medicine of the wondrous dharma teaching. Thus it is said to be skillful. The other three⁶²⁸ wisdoms and pure dharmadhātu, together with all their merits, are the basic support that is able to give rise to various benefits for sentient beings. Thus the verse speaks of the activity of upāya.⁶²⁹

⁶²⁸The text reads 餘二智, but this must be a mistake, for only the wisdom of intellectual mastery is mentioned.

⁶²⁹The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi teaches the same doctrine: "Although nirmanakāya and parasambhogakāya are not real consciousness or conscious states, nevertheless they manifest themselves as real consciousness and real

The sūtra says: It is fully endowed with the two limitless doors of samādhi and dhāraṇī.⁶³⁰ (Verse 3b)

The commentary explains: According to the first opinion, this verse refers to the accompanying merits, which are supported by the four wisdoms.

According to the second opinion, this verse refers to the mark of associated qualities of the six marks.

Samādhi refers to the eighty-four thousand samādhis, and dhāraṇī to the eighty-four thousand dhāraṇīs. As they both give rise to all conditioned merits, to all unconditioned merits, and both, by eliciting spiritual powers (ṛddhi), bring about benefit for sentient beings, they are called doors, [i.e., methods of entering]. These two are limitless because of the two adornments of merit and wisdom. They are unlimited, because their different varieties are all the

629cont. conscious states, because the inconceivable spiritual powers of the highest enlightened one are capable of transforming and manifesting dharmas without material forms. Otherwise, how could the Tathāgata manifest desire, hatred, etc., which he has long since severed? And how could śrāvakas and animals know the thought of the Tathāgata?" (Wei Tat, p. 798; Poussin, p. 710).

⁶³⁰The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra has: samādhidhāraṇī-dvāradvayāmeyasamanvitāḥ. Śīlabhadra has: tiñ-ñe-ḥḍsin dañ gzuñs kyi sgo dañ dpag-tu-med-pa gñis dañ ldan.

eighty-four thousand merits and wisdoms,
 or because they are perfected by the practice of
 meditation for immeasurable kalpas. The first
 five pāramitās are termed merit, while the
 last five are termed wisdom. Or, as appropriate
 to the essence of each, they are all accompanied
 and endowed with these two, [i.e., merit and
 wisdom]. Each of the four wisdoms is endowed with
 and constantly associated with these two doors
 [of samādhi and dhāraṇī], with these two adorn-
 ments.

Because they also have as their support pure dharma-
dhātu, since [samādhi and dhāraṇī] are not disassociated
 from pure dharmadhātu, the verse says that it is .
fully endowed. (325c)

The sutra says: It displays the differentiations of
essence, the experience of dharma, and transformation.⁶³¹
 (Verse 4a)

The commentary explains:

According to the first opinion this verse
 refers to the differentiations of the three
 bodies (trikāya), which is the completion of the
 five dharmas.

⁶³¹The Mahāvānasūtrāṃkāra has: svabhāvadharma-
sambhoganirmanairbhinnavṛttikaḥ. Śīlabhadra's text has:
rañ-bshin chos rdsogs-loṅs-spyod dañ sprul-pas tha-dad
hjug-pa-can.

According to the second opinion, it refers to the mark of differentiation of the six marks. Although pure dharmadhātu, which is the basic support for all Tathāgatas, is not differentiated, yet, because of the evolutions of the various different marks of the three bodies, the verse uses the term differentiations.

The term essence⁶³² means that the essence of the Tathāgata's first svabhāvikakāya is eternal and unchanging, and thus it is called the essence. Because it is the support for all merits, such as the powers of fearlessness, etc., it is also called dharmakāya.

The experience of the dharma means that the next sambhogakāya is able to experience various kinds of great dharma joy both for itself and for others.

Transformation means that nirmāṇakāya is able to manifest various kinds of transformations, because it desires to benefit and gladden sentient beings.

The term body (kāya) means essence, basis, the accumulation of multitudinous merit.⁶³³

⁶³²The text reads 自性法, but I think that 法 goes rather with the next 受用, for that commentary does treat the experience of dharma joy.

⁶³³Kāya comes from the root ci, to arrange in order, heap up, collect, gather, and thus an accumulation.

This is the general interpretation of the meaning of the three bodies.

Moreover, dharmakāya has as its mark tathatā that is the ultimate con-version.⁶³⁴ It is the basic support (āśraya) for the equality (samatā) of all buddhadharmas, and is able to give rise to all masterful activity, which is manifested in the increase of spotless dharmas.⁶³⁵ It is the essence of the equality (samatāsvabhāva) of all Tathāgatas. It is subtle, wondrous, and difficult to fathom.⁶³⁶ It destroys all discrimination and abolishes all mental fabrication (prapañca). Thus a sūtra says:

⁶³⁴ 法身者究竟轉依真如為相。Sīlabhadra de la ran-bshin-ba ni chos-kyi sku ste/ qnas yoñs-su-gyur-bahi mtshan-ñid. . . , "Essence here, as dharmakāya, is the mark of con-version." (Nishio, Buddhabhumivyakhyana, P. 125).

⁶³⁵ The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter IX, verse 4, has: sarvadharmasca buddhatvaṃ dharmo naiva ca kaścana/ śukladharmamayam tacca na ca taistannirupyate, "All dharmas are enlightenment, but not any particular dharma. It is comprised of spotless dharmas and is not indicated by [any impure dharma]."

⁶³⁶ The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter IX, verse 52, has: samāḥ suksmaśca tacchliṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ svabhāviko mataḥ, "The svabhāvikakāya (essence body) is equal (samatā), subtle, and self-abiding."

Vasubandhu, in the prose commentary, adds: svabhāvikāḥ sarvabuddhāṇāṃ samo nirviśistatayā/ suksmo durjñanatayā, "Because all Buddhas are not differentiated, they are subtle and difficult to know."

"The dharmakāya of all Buddhas is not associated with reflective thought (vitarka) and is not an object of reflection. It surpasses all reflective thought and mental fabrication."

Sambhogakāya has the fullness of all merit as its mark. It is the accumulated completion of all buddhadharmas. It is able to give rise to all masterful activity. It arises from the increase of all spotless dharmas. The essence of each Tathāgata is subtle, wondrous, and difficult to fathom. They dwell in pure lands, and their spontaneity is profound. They never come to an end and each experiences the joy of the dharma. They manifest various forms and enunciate various dharma teachings in order to cause the great bodhisattvas to also experience such dharma joy.

Nirmāṇakāya has the fullness of all spiritual transformations (rddhinirmāṇa) as its mark. It is the accumulated completion of all transforming activity. It manifests all masterful activity. It is brought forth from the increase of all spotless dharmas. Such transforming activity of each Tathāgata is subtle, wondrous, and difficult to fathom. They dwell in this world, manifest various forms, and enunciate various dharma

teachings. They mature the multitude of the lower bodhisattvas, Hīnayānists, and fools, and cause them to enter that great land, to transcend the triple world, and to be delivered from evil destinies [respectively].

This is the general interpretation of the activity that characterizes the three bodies.⁶³⁷

⁶³⁷ Bandhuprabha parallels the text of Śīlabhadra only in regard to dharmakāya. He then reworks that commentary on dharmakāya in order to explain the other two bodies. But this is seen as only the general explanation of trikāya, for the entire next chapter is added by Bandhuprabha as a lengthy analysis of trikāya.

PART THREE

CHAPTER THREE

Bandhuprabha on Trikāya

As stated above, the five dharmas support the three bodies.

According to one opinion, the first two [dharmas of pure dharmadhātu and mirror wisdom] support svabhāvikakāya. The next two [of equality wisdom and the wisdom of intellectual mastery] support sambhogakāya. And the wisdom of duty fulfillment supports nirmāṇakāya.

This is so, because a sūtra says that tathatā is dharmakāya, [and thus pure dharmadhātu supports dharmakāya, i.e., svabhāvikakāya]. And a śāstra says that by the con-version of ālaya consciousness one attains svabhāvikakāya,⁶³⁸ and mirror wisdom is that which, by con-verting ālaya, attains [this dharmakāya]. Therefore know that these two support svabhāvikakāya. (326a)

This sūtra says that the wisdom of duty fulfillment gives rise to all transforming activity. The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says that in all realms

⁶³⁸The Mahāyānasamgraha has: "By the con-version of ālaya consciousness, one attains dharmakāya." (Lamotte, La Somme, p. 282).

the wisdom of duty fulfillment gives rise to all the various kinds of immeasurable, inconceivable transformations.⁶³⁹ Therefore know that this last of the four wisdoms supports nirmāṇa-kāya.

Another śāstra says that equality wisdom is able to manifest various Buddha bodies, according to the predilections of the bodhisattvas in pure land.⁶⁴⁰ It is also said in the śāstra that the wisdom of intellectual mastery is able to manifest all masterful activity in the great assemblies, and to enunciate the dharma teaching without doubt.⁶⁴¹ Furthermore it is said that, because of the con-versions of the evolving consciousnesses (pravṛtti-vijñāna), one attains sambhoga-

⁶³⁹The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter IX, verse 74, has: krtyānuṣṭhānatā jñānam nirmanaiḥ sarvadhātuṣu/citrāprameyacinṭyaṣca sarvasatvārthakarakam, "The wisdom of duty fulfillment in all realms, by means of all kinds of immeasurable, inconceivable transformations, brings about benefit for all sentient beings."

⁶⁴⁰The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "[The wisdom of equality] manifests various parasambhogakāya and their lands, according to the predilections of all sentient beings." (Wei Tat, p. 768; Poussin, p. 683).

⁶⁴¹The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "In the great assemblies [the wisdom of intellectual mastery] is able to manifest unlimited activities, in all of which it attains mastery. It rains down the dharma rain and severs all doubt." (Wei Tat, p. 768; Poussin, p. 683).

kāya.⁶⁴² Therefore know that these middle two wisdoms support sambhogakāya.

Furthermore of all the ten meanings⁶⁴³ of the three bodies of Buddha, wisdom is the pre-eminent support. Therefore know that all the three bodies attain wisdom.⁶⁴⁴

According to a second opinion, it is only the first of the five dharmas, pure dharmadhātu, which supports svabhāvikakāya. The four wisdoms are all associated with that essence (svabhāva) and are manifested to bodhisattvas in the bhūmis. In one aspect their subtle marks support sambhogakāya. But, in being manifested to bodhisattvas who are not yet in the bhūmis, in another aspect, the activity of their crude marks supports nirmānakāya.

⁶⁴²The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "The śāstra says that sambhogakāya is attained by the con-version of the evolving consciousnesses." (Wei Tat, p. 794; Poussin, p. 707). The śāstra mentioned is the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, which, in discussing the differences between sambhogakāya and svabhāvikakāya, has: "They differ because the con-versions of the basis of the evolving consciousnesses and that of the ālaya consciousness are not the same." (Lamotte, La Somme, p. 331).

⁶⁴³These are ten meanings of Buddha, which will be discussed later on p. 877.

⁶⁴⁴This first opinion of the relationships between the five dharmas and the three bodies is also found in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. See Wei Tat, p. 794; Poussin, p. 706.

All the sūtras say that pure tathatā is dharmakāya. The Buddhastavaśāstra says that the Tathāgata's dharmakāya has no birth and no destruction. The Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra says that the basic nature of the Buddha's svabhāvika-kāya is eternal.⁶⁴⁵ The Vajracchedikaprajñā-pāramitāśāstra says that the merits upheld and discussed in the sūtras mean that dharmakāya has a cause that enables it to be realized, while the other two bodies have a cause that enables them to be produced.⁶⁴⁶ All the sūtras

⁶⁴⁵In discussing trikāya, the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra, chapter IX, verse 66, has: āśrayenāśayenāpi karmaṇa te samā matāḥ/ prakṛtyā'sraṃsanenāpi prabandhenaiṣu nityatā, "[The three bodies] are equal in their basic support, dispositions, and actions. In its basic nature, its state of resting, and in its continuity, they are eternal."

⁶⁴⁶This passage parallels the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: "There is [another] opinion that the first [of the five dharmas] supports svabhāvikakāya. It is said that the original nature of svabhāvikakāya is eternal. It is said that the Buddha's dharmakāya has no birth and no destruction. It is said that it has a cause for realization, but not a cause for production." (Wei Tat, p. 794; Poussin, p. 707). K'uei-chi comments: "The statement that svabhāvikakāya in its original nature is eternal is found in the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra, where all three are said to be eternal, and it is quoted in chapter seven of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa. The statement that the Buddha's dharmakāya has neither birth nor destruction is said in the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa and in the Buddhastavaśāstra. It is also found in chapter seventy-eight of the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra, and the Samdhinirmocanasūtra. Because, while dharmakāya has no birth or destruction, nirmāṇakāya does arise and is exhausted, Vasubandhu's Vajracchedikaprajñāpāramitāśāstra says that there is a cause for realization, but not for production."

and śāstras say that the ultimate con-version of the basis is dharmakāya. This con-version of the basis is precisely pure tathatā. Since this is not the path of discipline (pratipakṣā-mārga), know that dharmakāya has only pure dharmadhātu-tathatā as its nature.

And the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says mirror wisdom is sambhogakāya.⁶⁴⁷ The Mahāyānasamgraha says that the con-version of the evolving consciousnesses attains sambhogakāya, but the con-version of ālaya consciousness attains dharmakāya.⁶⁴⁸ This means that in the con-version from the seeds of the two obstacles in ālaya consciousness, one manifests and attains dharmakāya, which is the con-version to purity. This passage does not mention mirror wisdom, because it teaches that mirror wisdom is sambhoga, [i.e., the experience of dharma joy. Thus mirror wisdom does not support dharmakāya].

Furthermore there are two kinds of sambhoga-kāya. The first is svasambhogakāya (the body of personal experience), which is the completion

⁶⁴⁷ The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, chapter IX, verse 69, has: sambhogabuddhatañjñānapratibimbodayacca tat, " [Mirror wisdom] is the image of sambhogabuddha wisdom, from which it arises."

⁶⁴⁸ See note 642.

of the practice of three innumerable kalpas. The second is parasambhogakāya (the body for the experience of others), whereby all bodhisattvas experience dharma joy.

Therefore sambhogakāya includes all the characteristics commonly associated with the four wisdoms, [inasmuch as it is svasambhogakāya], and one aspect of transformations, [inasmuch as it is parasambhogakāya].⁶⁴⁹

All the sūtras and śāstras say that nirmāṇakāya manifests various images for sentient beings who have not yet entered the transforming bhūmis, i.e., its images are objects of understanding for these sentient beings. Therefore know that these images are not qualities (guṇa) of paramārtha, but only its transforming activity. The sūtras and śāstras say only that the wisdom of duty fulfillment is able to give rise to transforming action, and not that it is nirmāṇakāya.

⁶⁴⁹The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi has: "Svasambhogakāya is constituted by all those real qualities in the four wisdoms, and of the material body (rūpakāya) produced by mirror wisdom. The parasambhogakāya is the Buddha body that is produced by equality wisdom." (Wei Tat, p. 796; Poussin, p. 708). Thus neither of these wisdoms supports dharmakāya.

Although the three bodies are comprised in the pre-eminence of wisdom, yet dharmakāya is said to be wisdom only by convention, because it is the realization of the support of wisdom, and nirmāṇakāya is said to be wisdom only by convention, because it is the functioning of wisdom and (326b) because in its appearing it seems like wisdom. For these reasons there is no logical error in calling them wisdom.

[Sambhogakāya, being the experience of dharma joy, is wisdom], but both sambhogakāya and nirmāṇakāya are involved in birth and death, i.e., they are samsaric.⁶⁵⁰

⁶⁵⁰The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi has: "Some texts say that dharmakāya is included among eminent wisdoms, because dharmakāya is the support for those wisdoms and is their actual nature. Although svabhāvika-dharmakāya truly has unlimited qualities, yet because it is unconditioned (asamskrta), one cannot say that it has rūpa, citta, etc." (Wei Tat, p. 796; Poussin, p. 708). And again: "Although it is said that nirmāṇakāya is included among eminent wisdoms, it is only conventionally termed wisdom, because it arises like wisdom, or because it arises from wisdom. Its essence is not wisdom." (Wei Tat, p. 798; Poussin, p. 709).

The point of this discussion revolves around the question of whether the three bodies are supported by and comprised in wisdom, i.e., whether they are states of consciousness, or, whether, not being comprised in wisdom, they are the objective that structures the wisdom mind, and from which wisdom activities flow. The first opinion would make the three bodies dependent upon wisdom, for each of the four wisdoms support these bodies, especially mirror wisdom supports dharmakāya. The second opinion avoids this implication by holding that only dharmadhātu supports dharmakāya, while the four wisdoms

How then can the sūtras say that all the Buddha bodies are eternal?

They are eternal because of dharmakāya, which is the basic support for the other two. Although sambhogakāya and nirmānakāya are characterized by birth and death, yet they are said to be eternal, because [sambhogakāya] always experiences various dharma joys without ceasing, and [nirmānakāya] manifests numerous transformations in the ten realms without interruption. Thus they always experience joy and always take on human form.⁶⁵¹

The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra does say: "The three bodies are eternal, in their basic nature (prakṛtyā), in their state of non-resting (asramsana), and in their continuity (prabandha)."⁶⁵² But the term basic nature refers to svabhāvikakāya, because the basic nature of this body is eternal.

⁶⁵⁰cont. are directed to different kinds of sentient beings, and therefore are differentiated into sambhogakāya and nirmānakāya. But the danger of this opinion is to understand dharmakāya as some kind of an extra-mental ultimate truth, which would violate the principle of consciousness only. This is avoided by describing it as the support of wisdom, as the objective that structures the wisdom mind.

⁶⁵¹ 施食, pinda-pāta, i.e., alms food thrown into the bowl of a monk. Thus nirmānakāya takes on the human form of a monk, etc.

⁶⁵² See note 645.

The term state of non-resting refers to sambhoga-kāya, because it always experiences the dharma joy without interruption. The term continuity refers to nirmāṇakāya, because, even in passing away, it manifests an inexhaustibility of transformations. Therefore, because dharmakāya is free from all discrimination and mental fabrication and has no birth or death, it is said to be eternal. Although the other two bodies from moment to moment do have birth and destruction, yet, because they depend on that eternal body without interruption and constantly continue, they are also said to be eternal. As a sūtra says: "The dharmas of form, sensation, etc. of the Tathāgata are all eternally abiding." From this doctrinal principle (mārga-naya), [the Tathāgata's form bodies] have no birth or destruction, because they arise from the cultivation of uncontaminated seeds. But we have the absolute declaration⁶⁵³ that that which is born

⁶⁵³ — 向記, ekāṃśavyākaraṇa, absolute declaration, one of the four declarations (vyākaraṇa) of the Abhidharmakośa. (Poussin, Kośa, V, p. 44).

is destined for destruction, because all form and mind (rūpa-citta) are seen to be impermanent, and an eternally abiding form or mind has never yet been seen.⁶⁵⁴

Thus are the three bodies. But what are the dimensions [of these bodies]?

Dharmadhātu has tathatā as its essence, and tathatā is the real nature of all dharmas. Since dharmas have no limit, so dharmakāya, [which is supported by dharmadhātu], is limitless. It pervades all dharmas and there is no place in which it is not present. It is like empty space. One cannot say that its dimensions are large or small. However, from the marks [that we perceive] we say that it pervades all places.⁶⁵⁵

⁶⁵⁴The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi has: "As for dharmadhātu-parisuddhi, it is free from birth and destruction, and its nature is unchanging. Hence it is said to be eternal. As for the four wisdoms, because the basic support of their consciousness and conscious states is eternal, and because they are not interrupted or exhausted, they also are said to be eternal. But they are not eternal in themselves, because they are born from causes. For we have the absolute declaration (ekāṃśavyākaraṇa) that that which is born must eventually be destroyed. There is no rūpa, no citta, which is not impermanent. But, given the force of the original vow to convert all sentient beings, who are inexhaustible in number, the four wisdoms will never come to an end (窮未來際), will not be interrupted, and will not be exhausted." (Wei Tat, p. 790; Poussin, p. 701).

⁶⁵⁵Punctuate after 小. The sentence 就相而言遍.

Sambhogakāya both has form and does not have form. All dharmas that do not have form do not have any dimensions and cannot be said to be either large or small. Just as the body (i.e., dharmakāya) on which it depends and which is its object of understanding [pervades everywhere], so it may be said to pervade everywhere.

There are two kinds of form: real form and transformed form. Real form indicates those actions of the major and minor marks of the rūpakāya produced by the practice of three incalculable kalpas [i.e., the material body of an historical Buddha]. By the con-version of the five sense organs a contaminated rūpakāya attains the form (rūpa) of the Buddha's uncontaminated five sense organs, adorned with immeasurable major and minor marks. Such a body

655cont. 然隨事其量無邊：一切處 parallels the Siddhi's phenomenal marks, its dimensions are limitless." The entire passage reads: "Svabhāvikakāya has the dharmatā as its land. . . Both this Buddha body and its land are not included in form (rūpa), and, although we cannot say that their dimensions are small or large, yet, according to their phenomenal marks, those dimensions are limitless, and, just like empty space, pervade all places." (Wei Tat, p. 888; Poussin, pp. 711-712).

encompasses dharmadhātu and is called the true pure land. But in samsāra, its actions do have limitations. The dimensions of this body, which is a transformation of the ālaya consciousness, are not determined as to size. Rather they are similar to that of the realm [in which they are active]. Because the good actions of men in Jambudvīpa are very slight, the rūpakāya attained there would be at most six feet and four inches.⁶⁵⁶ Good actions in Pūrvavidha are more eminent, and a body there would be twelve feet and eight inches. In this manner, as the good actions progressively increase, the dimensions of the bodies thereby attained become progressively larger, until in the final heaven of rūpadhātu, (326c) because the actions which produce these forms there are most pre-eminent, the body there attained is sixteen thousand yojanas.⁶⁵⁷ Because of the accumulated permeation (vāsanā) of

⁶⁵⁶ 四肘。肘 is hastaka, a measure given as 一尺六寸 by Nakamura in his dictionary, which is one measure of 12" plus 7.2", which equals 19.2". Four of these amounts to 76.8" or six feet four, an appropriate size for a prestigious person.

⁶⁵⁷ 瑜膳那, yojana, which is variously given as from four to nine miles. Thus, the size of such a Buddha rūpakāya is more than 64,000 miles. It is due to such large sizes and weights that some texts say that the Buddha, when he descends, must sit on a diamond throne, since ordinary earth would not support him.

pure good roots during the bodhisattva stages of the ten bhūmis, the dimensions of these bodies become so large. As a sūtra explains: "At the realization of vajropamasamādhī, because all obstacles are destroyed and the measure of the power of good roots is infinite, the body thus attained completely fills dharmadhātu, and pervades the true pure land." This is because the transformed body and land of the pure consciousness associated with mirror wisdom are unlimited. The consciousnesses of all Buddhas transform [these bodies and lands] at the same place and the same time, and the similarity of their marks is not mutually incompatible. They will never come to an end, be interrupted, or severed. Thus they are able to cause all Buddhas to experience broad delight, and are therefore called sambhogakāya and sambhogabhūmi. Such bodies and lands are known only by Buddhas, and are not realized by the five sense organs of any bodhisattva. But the material organs of each [Buddha] are able to realize all objects of sensation,⁶⁵⁸ because they are without obstacle.

⁶⁵⁸ See the discussion of the Buddha's sense organs on pp. 433-437, where sense organs are attributed to Buddha only by saṃvṛtisatya.

These excellent marks of all Buddhas, which are beyond the sight [of sentient beings], their unlimited dharma voices, and the activities of all their sense organs are so unlimited, because they are universally perfect.⁶⁵⁹

⁶⁵⁹The Vi jñaptimātrātasiddhi has: "Svasambhogakāya returns and supports itself on its own land. The pure consciousness associated with mirror wisdom transforms itself into a pure Buddha land, perfect, without end, adorned with jewels. Such transformation is the result of the maturation of causes which produce a pure Buddha land, which causes have been previously cultivated for one's own benefit. This transformation begins at the moment when the bodhisattva becomes a Buddha, and will never come to an end. . . . Similar to the dimensions of the land are the dimensions of the body. Each of the thirty-two major marks (lakṣaṇa) and the eighty minor marks (anuvyañjana) of this Buddha body is infinite, for they arise from unlimited good roots. These qualities (guṇa) and wisdoms are not dharmas of form (功德智慧既非色法). Although one cannot say that the dimensions [of such a meritorious, wisdom body] are either large or small, yet because it depends on that which it realizes and that body which is its support (而依所證及所依身), [i.e., dharmakāya], one can say that it pervades everywhere." (Wei Tat, pp. 802-804; Poussin, pp. 712-713).

In discussing multiple Buddha bodies, the Vi jñaptimātrātasiddhiśāstra again has: "What happens when the conversion of one single being depends upon several Buddhas? In the same place and at the same time, each of these Buddhas transforms a body and a land, and the similarity of their forms are not mutually incompatible." (Wei Tat, p. 802; Poussin, p. 714).

Thus, while the Vi jñaptimātrātasiddhiśāstra says that one cannot attribute dimensions to svasambhogakāya, because its merits and wisdoms are not rupa, the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa holds that that sambhogakāya, which is characterized by real form, has dimensions, although they are not determined, but rather depend upon the nature and size of the sentient beings among whom such a body is active. Thus, inasmuch as sambhogakāya has real form, it is svasambhogakāya, the actual body in which a bodhisattva attains enlightenment for himself.

Transformed form, because of the power of the compassionate vow, manifests various kinds of bodies and various kinds of major and minor marks in order to lead the multitude of bodhisattvas to enter that great land. Various kinds here means that their voice depends upon the kind of land, and their dimensions are not determined.⁶⁶⁰

Nirmānakāya, also by the power of the compassionate vow, manifests transformed bodies in order to transform all sentient beings who have not entered the bhūmis. It both has form and does not have form. It does not have form, for it is the action that transforms thought (mano-nirmāṇa), [and thought has no form]. And, because the marks of all such merits as the powers, the fearlessnesses, etc., [being transformed thought], have no material form, and thus no dimensions. It has form, for it is the action that transforms

⁶⁶⁰The Viññaptimātratāsiddhi has: "Parasambhogakāya also rests upon its own land. By the power of compassion and mercy, . . . equality wisdom transforms itself into a pure land, either small or large, either inferior or superior, subject to change and modification . . . The dimensions of this body, like those of the land on which it rests, are undetermined." (Wei Tat, p. 802; Poussin, p. 713). Thus, inasmuch as sambhogakāya has transformed form, it is parasambhogakāya, the body in which a bodhisattva appears to assist other bodhisattvas.

speech (vāgnirmāna) as appropriate for the time, place, and multitude [of sentient beings to be converted, for speech has form]. As the sūtras explain, such a manifestation body is not determined in its dimensions.⁶⁶¹

Thus are the three bodies. But do all the Tathāgatas have such differentiations or not?

Because the true nature of dharmakāya is common to all Tathāgatas, they do not have differentiation. But, because the causes that render them experientially present⁶⁶² do have differentiations, we conventionally say that they do have differentiations.⁶⁶³

⁶⁶¹The Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "Nirmāṇakāya: . . . By the power of compassion and mercy . . . in conformity with the needs of those sentient beings who have not yet entered the bhūmis, the wisdom of duty fulfillment transforms itself into a Buddha land, either pure or impure, either small or great, subject to change and modification. . . Its dimensions, like those of the land, are not determined." (Wei Tat, p. 802; Poussin, p. 713).

⁶⁶²能證因, jñāpaka-hetu, a cause that leads to realization or awareness. Used in distinction from 能生因, janaka-hetu, a cause that gives birth to something. Thus the differentiations of Buddha bodies depend upon the changing awareness of sentient beings, for in itself Buddhakāya is not differentiated.

⁶⁶³The Vi jñaptimātratāsiddhi has: "Because svabhāvikakāya and its land are realized in an identical manner by all Tathāgatas, its essence has no differentiations." (Wei Tat, p. 802; Poussin, p. 713).

The other two bodies each are influenced by different causes, and their different essences do have differentiations. However, they do not cling to such distinctions, and, because of their similarity in the same place and the equality of their action in benefiting and gladdening, we say that they have no differentiations. Thus it is said that all Tathāgatas in their three bodies have no differentiations, because in the actions of their basic intentions (āśaya) the dharmadhātu, on which they depend, has no differentiations, because their intentions of benefiting and gladdening have no differentiations, and because all their phenomenal actions have no differentiations.

Thus are the three bodies. But do they have conditioned and distinct merits or not?

The Tathāgata's pure dharmadhātu has the con-version of the basis to tathatā (tathatā-āśrayaparivṛtti) as its mark, and is the ultimately true, good, original purity (paramārthakuśala-prakṛti-suviśuddha), because it is far removed from all defiled dharmas, because it is the basic support for all merit, because it is the true nature of all merit. (327a) Therefore

it is said to be endowed with all merits, but it does not have any differentiated merits of [the conditioned, distinct] form-mind.

The Buddha's sambhogakāya is endowed with the true merits of the dharmas of all form-mind, etc., and manifests these transformed merits for the sake of others.

The Buddha's nirmāṇakāya is endowed only with the transformed merits, whereby it manifests form-mind, etc.

Therefore each of the three bodies is said to have merits surpassing in number the sands of the River Ganges.

Are all the beings to be converted common to all Tathāgatas or not?⁶⁶⁴

According to one opinion, they are so common, because each and every Buddha is able to convert and save all sentient beings. They are all equal in merit and wisdom. For three incalculable kalpas they have all cultivated the course of resolution. (pranidhānavaryā). They have all in the same manner sought bodhi in order to save all beings. Thus it is said that the beings converted by one Buddha are [converted] by all Buddhas.

⁶⁶⁶Translated by Poussin, "Les Neuf Kalpas qu'a Franchis Śākyamuni pour devancer Maitreya," TP, XXVI, pp. 20-25.

According to another opinion, they are not common [to all Buddhas], because there is a basic relationship between a Buddha and all those beings he is to convert. Thus at the time of the Buddha Tiṣya, the Tathāgata [Śākyamuni] and Maitreya were both his disciples. That Buddha [Tiṣya] saw that the good roots of the sentient beings to be converted by Śākyamuni would come to maturation before the good roots of those sentient beings to be converted by Maitreya. He also saw that the preparatory course (hetucarya) of Maitreya [toward enlightenment] would be completed before Śākyamuni. And so he entered into teyodhātusamādhi⁶⁶⁵ and caused Śākyamuni to witness it. [Śākyamuni] for seven days and seven nights stood on one foot⁶⁶⁶ and praised that Buddha in one verse, and thus was led to surpass Maitreya and become Buddha before him.⁶⁶⁷

⁶⁶⁵ 火光定, teyodhātu-samādhi, a samādhi in which impurities are burned up and one becomes pure.

⁶⁶⁶ That is, a sign of his total absorption.

⁶⁶⁷ In his article, "Les Neuf Kalpas," Poussin reports two earlier versions of this story. The first is from the Avadānaśataka, 97 (II, p. 176), and the second is from the Vibhāṣaśāstra (T. 27, p. 890b-c). The latter reads: "The sūtra says: There once was a Buddha named Tiṣya or Puṣya. That Buddha had as his disciples two bodhisattvas. The first was named Śākyamuni and the second Maitreya. Upon being asked which of his two disciples would mature [to enlightenment] first, that

667cont. Buddha saw that Maitreya would mature before Śākyamuni. Then, upon being asked in what order the beings to be converted by these two would mature, he saw that those to be converted by Śākyamuni would mature first. Then he thought: How can I bring it about that those to be converted and their converters meet one another? In truth, it is easier to mature one man than many men. That Buddha then took up his mat, and, walking along the road, arrived at the top of the mountain. He entered a stone cave, spread his mat, sat down with his legs crossed, and entered the fire samādhi, and for seven days and nights he enjoyed the most sublime delight.

Then Śākyamuni betook himself immediately to the mountain. He sought that Buddha from place to place, just as a calf would seek its mother. Finally he arrived in front of that cave. . . [He perceived the Buddha in glory, and rapt in joy and admiration, taken aback in the middle of his step, he remained standing there for seven days on one foot, praising that Buddha with one verse. . .]

When he had finally come to the end of that praise, he had passed through nine kalpas and attained supreme bodhi before Maitreya.

But, bodhisattvas, upon drawing near to buddhabhūmi, acquire an excellent mastery in words, phrases, and discourse, which they had not previously attained. Why then did Śākyamuni use only one verse to praise that Buddha? Because of Śākyamuni's excellence of resolution and thought, he did not change his verse. If he would have changed it, his resolution would have lost its lucidity (prasāda). Moreover, Śākyamuni feared distractions, and a diversity of verses would have brought a diversity of thoughts, and how then could he have the efflux of but one thought? Also, in using but one verse, Śākyamuni manifested the absence of fatigue (parikheda) in this thought, for he is capable of producing in perpetual renewal an excellent resolution in regard to but one thought.

But why would the good roots of the Bodhisattva Maitreya have matured before [those of Śākyamuni]? And why was it the opposite case in regard to those who were to be converted by them?

Because the Bodhisattva Maitreya well cultivated his own benefit (svahita) and but little that of others. The opposite was the case with Śākyamuni."

Furthermore, when Buddha was about to enter nirvāṇa, he said these words: "All those who were to be saved by me have already been saved."

Also another sūtra says: "The Buddha, at the time of his nirvāṇa, saw that one who was to be converted by him was actually to be found in the realm of no thought and no non-thought,⁶⁶⁸ and that must be reborn in this world to be converted by him. He then established a nirmāṇakāya, which in a hidden manner continued to dwell in this realm, and with the body he first received [from his mother], Buddha appeared to enter nirvāṇa. That being died in the realm of no thought, and no non-thought, and came to be reborn in this world. That nirmāṇakāya, which had been established by Buddha, taught him the wondrous dharma teaching and he became an arhat. Then that nirmāṇakāya disappeared and was not seen again.

Furthermore all the sūtras in many passages say that there is a determined relationship between the one who converts and those whom he converts. Therefore those to be converted are not

⁶⁶⁸ 非想非非想處, naivasamjñānāsamjñādhātu, the highest realm of arupadhātu, which is an inopportune (akṣaṇa) birth, because there one cannot hear the dharma teaching.

common to all Buddhas.

The third, correct opinion is that they are both common to all Buddhas and are not common to them. In the original nature of the lineages (anādikālikagoṭradharmatā) [of sentient beings] there is a relationship whereby either many [sentient beings] are related to one [Buddha], or one [sentient being] is related to many [Buddhas]. During their preparatory course the bodhisattvas, whether in common or not in common, did not mature sentient beings in the one same fixed manner, and thus, upon becoming Buddhas, they either convert in common or they convert separately. If all the beings to be converted were common to all Buddhas, then why would there be many Buddhas? One Buddha [alone] would be able to convert all beings. And, since there would be but one Buddha dwelling constantly in the world and by his teaching converting sentient beings, then the other Buddhas would all have entered quietude [i.e., nirvāṇa]. And even that one Buddha would not convert all beings and lead them to enter Mahāyāna, because that would be useless.⁶⁶⁹

⁶⁶⁹ Mahāyāna is the path to become a Buddha, but as no other Buddhas are needed, it becomes superfluous.

Rather he would convert beings and lead them to enter other Vehicles⁶⁷⁰ and enter eternal quietude, because that would be easier. (327b) What sensible person would reject what was easy and hold onto what was difficult? Who would light a lamp to assist the sun? Therefore the beings to be converted are not all common [to all Buddhas].

But, on the other hand, if the beings to be converted were never common [to many Buddhas], then bodhisattvas would not elicit their broad vows, nor successively attend upon all Buddhas. They would not cultivate the Mahāyāna, and Sudāna and others would not serve as good spiritual friends,⁶⁷¹ and Buddhas would not entrust those they had converted to later Buddhas. And this contradicts the opinion that those to be converted are never common to all Buddhas, and thus it is not the case that those beings are never common [to all Buddhas].

Therefore, although each and every Buddha

⁶⁷⁰The text reads 三乘, but this must be an error for 二乘. Poussin, "Les Neuf," sidesteps the difficulty by translating: ". . . entrer dans les Véhicules."

⁶⁷¹Sudāna is the young man of the Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra, who, upon Mañjuśrī's instructions, seeks bodhi through encountering many spiritual friends.

has the ability to convert all sentient beings, nevertheless, sentient beings are not disposed to be converted by all Buddhas, with whom they have no relationship,⁶⁷² since they have never seen or heard [those Buddhas].

However, although each and every Buddha never comes to an end, and always abides in the world, teaching and converting immeasurable kinds of sentient beings, yet they manifest various kinds of transformations as appropriate, whether they manifest bodhi or nirvāṇa, whether they be called Śākyamuni or Maitreya, or anything else. The sentient beings to be saved by means of such transformations say that all Buddhas save them.

The above case of the being who, after being born in the realm of no thought and no non-thought, finally attained salvation by seeing the transformed marks of Śākyamuni is not incompatible [with the principle that transformations are shared by all Buddhas], since Śākyamuni himself established that

⁶⁷² 無緣佛, anārabhyabuddha. Arabhya means connection or relationship.

transformation [body] to remain after him.

But if one being is converted by all Tathāgatas [who bring about the transformation body for his sake], then which Buddha is it who comes before him and converts him? All Buddhas have the power of their compassionate vows, and it is impossible that just one would convert him, while all the others remain inactive. Each Buddha with which he has a relationship manifests a nirmāṇakāya at the same place and at the same time by means of their subsequently attained wisdom (prsthālabdhajñāna). And since the qualities [of these bodies] are similar to one another, they are not mutually opposed. Therefore [these Buddhas] in unison are the dominant, enabling cause that leads the consciousness of the being to be converted to be so transformed that he would witness one Buddha manifesting his spiritual powers or teaching the true dharma. These things are inconceivable and cannot be understood by those who deny the principle of consciousness only.

Moreover, svabhāvikakāya is quiescent and peaceful, for it is the support of merits that directly relate to self-benefit. But, inasmuch

as it is the dominant, enabling cause that benefits the multitude of beings, it is also related to benefiting others. Thus, inasmuch as it is the support for both the benefit and merit of the other two bodies, it is included in the benefiting of these two bodies.

Sambhogakāya has two aspects. The first is the aspect of one's own personal experience of dharma joy, and is the actual rūpakāya realized in the completion of self-benefiting practices and which leads to one's own experience of wondrous joy. The second is the aspect of others' experience of dharma joy, which refers to the transformed rūpakāyas realized by the full perfection of the practices of benefiting others, that has been cultivated for three incalculable kalpas in order that the great multitude of bodhisattvas might enter that great land. It manifests various forms and teaches various dharmas to cause all bodhisattvas to experience great dharma joy. Because of these two aspects, we would not be mistaken to say that this sambhogakāya consists only in self-benefit, or to say that it consists only in benefiting others, or to say that it consists in both.

Nirmānakāya consists in benefiting others, because it manifests all the transformed marks in order to benefit others.

Thus the three bodies have four aspects, which can be expressed in four phrases. The first is experience and not transformation (sambhoga-anirmana), which is the true sambhogakāya of the aspect of self-benefit (svasambhogakāya). (327c) The second is transformation and not experience (nirmāṇa-asambhoga), which are the nirmānakāya [created] for the sake of those not yet in the bhūmis. Whether gross or subtle, whether productive of joy or alarm, their variations are not determined. It is termed transformation and not experience, because these bodies do not necessarily lead to the experience of dharma joy. The third is both transformation and experience (nirmāṇa-sambhoga), which are the various transformation bodies manifested for bodhisattvas in the bhūmis. [They are termed experience], because they do cause all those bodhisattvas to experience dharma joy. It is modified according to circumstances and is not determined. The fourth is neither experience nor transformation (asambhoga-anirmāṇa). This is svabhāvikakāya.

In other texts it says that Buddha has two kinds of bodies. The first is the birth body (janakakāya) and the second is the dharmakāya. Here dharmakāya includes both svabhāvikakāya and the true sambhogakāya, [i.e., svasambhogakāya], because the first is the basic support for all meritorious dharmas, and the second is the accumulated perfection of all meritorious dharmas. Janakakāya here includes both nirmānakāya and parasambhogakāya, because they both manifest birth respectively to sentient beings and to bodhisattvas as is appropriate.

Furthermore another sūtra says that there are ten kinds of Buddhas: 1) Buddhas of full wisdom (abhisambodhibuddha), 2) Buddhas of earnest vow (pranidhānabuddha), 3) Buddhas who in their actions have variously matured (karmavipākabuddha), 4) Buddhas of masterful powers (adhiṣṭhānabuddha), 5) Buddhas of transformation (nirmāṇabuddha), 6) Buddhas of the dharma realm (dharmadhātubuddha), 7) Buddhas of mind (cittabuddha), 8) Buddhas of samādhi (samādhibuddha), 9) Buddhas of the essence (svabhāvabuddha), and 10) Buddhas of masterful activity.⁶⁷³

⁶⁷³ 隨樂, bsam-pa ji-lta-bshin. But in the parallel text of the Avataṃsakasūtra we find 如章佛, i.e., Buddhas, who, as they desire, have masterful rdhhi powers.

The first five of these are saṃvṛti, while the last five are paramārtha. They are included, as appropriate, in the three bodies, and in this manner you should understand their varieties and characteristics.⁶⁷⁴

The sūtra says: This pure dharmadhātu is enunciated by all Buddhas.⁶⁷⁵ (Verse 4b)

The commentary explains: This pure dharmadhātu of all Tathāgatas is enunciated in the same fashion by all Buddhas. That fully perfected Buddha land is differentiated in the five kinds of meritorious qualities, [i.e., the five dharmas], and the three bodies. Or, [according to the second opinion on the verses], it is differentiated in the six marks of essence, cause, result, action, associated qualities, and arising. Therefore these four verses summarize all the merits of Buddha land (buddhabhūmi). As explained above, this is the overall theme enunciated in this sacred teaching.

⁶⁷⁴These Buddhas are also treated in the Avatamsakasūtra. For the text of the sixty chüan version of Buddhabhadra, see T. 9, p. 634c. In the eighty chüan version of Sikṣānanda, see T. 10, p. 292a.

⁶⁷⁵The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra has: dharmadhātur-
viśuddho'yaṃ buddhanam samudāhṛtaḥ. Śīlabhārda's text has: saṅs-rgyas rnams kyi chos-kyi-dbyiṅs/ rnam-dag
bdi ni yaṅ-dag brjod.

The sūtra says: At that time the Bhagavan finished teaching this sūtra, and the entire assembly of the wondrously born bodhisattvas, mahāsattvas, all the mahāśrāvakas, the gods, men, and asuras in this world all heard this teaching of the Buddha, and all of them elicited great joy, received it in faith, and upheld it in practice.

The commentary explains: This passage explains that, upon hearing this dharma teaching, that multitudinous assembly relied upon its doctrine and received it in faith. Drawn on by the compassionate vow of the Buddha's pure consciousness, and transformed by the dominant power of this sūtra, the good roots of their minds then matured and appeared, as described above in the text. This means that, upon hearing this Buddha teaching, they all elicited joy, received it in faith, and upheld it in practice. All those śrāvakas, etc., whether they were transformations [of Buddha or of bodhisattvas] or were actually śrāvakas,⁶⁷⁶

⁶⁷⁶On p. 422, in the discussion of the realm in which this sūtra was preached by Buddha, the second opinion that that realm was sambhogabhūmi and the Buddha sambhogakāya offered the theory that the śrāvakas there present were not actually real śrāvakas at all, but rather transformations of Buddha or of bodhisattvas.

heard this dharma teaching,⁶⁷⁷ while each remained in his own place either in sambhogabhūmi or in nirmāṇabhūmi. Although what that assembly of disciples heard was the same, what they saw was different. There is no incompatibility in this. Those above did see those below, but those below did not see those above. [In this manner] each one realized benefit and happiness.⁶⁷⁸ (328a)

The Concluding Verses of the Commentary

I have now, according to my ability explained all the deep words and meanings of this Buddhabhumisūtra.

May the merits [thus attained] spread among all kinds of beings, and may they all quickly realize that unexcelled result.

May all the merits that arise from the writing of this commentary afterwards issue in excellent results.

And may they continue without end to benefit and gladden all sentient beings.⁶⁷⁹

⁶⁷⁷ Delete punctuation after 處, and place it after 法.

⁶⁷⁸ The correct opinion (pp. 424-425) explained that the body and realm of this sūtra is both sambhoga and nirmāṇa.

⁶⁷⁹ 含識, those who have 含 consciousness, i.e., sentient beings.

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- AO Acta Orientalia
- BEFEO Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient
- BG Bukkyōgaku (仏教学)
- BMFJ Bulletin de la Maison Franco-japonaise
- C Continuum
- EB Eastern Buddhist
- G Gregorianum
- IBK Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū (印度学仏教学研究)
- JA Journal Asiatique
- JPTS Journal of the Pali Text Society
- JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
- KDBK Komazawa daigaku bukkyōgakubu kenkyūkiyō (駒沢大学仏教学部研究紀要)
- M Muséon
- MCB Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques
- NB Nanto bukkyō (南都仏教)
- NBGN Nihon bukkyō gakubu nenpō (日本仏教学部年報)
- PTS Pali Text Society
- RA Revue Asiatique
- T Taishō shinshū daizōkyō (大正新脩大藏經)
- TP T'oung Pao

WZKSO Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd und
Ostasiens

ZII Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik

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